The 2021 Commodity Price Surge: Causes and Impacts on Trade Flows
This special topic chapter examines the significant rise in commodity prices in 2021, the impact the higher prices had on U.S. trade in 2020–21, and the factors that drove such increases. It begins with a brief synopsis of commodity price trends across key sectors (energy, agriculture, and minerals and metals) and relates the commodity price trends to changes in trade flows, demonstrating that higher commodity prices have contributed to significant increases in the value of U.S. trade. Three case studies follow, which examine the impact of price increases on the markets and trade flows for selected commodities that are critical to the U.S. and global economy—natural gas, corn, and aluminum.
Impact of Commodity Prices on U.S. Trade
Rising commodity prices in 2021 drove up trade values for commodity-heavy sectors and contributed significantly to the overall annual increases in total U.S. trade. The tables below show the value of U.S. trade for four sectors comprised largely of commodities (agricultural products, energy products, forest products, and minerals and metals) and for those sectors that generally do not contain commodities. In 2021, the value of U.S. trade for the commodity-driven sectors increased at a substantially faster rate than all other sectors and their share of total U.S. trade increased as well. In 2021, the value of U.S. imports for sectors associated with commodities increased by 36.8 percent compared to 16.6 percent for non-commodity sectors (table ST.1). Similarly, U.S. exports for sectors containing commodities increased by 35.1 percent in 2021 compared to 17.1 percent for non-commodity sectors (table ST.2). The increase in the value of exports for commodity sectors (up $166.7 billion) exceeded the growth in U.S. exports (up $162.3 billion) for all other sectors. The growth in the total value and share of U.S. trade that commodity sectors accounted for in 2021 was largely due to price increases. Tables ST. 3 and ST.4 illustrate the increase in average unit values of many of the highly traded components of commodity sectors in 2021.
Table ST.1: U.S. general imports, by sector, 2020–21
In millions of dollars and percentages.
Sectors |
General imports in 2020 (million $) |
General imports in 2021 (million $) |
Change in general imports from 2020 to 2021 (million $) |
Change in general imports from 2020 to 2021 (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Agricultural products |
163,343 |
193,771 |
30,428 |
18.6 |
Minerals and metals |
203,832 |
261,472 |
57,639 |
28.3 |
Energy-related products |
125,911 |
219,241 |
93,330 |
74.1 |
Forest products |
44,580 |
61,064 |
16,485 |
37.0 |
All commodity sector |
537,666 |
735,547 |
197,881 |
36.8 |
All other sectors |
1,798,324 |
2,097,326 |
299,001 |
16.6 |
All sectors |
2,335,991 |
2,832,874 |
496,883 |
21.3 |
Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed February 21, 2022.
Table ST.2: U.S. total exports, by sector, 2020–21
In millions of dollars and percentages.
Sectors |
Total exports in 2020 (million $) |
Total exports in 2021 (million $) |
Change in total exports from 2020 to 2021 (million $) |
Change in total exports from 2020 to 2021 (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|
Agricultural products |
157,227 |
185,394 |
28,167 |
17.9 |
Minerals and metals |
128,316 |
169,696 |
41,379 |
32.3 |
Energy-related products |
156,517 |
247,473 |
90,957 |
58.1 |
Forest products |
33,453 |
39,666 |
6,213 |
18.6 |
All commodities |
475,513 |
642,230 |
166,716 |
35.1 |
All others |
949,421 |
1,111,712 |
162,290 |
17.1 |
Total |
1,424,935 |
1,753,941 |
329,006 |
23.1 |
Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed February 21, 2022.
Table ST.3: Average unit values of general U.S. imports of select products, 2020–21
In dollars per specified unit and percentages.
Select product |
Product’s sector |
Unit |
General imports in 2020 ($/unit) |
General imports in 2021 ($/unit) |
Change in general imports from 2020 to 2021 ($/unit) |
Change in general imports from 2020 to 2021 (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Shrimp |
Agricultural products |
Kilograms |
8.38 |
8.76 |
0.38 |
4.5 |
Palm oil |
Agricultural products |
Kilograms |
0.72 |
1.01 |
0.29 |
40.3 |
Refined copper |
Minerals and metals |
Kilograms |
6.05 |
9.26 |
3.21 |
53.1 |
Unwrought nickel |
Minerals and metals |
Kilograms |
13.65 |
18.20 |
4.55 |
33.3 |
Crude oil |
Energy products |
Barrels |
36.68 |
60.41 |
23.73 |
64.7 |
Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed February 21, 2022.
Note: HTS headings/subheadings used in this table: Shrimp (0306.17.00); Palm oil (1511.90.0000); Refined copper (7403.11.0000); Unwrought nickel (7502.10.0000); Crude oil (2709.00).
Table ST.4: Average unit values of U.S. total exports of select products, 2020–21
In dollars per specified unit and percentages.
Select product |
Product’s sector |
Unit |
Domestic exports in 2020 ($/unit) |
Domestic exports in 2021 ($/unit) |
Change in general imports from 2020 to 2021 ($/unit) |
Change in general imports from 2020 to 2021 (%) |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Wheat |
Agricultural products |
Metric tons |
240.29 |
303.01 |
62.72 |
26.1 |
Beef |
Agricultural products |
Kilograms |
5.78 |
7.31 |
1.53 |
26.5 |
Copper ores and concentrates |
Minerals and metals |
Kilograms |
5.32 |
7.64 |
2.32 |
43.6 |
Zinc ores and concentrates |
Minerals and metals |
Kilograms |
1.47 |
2.27 |
0.8 |
54.4 |
Crude oil |
Energy products |
Barrels |
42.0 |
63.83 |
21.83 |
50.9 |
Source: USITC DataWeb/Census, accessed February 21, 2022.
Note: HTS6/Schedule B subheadings used in this table: Wheat (1001.99); Beef (0202.30.6000); Copper ores and concentrates (2603.00.0010); Zinc ores and concentrates (2608.00.0030); Crude oil (2709.00).
Commodity Price Trends
Global commodity prices surged to either multiyear or record highs in 2021, with the increases evident across a breadth of sectors (figure ST.1). According to the World Bank, annual average price indexes for energy, agriculture, and metals increased 82 percent, 23 percent, and 47 percent, respectively, compared with 2020.[1] Numerous factors combined to put upward pressure on prices, including increased demand for commodities caused in large part by a global manufacturing-based recovery from the downturn at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as a variety of supply disruptions. Such disruptions included labor and energy shortages, higher transportation costs, and inclement weather.[2] As described earlier, the price increases in commodities had a significant impact on the value of U.S. imports and exports in 2021.
Figure ST.1 Commodity Indices based on sectoral grouping, 2019–21.
World Bank Commodity Price Index components—Energy (coal, crude oil, natural gas); Agriculture (food, vegetable oils and meals, and other food); Metals (base metals: aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, tin, and zinc).
Source: World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
Note: Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010.
Global Supply and Demand Factors
The commodity price increases in 2021 that affected U.S. (and world) trade were largely attributable to several factors, which are discussed below and in the ensuing case studies. The first part of this section examines some of the global or regional crosscutting events that followed recovery from the early disruptions of the pandemic, which caused prices to escalate. Other factors that drove up prices include weather-related events that interrupted production and caused transportation issues. Such events had impacts on multiple sectors. This section concludes with a sampling of factors that led directly to price increases in some of the larger commodity segments, including the energy, agriculture, and minerals and metals sectors.[3]
Recovery of Global Demand
While commodity price increases in 2021 were in large part a rebound from the sharp declines that occurred in 2020, in many cases they went well beyond pre-pandemic price levels. This was a broad-based surge, led by energy and metals, and driven by a strong recovery in aggregate global demand, improving financial conditions and fiscal expansion in higher income economies.[4] The increase in demand was boosted by a relaxation of pandemic-related lockdowns in many countries.[5] In particular, global economic growth was estimated to have surged to 5.5 percent in 2021 based on estimated real global gross domestic product—its strongest post-recession pace in 80 years.[6] This economic growth significantly increased demand for commodities, contributing to relatively widespread price increases.
The price increases in 2021 follow a historic pattern in which prices for many commodities respond to global economic cycles. Commodity prices are frequently linked to demand for downstream goods (e.g., automobiles and construction materials), which can fluctuate with broader economic cycles. Since demand for many commodities is relatively inelastic, small shifts in supply or demand can lead to large price changes. For instance, many significant fluctuations in metals prices coincided with major economic events that have occurred since 1970.[7]
Transportation Disruptions and Costs[8]
Rising shipping costs in 2021 contributed to the increases in the price of commodities, many of which are heavily traded and integral components of global supply chains.[9] Maritime trade is considered the backbone of international goods trade, and high sea freight costs in 2021 disrupted global supply chains.[10] Maritime transportation carries the majority of all globally traded goods by volume.[11] Low maritime shipping costs enabled the creation of efficient global supply chains to meet consumer demand for everyday items, such as apparel and agricultural goods.[12] By yearend 2021, dry bulk shipping rates had surged to their highest levels since the 2008 financial crisis while container rates also shot up, buoyed by a recovery in global demand and congestion at ports. For example, the Baltic Dry index,[13] which measures rates for transporting commodities such as iron ore and coal on various shipping routes, was up 75 percent in 2021. Among the reasons for this sharp increase were strong demand for commodities, delays stemming from border restrictions, and shortages of crew and pilots to guide ships, as well as the extended six-day blockage of the Suez Canal in March that delayed about 400 ships carrying an estimated $10 billion of cargo per day.[14] The labor shortage for maritime workers was exacerbated by the pandemic (including the Delta variant of the virus that causes COVID-19) in 2021 and the slow rollout of COVID-19 vaccinations for seafarers.[15] Despite efforts to vaccinate workers directly in ports, by mid-2021, only about 2.5 percent of the global maritime labor pool had been vaccinated.[16] Lacking vaccinations, workers were often denied entries at ports and forced to remain on ships for extended periods, even when docked.[17] Challenges such as these made it difficult for shipping firms to maintain and recruit an adequate labor force, contributing to transportation woes. Along with seafarers, there were also shortages of longshoreman who work on the docks. An example that brings this problem into focus occurred in 2021, when more than 70 container ships waiting at ports in California were unable to unload goods because of a shortage of workers.[18] In addition, the shortage of truck drivers to transport commodities and other goods—a problem that had reportedly existed pre-pandemic but worsened after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic —to transport commodities and other goods delayed their entry into and departure from the ports to next destinations.[19] The aforementioned congestion across the world’s major maritime ports tied up shipping capacity and also contributed to shipping container shortages which factored into disruptions and increased transport costs.[20]
Weather
On the supply side, one of the forces driving commodity price increases in 2021 was the weather. Weather-related events affected markets for many raw materials, raising prices for a range of commodities. Many of those affected were inputs such as fossil fuels for producing electricity, lumber for construction, and wheat for food. While weather is regularly a factor that has an impact on commodity prices, several events in 2021 had especially significant effects: winter storms in the United States, droughts in South America, and heat waves and flooding in China.[21] For instance, in February, a rare winter storm in Texas increased demand for natural gas for heat while clogging wells with ice, drastically reducing natural gas production in the region and disrupting U.S. natural gas export flows.[22] Those conditions drove up spot prices for natural gas to record highs at the main U.S. gas trading hub in Louisiana.[23] In South America, the worst drought in decades scorched growing regions, damaging Brazil’s export corn crop and leaving the primary river used for transport too shallow for fully loaded boats to move crops to seaports for export. By mid-May, corn futures had risen to their highest prices in several years.[24] Flooding and a power grid strained by extremely high temperatures curtailed production of tin in China, the world’s largest producer, leading to record high prices for tin. Tin is a critical input used as a solder in printed circuit boards and electronic components for laptops and smart phones.[25]
Energy
Energy prices soared in 2021, especially for crude oil and natural gas, with some energy price benchmarks reaching record or multiyear highs (figure ST.2). Demand for fossil fuels rebounded from early 2020 as a result of rising global economic activity as well as increased energy use for heating and cooling, and reduced hydroelectric power generation owing to adverse weather (discussed earlier). Adverse weather and flooding also disrupted coal production in several countries. Crude oil prices rose during the second half of 2021 as oil availability was more limited due to supply disruptions and production constraints. Although production among members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and nonmember partners (OPEC+) rose slowly and steadily since early 2021, it trailed the uplift in demand stemming from strong economic recoveries in many of the largest global economies. This created a tight global oil market, where small short-term supply shocks, geopolitical events, and speculative activity can all shift prices significantly.[26] Reverberations from the rising prices of oil and natural gas affected prices of other commodities, such as metals, that require significant quantities of energy for extraction and processing. High natural gas prices also led to more consumption of substitute products coal and petroleum, further increasing demand for crude oil.[27]
Figure ST.2 Energy sectoral indices and certain price series, 2019–21.
Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010 prices and commodity prices in real U.S. dollars. Underlying data for this figure are available for download at https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
Source: World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
Note: Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010. Legend items followed by “(real dollars)” are commodity prices denoted in real dollars. Real dollars were calculated using the manufacturer’s unit value (MUV) index benchmarked to 2016. The MUV index is available in the annual price data series of the World Bank Group’s Commodity Markets “The Pink sheet.” The World Bank Group began reporting brent crude oil and Australia coal prices starting in January 1979 and January 1970, respectively.
Agriculture
Agricultural commodity prices rose sharply in 2021 as the strong global recovery that followed the economic downturn in 2020 increased demand, while supply was simultaneously affected by weather events and elevated input and shipping costs (figure ST.3). The overall rise in agricultural product prices was led by a surge in the prices of grains, oilseeds, and sugar.[28] Demand for livestock feed and a strong stocking cycle boosted Chinese imports of U.S. wheat and corn, contributing to price increases. Several other markets, including those for grains such as rice, tightened in 2021, supporting the index price increases illustrated in figure ST.3.[29] Prices for agricultural products also reflected rising input costs, especially for natural gas and fertilizers.[30] Among key food commodities, corn experienced the largest increase in prices followed by soybeans. Beverage prices were up significantly in 2021 as well, including coffee prices due in part to weather-related production shortfalls in Brazil.[31]
Figure ST.3 Agricultural sectoral indices.
Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010 prices and commodity prices in real U.S. dollars. Underlying data for this figure are available for download at https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
Source: World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
Note: Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010.
Minerals and Metals
Base metal prices slumped in the first half of 2020 as the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic depressed industrial activity and consumer demand worldwide. However, prices rose sharply during the final months of 2020 owing to rising demand, a resurgence in industrial activity in China that increased consumption of metals, lingering supply constraints related to the pandemic, and heavy stockpiling of industrial raw materials by China.[32] This trend continued into the first half of 2021, further boosting the prices of broadly used metals, including copper, aluminum, nickel, steel, zinc, and tin (figure ST.4). Increases in demand for minerals and metals used in commercial construction, steel production, and automotive and transportation industries were attributed to the recovery of economies after slowdown in response to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The copper, iron ore, steel, and zinc industries were particularly affected by the increased demand from manufacturing.[33]
The increased prices of base metals were also partially attributable to supply factors, such as curtailments, electricity shortages, and China’s policies to reduce energy consumption and pollution from metal refining. Metal smelters around the world curtailed production due to soaring energy expenses that elevated operating costs and regulatory pressure to cut carbon emissions.[34] The spike in energy prices and corresponding decline in metal production coincided with demand that was recovering from the initial slowdown at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, demand for zinc, which is used in steelmaking, was strong as economies around the world rebounded and the downstream demand for cars and construction improved. One of the largest price increases in the metals sector in 2021 was for nickel, when strong demand from China's stainless steel industry, the leading consumer of nickel, drove up global prices.[35] Policy-led decisions to rein in the supply of some industrial materials and metals production in China, together with continued demand from emerging sectors such as metals used for renewable energy applications, also kept metals prices elevated through the end of 2021.[36]
Figure ST.4. Base metals index and certain base metal price series, 2019–21.
Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010 prices and commodity prices in real U.S. dollars. Underlying data for this figure are available for download at https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
Source: World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
Note: Nominal monthly indices are based on averaged monthly values from 2010. Legend items followed by “(real dollars)” are commodity prices denoted in real dollars. Real dollars were calculated using the manufacturer’s unit value (MUV) index benchmarked to 2016. The MUV index is available in the annual price data series of the World Bank Group’s Commodity Markets “The Pink sheet.”
Unwrought Aluminum
Background
Unwrought aluminum—known for its light weight, high strength, and recyclability—is used in many applications across several sectors including construction, automotive, aerospace, and packaging.[37] Global pricing for aluminum is typically based on trading prices at the London Metal Exchange (LME), a metal futures trading market.[38] While the LME price acts as a global price, major consuming regions also often have regional spot prices, such as the Midwest Premium, which dictates the price of aluminum in the Midwest United States.[39] Unwrought aluminum is commonly categorized into primary and secondary unwrought. Primary unwrought is aluminum that has been newly refined from mined ore, while secondary unwrought aluminum is largely composed of aluminum scrap that has been remelted. Both primary unwrought aluminum and secondary unwrought aluminum are typically bought and sold in the form of billets or ingots.[40] Unwrought aluminum can be shipped by truck or rail on land and by ship overseas.[41]
According to World Bank commodity pricing data, average annual aluminum prices increased by nearly $769 per metric ton (45.1 percent) in 2021, reaching their highest monthly prices since 2008.[42] Prices began rising in May 2020, corresponding with a rebound in global manufacturing and construction that followed initial COVID-19 pandemic-related production curtailments. Between May 2020 and July 2021, prices grew at a fairly steady rate, averaging 3.9 percent monthly. Prices then spiked by 8.9 percent between August and September 2021, and peaked at their highest point in October 2021. Although prices fell slightly in November, December price levels were still well above those of previous years.
Figure ST.5. Global aluminum prices, 2019–21
Price in dollars per metric ton ($/mt). Underlying data for this figure are available for download at https://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets.
Source: World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
Global Supply Factors
Global aluminum smelter production grew from 65.1 million tons in 2020 to 68.0 million tons in 2021, an increase of 4.5 percent.[43] Despite this growth, demand rose more quickly and global aluminum prices rose significantly. Additional growth in aluminum production was limited by several supply-side factors, including shortages of upstream inputs such as alumina and bauxite, high energy costs, slowing production in China, and increased freight rates and shipping delays.[44]
At the beginning of the aluminum supply chain, prices for bauxite from Guinea, the world’s second largest bauxite producer, spiked to an 18-month high in July following a military coup in Guinea.[45] Bauxite and alumina supply chains were further constrained as several bauxite mines and alumina refineries were shut down in China, while Brazil and Jamaica experienced reduced capacity and also saw closures of alumina refineries.[46]
Aluminum production costs were also affected by surging global energy prices, as primary aluminum smelting is extremely energy intensive. Industry sources estimate that electricity generally accounts for about 30 percent of the total cost of primary aluminum production. In China, however, the world’s largest aluminum-producing country, electricity may account for closer to 45 percent of aluminum production costs.[47] China’s high energy prices led to decreasing aluminum production in the country during the second half of the year.[48] Flooding in the Shangxi province, which provides 30 percent of China’s energy supply, caused the temporary closure of more than 60 coal mines.[49] Meanwhile, droughts in the Yunnan province, which supplies about 10 percent of the country’s aluminum capacity, led local governments to cap aluminum production capacity due to hydropower shortages.[50] Power-related curtailments in these and several other regions contributed to nearly 2.3 million metric tons of Chinese production cuts between September and November 2021.[51] The power issues and related curtailments, as well as China nearing its government-set cap on aluminum capacity, not only affected prices but also caused China to increase imports over the last two years.[52] China’s unwrought aluminum imports increased by 633 percent in 2020 and another 75 percent in 2021, reducing the availability of the commodity in other markets.[53]
The energy price spike expanded beyond China and became a global issue for aluminum smelters, particularly in Europe where natural gas prices also rose significantly in 2021.[54] Industry sources claim that high energy prices prevented idled capacity in Europe and elsewhere from coming back online to benefit from the rising aluminum demand and prices.[55] At least one European aluminum smelter idled capacity because of high energy prices in 2021,[56] and several more have since idled or planned to idle capacity at the beginning of 2022, indicating an ongoing trend.[57] Finally, as is the case with many other commodities, increased freight rates and global shipping delays have also contributed to tighter supplies and higher delivered costs for aluminum.[58]
Global Demand Factors
Global aluminum demand growth outstripped supply growth in 2021. The Economist Intelligence Unit estimates that global demand for primary aluminum increased by 7.8 percent in 2021, while production only rose by 4.5 percent.[59] Some of the rising demand can be attributed to rebounds in the downstream construction and auto sectors that followed initial COVID-19 pandemic-related production slowdowns.[60] The global construction market, which accounts for 25 percent of global aluminum consumption, increased by 4.1 percent in 2021.[61] Meanwhile, global motor vehicle production increased by 10.0 percent in the first three quarters of 2021, and 3.0 percent for the full year 2021.[62]
In addition to production rebounds in traditional downstream sectors, demand growth can also be attributed to a push for “green” technology and products in several sectors.[63] In 2020, a survey of North American automakers found that aluminum is the fastest-growing material used in cars and trucks, and aluminum content levels were expected to increase by 12 percent by 2026. Aluminum’s lighter weight in vehicles contributes to improved gas mileage and less fuel emissions and allows for the extra weight of batteries in electric vehicles. Electric vehicles, which tend to use more aluminum, saw sales growth of 98 percent over 2020 sales globally, despite semiconductor microchip and other component shortages.[64]
Aluminum beverage cans also saw strong demand in 2021, attributable to rising interest in sustainable and recyclable packaging.[65] In addition, industry sources also cite to the growing popularity of craft beers, hard seltzers, and other beverages increasingly being offered in cans.[66]
Impact on U.S. Trade Flows
The value of aluminum trade flows to and from the United States grew significantly in 2021. Imports of unwrought aluminum saw large increases, growing by $4.5 billion in 2021.[67] Rising prices played an important role, as the value of imports rose by 65.7 percent while the volume only rose by 12.6 percent. The 2021 import total was also 29.3 percent larger by value than the 2019, pre-pandemic level. Major import sources remained largely unchanged, with Canada and the United Arab Emirates being the largest suppliers, although imports from each increased by 68.1 percent and 60.3 percent, respectively, by value. While the United States is not a significant exporter of unwrought aluminum and saw decreased domestic output of primary unwrought aluminum from 2020 to 2021,[68] domestic exports of unwrought aluminum increased by more than $224.6 million (43.3 percent) in 2021. [69] The 2021 export total also represents a 15.8 percent increase over 2019. While major export destinations for unwrought aluminum remained largely unchanged, export growth likely reflects higher prices and larger volumes filling the supply gaps created by production curtailments elsewhere.
Corn
Backgrounds
The year 2021 saw record highs in agricultural commodity prices worldwide and average annual corn prices, in particular, surged by 58.4 percent compared to the previous year. Export prices for corn generally track closely across global markets, with many global corn price series generated from the non-seed no. 2 yellow corn price out of the U.S. Gulf Coast ports.[70] U.S. corn is typically shipped by rail and truck from the interior of the country to be exported via bulk shipping to overseas markets. As an input into food, animal feed, and energy products, corn trade and its price movements have implications for several downstream markets. The United States was the largest global exporter of corn by value in 2019 and 2020.[71] The 2021 corn price movements were driven by Chinese feed demand, declining global stocks, strong internal demand in Brazil, and weather-related corn supply disruptions in other non-U.S. corn exporting countries. These price movements had a positive impact on farm profits.
Prices for corn peaked in May 2021 at their highest levels since 2012, growing 31.2 percent from January 2021 alone (Figure ST.6).[72] This price rally began in May 2020, with prices for corn rising or holding steady in every month but 1 in the following 12 months, growing by 111.5 percent from May 2020–April 2021. Although prices declined somewhat from June through October 2021, the price levels during those five months were still higher than the highest monthly corn price seen over the past seven years.
Figure ST.6. Global corn prices, 2019–2021
Price in dollars per bushel. Underlying data for this figure are available for download at https://data.ers.usda.gov/FEED-GRAINS-custom-query.aspx.
Source: USDA, ERS, Feed Grains Database, U.S. Gulf ports, Louisiana, monthly, accessed January 26, 2021.
Note: This price series was chosen to approximate the global price of corn because it is reflective of the spot price of corn in the Mississippi Gulf, the U.S. ports through which nearly two-thirds of all U.S. grains are exported. Denicoff, Prater, and Bahizi, Corn Transportation Profile, August 2014; USDA, FGIS, “Export Grain Inspection 2021,” accessed May 3, 2022. The United States is the top global exporter of corn, comprising approximately 30–45 percent of the world’s corn exports annually over the past five years. Pricing data are missing for September 2021, as shippers at the export terminals were not offering any bids in the month of September following Hurricane Ida-related power outages and damage to grain terminals. Monthly prices are averages of the daily average prices reported to USDA Agricultural Marketing Service at these export terminals. Email correspondence with U.S. government official, March 14, 2022; Plume and Huffstutter, “More Grain Terminals Found Damaged by Ida, Exports May Stall for Weeks,” September 1, 2021.
Global Supply Factors
On the supply side, global corn prices had been impacted by weather events in several key producing countries in the previous growing season that diminished total production, causing countries to run down their corn stocks. Total world corn supply was lower in the U.S. 2019/20 marketing year ending in August 2020 compared to the previous marketing year.[73] This was due in large part to lower-than-expected yields in the United States for crops harvested in September–November 2019, and in Brazil (the second-largest exporter of corn after the United States) for crops harvested in June–September 2020, as a result of poor weather during the growing season in both countries.[74] While global production levels rebounded somewhat during the U.S. 2020/21 marketing year, global stocks declined further, as La Niña-related weather events negatively impacted yields in Brazil and strong internal demand in the major corn-exporting countries increased domestic consumption.[75] As a result, the amount of corn available for export could not keep pace with global import demand, driving up global prices.
Global Demand Factors
The major driver in 2021 of increasing global corn prices on the demand side was China’s demand for feed inputs following the outbreak of African swine fever (ASF) experienced by the Chinese swine industry. The first cases of ASF were reported in August 2018. In the months that followed, China’s hog herd was decimated, reduced by over 40 percent between October 2018 and October 2019 according to Chinese government statistics.[76] China’s overall animal feed demand declined in turn, and although feed demand in other meat sectors that were being substituted for pork partially offset these losses, China’s corn consumption was depressed in the 2018/19 and 2019/20 U.S. marketing years.[77] Once China’s efforts to rebuild its swine herd began to see results and herd numbers started to rebound (about May 2019 according to official Chinese data), more feed was needed to sustain the herd’s growth to pre-ASF numbers, with China’s total domestic animal feed production seeing an increase of about 10 percent year-over-year in 2020. [78] The demand for feed continued into 2021, as the Chinese official statistics estimated a corn supply gap of 18.5 million metric tons (MMT) for the 2020/21 U.S. marketing year.[79] Additionally, China’s state reserves of corn were reported to be nearly depleted via 15 rounds of auctions from May to September 2020.[80] Much of this corn was bought for commercially owned stocks, which appeared to be at a record high in early 2021 with some feed mills reporting holding a six-month inventory compared to the usual two-three months. With increased demand by animal sector end users and a delay in corn stocks reaching end users, China’s internal price for corn grew 50 percent year-over-year from April 2020 to April 2021, increasing import demand and putting significant upward pressure on the global price for corn. [81]
Chinese demand for feed reportedly slowed in mid-2021, in part explaining the declining global corn prices in the latter half of the year. [82] Reportedly, lower Chinese corn purchases at state-run auctions in the latter half of the year indicated that hog farms were not interested in restocking their herd at that time and had made a strong substitution in their feed inputs for wheat and rice.[83] The lack of interest by Chinese producers in continuing to restock their hog herd was informed in part by continued ASF outbreaks in parts of the country in early to mid-2021.[84] This threat of infection led producers to sell their animals to reduce their risk of losses to ASF. This influx of hogs on the Chinese market contributed to the decrease in the Chinese pork price, which, in turn, lessened the demand for pork feed further.[85]
The United States was the country that met the majority of China’s increased corn import demand in 2021. While this was in part because of the abovementioned lower yields in other major corn-producing countries, macroeconomic trends and strong internal demand for corn in Brazil also played a role in dampening Brazil’s corn exports during 2021, removing it as a corn supplier for China. Continued depreciation of the Brazilian real (BRL)—30 percent weaker against the U.S. dollar in March 2021 than in March 2020—made imports into Brazil comparatively more expensive,[86] thus increasing the internal price for corn feed inputs for the livestock sector.[87] Internal demand for feed was strong as well in Brazil, driven by Chinese demand for Brazilian animal products; China imports over half of Brazil’s pork and beef exports.[88] Strong Chinese demand, driven by consumer switching from pork to other animal proteins and reliance on imported pork following ASF, acted in concert with the continued BRL depreciation, which made Brazilian exports more competitively priced, and drove record export values of Brazilian pork and beef.[89] As a result, Brazil tended to rely more heavily on its domestic supply of corn in 2021, including its stocks, to meet its animal feed demand, restricting global supply and serving to put further upward pressure on corn prices.[90]
Impact on U.S. Trade Flows
U.S. exports of corn in 2021 grew by $9.4 billion to $19.0 billion, with the divergence in the relative magnitude of this change in value versus volume (102.4 percent by value and by 35 percent by volume) reflecting the increasing price of corn globally from 2020 to 2021.[91] China’s imports of corn rose sharply in the 2021 calendar year, growing from $2.5 billion to $8.0 billion (221 percent) over the previous year, a 151 percent quantity increase of nearly 17 MMT. These imports of corn by China represented over 20 percent of all corn imports globally. Of China’s 2021 corn imports, about 70 percent by value originated in the United States.[92] This represented an increase of 12 MMT of U.S. corn exports to China over the previous year according to U.S. trade data. In terms of value, U.S. corn exports to China rose by $3.9 billion (316.4 percent) to $5.1 billion.[93]
Trade policies in the United States and China may be partly responsible for the rise in Chinese imports of U.S. corn.[94] China agreed to purchases of at least $80 billion in U.S. agricultural commodities between 2020 and 2021 as part of the Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and The People’s Republic of China, more commonly known as the Phase One Deal, which entered into force on February 14, 2020.[95] China’s corn imports from the United States have far exceeded the 2017 baseline totals of $152 million for corn upon which targets for the Phase One Deal were negotiated; U.S. corn exports to China totaled $1.2 billion in 2020, while 2021 exports totaled $5.1 billion, exceeding the 2020 full-year total by the end of April.[96] China’s corn imports also far exceeded its tariff-rate quota (TRQ) in-quota volume of 7.2 MMT in 2020 and 2021. Chinese official data report 11.3 MMT of corn imports in 2020, exceeding China’s World Trade Organization (WTO) TRQ for the first time in history,[97] and with even larger volumes of corn imported in 2021, the in-quota volume was exceeded again in 2021.[98] USDA reports that it remains unclear if the 65 percent out-of-quota duty was applied to imported corn in 2020 or if additional in-quota volume for the corn TRQs was allowed by the Chinese government.[99]
U.S. corn exports to the world increased by over 18 MMT in 2021 from the previous year. With 24.2 percent of all U.S. corn exports, Mexico was the second largest export market for U.S. corn in 2021 after China (26.9 percent) and ahead of Japan (16.6 percent). U.S. exports to Mexico rose by $2.0 billion (76 percent) to $4.7 billion in 2021. [100]
Natural Gas
Background
Natural gas is one of the most common fuels for power generation and heating, supplying about one-fourth of the world’s primary energy consumption.[101] It is generally transported through pipelines in gaseous form or is liquefied at very cold temperatures and transported through specialized infrastructure, containers, and shipping vessels.[102] Pricing for U.S. pipeline natural gas is typically based on trading prices at the Henry Hub, a natural gas distribution hub in Louisiana that connects nine interstate gas pipelines.[103] Liquefied natural gas (LNG) costs more to supply and often sells at a significantly higher price; for example, a major U.S. LNG exporter reported charging liquefaction fees ranging from $2 to $2.50 per million Btu (MMBtu) resulting in U.S. LNG exports costing about double the U.S. Henry Hub price.[104] Consequently, regional benchmark prices can vary considerably; regions with high demand and relatively limited pipeline gas supply face higher prices than regions that are less reliant on LNG imports. Over the past five years, average monthly benchmark prices for natural gas in Europe and Asia have often been at least double the U.S. (Henry Hub) price for natural gas (figure ST.7). The benchmark price in Asia—based more specifically on LNG prices in Japan—is the highest of the three. The higher benchmark price is consistent with Japan’s minimal natural gas production, lack of access to international gas pipelines, and the relatively high regional demand for LNG from Japan, South Korea, and China.[105]
Figure ST.7. Monthly natural gas prices by location, January 1992–November 2021
Price in U.S. dollars per million British thermal units (MMBtu). Underlying data for this figure are available for download at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/ with the following time series datasets: PNGASJPUSDM, PNGASEUUSDM, and PNGASUSUSDM.
Source: IMF, “Global price of LNG, Asia [PNGASJPUSDM],” “Global Price of Natural Gas, EU [PNGASEUUSDM],” “Global Price of Natural Gas, US Henry Hub Gas [PNGASUSUSDM]” retrieved from FRED, March 4, 2022.
Natural gas prices increased rapidly in 2021 and reached much higher monthly averages than for any other period in the past five years, particularly in Europe and Asia (figure ST.7). From March to October, average monthly prices for natural gas rose about fivefold in Europe and sixfold in Asia. Monthly prices in the United States more than doubled over the same period but rose to a much lower average of $5.50 per MMBtu in October—compared to $30 per MMBtu in Europe and $35 per MMBtu in Asia. Natural gas prices in Asia and the United States also briefly spiked earlier in the year in response to separate weather events, averaging over $20 per MMBtu in Asia in January due to a cold weather snap and over $5 per MMBtu in the United States in February due to Texas Winter Storm Uri which temporarily impacted supply and demand.[106]
Global Supply Factors
The global supply of natural gas grew moderately (by about 3 percent) from 2020 to 2021 but was outpaced by demand growth, resulting in a very tight market. The United States and Russia, the top two global producers (collectively supplying about 42 percent of global output), each reported increased natural gas output and exports. However, U.S. producers were slow to resume drilling after bearing substantial losses in 2020 and reinvested in production at much lower rates than historic levels.[107] Russia reported much larger growth in natural gas production, boosting output by 13.7 percent in 2021. However, about half of this increase supplied the domestic Russian market.[108] Limited Russian exports to Europe in late 2021, combined with declining European natural gas production and diminished inventories, contributed to natural gas shortages and higher prices in Europe in late 2021.[109]
Extreme weather also disrupted U.S. production. Natural gas production in Texas fell 46 percent in February during the week of Winter Storm Uri, due to freeze-offs at production sites and emergency rotating power cuts shutting down natural gas supply infrastructure.[110] The storm also disrupted U.S. export flows from Texas, affecting both pipeline exports to Mexico and supplies of feedgas to U.S. LNG export facilities. Moreover, Hurricane Ida temporarily shuttered most U.S. natural gas production in the Gulf of Mexico in early September, supporting elevated U.S. Henry Hub prices in September and October.[111]
LNG trade expanded in 2021 but was limited by supply-side factors like weather-related disruptions, facility outages, and capacity constraints. Significant global LNG supply outages first occurred in 2020 but remained at high levels in 2021 despite elevated demand, with about 8 percent of capacity offline.[112] Australia, Qatar, and the United States continued to the be the top LNG exporters, and the United States led growth in LNG exports due to capacity additions completed in 2020 and a sustained price advantage over international gas prices throughout the lower demand summer months.[113] U.S. LNG export levels were close to peak capacity for most of 2021, with supply-side disruptions like storms and pipeline maintenance as the main driver for downward fluctuations in monthly volumes.[114]
Global Demand Factors
Global natural gas demand rose faster than supply in 2021, reducing inventories and raising prices. Several factors drove natural gas demand, most notably a rapid recovery from the economic downturn in 2020 and weather conditions. Low natural gas inventories and energy transitions away from coal and nuclear power also made the impact on prices more acute. Economic activity in the United States and many other developed economies started to rebound in late 2020 and early 2021.[115] Global manufacturing value added rose an estimated 7.3 percent in 2021, accompanied by increased natural gas demand from industrial users (especially in China).[116]
Weather conditions in 2021 also drove up demand for natural gas. Droughts in Brazil, California, and Turkey, and lower-than-normal wind speeds in Europe in the third quarter of 2021 reduced the availability of renewable energy, increasing demand for gas-fired power generation.[117] As noted above, extreme cold weather events in the Northern Hemisphere during January and February also caused temporary surges in demand for natural gas for heating. These demand pressures were further amplified by reduced availability of alternative sources of energy—low local natural gas inventories, phase outs of coal-fired power, and nuclear plant outages worsened the price spike in Northeast Asia in January.[118] The January freeze in Northeast Asia and Winter Storm Uri also reduced inventories and diverted natural gas supplies, contributing to tight market conditions later in the year.[119] Japan, China, and South Korea continued to be the top LNG importers, while China and Brazil had the largest increases in LNG import quantities from 2020.
Impact on U.S. Trade Flows
U.S. trade flows reflect both the unusually high increase in natural gas prices discussed above as well as an increase in the quantity of U.S. LNG and pipeline gas exported. The value of U.S. natural gas exports grew significantly by $21.2 billion (114.7 percent) to $39.7 billion in 2021; while, the volume of U.S. natural gas exports rose by 1.4 trillion cubic feet (25.9 percent) to 6.7 trillion cubic feet.[120] In addition to being one of the largest suppliers of LNG, the United States is also the top source of destination-flexible LNG contracts. Consequently, U.S. LNG destination markets shifted significantly in 2021 in response to changes in global demand, with much higher shares of exports going to Brazil and China.[121] As noted above, U.S. LNG exports grew in 2021 but were limited by export capacity constraints and weather-related disruptions.
[1] World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
[2] This chapter examines many recent developments that had an impact on commodity prices. However, we recognize that there are other factors, such as fluctuations in currency valuations among trading partners, that might also play a role. Most commodities sold in global markets are priced in U.S. dollar terms. Therefore, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar may correspond with declines in dollar denominated commodity prices. That said, commodity prices and exchange rates factor in other macroeconomic conditions that often complicate the relationship between the U.S. dollar value and commodity prices. For more details on the U.S. dollar exchange rates during the year, see figure MC.6 in the Global Macroeconomic Conditions section.
[3] While industry sources indicate that speculation, driven by such players as traders and investors, contributed to price changes for certain commodities, these effects are not always transparent and quantifying them is difficult so they are not covered below. An example of a platform that is widely used for speculation is the London Metal Exchange (LME), where most of the world’s future trades occur for nonferrous metals (e.g., aluminum, copper, zinc, and nickel). The LME’s participants include a mix of industrial metals companies, which tap the market to offset their price risks, and hedge funds, which use it to speculate. LME trading activities have an impact on global prices for many metals and can lead to price volatility at times. See Farchy, Cang, and Burton, “Analysis—Behind the Nickel Mess on the London Metal Exchange,” March 21, 2022. This chapter primarily focuses on fundamental causes for commodity price changes.
[4] World Bank Group, “Global Economic Prospects,” January 2022, 113–16.
[5] World Bank Group, “Global Economic Prospects,” January 2022, 3.
[6] World Bank Group, “Global Economic Prospects,” January 2022, 3.
[7] Notably, the four global recessions (1974–75, 1981–82, 1990–91, and 2008–09), and three global slowdowns (1998, 2001, and 2012), World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets Outlook—Causes and Consequences of Metal Price Shocks,” April 2021, 13.
[8] See the special topic chapter, “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Freight Transportation Services and U.S. Merchandise Imports” in Shifts in U.S. Merchandise Trade, 2020 report for more detailed information about the impact of shipping costs on U.S. merchandise trade.
[9] Fletcher and Steer, “Hedge Funds Ride Wave in Volatile Year for Shipping Costs,” December 27, 2021.
[10] UNCTAD, “Review of Maritime Transport 2020,” November 12, 2020.
[11] The United Nation's Center for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimated that maritime transportation carried 80 percent of all globally traded goods by volume in 2018. LaRocca, “Rising Maritime Freight Shipping Costs Impacted by COVID-19,” 2021.
[12] LaRocca, “Rising Maritime Freight Shipping Costs Impacted by COVID-19,” 2021.
[13] The Baltic Dry Index (BDI) is an index of average prices paid for the transport of dry bulk materials across more than 20 routes. The BDI is often viewed as a leading indicator of economic activity because changes in the index reflect supply and demand for important materials used in manufacturing. Kopp, “The Baltic Dry Index Measures Changes in Transportation Costs,” October 31, 2021.
[14] Fletcher and Steer, “Hedge Funds Ride Wave in Volatile Year for Shipping Costs,” December 27, 2021; Rich, Reed, and Ewing, “Clearing the Suez Canal Took Days. Figuring Out the Costs May Take Years.,” March 31, 2021.
[15] Tayeb, “The Global Shipping Crisis and Labor Shortages May Get Worse,” July 17, 2021.
[16] Tayeb, “The Global Shipping Crisis and Labor Shortages May Get Worse,” July 17, 2021.
[17] Goodkind, “Companies Are Showering Shipping Workers with Perks,” January 26, 2022.
[18] Caminiti, “Lack of Workers Is Further Fueling Supply Chain Woes,” September 28, 2021.
[19] Caminiti, “Lack of Workers Is Further Fueling Supply Chain Woes,” September 28, 2021.
[20] Northam, “The Pandemic Economy’s Latest Victim?,” November 16, 2021.
[21] Dezember, “Blame Bad Weather for Your Bigger Bills,” December 28, 2021.
[22] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 21–28.
[23] Dezember, “Blame Bad Weather for Your Bigger Bills,” December 28, 2021.
[24] Dezember, “Blame Bad Weather for Your Bigger Bills,” December 28, 2021.
[25] Dezember, “Blame Bad Weather for Your Bigger Bills,” December 28, 2021.
[26] EIU, “Crude Oil Forecast,” February 1, 2021.
[27] World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets Outlook—Urbanization and Commodity Demand,” October 2021; IEA, “What Is behind Soaring Energy Prices,” October 12, 2021.
[28] EIU, “Commodity Forecast,” December 19, 2021.
[29] EIU, “Commodity Forecast,” December 19, 2021.
[30] World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets Outlook—Urbanization and Commodity Demand,” October 2021, 32.
[31] World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets Outlook—Urbanization and Commodity Demand,” October 2021, 32.
[32] EIU, “Commodity Forecast—World (Industrial Raw Minerals),” September 1, 2021.
[33] USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2022, January 31, 2022, 5.
[34] Horner, “Metals Prices Surge After Gas Crunch Crimps Output,” October 14, 2021.
[35] EIU, “Stainless Steel and Green Investments Prop up Nickel Market,” October 1, 2021.
[36] EIU, “Commodity Forecast—World (Industrial Raw Minerals),” September 1, 2021.
[37] For the purposes of this chapter, “unwrought aluminum” is limited to HS heading 7601. This differs from the Mineral and Metals chapter, where unwrought aluminum includes HS headings 7601, 7602, 2606 and subheading 2620.40.
[38] London Metal Exchange, “A Detailed Guide to the LME,” 2018, 3–4.
[39] S&P Global, “Platts Aluminum Midwest Premium Explained,” accessed March 9, 2022.
[40] Billets are a form of solid aluminum which can be used as inputs in the extrusion process to produce various aluminum products such as bars, rods, profiles, tubes, and pipes. Ingots are another form of solid aluminum which are intended for remelting into products such as plate, steel, or foil. Unwrought aluminum may also be sold in molten form, but can typically only be shipped short distances in this form. USITC, Aluminum: Competitive Conditions Affecting the U.S. Industry, June 2017, 51–55.
[41] Soracchi, “Freight Shipping Aluminum,” January 12, 2021.
[42] World Bank Group, “Commodity Markets (The Pink Sheet),” accessed March 18, 2022.
[43] USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries: Aluminum, January 2022.
[44] Bauxite is an ore commonly found in the earth’s crust that contains aluminum. It is refined by the Bayer Process into alumina (or aluminum oxide). Alumina is then electrolytically smelted into aluminum via the Hall-Heroult electrolytic process. USGS, “Bauxite and Alumina Statistics and Information,” accessed March 11, 2022, 51–55. USITC, Aluminum: Competitive Conditions Affecting the U.S. Industry, June 2017, 51.
[45] Reid, “Guinea Bauxite Prices Rise After Coup,” September 6, 2021.
[46] While power issues and flooding led to the closure of several bauxite mines and alumina refineries in China, an alumina refinery in Brazil reduced capacity due to damaged facilities, while another in Jamaica closed following a fire at the facility. Shanghai Metal Markets, “The Heavy Rain in Shanxi Has Caused Bauxite Mines to Stop,” October 9, 2021. Argus Media, “Jamaican Bauxite Refiner Closed by Fire,” August 25, 2021; Home, “Guinea Coup Adds Bauxite to Aluminium’s Supply Concerns,” September 7, 2021; USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries: Aluminum, January 2022.
[47] Kloeckner Metals Corporation, “Factors Affecting Aluminum Pricing,” June 14, 2021.
[48] Home, “Power Problems Take a Toll on Global Aluminium Output,” January 25, 2022.
[49] Skidmore, “China Coal Futures Hit High After Floods Worsen Energy Crisis,” October 11, 2021.
[50] Reuters, “China’s Yunnan Imposes Output Curbs,” September 13, 2021.
[51] Ip, Tan, “China’s Aluminium Supply Shortage,” October 29, 2021.
[52] Detrixhe, “China’s Environmental Goals Are Driving Aluminum Prices,” August 30, 2021.
[53] IHS Markit, Global Trade Atlas, HS heading 7601, imports from all partners, in USD, accessed May 3, 2022.
[54] For more information, see the case study on natural gas.
[55] Burton, “Any Chance of New Aluminum Supply,” September 20, 2021.
[56] In December 2021, Europe’s largest aluminum smelter in Dunkerque, France idled 3 percent of its capacity. Hobson, “Power Price Surge Pushes Aluminium to 2-Month High,” December 23, 2021.
[57] Hoyle and Wallace, “Aluminum Prices Can’t Keep Up with Energy Costs,” January 30, 2022.
[58] Saefong, “Why Some Benchmark Aluminum Prices Have Soared,” accessed February 14, 2022.
[59] Economist Intelligence Unit, “Aluminium,” January 1, 2022.
[60] Burton and Farchy, “Inflation Comes for Aluminum, as the Everywhere Metal Surges,” July 28, 2021.
[61] Aluminium Leader, “How the World Aluminium Market Works,” accessed February 8, 2022; Perspectives, “Global Construction,” accessed February 8, 2022.
[62] OICA, World Motor Vehicle Production, accessed May 3, 2021.
[63] In addition to the beverage and auto sectors discussed in this section, industry sources note that aluminum wire used in offshore wind power stations are also a potential driver for aluminum demand; Skidmore, “Aluminium Price Hits 13-Year High,” October 12, 2021.
[64] Aluminum Association, “Auto’s Fastest Growing Material,” accessed February 8, 2022; Green Cars, “How Many Electric Vehicles Sold in 2021?” December 23, 2021.
[65] Lazzaro, “Automotive Aluminum Demand to Stay Pressured in 2022,” November 3, 2021.
[66] Industry sources also note that the closure of restaurants and subsequent shift to more dining occurring at home has attributed to stronger demand for beverages in aluminum cans. Pyzyk, “High Aluminum Prices,” October 27, 2021; Spencer, “Beverage Cans,” June 24, 2021; Bloomberg, “Price Surge in Forecast for Aluminum,” August 1, 2021.
[67] USITC DataWeb/Census, general imports, value in U.S. dollars, HTS heading 7601.
[68] Domestic secondary unwrought aluminum production increased marginally, by approximately 150 tons between 2020 and 2021. USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries: Aluminum, January 2022.
[69] USITC DataWeb/Census, domestic exports, value in U.S. dollars, HS heading 7601.
[70] See as examples: World Bank Group, World Bank Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet), April 4, 2022, 3; IMF, IMF Primary Commodity Price Index, January 25, 2019, 6.
[71] IHS Markit, Global Trade Atlas, Exports from all reporters, HS 1005.90, Corn (maize) other than seed corn, accessed May 3, 2022. Corn and minimally processed corn products (groats, meal, starch, oil, bran, oilcake) are traded internationally under several different HS headings. Non-seed corn (HS 1005.90) represents the largest of these trade flows at the 6-digit HS level by value globally.
[72] As measured by prices recorded for no. 2 yellow corn in Gulf Coast ports in Louisiana. No. 2 yellow corn (sometimes known as dent corn or field corn) is the main type of corn grown in the United States and is typically used as an input for livestock feed and wet milling. Iowa Corn, “Corn: It’s Everything,” accessed January 27, 2022. Non-seed no. 2 yellow corn falls under U. S. Census Bureau’s Schedule B 1005.90.2030 and represented nearly 80 percent by quantity and value of U.S. corn exports under the 6-digit 1005.90 subheading in 2021. USITC DataWeb/Census, HTS 1005.90, accessed February 14, 2022. Because no. 2 yellow corn is not broken out in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS) under an 8-digit subheading or 10-digit statistical reporting number, and in an effort to evaluate trade of corn globally, this analysis will consider corn imports and exports at the 6-digit level under HS 1005.90.
[73] USDA, FAS, “PS&D Online,” accessed January 27, 2022. World corn supplies here refer to available global supply, which is the sum of global production and global beginning stocks. Marketing years are periods of 12 months (or less) that correspond with the natural planting and marketing cycle for a particular crop in a certain country. Marketing years typically span two calendar years and are thus denoted in the XXXX/XX format. The marketing year for corn grown in the United States is September through August—e.g., the U.S. 2019/20 corn marketing year lasts from September 1, 2019, through August 31, 2020. USDA, ERS, Feed Grains Database—Documentation, September 20, 2021. Calendar years in this writeup will be denoted in the XXXX format.
[74] U.S. Grains Council, “Corn Harvest Quality Report 2019/2020: Planting and Early Growth Conditions,” accessed April 14, 2022; USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—Brazil, July 6, 2020; USDA, WAOB, World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates, November 8, 2019. June through September is the harvest season for the “safrinha” corn crop in Brazil, which is typically planted on the same land as soybeans following their harvest. This is the second of Brazil’s three annual corn harvests—of the three, the safrinha crop has been the largest and the most likely destined for exports in recent years.
[75] Lowered corn yields in Brazil were due to a number of factors. First, increasing global corn prices during the planting season encouraged Brazilian farmers to expand their planted corn acreage and plant in suboptimal conditions later in the season—much of the safrinha corn was planted several weeks later than normal due to a delay in the first-season soybean crop harvest. Additionally, corn producers encountered a historic drought in many areas of south-central Brazil where most of the safrinha crop is grown, and a series of frosts in July that killed much of the corn before it finished maturing. USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update - Brazil, June 21, 2021, 3-4; USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update - Brazil, October 5, 2021, 5-6. In Brazil, in the face of shrinking corn supply in U.S. marketing year 2020/21, domestic consumption grew compared to the previous marketing year while ending stocks remained constant and exports decreased, indicative of strong internal demand. In the United States over the same time period, while corn supply grew slightly and domestic consumption decreased slightly, the growth in corn exports was largely met through a large drawdown of stocks, as internal demand for corn was maintained. USDA, FAS, “PS&D Online,” accessed January 27, 2022.
[76] Haley and Gale, “African Swine Fever Shrinks Pork Production in China,” Amber Waves (blog), February 3, 2020.
[77] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—China, March 3, 2020, 1–3. China’s imports of corn were relatively modest (around $1 billion or less) in 2018 and 2019.
[78] USDA, FAS, Livestock and Products Annual - China, August 7, 2020, 4–5; USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Annual - China, April 16, 2021, 3.
[79] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Annual—China, April 16, 2021, 5.
[80] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—China, October 2, 2020, 6–7; USDA, FAS, China’s Corn Imports Estimated to Hit 22 Million Metric Tons, November 4, 2020. China’s state-owned enterprise, Sinograin, houses the country’s reserves of grains and oilseeds, and auctions its reserves to distribute it among commercial entities such as feed mills and other processors.
[81] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Annual—China, April 16, 2021.
[82] Anand, “US Soybean Exports to China Slump,” November 23, 2021; USDA, FAS, “Pork Price Decline Impacts Production,” June 23, 2021.
[83] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—China, September 30, 2021, 5. The Chinese government confirmed that feed companies were substituting wheat and rice for corn in feed because of high corn prices. The substitution rate of wheat for corn was as high as 30 percent in some areas. However, feed mills claim that corn is their first choice for feed as wheat requires an added enzyme and oil to be made comparable, sorghum’s taste profile is not as desirable for hogs, and barley must be first unhusked. USDA FAS GAIN, Grain and Feed Update—China, July 1, 2021; USDA, FAS, Perspectives on the Feed and Swine Sectors, May 14, 2021. USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—China, October 2, 2020; USDA, FAS, China’s Corn Imports Estimated to Hit 22 Million Metric Tons, November 4, 2020.
[84] USDA, FAS, China Notifies ASF outbreak in Yunnan Province, March 25, 2021; USDA, FAS, China Notifies ASF outbreak in Xinjiang Province, March 4, 2021; USDA, FAS, China Notifies ASF outbreak in Hunan Province, April 11, 2021.
[85] USDA, FAS, Perspectives on the Feed and Swine Sectors, May 14, 2021; USDA, FAS, Pork Price Decline Impacts Production, June 23, 2021.
[86] In response to complaints by the national animal protein association, the Brazilian government lifted import tariffs on corn, soybeans, and soybean meal and oil imports from outside Mercosur in October 2020. The action decreased tariffs on corn from 8 percent and was in effect until March 31, 2021. USDA, FAS, Brazil Eliminates Soybean and Corn Import Duties, October 19, 2020; USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—Brazil, January 29, 2021; USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Annual - Brazil, April 1, 2021, 11.
[87] In May 2021, the price of corn traded on Brazil’s primary commodity exchange market peaked at an all-time monthly high of R$100.72 per 60-kg bag (US$8.06/bushel). Those prices are more than double the levels seen at the same month in 2020. USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—Brazil, June 21, 2021.
[88] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Annual - Brazil, April 1, 2021, 17; IHS Markit, Global Trade Atlas, Exports from Brazil, HS 0201, 0202, 0210.20, 1602.50, 0203.11, 0203.12, 0203.19, 0203.21, 0203.22, 0203.29, 0210.11, 0210.12, 0210.19, 1602.41, 1602.42, and 1602.49, accessed April 6, 2022.
[89] USDA, FAS, Livestock and Products Semi-Annual—Brazil, February 18, 2020, 5; USDA FAS, Livestock and Products Semi-Annual—Brazil, March 30, 2022, 21,30.
[90] Brazil exported only a negligible amount of corn to China in 2021 and saw its exports of corn to the world decrease by 1.6 MMT from 2020 to 2021. IHS Markit, Global Trade Atlas, accessed April 11, 2022.
[91] USITC DataWeb/Census, HTS subheading 1005.90, domestic exports by value, 2020-21, accessed March 16, 2022.
[92] IHS Markit, Global Trade Atlas, HS 1005.90, accessed March 17, 2022.
[93] USITC DataWeb/Census, HTS subheading 1005.90, domestic exports by quantity and value, 2020–21, accessed March 16, 2022.
[94] USTR, 2022 Trade Policy Agenda and 2021 Annual Report, March 2022, 118.
[95] USTR, Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and The People’s Republic of China (Phase One Agreement), January 15, 2020; USTR and USDA, Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and The People’s Republic of China Fact Sheet, accessed January 27, 2022; USTR, “USTR Announces Formation of Bilateral Evaluation” February 14, 2020. In February 2020, China announced a tariff exclusion process to suspend its countermeasures against U.S. section 301 tariffs for certain products, including corn, which went from a 36 percent to a 1 percent in-quota import tariff level following this action. China has a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) in place for imports of corn, though the administration of the TRQ, along with the TRQ for wheat and rice, has been the subject of a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute (DS517) brought by the United States, with consultations requested in December 2016. The report of the panel, adopted on May 28, 2019, concluded that various aspects of China's TRQ administration were inconsistent with the obligations to administer TRQs (1) on a transparent, predictable, and fair basis, (2) using clearly specified requirements and procedures, and (3) in a manner that would not inhibit the filling of each TRQ. While China stated its intent to implement the recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) following the release of the panel report, the United States contends that China failed to bring its measures into compliance within a reasonable amount of time, and requested authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions on China in July 2021. A compliance panel on this issue was established in August 2021 at China’s request. WTO, “DS517: China—Tariff Rate Quotas for Certain Agricultural Products, Summary of Dispute Settlement to Date,” accessed January 28, 2022. USDA, FAS, China Announces Increases to Additional Tariffs, August 18, 2019, 17; Government of China, Customs Tariff Commission of the State Council, “Tax Commission Announcement [2020] No. 2,” February 17, 2020.
[96] Note that for the agricultural commodities identified under the agreement, China committed to purchasing amounts corresponding to the total value of 2017 imports from the United States plus some additional annual amounts in 2020 and 2021, not purchase totals for specific commodities. In sum, purchases for all agricultural products would amount to at least $80 billion over the agreement period. USTR, Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and The People’s Republic of China (Phase One Agreement), January 15, 2020; USTR and USDA, Economic and Trade Agreement between the United States of America and The People’s Republic of China Fact Sheet, accessed January 27, 2022; USITC DataWeb/Census, HTS subheading, 1005.90, domestic exports by value, 2017, 2020–21, monthly, accessed March 16, 2022.
[97] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Annual—China, April 16, 2021.
[98] TRQ in-quota volumes have remained unchanged since 2004. Regmi, U.S. Challenges to China’s Farm Policies, February 17, 2022, 2.
[99] USDA, FAS, Grain and Feed Update—China, January 21, 2021.
[100] USITC DataWeb/Census, HTS subheading, 1005.90, total exports by quantity and value, 2020–21, accessed March 16, 2022.
[101] Natural gas is also used as a fuel or raw material in various industrial, commercial, and transportation applications. BP, “Primary Energy,” July 2021; EIA, “Use of Natural Gas,” December 7, 2021.
[102] EIA, “Natural Gas Imports and Exports,” July 12, 2021; EIA, “Liquefied Natural Gas,” July 20, 2021.
[103] Chen, “Henry Hub,” July 1, 2019.
[104] About 15 to 18 percent of natural gas delivered to LNG export facilities is consumed for the liquefaction process. Weber and Wyeno, “Cheniere Offering More Competitively Priced LNG,” November 6, 2020; EIA, “Liquefied Natural Gas,” July 20, 2021.
[105] EIA, “Country Analysis Executive Summary: Japan,” October 2020, 14; GIIGNL, GIIGNL Annual Report 2021, April 26, 2021, 6, 30.
[106] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021.
[107] Rystad Energy, “Shale Getting Stingy?,” November 22, 2021; IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 94.
[108] Reuters, “Gazprom’s Gas Exports Up in 2021,” January 2, 2022.
[109] Total Russian gas flows to Europe grew in 2021 but fell short of their announced annual target and dropped significantly in October. Low Russian-owned gas inventories in Europe and limited spot market sales of Russian gas in late 2021 prompted speculation that Russia might be withholding natural gas to pressure Germany on more quickly approving the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Soldatkin and Golubkova, “Europe Gas Prices Hit All-Time Highs,” October 1, 2021; Reuters, “Gazprom’s Gas Exports Up in 2021,” January 2, 2022; EIA, “Natural Gas Weekly Update,” September 30, 2021; Kramer, “Putin Suggests Germany Approve Nord Stream 2,” October 13, 2021.
[110] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 21–28; EIA, “U.S. Natural Gas Prices Spiked in February,” January 6, 2022.
[111] EIA, “EIA Expects Higher Natural Gas Prices,” September 8, 2021.
[112] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 53.
[113] EIA, “U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports Grew to Record Highs,” January 6, 2022; GIIGNL, GIIGNL Annual Report 2021, April 26, 2021, 6, 38; EIA, “Liquefied U.S. Natural Gas Exports (Database),” January 31, 2022.
[114] Monthly U.S. LNG export levels in 2021 were the lowest in February, June, and September, driven respectively by winter storm Uri, pipeline maintenance, and Hurricanes Ida and Nicholas. Several planned U.S. LNG export capacity additions came online in 2020, and several other additions were approved and started coming online in late 2021. EIA, “U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports Grew to Record Highs,” January 6, 2022; EIA, “U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Export Capacity Will Be World’s Largest,” December 9, 2021; EIA, “Natural Gas Weekly Update,” September 16, 2021; EIA, “Natural Gas Weekly Update,” September 30, 2021; EIA, “Liquefied U.S. Natural Gas Exports (Database),” January 31, 2022.
[115] Milesi-Ferretti, “A Most Unusual Recovery,” Brookings (blog), December 8, 2021; CRS, Global Economic Effects of COVID-19, November 10, 2021.
[116] UNIDO, World Manufacturing Production, December 8, 2021; IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 69, 75.
[117] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 31–35; Franke, “EU Wind Generation Falls to 8-Week Low,” November 15, 2021.
[118] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 11–13; Obayashi, “Japan Goes Nuclear in Bid to Stay Cool,” July 21, 2021.
[119] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 11, 18, 28, 29.
[120] USITC DataWeb/Census, HTS subheadings 2711.11 and 2711.21, accessed March 11, 2022; EIA, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports by Country,” accessed June 6, 2022.
[121] IEA, Gas Market Report, Q4 2021, October 2021, 33, 48, 50; EIA, “U.S. Liquefied Natural Gas Exports Grew to Record Highs,” January 6, 2022; EIA, “U.S. Natural Gas Exports by Country,” accessed June 6, 2022.
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