

UNITED STATES
INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:)
) Investigation No.:
CITRIC ACID AND CERTAIN CITRATE) 701-TA-456 and
SALTS FROM CANADA AND CHINA) 731-TA-1151-1152
) (Preliminary)

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THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:)
) Investigation No.:
 CITRIC ACID AND CERTAIN CITRATE) 337-TA-423 and
 SALTS FROM CANADA AND CHINA) 731-TA-1151-1152
) (Preliminary)

Wednesday,
 May 7, 2008

Room 101
 International Trade Commission
 500 E Street, SW

Washington, D.C.

The preliminary conference commenced, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. before the United States International Trade Commission, ROBERT CARPENTER, Director of Investigations, presiding.

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Countervailing Duties:

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Industry Co., Ltd.,High Hope International Change
Group, Jiangsu Native Product Imp & Exp Corp., Ltd.,
Huangshi Xinghua Biochemical Co., Ltd., Huozhou Coal
Electricity Shanxi Fenhe Biochemistry Co., Ltd.,
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Lianyungang Shuren Kechuang Imp & Exp Co., Ltd.,
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(9:33 a.m.)

1
2
3 MR. CARPENTER: Good morning and welcome to
4 the United States International Trade Commission's
5 Conference in connection with the preliminary phase of
6 countervailing duty investigation number 701-TA-456
7 and antidumping investigation number 731-TA-1151 to
8 1152 concerning imports of Citric Acid and Certain
9 Citrate Salts from Canada and China.

10 My name is Robert Carpenter. I'm the
11 Commission's Director of Investigations, and I will
12 preside at this conference.

13 Among those present from the Commission
14 Staff are from my far right, George Deyman, the
15 supervisory investigator; Chris Cassise, the
16 investigator; on my left, Mary Jane Alves, the
17 attorney/advisor; John Benedetto, the economist; John
18 Ascienzo, the auditor; and Jeff Clark, the industry
19 analyst.

20 I understand the parties are aware of the
21 time allocations. I would remind speakers not to
22 refer in your remarks to business proprietary
23 information and to speak directly into the
24 microphones.

25 We also ask you state your name and

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1 affiliation for the record before beginning your
2 presentation. Are there any questions?

3 (No response.)

4 MR. CARPENTER: If not, welcome, Mr. Ellis;
5 please proceed with your opening statement.

6 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Mr. Carpenter and
7 members of the staff. Good morning, my name is Neil
8 Ellis from Sidley Austin, and I represent Petitioners,
9 Archer Daniels Midland Company, Cargill, Incorporated,
10 and Tate & Lyle Americas, Inc.

11 Together, these companies comprise virtually
12 the entire U.S. industry for citric acid and certain
13 citrate salts, the subject merchandise of this
14 investigation. For convenience, I'm going to use the
15 term just citric acid during my presentation.

16 A good starting point for today's discussion
17 is the Commission's negative determination in the
18 previous investigation of imports of citric acid from
19 China in early 2000. It is worth highlighting the
20 significant changes in the market that have occurred
21 over the past eight years, which have resulted in
22 severe injury to the U.S. industry and threat of
23 continuing injury caused by unfairly traded imports
24 from China and Canada. I've got a slide up there
25 showing some of the major differences between the two

1 periods.

2 Looking at the Commission's views in 2000,
3 it is clear that the negative outcome was underpinned
4 by two major considerations. First, in that year,
5 nonsubject imports were a significant presence in the
6 U.S. market, and they were seen as a more direct cause
7 of whatever injury was inflicted on the U.S. industry
8 than were imports from China.

9 Second, the U.S. market was seen as divided
10 into two segments: food and beverage, and industrial.
11 Although imports from China were increasing, it was
12 generally understood that the Chinese product could
13 not compete in the large food and beverage segment of
14 the U.S. market.

15 As you will hear from our witnesses this
16 morning, neither of these conditions exist today. The
17 subject imports have grown overwhelmingly since 2000.
18 Canadian production did not even exist back then.
19 Yet, in 2007, Canadian imports represented one third
20 of total U.S. imports.

21 Chinese production has increased almost 20
22 fold since 2000, with the result that imports from
23 China now represent approximately one half of total
24 imports in the year 2007.

25 No other sources of imports of citric acid

1 come even close to these two. In fact, the total
2 subject imports accounted for over 80 percent of total
3 imports of citric acid in 2007.

4 There can be no question that now, unlike
5 2000, subject imports are playing a critical role in
6 the conditions that plague the U.S. market.

7 As to the second difference from the year
8 2000 to today, there has been a major improvement in
9 the quality of the product imported from China. This
10 is a direct result of the huge investment in expanding
11 and improving capacity in China, due in no small part
12 to the generous subsidies provided by the Chinese
13 national and provincial governments.

14 There again can be no question but that as a
15 result, Chinese citric acid is a heavy presence in the
16 food and beverage segment of the U.S. market, unlike
17 the year 2000; and that major users of U.S. citric
18 acid in that segment of the market consider Chinese
19 product to be an acceptable source of citric acid for
20 their ingestible products.

21 Chinese imports into the United States are
22 now so overwhelming that they are far larger than the
23 total quantity consumed in the relatively small
24 industrial segment of the market.

25 The developments in the Chinese industry

1 that in 2000 were predicted to take two to three years
2 to occur have now long since occurred eight years
3 later. Of course, JBL, the Canadian producer, has the
4 most recently constructed plant in North American, and
5 therefore the most modern equipment.

6 Again, there can be no question but that
7 product incorporated from Canada is of the quality
8 required to serve the food and beverage segment of the
9 U.S. market, and that it does, in fact, serve that
10 market.

11 Thus, the conditions of competition are very
12 different during the current period of investigation,
13 as compared to those in the prior investigation. The
14 result is that we have a commodity product with high
15 fixed costs, for which competition is driven by price.

16 Further, the cost of goods sold has
17 increased recently, due in large part to the
18 increasing costs of raw material inputs used in the
19 production of citric acid.

20 But the price competition from unfairly
21 traded imports has made it impossible for the U.S.
22 industry to sell citric acid at prices that would
23 enable them to cover their costs and obtain an
24 adequate return on their investment.

25 Thus, over the current POI, the U.S.

1 industry has been suffering material injury. This
2 injury has been felt across the board by all members
3 of the industry and over an extended period of time,
4 and the injury is directly caused by the unfairly
5 traded imports. We will hear further testimony on
6 these points from Petitioner's panel later this
7 morning; thank you.

8 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you, Mr. Ellis.

9 Mr. Waite and Mr. Porter, please?

10 MR. WAITE: Good morning, Mr. Carpenter and
11 members of the Commission staff. My name is Fred
12 Waite. I am counsel to Jungbunzlauer Technology, the
13 only producer of citric acid in Canada.

14 When the Commission looks at the volume and
15 pricing of Canadian imports of citric acid, it is
16 looking at JBL, a reliable, responsible, and high
17 quality supplier, that has benefitted and not harmed
18 the U.S. market.

19 In fact, customers in the United States
20 consider JBL to be an additional domestic supplier,
21 along with the Petitioners.

22 In my 150 seconds this morning, I want to
23 emphasize several significant facts that distinguish
24 JBL and this case from the cases that the Commission
25 often sees.

1 First, JBL's prices for citric acid in the
2 U.S. market are consistently higher than other
3 suppliers' prices, including the domestic industries'
4 own prices. The information already on the record
5 shows that throughout the period of investigation, JBL
6 oversold the domestic producers.

7 Second, JBL is producing at virtually full
8 capacity, so there can be no threat that it can
9 increase shipments to any significant degree.

10 Third, the domestic industry treats JBL as
11 one of its own. We will discuss this point further
12 during our panel's presentation later this morning.

13 Fourth, in every year of the period of
14 investigation, JBL announced price increases and tried
15 to increase the price of citric acid in the U.S.
16 market.

17 Fifth, like the Petitioners, JBL ships
18 directly from its plant to customers in the United
19 States.

20 Sixth, JBL sells a premium product at a
21 premium price.

22 For these reasons, we urge the Commission to
23 make a negative determination with regard to Canada.
24 We know that negative determinations are unusual in
25 the preliminary phase of an investigation. But we

1 submit that these unusual conditions warrant such a
2 result here; thank you.

3 MR. PORTER: Mr. Carpenter, for the record,
4 my name is Daniel Porter, with the law firm of Heller
5 Ehrman, LLP.

6 I appear today on behalf of Chinese
7 producers and exports. Mr. Carpenter, Mr. Waite and I
8 split the brief time allotted for the opening
9 statement to make an important point. The Commission
10 should not cumulate imports from China and Canada in
11 its causation analysis.

12 In this particular market, the U.S. market,
13 there's simply not a sufficient overlapping
14 competition between Chinese producers and JBL to
15 justify cumulation.

16 Mr. Carpenter, as you know well, eight years
17 ago, these same U.S. producers came to Washington,
18 came to this very building, and alleged they were
19 suffering material injury from competition from citric
20 acid imports from China.

21 The Commission rejected their argument,
22 because the available evidence of the record
23 demonstrated the actual competitive dynamics were far
24 different. Essentially, the Commission found that the
25 U.S. market was a big market with several distinct

1 segments, and that the Chinese suppliers and U.S.
2 suppliers focused their competitive energies on
3 different segments.

4 Mr. Carpenter, there is no question that
5 eight years later, much has changed in the world,
6 including the citric acid world. However, as you will
7 hear from the industry representatives, the
8 Commission's essential conclusion remains the same.
9 The U.S. citric acid market is still a big market.
10 Overall demand is still much more than the three U.S.
11 producers can supply. So imports are required.

12 Still today, the physical nature of the
13 citric acid product means that U.S. and Chinese
14 suppliers focus their competitive energies on
15 different parts of the market.

16 Mr. Carpenter, please do not misunderstand
17 my argument. I am not arguing that there is no
18 competition between Chinese and U.S. producers. There
19 are undoubtedly some customer accounts for which the
20 Chinese and U.S. suppliers vie.

21 However, when you step back and examine the
22 entire market, as the Commission is required to do, we
23 are confident that the record evidence will
24 demonstrate that the nature and composition of the
25 competition between the Chinese and U.S. suppliers is

1 not sufficient for an affirmative preliminary
2 determination; thank you.

3 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you, gentlemen, for
4 those comments. Mr. Ellis, would you please bring
5 your panel forward at this time.

6 MR. ELLIS: Good morning; thank you again,
7 Mr. Carpenter and members of the staff. To provide
8 more information regarding the themes that I presented
9 earlier, I'd like to turn to representatives of the
10 U.S. industry, who will address specific issues in the
11 citric acid industry and are available to answer your
12 questions.

13 As brief introductions, first, John Oakley,
14 to my right, is the Business Director of Food
15 Additives at Archer Daniels Midland Company. He will
16 provide an introduction to the product itself,
17 including the physical characteristics, how it is
18 manufactured, and its principle uses.

19 Second, Mark Christiansen, to his right, the
20 Acidulants Sales Manager at Cargill, Incorporated,
21 will provide an overview of the marketing and
22 distribution aspects for the subject merchandise. He
23 will specifically address the pricing structure of the
24 market and the influence of what is known as the China
25 price on annual negotiations with major customers.

1 Third, Curt Poulos, Commercial Director of
2 Food Ingredients, Acidulants, of Tate & Lyle Americas,
3 will address the financial conditions of the citric
4 acid industry.

5 Due to the price suppression caused by the
6 subject imports, U.S. producers have been unable to
7 increase their prices to cover rising costs, and have
8 been unable to finance investment in new capacity.
9 Mr. Poulos will explain this in more detail. He will
10 also explain why pricing from Canada and China does
11 not appear to be in accordance with market principles.

12 Fourth, Chuck Anderson and Andrew
13 Szamosszegi, from Capital Trade, Inc., will discuss
14 the economics of the conditions of competition,
15 threat, and causation.

16 These witnesses are accompanied by other
17 personnel from the U.S. producers, who are available
18 to answer your questions. With that, I'd like to turn
19 the floor over to John Oakley from ADM, to introduce
20 you to the citric acid product and market; thank you.

21 MR. OAKLEY: Good morning, I'm John Oakley
22 of the Archer, Daniels, Midland Company. I am
23 currently the Business Director for the Food Additives
24 Group, which includes the citric acid and citrates
25 products.

1 Over the last six years, I have been
2 involved with the citric product line through sales
3 and management roles. This has provided me the
4 opportunity to gain much experience with the citric
5 and citrate products, and the markets for those
6 products.

7 We have extensively described in our
8 petition the characteristics, uses, channels of
9 distribution, and processes used to manufacture citric
10 acid and the certain citrate salts of concern to the
11 domestic industry. In my presentation, I will briefly
12 touch upon those topics in highlighting the commodity
13 nature of these products.

14 Citric acid, sodium citrate, and potassium
15 citrate are all commodity chemicals produced and
16 consumed worldwide. All three products are commonly
17 available as odorless, translucent crystals. In this
18 dry form, they are sold in two primary different
19 granulation sizes: granular and fine granular. A
20 very small amount is sold in powder form.

21 The granulation styles, particularly
22 granular and fine, which are the most common, are
23 comparably priced. The products also are sold in only
24 a limited packaging. The dry forms typically are
25 packed in 50 pound or 25 kilogram polyethylene line

1 bags; or alternatively, in super sacks, which are bulk
2 bags typically containing up to one metric ton.

3 If the products are sold in solution, which
4 is usually water, there is no packaging. These
5 limited packaging alternatives also exemplify the
6 commodity nature of the goods.

7 Citric acid is used in the food and beverage
8 industry, primarily as an acidulant, preservative, and
9 flavor enhancer, because of its tart flavor, high
10 solubility, acidity, and buffering capabilities. It
11 is commonly used in carbonated and non-carbonated
12 drinks, dry powdered beverages, wines and wine
13 coolers, jams, jellies, preserves, gelatin desserts,
14 candies, frozen foods, and canned fruits and
15 vegetables.

16 Citric acid is also used in household
17 detergents, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, metal
18 finishers and cleaners, durable press textile
19 finishing treatments, and numerous other industrial
20 applications. Probably the largest application, other
21 than in the food and beverage sector is in the
22 detergents.

23 Sodium citrate and potassium citrate, the
24 citrate salts of concern, have many of the same end
25 uses as citric acid, so I will not spend any time

1 reiterating those uses.

2 Suffice it to say, the products are produced
3 by the same companies, are sold in the same market,
4 largely to the same customers, and at overlapping
5 prices.

6 As for unrefined calcium citrate, it is an
7 intermediate product, produced by manufacturers that
8 use the lime sulfuric refining method. I do not
9 believe that there is much current trade in this
10 product in the world today. However, we know that in
11 the past, unrefined calcium citrate has been produced
12 in one country and shipped to another country for
13 finishing into citric acid.

14 Unrefined calcium citrate, to my knowledge,
15 has no other use than to serve as an input into the
16 citric acid production.

17 My colleagues and I will be happy to respond
18 to any questions you might have about the
19 characteristics, production, or other issues regarding
20 unrefined calcium citrate.

21 Although there clearly are a large number of
22 applications for citric acid and the citrate salts,
23 our production equipment is set up to produce to only
24 one standard. That standard is a combination of the
25 food chemical codex, or FCC, and United States

1 pharmacopia, or USP, requirements.

2 Our U.S. facility, and I believe the
3 facilities of our competitors as well, can be run to
4 produce 100 percent food grade citric acid; that is,
5 product that meets FCC and USP requirements.

6 While some production does not meet the food
7 grade standards, the amount is less than the quality
8 that is sold for non-food applications. Therefore,
9 much of what is sold to the industrial users is
10 product that meets the FCC USP requirements.

11 As we described in our petition, this is an
12 industry where customers are highly concentrated.
13 Even though citric acid has many uses, the fact is
14 that approximately 75 percent of all citric acid,
15 sodium citrate, and potassium citrate sold in the
16 United States, is sold to about 25 end users.

17 These important customers, as Mark
18 Christiansen will tell you, typically purchase citric
19 acid, sodium citrate, and potassium citrate through
20 fixed price, fixed term contracts. Those customers
21 are driven overwhelmingly by considerations of price,
22 once the FCC and USP quality standard has been met.

23 For many years, large national distributors
24 have been among ADM's most important customers.
25 However, in recent years, our Chinese and Canadian

1 competitors have been particularly aggressive at
2 wrestling those accounts away from us.

3 As is often the case, targeting distributors
4 is the easiest and quickest way for importers to get
5 their product into the market. The distributors can
6 perform much of the leg work, convincing end users
7 that the product is of acceptable quality.

8 They can also allay potential customer
9 concerns about delivery and availability of imported
10 product by carrying inventory in the United States.
11 If stored properly, hydrous citric acid can have a
12 shelf life of three or more years.

13 The point at which ADM competes with imports
14 in the distributor market is when their customers are
15 offered Chinese or Canadian product in lieu of ADM
16 product at lower prices. We lose the sale to the
17 distributor, because they have lost the order to
18 another distributor offering this lower priced import
19 product.

20 Pretty soon, even our most loyal
21 distributors tell us that they have to carry Chinese
22 or Canadian product along with our product, in order
23 to offer their customers lower prices.

24 Reinforcing the commodity nature of the
25 products is the fact that all major producers are

1 using similar production methods. All of them use a
2 two stage production process.

3 The first stage is the fermentation of a
4 starch or sugar base, using a fermenting organism,
5 normally a specific mold or yeast. The second stage
6 is the recovery and refining of the crude citric acid
7 produced by the fermentation. For the first stage, we
8 believe that most of the world's major producers use
9 the deep tank method, and most rely on corn as the
10 starting raw material. The additional raw material
11 inputs are the same or very similar across producers.

12 For the second stage, there are three
13 commonly available processes: the lime sulfuric acid
14 method, the solvent extraction method, and the ion
15 exchange method. Even with these different technology
16 options, the fixed capital costs are similar, and the
17 efficiencies of one second stage technology, as
18 compared to another, are not so different that it
19 could give a significant pricing advantage to a
20 particular producer.

21 Looking at both production stages together,
22 the fixed capital costs for large volume production of
23 citric acid are significant. Therefore, manufacturers
24 have the usual incentive of manufacturers in
25 industries with high capital costs to keep their

1 plants running as close to full capacity as possible.
2 This reinforces the price driven nature of the market
3 for these goods.

4 As for the production of sodium citrate and
5 potassium citrate, both begin with citric acid as
6 their raw material input. At ADM, we divert a stream
7 of unfinished citric acid slurry to a tank known as a
8 reactor, where it is converted into sodium citrate by
9 reacting the refined citric acid with sodium hydroxide
10 or sodium carbonate, and then crystallizing the
11 resulting sodium citrate.

12 The same equipment and processes are used to
13 produce potassium citrate by reacting the citric acid
14 slurry with potassium hydroxide or potassium
15 carbonate.

16 There are no meaningful technological
17 alternatives for these reaction and crystallization
18 processes that would give one producer a competitive
19 advantage in pricing its goods.

20 In addition, the capital equipment
21 investment needed to produce sodium citrate or
22 potassium citrate from citric acid is low, and
23 independent converters can and do produce these
24 citrates using finished citric acid as the input.
25 With such low barriers to entry by potential

1 converters, significant pricing premiums are not
2 possible.

3 In terms of pricing, citric acid and sodium
4 citrate are very comparable, with sodium priced a
5 little lower than citric acid, reflecting its lower
6 dry weight cost.

7 Chinese producers have been particularly
8 aggressive in offering lower priced sodium citrate in
9 the U.S. market. Potassium citrate is priced somewhat
10 higher than the other two products. However, this is
11 because of the substantially higher and ever-
12 increasing cost of potassium hydroxide, the chemical
13 that is used to convert citric acid to potassium
14 citrate. The higher price does not reflect higher
15 profit margins.

16 On a citric only basis, adjusting for the
17 value of potassium, the price of citric acid and
18 potassium citrate are similar.

19 In the last investigation of citric acid in
20 2000, the Commission found that the market was
21 segmented into two portions, with one of those
22 portions, the food and beverage sector, insulated from
23 Chinese import competition.

24 Even though the market quality standard was
25 and is the FCC and USP criteria, at the time of the

1 2000 investigation, there were significant quantities
2 of Chinese goods that, in fact, did not meet those
3 standards and were present in the U.S. market place.
4 In the intervening years, those quality issues with
5 regard to Chinese imports have largely disappeared.

6 While some lower grade product produced by
7 one of the dozens of small scale Chinese producers
8 does find its way to the U.S., most of Chinese imports
9 these days come from five or so large scale producers,
10 such as BBKA, RZBC, Yixing Union, TTCA, and DSM.

11 These producers have world class equipment,
12 and produce citric acid and citrate salts that meet
13 food and beverage purity and quality standards. In
14 fact, since the last dumping case, Chinese goods have
15 fully penetrated the food and beverage sector of the
16 U.S. marketplace.

17 In addition, Canadian product is of the same
18 quality as that produced in the United States, and
19 there has never been a question as to the ability of
20 Canadian product to meet the requirements of the U.S.
21 food and beverage sector.

22 Therefore, the market segmentation no longer
23 has any significance for the purpose of restricting
24 Chinese competition, and pricing is uniform across the
25 entire market for citric acid, as would be expected in

1 a commodity market.

2 Finally, I would like to relate to the Staff
3 our experience with unfair trade in Europe. As you
4 will hear later this morning, imports of Chinese
5 product into the EU are three times the volume of
6 imports into the U.S., even though the EU market is
7 only slightly larger than the U.S. market.

8 This massive volume of unfairly traded
9 imports forced us to close down our plant in Ringus
10 Guinea, Ireland. We are worried that if the EU
11 imposes dumping duties on imports of Chinese citric
12 acid this summer, this volume will be directed at the
13 U.S. market, further imperiling our continuing
14 operations at our U.S. plant.

15 Even without additional volumes from China,
16 the current levels of subject imports have forced
17 prices down, reduced our volumes, and created a
18 situation of unsustainable financial returns.

19 The recent impressive economic performance
20 of other ADM business lines highlights the poor
21 economic performance of the citric acid division even
22 more, and makes it more difficult for the company to
23 justify remaining in this business.

24 This concludes my remarks. I would be happy
25 to answer any questions.

1 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, John; we would now
2 like to hear from Mark Christiansen, the Acidulants
3 Sales Manager at Cargill, Inc., who will provide an
4 overview of the marketing and distribution of the
5 subject merchandize; thank you.

6 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Good morning, my name is
7 Mark Christiansen, and I am the Cargill Sales Manager
8 for Acidulants, which includes citric acid and its
9 derivatives, sodium citrate, and potassium citrate.

10 My job is to sell our company's annual
11 output of citric acid; hopefully at prices that will
12 ensure that our costs are covered and the company
13 earns a fair return on its significant investment.

14 Believe me, my job has been very difficult
15 over the past several years. The increasing presence
16 of Chinese and Canadian citric acid in the U.S. market
17 has driven prices down from levels we think are
18 appropriate and necessary, and have forced Cargill to
19 sell at prices that, at times, do not even meet our
20 manufacturing costs.

21 I am here today to describe to you the
22 market for citric acid and its close derivatives,
23 sodium citrate and potassium citrate.

24 As you have heard from John Oakley, citric
25 acid, sodium and potassium citrates, are basic

1 commodities. As a marketing guy, I like to focus our
2 customers on Cargill's superior quality and service.
3 But the reality is that price is the overwhelming
4 driver in the market for this product.

5 The importance of price in purchasing
6 decisions is magnified by the way in which the product
7 is sold. It is important for the Commission to
8 understand the essential nature of the citric acid
9 market, under which I and my counterparts at ADM and
10 Tate & Lyle must operate.

11 That essential nature is this. Towards the
12 end of every year, November and December, Cargill,
13 along with other U.S. producers, negotiates to sell
14 almost 80 percent of its total output for the upcoming
15 year. A very small number of large customers account
16 for the bulk of the order volume.

17 Because we must sell our output to a few
18 large customers within a very short window, the
19 customers have tremendous negotiating leverage. It is
20 almost like a reverse auction. At some point, Cargill
21 and other U.S. producers must meet the customers'
22 price requirements, in order to book sufficient orders
23 for the coming production year.

24 If we miss out on a major order or two,
25 early in the selling season, the pressure on Cargill

1 to lower prices to gain remaining orders can become
2 enormous.

3 During this period of concentrated sales
4 activity, non-price factors such as availability or
5 delivery terms or payment terms are not a major factor
6 in the negotiations. Since sales are being negotiated
7 for a year, timely delivery is simply assumed.
8 Frankly, if I have sold out next year's production and
9 don't have product available, I simply would not bid
10 for the business.

11 As for the Chinese and Canadian material,
12 it's certainly is comparable in terms of non-price
13 factors. Much of the Chinese product is imported by
14 distributors such as Unibar and Mitsubishi. These
15 companies and other major distributors have taken the
16 lead in insuring that there are substantial
17 inventories of imported product available.

18 Maybe eight years ago, U.S. customers might
19 have been concerned about the time it would take to
20 obtain product from China in a timely fashion. But
21 that is no longer the case. There is plenty of
22 Chinese inventory available, and the JBL plant in
23 Canada does not have any locational disadvantages in
24 comparison to U.S. producers.

25 Then there is the issue of quality. I

1 understand that in the last antidumping investigation
2 in 2000, the Commission found that Chinese imports of
3 citric acid were not injuring the U.S. industry,
4 because they had not penetrated the food and beverage
5 market in any significant degree.

6 Much of the imported product from China at
7 that time was in the monohydrate form; whereas, many
8 U.S. users prefer citric acid in its anhydrous form.
9 Canada was not even a factor at all. The site at Port
10 Colborne was still a green field.

11 Well, as Neil has told you, things have
12 changed significantly since then. Many customers have
13 told me that the quality of citric acid coming from
14 China is world class. As a result of support and
15 subsidies from the Chinese government, Chinese
16 manufacturers have invested substantial sums in deep
17 tank fermentation equipment, sophisticated
18 extractions, and full drying capabilities.

19 All of the major Chinese exporters that I
20 know of meet the USP and FCC standards for food and
21 beverage uses.

22 To the extent that major customers require
23 pre-qualification, I believe that Chinese producers
24 have successfully passed this hurdle; and there is no
25 question that JBL Canada, with the newest plant in

1 North America, offers citric acid of the highest
2 quality and has no problem qualifying as a supplier.

3 The Commission undoubtedly has heard about
4 the so-called China price. In an annual bidding
5 cycle, such as that for citric acid, the China price
6 can be particularly devastating. Customers only have
7 to raise the specter of sourcing from China, or in the
8 past few years, from Canada, and Cargill is forced to
9 respond to this threat by dropping its price
10 significantly.

11 It doesn't matter if the customer is in the
12 food and beverage or the industrial business. In all
13 instances, price is the principle factor.

14 JBL has also been particularly aggressive on
15 price. With a new plant in a small domestic market,
16 JBL has had to secure orders from large U.S. end users
17 and national distributors, in order to justify its
18 substantial investment.

19 I've been told by my customers that JBL has
20 offered aggressive pricing, sometimes for multiple
21 year agreements, in an attempt to gain large volume
22 orders from key U.S. customers.

23 I suspect that later today, you'll hear how
24 Chinese imports have dropped recently; thus,
25 alleviating downward pressure on U.S. markets.

1 However, the question that I would ask the Chinese
2 producers is, why have imports suddenly dropped?

3 The answer is, since the EU launched a
4 dumping investigation last year, the market has been
5 ripe with rumors about a possible U.S. case.
6 Restraint may be temporary in the hope that an
7 investigation in the U.S. would not be launched.

8 I understand that although U.S. import data
9 shows a drop in imports from China, so far in 2008,
10 Chinese export data shows substantial increases in
11 exports from China to the U.S. Thus, I do not expect
12 that the minor blip in market improvement in the past
13 two months is a sign of a long term market trend that
14 will continue if the Commission does not allow this
15 investigation to go forward.

16 Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any
17 questions you may have.

18 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Mark.

19 We will now hear from Curt Poulos, the
20 Commercial Director of Food Ingredients and Acidulants
21 of Tate & Lyle Americas, who will address the
22 financial conditions of the citric acid industry and
23 the injury inflicted by unfairly traded imports; than
24 you, Curt.

25 MR. POULOS: Good morning, my name is Curt

1 Poulos, and I'm the Commercial Director for Acidulants
2 at Tate & Lyle Americas. My responsibilities include
3 sales to key global accounts and worldwide
4 coordination of acidulant sales, include citric acid.

5 I have been in and around the citric acid
6 industry for most of my 28 year professional career.
7 My friend at Cargill has given you a concise
8 explanation of the market dynamics for citric acid,
9 sodium citrate, and potassium citrate. I would like
10 to explain how those market conditions translate into
11 financial performance.

12 A good starting point is to review what has
13 been happening on the cost side. The principle raw
14 material input for citric acid production in North
15 America is corn. Anyone who reads the newspaper knows
16 that corn prices worldwide have been skyrocketing, as
17 more and more corn is used to produce ethanol.

18 You can see on the graphic the dramatic
19 changes in prices over the past several months.
20 Although these rising corn prices and demand for
21 ethanol are creating profits for some divisions within
22 the corporate family of citric acid producers, it is
23 having exactly the opposite effect on citric acid
24 profitability.

25 The second largest element for variable cost

1 is energy. Again, the graphic shows the dramatic
2 changes in energy for both natural gas and
3 electricity.

4 Electricity costs, as well as costs for
5 natural gas, are up substantially over the past three
6 years. So here is an industry facing rapidly rising
7 variable costs and tremendous price pressure caused by
8 a glut of imports. These are the classic conditions
9 for a price cost squeeze, and I believe the Commission
10 will readily see this, when they look at our financial
11 results.

12 U.S. producers simply have not been able to
13 raise prices to cover increasing costs. There is no
14 doubt that the presence of imports has been
15 suppressing U.S. prices. In its annual negotiations,
16 over the past three years, Tate & Lyle has repeatedly
17 asked its customers for higher prices to cover these
18 increased costs. But it has been unable to obtain
19 those price increases, because our customers use
20 Canadian and/or Chinese supply to leverage our prices
21 down.

22 Another important factor that the Commission
23 should be aware of is that citric acid plants are
24 continuous operations, and have to be operated around
25 the clock, seven days a week. As you have heard, this

1 is a very high, fixed cost industry. The cost, from a
2 technical standpoint, of slowing or shutting down,
3 even for short periods of time, is substantial.

4 These are highly automated continuous
5 processes that operate within very narrow parameters
6 to maintain good process control, and to meet the high
7 quality standards of our customers.

8 Slowing production is difficult to do from a
9 technical standpoint, as it will throw the processing
10 outside of its optimal parameters. Shutting down
11 operations for even a short period creates problems
12 with processing and environmental controls.

13 Our products must meet strict food and
14 pharmaceutical standards. If shut down, all the
15 equipment must be flushed and cleaned. This creates a
16 backup for our environmental control equipment, which
17 greatly extends the time required for the plant to
18 return to quality standards and full operation.

19 I'd like to discuss a few points about the
20 impact of the imports on our company's performance.
21 Because of poor market conditions, Tate & Lyle has
22 been unable even to consider additional capital
23 investment to increase efficiency or expand capacity
24 in the United States.

25 In fact, because of the global over-capacity

1 in citric acid production, which is almost exclusively
2 the consequence of expansion in China and Canada, Tate
3 & Lyle has reviewed its overall acidulance business,
4 and has had to consider closing its facility in the
5 United States.

6 The global pattern of closures in
7 unmistakable. The first to close its plant is where
8 Chinese competition is the fiercest. In Europe, where
9 imports from China are three times the level of the
10 United States, Tate & Lyle has already had to close
11 its plant in Selby, England.

12 This is not simply a situation of being
13 unable to justify new capital investment. Because of
14 poor market conditions, we have recently written down
15 the book value of our assets, on the basis that
16 projected earnings under current market conditions
17 fail to cover all costs, including future
18 depreciation.

19 Although this is considered a non-operating
20 expense, it is directly related to poor market
21 conditions in the citric acid business. This action,
22 I believe, is a direct result of competition with
23 unfairly traded imports, and should be considered by
24 the Commission as evidence of injury.

25 In addition to the ever-increasing supply

1 from China, Tate & Lyle, along with our U.S.
2 competitors, have had to deal with imports from a
3 brand new plant in Canada, just a few miles from the
4 United States border.

5 Obviously, this plant is aimed at the U.S.
6 market. Canada's domestic market simply is not large
7 enough to support a plant the size of JBL's. Early in
8 the decade, there was talk of a substantial new market
9 in Canada, associated with oil sand extraction. My
10 understanding is that the Chinese have captured that
11 market, which has forced more Canadian product into
12 the United States.

13 Because it is a new plant, JBL is saddled
14 with high fixed costs, which means that it is under
15 great pressure to maximize its sales volumes.

16 From a financial perspective, Tate & Lyle
17 will not produce citric acid indefinitely, if the
18 returns do not adequately justify this investment.
19 Citric acid is a capital intensive industry. A modern
20 world-class plant requires investment of over \$100
21 million. This equipment is operated in a hostile
22 environment. Citric acid is an acid, after all, and
23 must be regularly serviced and upgraded.

24 However, because of the extremely poor
25 financial returns in recent years, our management has

1 been reluctant to provide funds to invest in new
2 production capacity. Capital has been limited to only
3 the most urgent needs to maintain product quality
4 standards and the safety of our workforce.

5 More importantly, investment in new
6 processes and technology have been reduced; and as a
7 result, our ability to compete may be constrained over
8 the long term.

9 The U.S. industry's commitment to citric
10 acid becomes even more problematic in a period during
11 which other product lines are showing substantial
12 profits, and even greater potential returns. Our
13 companies have other opportunities where they can
14 invest their resources.

15 Unless the market conditions improve, I
16 suspect that all three U.S. producers will face
17 difficult decisions, when their plants require
18 significant investment. Our corporate management will
19 only accept investments which exceed the cost of
20 capital over the long term; thank you.

21 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Curt. We will now
22 hear from Chuck Anderson and Andrew Szamosszegi from
23 Capital Trade, who will discuss the conditions of
24 competition, threat and causation. Thank you. Chuck?

25 MR. ANDERSON: Good morning. Again, for the

1 record, I am Chuck Anderson with Capital Trade. You
2 have just heard about the product, the market and the
3 financial conditions of the U.S. citric acid and
4 certain citrate salts industry. I would now like to
5 place this information into the framework that the
6 Commission calls conditions of competition. My
7 colleague Andrew Szamosszegi will then discuss threat,
8 and then I will conclude with a brief presentation
9 about causation.

10 First and foremost, there is no doubt that,
11 on the spectrum of product types ranging from a highly
12 differentiated consumer product on the one end to a
13 pure commodity on the other, that citric acid falls
14 squarely on the commodity end. As is shown in the
15 slide before you, there are very few different grades
16 or forms or levels of quality for the subject
17 products, and really only two different packing
18 methods.

19 The market for the subject product, as you
20 have also heard, is fairly homogenous. There are two
21 distinct categories of end uses, one which might be
22 labeled fit for human consumption, which includes the
23 food and the beverage and the pharmaceutical, and the
24 other that is not ingestible, which we call
25 industrial. However, we do not expect to see huge

1 price differences between the two markets.

2 I am told by the company sales and marketing
3 people that it is volume more than any physical factor
4 or end use that drives price. Two cautionary comments
5 about pricing comparisons. First, citric acid in the
6 United States generally is sold on a delivered basis.
7 Freight is a significant factor, I think as your
8 questionnaire responses will show, so it is important
9 to know exactly at what geographical point a given
10 quote or sales price represents.

11 Second, competition between imports and
12 domestic sales takes place at both the distributor
13 level and at the end user level. Some of the major
14 distributors, according to PIERS data, are direct
15 importers. The U.S. industry loses sales to those
16 important customers when those customers choose to
17 import Chinese or Canadian product rather than
18 purchase U.S. product. Thus, in some instances, it is
19 the importer's purchase price, and not their reselling
20 price, which is the first point of competition with
21 the U.S. producers.

22 The second fact to keep in mind is that
23 demand for citric acid is derived from demand for the
24 products that use it, principally beverages, food
25 products and detergents. Moreover, citric acid

1 represents a small portion of the total costs of these
2 end use products, typically well less than 1%.
3 Accordingly, large changes in price have little effect
4 on the overall demand for citric acid.

5 In fact, demand has been fairly constant,
6 growing at the same rate as the overall economy. On
7 the demand side, the market is mature and stable with
8 no new major markets or applications during the POI.
9 A third important factor driving the economics of this
10 market is that it is a high fixed cost industry. As
11 Curt has explained, the production of citric acid in
12 the U.S. employs extensive, specialized equipment and
13 highly sophisticated automated process controls.

14 Like any fixed cost industry, when supply is
15 abundant and demand is not responsive to changes in
16 price, price will trend downwards towards marginal
17 cost, and there is no question that supply from
18 imports has been abundant. In 1999, the year that the
19 ITC conducted its last antidumping investigation of
20 citric acid, the Commission found that import volumes
21 of subject merchandise were approximately \$45 million.

22 Now, as you can see from this slide right
23 now, imports have risen to a level of around \$126
24 million, and we are showing this in value instead of
25 volume because the volume data for Canada is not made

1 public by Customs. Nevertheless, I believe that the
2 confidential data for Canada and the public Customs
3 data for China will show that the combined subject
4 imports represents a much larger portion of the total
5 U.S. market than the approximately 8% for China and 0%
6 for Canada calculated by the Commission in 1999/2000.

7 And there is no question that subject
8 imports now are in the all-important food and beverage
9 market in a big way. The next bar chart juxtaposes
10 the total industrial market in the U.S. with total
11 subject imports. It's total industrial market on the
12 left, total subject imports on the right. Thus, it is
13 clear to the naked eye that even if subject imports
14 were taking 100% of the industrial market, which by
15 the way we know they are not doing, there still would
16 be substantial volumes left over to serve food and
17 beverage customers.

18 The extensive lost sales and lost revenue
19 allegations provided in the petition also demonstrate
20 that subject imports now play a major role in the food
21 and beverage market. If the Commission wants
22 additional evidence of Chinese and Canadian presence
23 in this market, they need only peruse the internet.
24 As the Chinese sales offers and company website pages
25 show, and these are just two of many examples which we

1 will provide in our brief, many, many Chinese
2 producers are offering food-grade anhydrous product
3 for sale.

4 In addition, the PIERS data confirms that
5 most of the product coming in from China now is
6 anhydrous. Finally, I note that JBL's plant in Canada
7 undoubtedly produces anhydrous citric acid that is
8 perfectly suitable for food and beverage applications.
9 Another salient factor in considering the impact of
10 imports on the domestic industry is this annual
11 contracting cycle that Mark talked about.

12 The Commission does not often see such a
13 strong seasonality in contracting. I'm not talking
14 about sales, I'm talking about contracting. In
15 addition, as the top 10 customer lists for the U.S.
16 producers will show, there are very few customers that
17 account for the majority of sales. Since all major
18 suppliers are in the market, U.S. producers and
19 importers, and they are selling out most of next
20 year's available supply to a relatively few number of
21 customers within a very short time window, these few
22 customers have tremendous leverage in negotiating
23 price.

24 At some point, the U.S. producers have to
25 accept orders in order to lock in annual production

1 goals. A few large customers that hold out or switch
2 to subject imports at the early part of the
3 negotiating window can have a major impact on price
4 negotiations for the remaining large contracts. And
5 now Andrew will say a few words about threat.

6 MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Good morning. My name is
7 Andrew Szamosszegi, for the record, and I am with
8 Capital Trade. In addition to the indicators of
9 current injury, there are also very strong evidence
10 supporting a finding of threat of injury. In
11 particular, it is very difficult to ignore the 800-
12 pound gorilla in the room, which is large and growing
13 capacity in China.

14 The latest data we have indicate that total
15 capacity in China exceeds 1 million metric tons, or
16 2.2 billion pounds. This represents over half of the
17 worldwide capacity for citric acid, and capacity is
18 still rising. I do not know of any domestic demand
19 factors or comparative advantages that are driving
20 this dramatic increase in production capacity. As for
21 demand, the total Chinese market for citric acid
22 represents less than 20% of production capacity in
23 China.

24 As for comparative advantage, moderate
25 citric acid production is not based on cheap labor.

1 The most important components are the substrate upon
2 which the mold or yeast feeds, energy and capital
3 equipment. China has no comparative advantage in any
4 of the three. Taken together, these factors and their
5 true cost to China would suggest that, contrary to
6 what has occurred, China is not a very good platform
7 for global citric acid production.

8 Why, then, has China become the number one
9 platform for global citric acid production? Perhaps
10 the next slide, which contains a map of China's
11 provinces, can provide a clue. The provinces shaded
12 in red are reported to contain at least one citric
13 acid producer. As the map indicates, citric acid
14 production is widely dispersed across China.
15 Responding to government promotion of industry as well
16 as local development needs, sub-national governments
17 in China have created an environment conducive to
18 uncontrolled capacity expansion.

19 Provinces and local municipalities compete
20 with each other to build or add new citric acid
21 production capacity, completely ignoring the supply
22 and demand realities of the local and global markets.
23 This dynamic is underscored by the number of Chinese
24 firms represented in this proceeding. According to
25 one source, the citric acid production capacity in

1 China doubled between 2000 and 2005.

2 The extensive government support for the
3 Chinese citric acid industry is documented in our
4 countervailing duty petition. Despite the fact that
5 the national government has a program for shutting
6 down old, inefficient capacity, new, more modern,
7 export-oriented capacity continues to emerge. The
8 slide before you shows just three examples of the
9 announced capacity increases.

10 In other industries, China has justified its
11 enormous capacity build-up on the basis that the
12 country is only building to meet anticipated domestic
13 demand. This does not appear to be the case with
14 citric acid. According to a recent study, the Chinese
15 market is only expected to be, at most, 330,000 metric
16 tons in 2010, which still represents less than 30% of
17 current Chinese production capacity.

18 The production of this expanded industry can
19 only go one place, and that's off-shore, and there may
20 be fewer places for it to go. As several people on
21 this panel have mentioned, the ongoing antidumping
22 investigation in the EU threatens to divert
23 substantial quantities of Chinese product to the
24 United States. As you've already heard, shipments to
25 the European Union in 2007 were triple the volume of

1 exports to the United States from China.

2 Accordingly, if the EU market is closed or
3 significantly limited to China because of the actions
4 of the EU industry, which includes JBL, the pressure
5 to ship to the United States will be enormous. As
6 shown in the next slide, the total amount of product
7 shipped by China to the EU, combined with 2007 levels
8 of imports into the U.S. from China and Canada, almost
9 equals the entire U.S. market for these products.

10 Turning briefly to Canada, the most
11 important facts for the Commission to consider in
12 assessing the threat posed by Canadian imports are,
13 one, plant location, two, plant age, and three, market
14 size. The Canadian plant lies next to the U.S.
15 border, making the U.S. the natural market for JBL.
16 Transportation costs in this industry, after all, are
17 not insignificant.

18 Because the Canadian plant is relatively
19 new, it is likely saddled with high depreciation
20 costs, and hence, may have higher fixed costs than its
21 U.S. competitors. This places added pressure upon
22 management to run the plant flat-out in order to
23 spread fixed costs over as many units as possible, and
24 the local market is clearly incapable of absorbing
25 flat-out production, as demonstrated in the next

1 slide.

2 Finally, the presence of Chinese imports in
3 the Canadian market, particularly if the EU case is
4 successful, may make Canada an even more attractive
5 market for the Chinese product. I'll turn it back to
6 Mr. Anderson for conclusion.

7 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you. I'll now just say
8 a few words about causation. From an economic
9 perspective, this is not a particularly complicated
10 causation case. The U.S. industry has been performing
11 very poorly over the POI in what is a classic
12 commodity market. High fixed costs and inelastic
13 demand magnify the price, and ultimately the financial
14 impact of oversupply.

15 The highly concentrated selling period for
16 annual output makes price an even more important
17 factor in purchasing decisions. In terms of
18 causation, subject imports are the only likely main
19 culprit. The volume of subject imports is significant
20 and it is growing. To illustrate the importance of
21 subject imports, let's consider the other likely
22 suspects in the case of the decline of the U.S.
23 industry.

24 Number one, self-inflicted injury. Well,
25 there have been no significant disruptions of

1 production between 2005 and 2007. U.S. producers have
2 not engaged in expensive investments in unneeded
3 capacity, nor have they engaged in financially
4 draining acquisitions, and no one contests the quality
5 of the U.S. product or claims that it is unsuitable
6 for some uses.

7 What about non-subject imports? Well, they
8 are a small and declining factor in the U.S. market.
9 What about changes in demand? Demand is stable and
10 growing, and there have been no major new uses during
11 the POI for which the U.S. industry has missed the
12 boat. The basic fact is that citric acid and citrates
13 from China and Canada represent a very substantial and
14 growing part of the U.S. market.

15 In a commodity market, volumes at the level
16 of subject imports must erode U.S. financial
17 performance, both through lower prices and reduced
18 sales quantities, relative to the but-for world
19 without unfairly traded imports. These trends are
20 clearly visible in the data. Given these facts and
21 conditions, it is extremely difficult to envision a
22 scenario where imports are not a cause of injury.

23 Thank you. This concludes our testimony.

24 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Mr. Carpenter and
25 staff. That concludes the presentations of

1 Petitioners' panel. We are now happy to answer
2 questions you and your team may have for us.

3 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you, panel, very much
4 for your presentation. It was very helpful. Mr.
5 Ellis, did you say that you had paper copies of the
6 slides that you presented?

7 MR. ELLIS: Yes, we do.

8 MR. CARPENTER: Okay, fine. If we can give
9 one to the court reporter, we'll have that attached to
10 the transcript. Thank you. We'll begin the questions
11 with Mr. Cassise.

12 MR. CASSISE: Good morning, Mr. Ellis.
13 Welcome all that have come to our conference. I'd
14 like to begin the questioning with this issue of
15 market segmentation that you've argued has gone away
16 since our 2000 investigation. I'd like to start by
17 just what the standards are and the different end
18 uses. You have in the petition in the exhibits the
19 standards from the USP and the FCC.

20 I'd like one of the industry witnesses to
21 just point to me somewhere in those standards, what
22 were the Chinese imports in 2000 not meeting, what
23 were they failing to meet in those standards in 2000,
24 and what you claim they have subsequently remedied.
25 I'd kind of like just some specificity.

1 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I'll do my best to answer
2 your question. Back in 2000, what I feel the Chinese
3 were lacking on their specifications was very little
4 compared to what we would have on our specifications
5 for the USP and FCC standards. I believe it was more
6 of an issue that at that point in time the Chinese
7 were still expanding their industry. Today's level of
8 sophistication that they have at their facilities and
9 the amount of capacity they have there has brought
10 their facilities up to world-class standards, and are
11 well in line with the USP and FCC standards.

12 MR. CASSISE: Okay, and I guess that's what
13 I am trying to get at is that, even in the petition,
14 there's this, in my mind, a contradiction where you
15 don't produce to set standards, but yet you claim that
16 there are standards. You know, I think Mr. Oakley
17 said, well, we produce everything to one standard, but
18 some of it doesn't meet that standard, so I need a
19 little bit more specificity on these standards.

20 You just say they meet the standards and
21 they have more sophisticated production. Is there
22 anything in the standards that you gave us in the
23 petition that, you know, what meets the standards,
24 what did the Chinese not meet in 2000 and what did
25 they do in the interim to meet those standards? I

1 mean, besides just saying it's more sophisticated. I
2 mean, maybe you don't know. I'll get that this
3 afternoon. I just wanted to have your opinion on the
4 record.

5 MR. OAKLEY: I think two of the keys would
6 be around the impurity level of the product and
7 granulation. Industries, certain customers and
8 industries call for specific, consistent granulation
9 to run their processes efficiently. In my opinion,
10 back in the 2000 case, a lot of the Chinese production
11 did not have that consistent product, or their
12 impurities were too high.

13 MR. CASSISE: Okay. Mr. Oakley, that also
14 brings me back to my question that I cited your
15 testimony in my question which, and I just want to
16 clarify that you say that ADM produces all of their
17 citric acid, their production is set up to produce one
18 standard of quality.

19 MR. OAKLEY: Correct.

20 MR. CASSISE: But yet, you say that some of
21 it ends up, the end product doesn't meet certain
22 standards. What happens within the manufacturing
23 process that makes different standards?

24 MR. OAKLEY: Generally, again, one of the
25 things that can happen is it can be around this

1 granulation issue. If we are producing to a certain
2 specification, there are granulation specifications
3 within that. If the product does not meet it, it
4 can't be sold into that industry. So, generally what
5 would happen is it would be deemed an industrial type
6 of product.

7 MR. CASSISE: But it's not, I mean, is this
8 a random thing? I mean, do you flip a switch that
9 says, okay, today FCC standards, let's flip another
10 switch tomorrow that says industrial standards, or is
11 it completely random?

12 MR. OAKLEY: It would be generally an issue
13 with the production process, a problem, if you will.

14 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

15 MR. OAKLEY: So we produce consistently to
16 100% FCC/USP specifications.

17 MR. CASSISE: So you get a bad batch, it
18 becomes industrial?

19 MR. OAKLEY: When we get a bad batch, yes.

20 MR. CASSISE: Okay. How many bad batches do
21 you have? What share would be called bad batches on a
22 given year?

23 MR. OAKLEY: I don't know that right off the
24 top of my head.

25 MR. STALOCH: I do, but it's very small.

1 It's like less than .1% in a year, so it's very, very
2 small.

3 MR. CASSISE: Okay, would that mean that in
4 order to supply the industrial market, you would, for
5 lack of a better term, have intentional bad batches?

6 MR. STALOCH: No, you would just use your
7 food-grade, put that in the industrial market. Like
8 we said, it comes off the crystallizer, it's sieved,
9 and it's basically one product and it serves into all
10 the different markets. So if it's a dry product, it's
11 basically the same.

12 MR. CASSISE: So there wouldn't be a price
13 premium for, say, well, there wouldn't be a price
14 decline for industrial?

15 MR. STALOCH: That's correct. No.

16 MR. CASSISE: A quick question on the
17 unrefined calcium citrate. Is anybody aware of any
18 imports of that product coming into the United States?

19 MR. ELLIS: It appears that nobody is aware
20 of UCC coming to the United States.

21 MR. CASSISE: Okay. Thank you. This
22 question is for, I think, ADM and Cargill. I'm
23 assuming you produce the corn you use as a raw
24 material in your production process, is that correct?

25 MR. STALOCH: The farmer produces the corn.

1 We buy the corn, turn it into dextrose.

2 MR. CASSISE: So you would be paying market
3 prices for that corn?

4 MR. STALOCH: Correct.

5 MR. CASSISE: Is there a -- I mean, we saw
6 the chart. Corn prices have almost tripled in the
7 last year or so, and the petition mentions that
8 there's other alternatives you could use to corn. Is
9 there a tipping point where corn is no longer
10 profitable at all to use? Have we reached that point?
11 Any comment on that?

12 MR. STALOCH: Are you saying corn relative
13 to other feed stocks, or would we --

14 MR. CASSISE: Yes, let's start with this.
15 What are the other feed stocks that can be used to
16 make citric acid?

17 MR. STALOCH: Well, you could use sugar, but
18 that's very, very high. That's probably, corn would
19 have to get to be about \$20 a bushel --

20 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

21 MR. STALOCH: -- to use sugar.

22 MR. CASSISE: Okay, is sugar the only
23 alternative?

24 MR. STALOCH: You could use other forms of
25 starch like potato starch, but those are also very

1 expensive, so in the U.S., corn is the most economical
2 still.

3 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

4 MR. STALOCH: You could use wheat, but
5 that's quadrupled in price.

6 MR. CASSISE: Right. So you would estimate
7 corn would have to get to \$20 a bushel before you even
8 thought of using another feed stock?

9 MR. STALOCH: Well, for sugar, because as
10 you know, sugar is not at world price here. It's
11 double world price, so yes, we would not use sugar.

12 MR. CASSISE: Are you aware of the primary
13 feed stock that the Chinese producers use? Is it also
14 corn?

15 MR. STALOCH: They use basically mostly
16 corn. They've used potatoes in the past. They've
17 used sugar, molasses, but the majority of it is corn,
18 is what we believe.

19 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

20 MR. ANDERSON: I might want to elaborate on
21 that. You'll see some of the studies show that there
22 is tapioca and there is sweet potato also used in
23 China, but we believe that the major producers using
24 the deep tank fermentation have switched to corn.
25 Corn does have certain advantages. You do get a

1 higher quality product, generally, from that. So in
2 terms of what's coming to the United States, it's our
3 belief that corn is the principal substrate.

4 MR. CASSISE: Okay. Thank you. I don't
5 know if anyone wants to mention potassium citrate,
6 which wasn't involved in the prior investigation. I'm
7 sure you'll brief it in your post-conference brief,
8 but did anybody want to make the argument that there
9 is not a major difference between potassium citrate
10 and sodium citrate and citric acid? I mean, the end
11 uses are pretty much the same. Any distinguishing end
12 uses for just potassium?

13 MR. STALOCH: I could answer that. The
14 biggest thing about sodium citrate and potassium
15 citrate, the major cost is the citric acid molecule,
16 so that's what's made in the process, and then you
17 react that with either caustic or potassium hydroxide,
18 so that's how the three are related. The major
19 molecule is citric acid.

20 MR. CASSISE: Okay, thank you.

21 MR. ELLIS: Excuse me. Of course, we will
22 address further, obviously --

23 MR. CASSISE: Right, I understand. I just
24 wondered if anyone had any comments they wanted to
25 mention here. I fully assume you'll brief that in

1 your --

2 (Pause.)

3 MR. CASSISE: That's all I have for right
4 now. Thank you.

5 MR. CARPENTER: Ms. Alves?

6 MS. ALVES: Good morning. Mary Jane Alves
7 from the General Counsel's Office. Thank you again
8 for coming this morning. Your testimony already has
9 been quite helpful. I do have a number of questions
10 for you. First, Mr. Carpenter had already mentioned
11 this morning -- and thank you for giving us copies of
12 the PowerPoint slides -- have you also given copies to
13 Respondent's counsel as well?

14 MR. ELLIS: Yes, we have.

15 MS. ALVES: Okay. Just checking. Let me
16 start off with the scope of these investigations. I
17 realize Chris has already talked a little bit about
18 the fact that there is now potassium citrate included
19 in the scope, as well as unrefined calcium citrate.
20 Can you talk to me a little bit about why both of
21 those products were included in the scope? Is it
22 simply for circumvention purposes, or are there new
23 uses that weren't previously out there?

24 MR. ELLIS: I'll address the unrefined
25 calcium citrate and I'll ask others to address the

1 potassium. On the unrefined calcium citrate, there is
2 a circumvention concern. In other words, the calcium
3 citrate is a necessary product, intermediate product,
4 in the production of citric acid when you use the
5 lime-sulphuric method, and there is evidence in the
6 world market that, although it hasn't come into the
7 United States, in response to one person's question,
8 nevertheless it has crossed borders.

9 So it would be possible to produce the UCC
10 in one country, ship it elsewhere, and finish the
11 production process to convert it into citric acid. So
12 we wanted to include this intermediate product to make
13 sure that didn't happen in the United States.

14 Does anyone else want to talk about
15 potassium citrate?

16 MR. ANDERSON: I just want to say one thing
17 about the two salts, sodium citrate and potassium
18 citrate, and that is, in the 1999/2000 investigation,
19 the Commission did find that there was one like
20 product, including citric acid and sodium citrate. If
21 you go back and look at the staff report, you also see
22 a lot of discussion about potassium citrate. My
23 suspicion is, because no one wanted to raise it as an
24 issue, it didn't become a like product at that time,
25 it's why is potassium citrate not in the petition?

1 In fact, sodium citrate and potassium
2 citrate are probably closer to each other than sodium
3 citrate and citric acid, so if citric acid and sodium
4 citrate are one like product, then potassium citrate
5 should be in the same like product. They are all
6 acidulants. They are used basically for the same
7 purpose, sold in the same markets, and in our
8 particular case, and this is important, they are
9 produced in the same production facilities.

10 That is, our producers take an unfinished
11 slurry of citric acid and just convert it to a
12 reactor. That reactor can be used to produce either
13 potassium citrate or sodium citrate, so it's very
14 similar in terms of manufacturing processes. Really
15 what it amounts to is what salt the customer wants
16 attached to the citric acid molecule. Some want
17 sodium for their particular purposes, others wanted
18 potassium.

19 So that's basically --

20 MS. ALVES: So that's why you would then go
21 to the additional, I assume it's additional expense,
22 in order to produce the potassium citrate as opposed
23 to the citric acid, for example? So, the reason would
24 be that the customer prefers to have it attached to a
25 particular --

1 MR. STALOCH: Yes, that is correct, and a
2 lot of the rise in the potassium citrate has been with
3 the low salt. People don't want sodium in their diet,
4 so they switch to this, so it's become more popular in
5 this decade.

6 MS. ALVES: Okay. But they are going for
7 the same applications but perhaps the low-salt version
8 might be using one alternative or another?

9 MR. ELLIS: He is indicating yes. You have
10 to speak --

11 MR. STALOCH: Yes.

12 MS. ALVES: Sorry. Thank you. All right,
13 that was helpful. The scope now also refers to
14 certain blends that are included in the scope. You
15 also indicated, I believe, in the petition that there
16 is the CEH report that's included as one of the
17 appendices, that certain esters of citric acid and a
18 few additional salts are not included in the CEH
19 report's definition of citric products.

20 Are the blends produced domestically, or is
21 that another circumvention?

22 MR. ELLIS: It's primarily a circumvention
23 concern.

24 MS. ALVES: Okay.

25 MR. ELLIS: In other words, we did not want

1 to have it where somebody could put potassium citrate
2 with sodium citrate and bring it into the United
3 States and not have it count as covered by the
4 antidumping order, if there is one. Likewise, we know
5 of occurrences where a citric acid or a citrate can be
6 combined with, can be blended with sugar and imported
7 into the United States.

8 We wanted to make that clear that as long as
9 the covered product is above a certain percentage of
10 that blend, that that also would be covered by the
11 scope of this case.

12 MS. ALVES: Okay. All right, so at this
13 point in time, you are not aware of any imports or
14 domestic production of the blends?

15 MR. ELLIS: I think we are aware
16 historically of imports of blends of citric acid and
17 sugar.

18 MS. ALVES: Okay.

19 MR. ELLIS: Obviously not for circumvention
20 purposes, because there is no order, but nonetheless,
21 there seem to be other reasons out there why blends
22 like this may be occurring and may be imported, and
23 for that reason, we wanted to address that possibility
24 in this scope definition.

25 MS. ALVES: Okay, but the tariff subheading

1 that you believe corresponds to the blends, which was
2 3824909290, would that include things other than the
3 blends?

4 MR. ELLIS: It might, yes. That's another
5 category.

6 MS. ALVES: Okay. Where I am going with
7 this is I'd like the parties to comment, ideally here
8 if you can, on the data sources that we should be
9 using in order to, for example, measure imports, and
10 then to calculate apparent domestic consumption.
11 Should we be looking at that tariff subheading as
12 well, or the other tariff subheadings that
13 predominantly are the citric acid, the potassium
14 citrate/the UCC which you don't believe any is coming
15 in, and then the sodium citrate?

16 MR. ELLIS: Right. As to the main products,
17 including UCC, it's relatively straightforward which
18 HTS numbers you would use. The blends, we discussed
19 it actually with Customs as well and this is the
20 direction they led us to, this particular HTS code,
21 the one you just mentioned.

22 MS. ALVES: Okay, but that may include
23 things that are not blends? Do you have any sense of
24 --

25 MR. ELLIS: I don't have any sense of that,

1 no. I'm sorry.

2 MS. ALVES: Okay.

3 MR. ELLIS: We could try to look into that
4 though.

5 MS. ALVES: Okay. You'd also mentioned this
6 morning that there might have been a decline in the
7 import statistics in recent periods for China, and you
8 were looking at data on exports from China. I assume
9 you are not making the argument, or perhaps you are
10 making the argument, that we should be using export
11 data, not import statistics?

12 MR. ELLIS: No, I don't think we are making
13 that argument. The point we were trying to make
14 during that presentation is that there has been a vast
15 increase in imports over the course of the three-year
16 POI. The interim period appears to show a decline,
17 somewhat of a decline. However, we are suggesting
18 that that decline is artificial and temporary, and
19 therefore it should not outweigh the Commission's
20 consideration of the three years of rapid increase in
21 imports that we saw in the three main years of the
22 POI.

23 It's not that we are suggesting you discard
24 the import data entirely.

25 MS. ALVES: Okay, and then, any preference

1 between the import statistics and the importer
2 questionnaire responses? You may not be able to
3 comment on that here, but if in your post-conference
4 briefs, you could give us your thoughts on that as
5 well?

6 MR. ELLIS: We'll have to hold that for our
7 briefs.

8 MS. ALVES: Okay. There was testimony this
9 morning that the shelf life of these products could be
10 as much as three or more years if they were properly
11 stored. Would that be for the dry version or the
12 solution version of the product, or both?

13 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: That would be for the dry
14 packaged version.

15 MS. ALVES: Okay, and are the imports coming
16 into the United States primarily in the dry version?

17 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes.

18 MS. ALVES: Are you comfortable telling me
19 here, are most of your sales in the granular dry
20 version as opposed to the solution version?

21 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes.

22 MR. POULOS: Our sales are similar, and
23 about 25% are sold as liquid.

24 MS. ALVES: Okay. In some other cases we've
25 had arguments in other chemical cases about whether or

1 not there is competition, for example, in dry versus
2 liquid versions of products. Are you competing with
3 imports in both the dry and the solution form?

4 MR. POULOS: Yes, we do compete on the
5 solution form, because the conversion of dry citric
6 acid to a 50% solution is not a costly means, and
7 there are a number of converters in the United States
8 that we compete against.

9 MS. ALVES: Okay, and can you estimate for
10 me the amount of cost that it would take, or the level
11 of technical expertise that it would take for them to
12 process it that way?

13 MR. STALOCH: I could. I mean, it would
14 take a 10-year-old to mix the dry with the water, so
15 that's pretty simple. So no technical expertise
16 there, and then as far as costs would go, it would be
17 less than 1/40 of the cost, 1/50 of the cost, very,
18 very minimal.

19 MS. ALVES: Okay. It's sometimes difficult
20 in these preliminary staff conferences to anticipate
21 what the arguments are going to be. I know that there
22 are going to be cumulation arguments, so I am trying
23 to just guess what some of them may be. I've had some
24 help this morning, which was great. To the extent
25 that there are additional issues that I am raising in

1 terms of questions this afternoon, I would appreciate
2 it if you could answer those same questions from your
3 perspective as well.

4 It's always difficult to anticipate exactly
5 what the arguments are going to be. Respondents don't
6 have that much time in their opening statement, so
7 they can only give us as much detail as they can.
8 There has also been some discussion this morning of
9 the fact that in the previous case, the Chinese
10 producers may have been supplying mostly the
11 monohydrate as opposed to anhydrous form.

12 Are you aware, is there still some of the
13 monohydrate form being supplied by the Chinese
14 producers?

15 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes, there's still some
16 amount of monohydrate, but as we indicated earlier,
17 from the PIERS statistics, you can see that the
18 largest volume now is the anhydrous form coming into
19 the U.S.

20 MS. ALVES: Okay, and what about the
21 Canadian product?

22 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: The anhydrous form.

23 MS. ALVES: Okay, and it's your position
24 that either form could be used by the same purchasers?

25 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes.

1 MS. ALVES: Okay. The Canadian respondents
2 this morning in their opening statements indicated
3 that they believe that the Canadian product is a
4 higher quality product. Are there any quality
5 differences between the domestically supplied product,
6 that you are aware of, and the Canadian product, or a
7 portion of the Canadian product?

8 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Not that I am aware of.
9 They both meet USP/FCC standards.

10 MS. ALVES: Are there certain applications
11 that the Canadian product is sold for that the U.S.
12 product is not sold for?

13 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Not that I am aware of.

14 MS. ALVES: Okay. What about the
15 differences between the Canadian product and the
16 Chinese product? Are there quality differences there?

17 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No.

18 MS. ALVES: Are all of you in agreement?

19 MR. POULOS: I think one of the challenges
20 you face in China is implying that there is a single
21 producer in China, and each site will have its little
22 idiosyncracies of quality and service, as we all do.
23 So to say there is a single China quality is difficult
24 because it runs a pretty vast continuum. That said,
25 it's been incrementally increasing from the time of

1 the original investigation of 2000 until now.

2 MS. ALVES: Okay. Okay, so in terms of
3 producers in China, there's a spectrum of producers,
4 or perhaps a spectrum of what they are capable of
5 producing in terms of the impurity levels and what
6 have you. What about the Chinese suppliers to the
7 U.S. market? What is being supplied to the U.S.
8 market? Is there a spectrum of products being
9 supplied here, or?

10 MR. STALOCH: The vast majority of the
11 Chinese product is equivalent to the U.S., so probably
12 90% or greater. I mean, it's the vast majority, and
13 the Canadian -- I just wanted to come back to that --
14 the Canadian product, we benchmark every year product
15 worldwide, and it's similar to ours and to our
16 competitors. So there is no difference that we can
17 see, and in the Chinese product as well, we see no
18 difference, every year.

19 MR. ANDERSON: I might be able to cast a
20 little bit more light on this issue too, and that is,
21 if you look at the PIERS data as to who the exporters
22 are from China who constitute the imports to the
23 United States, it's really skewed towards the largest
24 four or five producers in China. These are very large
25 plants with deep tank fermentation, full drying

1 capabilities, producing USP/FCC-grade product.

2 There does appear to be, you know, some of
3 the smaller producers whose product is coming in, but
4 in terms of overall volume, I think that is pretty
5 insignificant.

6 MS. ALVES: Okay. There's been several
7 references this morning to a pending case in the
8 European Union. Can you provide some more specifics
9 in your post-conference briefs about the case?

10 As I understand your testimony this morning,
11 the case is simply an anti-dumping case and not a
12 subsidy case as well.

13 MR. ELLIS: That's correct. It's just anti-
14 dumping against China.

15 MS. ALVES: Is there a provisional
16 determination yet?

17 MR. ELLIS: Our understanding is that the
18 provisional determination is being negotiated, or
19 worked out, even as we speak right now, today.

20 MS. ALVES: So it could be issued or
21 published at --

22 MR. ELLIS: Today, or whenever. As you
23 know, the European Commission has to gather the votes
24 from the member states and then to issue a public
25 notice of what is happening right now.

1 MS. ALVES: Okay. So your reference this
2 morning to something coming out this summer was to the
3 final?

4 MR. ELLIS: Correct.

5 MS. ALVES: Okay. And if you have any more
6 details that would be certainly helpful.

7 In the 1999-2000 case, in the Commission's
8 competition-discussion portion of the opinion, the
9 Commission indicated that at the time food and
10 beverage manufacturers accounted for as much as two-
11 thirds of the total demand.

12 The Commission also talked about increases
13 in demand, especially for the beverage and somewhat
14 for the food and pharmaceutical uses, and that the
15 slowest demand growth was for detergent applications.

16 Can you talk about the level of demand in
17 the U. S. market for the various applications; and can
18 you also tell me about any demand changes that you've
19 seen over the period of investigation, and then going
20 forward?

21 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I would say that the
22 proportions today are still fairly similar to what we
23 see in the marketplace. Growth rates during that time
24 period, as we mentioned earlier in our testimony, have
25 been similar to what we've seen in the overall

1 economy.

2 MS. ALVES: And that's for all of the
3 applications?

4 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Yes.

5 MS. ALVES: In the last investigation, non-
6 subject imports appeared to be a much larger share of
7 the U. S. market, and non-subject imports are still in
8 the U. S. market.

9 You indicated this morning that you believe
10 we're talking about a commodity product. Are you
11 talking a commodity product for purposes of Bratsk as
12 well?

13 MR. ELLIS: We were waiting for a Bratsk
14 question. Yes, we would not deny that a Bratsk
15 analysis should be applied to this case. But we think
16 that this situation easily meets the requirements, of
17 however you want to put it, for a Brodsk analysis.

18 In other words, it is a commodity. But a
19 huge percentage of the imports are subject imports, 80
20 plus %. So the possibility that non-subject imports
21 could -- that an order would have the impact of simply
22 benefiting non-subject imports, rather than U. S.
23 industry, is really implausible in this case because
24 non-subject imports simply aren't here in a large
25 enough capacity to take over Chinese and Canadian

1 capacity.

2 In other words, under a Brodsk analysis in
3 this case, the benefit of anti-dumping order would
4 clearly fall to the U. S. industry.

5 MS. ALVES: Okay. Can you talk about the
6 identities of the non-subject imports in the U. S.
7 market?

8 MR. ELLIS: We understand that they are
9 Israeli and Belgian producers.

10 Now, of course, if there is anti-dumping
11 order in the U.C. (ph) imposed, the Belgium producer
12 will be focusing entirely on its own market because it
13 will then have a very large demand, and it will then
14 want to provide supply for it.

15 And the Israelis are not remotely large
16 enough to have much of an impact in the U. S. market,
17 and there really is no one other than those two.

18 MS. ALVES: Okay.

19 MR. ANDERSON: I was just going to say that
20 the data shows that Belgium is in the No. 3 spot. You
21 have China and Canada vying for No. 1 and No. 2, but
22 there's a huge drop down to No. 3.

23 Belgium, which I believe is DSM, is that
24 right? DSM, which also is a Chinese producer, but
25 that's a very far drop. Once you get below Belgium,

1 then the quantities from individual countries are
2 really pretty small.

3 MS. ALVES: You mentioned this morning that
4 there were some closures of your sister facilities in
5 Europe. Were they temporary closures, or were they
6 permanent closures?

7 MR. OAKLEY: At ADM, we permanently closed
8 our facility in Ringus Guinea Island in 2005.

9 MR. POULOS: And the same in our facility in
10 Selby, England. It was closed in early 2007
11 permanently.

12 MS. ALVES: I think those are the only
13 questions I have for now, thank you. That was very
14 helpful.

15 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Benedetto?

16 MR. BENEDETTO: Thank you all very much for
17 your testimony. I only have a few more questions. If
18 I ask anything that's business proprietary, please
19 just say so, and answer in follow-up in your brief, if
20 you can.

21 My first question is: Citric products that
22 go to the food and beverage industry, are they
23 distributed differently than the citric products that
24 go to the industrial segment?

25 In other words, are they more likely to go

1 to distributors than directly to the end users, or
2 vice versa?

3 MR. OAKLEY: In general, no, but the
4 channels of distribution would be very similar to the
5 various industries.

6 MR. BENEDETTO: Does everyone agree with
7 that? Okay, everyone does.

8 Why do citric products sometimes go to a
9 distributor versus going to a end user, then, if it's
10 not a market-segment issue?

11 MR. OAKLEY: As we mentioned in the
12 testimony, there's a small number of very large citric
13 acid users, but then there's a tremendous number of
14 smaller users.

15 MR. BENEDETTO: Smaller users?

16 MR. OAKLEY: Yes. And the distributors tend
17 to service a lot of those, or they can also provide a
18 service of storing inventory. In the case of a
19 product coming from overseas or from Canada, they can
20 store it within the United States for quicker
21 delivery.

22 MR. BENEDETTO: Okay, great. Now, I have
23 two questions on some things that I thought I heard
24 this morning that the Respondent said.

25 I think, first, one of the Respondents said

1 that the Canadian product is actually going to be
2 higher priced. Does that sound true to you all,
3 higher priced than domestic product?

4 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: Not in my case.

5 MR. BENEDETTO: Anyone else?

6 MR. POULOS: I haven't seen that to be the
7 case.

8 MR. BENEDETTO: Okay. If you could just
9 confirm the feeling that I get from you is that your
10 impression is that the Chinese product is also lower
11 priced than the U. S. product. Is that correct?

12 MR. OAKLEY: In my experience, both the
13 Chinese and the Canadian product, we think is lower
14 priced.

15 MR. BENEDETTO: Is that everyone else's
16 experience as well there?

17 MR. POULOS: Yes.

18 MR. BENEDETTO: Then I think I heard this
19 morning also an allegation that the U. S. industry
20 could not supply the entire U. S. market.

21 Do you have a response to that allegation?

22 MR. STALOCH: I think, from our experience,
23 when products are fairly traded and fairly priced, we
24 can supply the industry.

25 There hasn't been an investment in the last

1 ten years, very minimal as Curtis had said, because of
2 that issue, so that's where we're at today.

3 MR. BENEDETTO: Anyone else?

4 MR. ELLIS: Also, without getting into BPI,
5 I would note that our questionnaire responses show
6 that we do have excess capacity that's unutilized in
7 the United States that could be used for production to
8 meet the increasing demand in the United States.

9 MR. ANDERSON: And, in addition to that,
10 there are also substantial exports to other markets,
11 and that also constitutes available supply for the U.
12 S. market.

13 I just wanted to say one thing about
14 capacity-utilization rates. Because the figures that
15 we presented may appear high if you just basically
16 compare them to other industries, but this is an
17 industry which really, for economic and technical
18 reasons, shots to operate at pretty much 100%
19 capacity.

20 So, even a few points of operation below
21 full capacity could represent substantial product, but
22 it also could represent substantial losses. So it's
23 important to keep in mind, when you're looking at the
24 capacity utilization numbers. that you consider in the
25 context of this industry.

1 MR. BENEDETTO: Okay. Thank you all very
2 much.

3 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Ascienzo?

4 MR. ASCIENZO: Thank you. Good morning.
5 And thank you for your testimony again.

6 I'm looking at this increase in corn prices
7 over the POI that you provided. It looks like corn,
8 according to this, in the Central Illinois market, was
9 about \$2 a pound in 2005-2006; and then it bolted
10 upwards to \$4, and then even higher in 2007 and 2008.

11 I presume there is, but I've got to ask for
12 the record: Is there a one-to-one ratio between the
13 corn price here and the corn that you use as raw
14 materials for citric acid?

15 MR. STALOCH: Those are in bushels, so it's
16 kind of odd. There are 56 pounds in a bushel. The
17 yields are proprietary but it's not pound for pound.

18 MR. ASCIENZO: It's not pound for pound,
19 okay. I presume: If this doubled, or even went more
20 than that, that means that that doesn't necessarily
21 mean that your raw materials prices would have
22 doubled?

23 MR. STALOCH: But is a significant cost
24 factor, so the raw material can be 25% --

25 MR. ASCIENZO: Right.

1 MR. STALOCH: -- of the cost to
2 manufacturers. So, when you have corn tripling, you
3 do have to continue to raise prices and you just get
4 further and further behind.

5 MR. ASCIENZO: Right, I understand that.

6 But my point is this: If this is doubled, or
7 more than doubled, and if you look at the data, I
8 think you'll see that on the unit basis, the raw
9 material cost have not doubled. They're gone up
10 significantly, but they have not doubled.

11 So if you could comment on that, either here
12 or in your post-conference brief, as to --

13 MR. STALOCH: If I could just comment
14 quickly?

15 MR. ASCIENZO: Sure.

16 MR. STALOCH: Each company has the ability
17 to hedge their corn to go out and buy, but that's only
18 on a limited basis. So what you see there hasn't
19 fully hit the market yet.

20 MR. ASCIENZO: All right, thank you.

21 The production process: The way I understand
22 it, the bio-mass, I guess it's called, the corn
23 tapioca whatever, is put into a vessel and is
24 fermented is it for a week to two, something like
25 that, is that approximately right?

1 MR. STALOCH: Approximately, it can be
2 anywhere from a half a week to a full week, depending
3 on how efficient your organism is.

4 MR. ASCIENZO: Then I presume the different
5 producers have many different vessels because
6 otherwise you'd just have every --

7 MR. STALOCH: That's correct.

8 MR. ASCIENZO: Okay. So there is several,
9 so they're staggered, so you've got this stuff coming
10 off line, I don't know, daily, hourly, something like
11 that?

12 MR. STALOCH: That is correct. There's
13 multiple vessels. It's a batch process on the
14 fermentation side.

15 So, depending on the size of your plant, you
16 may have one to five or six of these vessels coming
17 down per day.

18 MR. ASCIENZO: Is that the same for all the
19 other producers?

20 MR. OAKLEY: Yes.

21 MR. ASCIENZO: Wonderful, okay, thank you.

22 By-product revenue: I think in the petition,
23 it mentions that the bio-mass, when it's done, after
24 it's fermented, is sold, let's say as animal feed.

25 But is some sort of by-product revenue

1 involved here?

2 MR. STALOCH: It's very minimal because you
3 have to dry it and process it. So it's basically a
4 break even process.

5 MR. ASCIENZO: Okay. Is that the same for
6 everyone?

7 MR. OAKLEY: Yeah, by-product revenue is --
8 I'd say it's pretty much a break even in this.

9 MR. ASCIENZO: In your post-conference
10 brief, could you provide a little more details?

11 For 2007, could you say something like: We
12 have x tons of bio-mass. We sold it for this, but it
13 costs this much to process, so the net was zero.
14 Something along that line, is that possible?

15 NO AUDIBLE RESPONSE.

16 Thank you very much.

17 If you had to build a new plant, how long
18 would it take, how much would it cost; and, then how
19 much do you think you would save in production costs
20 on a per-pound basis if you built a new plant versus
21 operating the plants that you currently have?

22 MR. STALOCH: That's a lot of questions.

23 MR. ASCIENZO: Yes. You can answer in the
24 post-conference brief.

25 MR. STALOCH: First off, it depends on the

1 part of the world as to how long it would take the U.
2 S.

3 MR. ASCIENZO: The United States.

4 MR. STALOCH: The United States, yes. So
5 the permitting process here are more extensive. You
6 need o go and get your permits before you can actually
7 start to dig and construct.

8 Basically, for one, you've the capital
9 approved, went to the permitting process to the
10 engineering and built it. You could have it on line
11 somewhere between 18 to 24 months, depending on how
12 large the expansion is.

13 If it's a very minor expansion, maybe it
14 takes a year because it's just ordering equipment and
15 putting it in. If it's a major expansion, it would be
16 18 to 24 months.

17 MR. ASCIENZO: And you can answer it post-
18 conference, and the capital up front for \$100 million
19 or whatever? And then, assuming you could build a
20 state-of-the-art plant, would you save one cent a
21 pound, two cents, five cents?

22 You don't have to answer me now.

23 MR. STALOCH: Yes, we could put that it in
24 the brief. I think that would be best.

25 MR. ASCIENZO: Thank you. Your lack of

1 profitability, it's been mentioned a couple of times,
2 have kept you from having capital expenditures that
3 you would like to have had the last several years.

4 Could you, in your post-conference brief,
5 give us a list by company of projects that have been
6 turned down that you would have liked to have done?
7 And could you give us an estimate of what they would
8 cost?

9 MR. ELLIS: Okay, we can do that.

10 MR. ASCIENZO: Thank you very much.

11 One last question. Energy costs: We see
12 that the price of energy, I guess, has essentially
13 doubled from at least the previous investigation to
14 this investigation.

15 You can do it now, but I'm sure that this
16 will be in a post-conference submission, per company,
17 could you tell us specifically what the energy cost
18 per pound is for the citric acid and the salts,
19 whether it's five, ten or fifteen cents a pound for
20 2007, for your most recently completed fiscal period?

21 MR. STALOCH: We can do that, but it's about
22 20%.

23 MR. ASCIENZO: About 20%?

24 MR. STALOCH: Yes, it's very significant.

25 MR. ASCIENZO: Very significant.

1 MR. STALOCH: It depends on your energy
2 source.

3 MR. ASCIENZO: Yes. Thank you very much. I
4 have no further questions.

5 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Clark?

6 MR. CLARK: Good morning. Thank you for
7 being here.

8 I guess one of the things I want to ask,
9 just to make sure that I have on the record: Again,
10 we're using the same facilities and the same employees
11 for all the products that we're talking about here,
12 including UCC, correct?

13 MR. OAKLEY: That's correct.

14 MR. CLARK: But recently you've had a
15 greater demand for the potassium citrates since people
16 want to avoid sodium in their diets.

17 How does it impact your operations to
18 produce these citrates in the same vessels?

19 Do you have just certain reactors that are
20 dedicated to potassium citrate? Because we've talked
21 about flushing costs and shut-down costs. For
22 instance, I'm trying to understand if you need to
23 switch operations in order to produce a different
24 product?

25 MR. STALOCH: Potassium citrate is generally

1 produced on the same production equipment as sodium
2 citrates, so you're just campaign it.

3 MR. CLARK: Excuse me, you're just what?

4 MR. STALOCH: You just batch it through,
5 campaign sort of.

6 MR. CLARK: Do you do any other flushing, or
7 is there any other --

8 MR. STALOCH: There's a procedure that you
9 use to make sure that the two don't mix.

10 MR. CLARK: How long does it take to do
11 that? Is that extensive? Is there any costs involved
12 in that?

13 MR. STALOCH: It's minimal costs. It maybe
14 takes, depending on how skilled your team is, between
15 four to eight hours. It's largely making sure that
16 you're following a procedure on a piece of paper.

17 MR. CLARK: Let's talk about now about some
18 of the different grades, or I guess particle size here
19 on our product.

20 There's granular, fine granular and powder.
21 Certain customers, they demand I guess I just want to
22 -- into which products are these three particle sized
23 directed in general?

24 MR. STALOCH: In general, I mean the
25 majority of the sales are in the granular and fine

1 granular product. Those cross over industries between
2 industrial, and food and beverage.

3 The powder, we tend to find more, it might
4 be in certain spice companies. So the food companies
5 or pharmaceutical applications, things like that.

6 MR. CLARK: Since we've already mentioned
7 Bratz here earlier today, have there been any other
8 major breakthroughs in any technologies or processing
9 for this any place around the world?

10 In the petition, you mentioned a couple of
11 things about Japan using different in-put and a
12 different process. Is anybody else doing anything
13 that we need to be aware of?

14 MR. STALOCH: The technology advances are
15 incremental. So people will continue to work on their
16 organism to do the fermentation, but those are
17 generally incremental. And there's different unit
18 operations where we've had incremental improvements,
19 but nothing that I would consider a breakthrough
20 technology.

21 Although one man's breakthrough technology
22 is another's man's incremental technology.

23 MR. CLARK: Okay, thank you.

24 Regarding UCC: We said there isn't really a
25 market here in the U.S. and you've included that in

1 part to try to make sure that somehow you don't
2 circumvent an order.

3 Is there much of a UCC market elsewhere
4 around the world?

5 MR. OAKLEY: Not that I'm aware of today,
6 no. But we have seen in the past that product being
7 used and transferred from one country to another to be
8 further processed.

9 MR. CLARK: Okay, thanks.

10 MR. ELLIS: I'm sorry, just to be clear:
11 Again, UCC is only used as an in-put to make the
12 finished citric acid.

13 There's no other use that it can be produced
14 for, and it's a necessary step in the production of
15 citric acid when you use one of the processes, the
16 wine sulfuric process.

17 Again, the only reason would be to transfer
18 from one country to another would be for the purpose
19 of finishing the citric acid in the second country?

20 MR. CLARK: Okay, thank you.

21 That's all I have for now, thank you.

22 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Deyman?

23 MR. DEYMAN: I'm George Deyman, Office of
24 Investigations.

25 Based on import statistics presented in the

1 petition, the average unit values of U. S. imports of
2 citric acid from non-subject countries have been
3 substantially higher than the average unit values of
4 citric acid from Canada and China.

5 Is there anything different about the citric
6 acid from non-subject countries that would command
7 higher unit values, or higher prices than the product
8 from Canada and China?

9 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: There's no significant
10 difference.

11 MR. STALOCH: Like I say, we bench mark
12 everybody's product every year, and we've not found
13 any difference.

14 MR. OAKLEY: If I could just add to that:
15 One of the things that the customers in the U. S.,
16 they're going to look for these specifications that
17 we've mentioned, FCC and USP, so producers are
18 shooting those specifications. So the product tends
19 to be very similar.

20 MR. DEYMAN: Now, to what extend does citric
21 acid need to be qualified at U. S. customers? And,
22 assuming that it needs to be qualified, how long does
23 the qualification process take?

24 MR. POULOS: Almost entirely, consumers of
25 citric acid will go through a qualification step. The

1 first step will be a sample, and that sample will be
2 tested against the U.S. PFCC Standards. That may be
3 the only step for some customers.

4 Others may require an audit where they will
5 send a team to one of our facilities to follow through
6 our process and understand the standards that we use.
7 So there's not a specific one answer. It depends on
8 the customer as to how they perceive the need for
9 qualification.

10 MR. DEYMAN: As far as you know, are the
11 Canadian and Chinese products qualified at all the
12 major U. S. customers?

13 MR. POULOS: From what my customers have
14 told me, yes.

15 MR. DEYMAN: All right. I spoke to a
16 purchaser of some of these products, who said that he
17 believed that one or more forms or salts of citric
18 acid weren't available in the United States. He
19 specifically mentioned monosodium citrate, which, he
20 said, he couldn't get in the United States.

21 Do you have any comments on that? Do you
22 produce the full range of product here?

23 MR. POULOS: We don't currently produce
24 monosodium citrate, but the ability exists. It's just
25 that it's a very small market.

1 MR. DEYMAN: The other producers, do you
2 produce it?

3 MR. STALOCH: We do not produce it. But as
4 John said, we could produce it as well. But it's a
5 small market. We don't.

6 MR. POULOS: And the same, we do not produce
7 monosodium citrate. It's use in application is quite
8 small. But the capability, certainly, would be there
9 should the market require it.

10 MR. DEYMAN: Are there any other products
11 covered by the scope of the investigations that you
12 don't produce in the United States?

13 MR. ELLIS: Everyone is indicating: No.

14 MR. DEYMAN: All right.

15 MR. ANDERSON: I just want to just mention
16 about the monosodium citrate, which is: There's more
17 than one use for monosodium citrate. If it were
18 excluded from the order, there could be potentially
19 far more uses for monosodium citrate.

20 Based on discussions with the industry, the
21 people we had yesterday, you could re-engineer a lot
22 of products that use -- is it trisodium citrate, to
23 use monosodium if, basically, monosodium were
24 excluded. It's just a slightly different molecular
25 structure.

1 MR. DEYMAN: So that's why you included it
2 in the scope because you specifically included that,
3 if I recall?

4 MR. ELLIS: Yes, that's correct.

5 MR. DEYMAN: My last question is: In the
6 previous investigation on citric acid, the Commission
7 found that converters, that is companies that obtain
8 citric acid and then convert it into a sodium citrate
9 solution, were not engaged in sufficient production-
10 related activity to be included in the domestic
11 industry.

12 Do you believe that the situation with
13 regard to converters is still the same today?

14 MR. ELLIS: Yes, it's still the major
15 expense, the major know-how is making the citric
16 molecule. But when you convert, it's basically mixing
17 two things together in a reactor.

18 MR. DEYMAN: So the value added of the
19 conversion process would be minimal compared to the
20 total cost. Is that right?

21 MR. STALOCH: Yes, and the investment
22 required would be very minimal, so our belief is still
23 the same.

24 MR. DEYMAN: Do you agree?

25 MR. OAKLEY: Yes, I agree.

1 MR. DEYMAN: Thank you. I have no further
2 questions.

3 MR. CARPENTER: I have just a few additional
4 questions.

5 First of all, in terms of quality, you
6 indicated in your testimony very consistently that
7 qualify from all sources is comparable; it all meets
8 the industry standards, such as FCC and USP.

9 I was wondering are there any customers that
10 have their own requirements that might exceed the
11 industry's standards, or have their own particular
12 specifications that might make it more difficult for
13 some sources to supply the product as opposed to other
14 sources?

15 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: No, I don't think there
16 would be anything like that that exists.

17 MR. CARPENTER: Okay.

18 MR. STALOCH: People have different
19 specifications but it wouldn't be exceeding. So it's
20 not like they want higher purity or things like that.
21 It's just different is all.

22 MR. CARPENTER: All right. Thank you.

23 Mr. Anderson, you make a statement that
24 major customers have a big influence on price, which I
25 would expect to be the case in an industry like this,

1 and maybe the industry's witnesses as well, elaborate
2 on that. How does that work?

3 My understanding is that the bulk of the
4 product is sold through distributors and a statement
5 was made that importers target distributors.

6 Could you give us some discussion about how
7 prices are determined in the industry, how price
8 negotiations occur?

9 MR. ANDERSON: Mark, I'll start and then you
10 can rescue me when I get in trouble, okay.

11 First of all, those ten, twenty top
12 customers are not only end users, there is also some
13 distributors in that group, and they're involved in
14 this annual negotiating cycle at the same time.

15 What struck me as being highly unusual in
16 this industry, in comparison to many other products
17 that the Commission looks at, is the fact that these
18 sales are concentrated in a very short time window,
19 and really sold to very few customers.

20 So the reason that these large customers
21 have such a major impact on price is that when you
22 have so few customers all basically lining up and
23 demanding their low prices all in the same windows,
24 the producers essentially have to begin to lock in
25 contracts in order to basically fulfill their

1 production goals for the following year.

2 Therefore, a big customer will have a major
3 impact on price. If you lose out a big customer early
4 in that short time window, then you are going to have
5 a tendency to lower your price to get another large
6 customer in order to basically fulfill your production
7 goals for that period.

8 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you.

9 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: I think that Chuck did a
10 good job of explaining the overview of the process.
11 But it goes back to the very tight window where you
12 have an opportunity to negotiate sales volumes that
13 hopefully allow your plant to run at a full capacity.

14 During these time periods, in the past,
15 we've tried to initiate price increases. But the
16 competitive behavior from the Chinese and the
17 Canadians, during that time period, did not allow
18 that.

19 Then, basically, you're trying to chase over
20 the remaining pieces of volume that are left in order
21 to run your plant at a high rate. So it's a very
22 competitive time period.

23 MR. CARPENTER: You've argued that importers
24 have exerted a downward pressure on price. I'm
25 wondering how they do that?

1 Do your customers, distributors, or end
2 users come back to you and indicate to you that
3 they've been offered a lower price for imports from
4 say from Canada or China? Or it somehow common
5 knowledge in the industry what the pricing levels are?

6 MR. OAKLEY: I'll speak for ADM, and our
7 experience. We do a fair amount of business through
8 distribution. It will happen in a couple of ways.
9 Either they will be out competing for a piece of
10 business and receive feed back that an importer has
11 come in through another channel, or come in directly
12 to that customer offering lower prices, which forces
13 us to lower prices to try to meet and keep that
14 business.

15 Or they will come to the distributor
16 themselves offering lower prices for the same product
17 to try to gain the business away from us.

18 MR. POULOS: I think from a Tate & Lyle (ph)
19 standpoint, and I'm sure for most of the industry, we
20 go through a standard discovery process of inquiry
21 about pricing. The only perfect knowledge I think you
22 end up with is when you don't get the business.

23 Unfortunately, that's happened more often
24 than we care to think.

25 And as you go through the discovery process,

1 one of the obvious questions is: Are they all
2 qualified suppliers? Because you've asked the
3 question about qualifications.

4 In general, the market requires
5 qualification steps. When you're in that group of
6 qualified suppliers, price becomes the primary
7 motivation for selection.

8 MR. ANDERSON: And, Mr. Carpenter, I would
9 refer you to the extensive lost sales and lost-revenue
10 allegations in the petition.

11 I think documents comprehensively the extent
12 to which there are actual prices that are mentioned by
13 customers, either Canadian prices or Chinese prices,
14 in the context of negotiations, that doesn't
15 necessarily mean that the customer has their Chinese
16 supply locked up, but the China price or the Canadian
17 price is used as a way of negotiating in this very
18 intensive time window.

19 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you. That's very
20 helpful.

21 There's also a statement made that in this
22 industry volume drives price. Is it typical for the
23 U. S. producers here to provide volume discounts to
24 their largest customers?

25 You may have supplied details on that in the

1 questionnaire responses. If so, I apologize. You
2 don't need to respond further. But I was just
3 wondering, in general, if you typically provide volume
4 discounts?

5 MR. CHRISTIANSEN: From Cargill's
6 standpoint, volume discounts and things like rebates,
7 if somebody reaches a certain volume, are not
8 existing.

9 MR. OAKLEY: The only thing that I would add
10 is the larger customers, as we've mentioned, there's
11 several large customers that represent a big portion
12 of the volume.

13 They tend to have a global presence, and are
14 extracting bids from every one of the producers
15 represented here, plus a variety of import from
16 Chinese or Canadian product. They would tend to
17 command perhaps lower prices to lock up volume. It's
18 just depending on where they are in the cycle.

19 MR. CARPENTER: Okay.

20 MR. ANDERSON: To sort of put this in your
21 normal way of looking at things: The volume has an
22 effect on price negotiations, but I have not seen any
23 evidence of separate volume discounts or rebates.
24 It's just basically volume as a consideration in price
25 negotiation.

1 But this industry does not, the U. S.
2 producers at least, don't offer after-sale discounts
3 or rebates based on volume.

4 MR. CARPENTER: I see, thank you.

5 Just one last question: I'm still trying to
6 reconcile one point of contention between what Mr.
7 Waite indicated in his opening statement, and your
8 responses to previous questions from the Staff.

9 He indicated that the product from JBL was
10 a premium product and commanded a premium price, and
11 we've explored that to some extent.

12 And he indicated I believe that the
13 questionnaire data showed that the product from JBL is
14 priced higher than the domestic product, and the
15 Chinese imports, if I'm not mistaken.

16 From your testimony and your responses to
17 the questions, it sounds like you would disagree with
18 that.

19 My only question for those of you who are
20 under the APO, when you have an opportunity to look at
21 the price data as complete as we're able to provide it
22 from the questionnaires, if it turns out that, in fact
23 JBL's product is priced higher than the Chinese
24 product or the domestic product, if you could attempt
25 to comment on that in your post-conference brief and

1 provide some sort of explanation as to why you believe
2 that might be the case?

3 MR. ELLIS: Yes, we'll be happy to do so.

4 MR. ANDERSON: I would caution you to take a
5 very close look at some of these pricing comparisons,
6 and consider it in the context of everything else
7 you've heard in other pieces of information because
8 some of it does appear to be pretty wacky, to be
9 honest with you.

10 I'll be interested in hearing to see what
11 this quality difference is, for example, and whether
12 or not that constitutes a premium in pricing?

13 We do have some questions about some of the
14 data that has been submitted so far, but I think that
15 we would prefer to respond to that in the post-hearing
16 brief.

17 MR. CARPENTER: Definitely, good.

18 There some additional questions, I believe,
19 Mr. Cassise?

20 MR. CASSISE: I have one request for the
21 post-conference. That is: to, again, revisit this
22 market segmentation.

23 In the 2000 investigation, the Commission
24 found that around two-thirds of U. S. consumption was
25 this food and beverage segment. Approximately one-

1 third was industrial, and less than 10% was
2 pharmaceutical.

3 So, using those market segments, which
4 haven't changed, could you, in your post-conference,
5 just split out say your 2007 U. S. shipments, and
6 estimate where those shipments went in relation to
7 their end use, using those segments: food and
8 beverage, pharmaceutical, and industrial/laundry.

9 I noticed in page 8 of the petition, you had
10 mentioned that this detergent end use has been
11 increasing over the years, so keep that in mind when
12 you address that in the brief as well.

13 Also, if you could break that out by citric
14 acid, sodium, citrate and potassium citrate as well.

15 That's all I have, thank you.

16 MR. CARPENTER: Ms. Alves?

17 MS. ALVES: Just an add-on to some of what
18 you're already going to be discussing in terms of some
19 of the allegations made by the Canadian producer about
20 the differences in terms of their prices versus U. S.
21 and the Chinese prices.

22 Mr. Anderson, this morning, you testified
23 that prices in this industry are made on a delivered
24 basis. If you could discuss, in your post-conference
25 brief, whether or not that may have some impact on any

1 pricing differences that we're seeing?

2 And if you could also discuss whether or not
3 there might be difference in terms of prices to end
4 users, or distributors that we're seeing here as well?

5 A lot of these issues are obviously going to
6 go towards accumulation, which it sounds as though
7 from their opening statement this morning, the
8 Respondents will be addressing more this afternoon.

9 So, again, if you could discuss whatever
10 accumulation issues they raise as well, that would be
11 helpful?

12 MR. CARPENTER: Any other questions around
13 the table?

14 Again, thank you very much for your
15 testimony and for your helpful responses to our
16 questions. We very much appreciate it.

17 At this point, we'll take a short break and
18 resume the conference about ten minutes to twelve.

19 MR. ELLIS: Thank you, Mr. Carpenter.

20 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you.

21 (Whereupon, a short recess was taken.)

22 MR. CARPENTER: Could we resume the
23 conference now, please? Please begin whenever you're
24 ready.

25 MR. SMITH: Good morning. My name is Matt

1 Smith, Senior Purchasing Manager at Proctor & Gamble
2 responsible for P&G's purchases of citric acid for
3 consumption in North America. With me here today is
4 Jim Hodges, who is the Purchasing Group Manager at P&G
5 for Global Chemical Purchases.

6 P&G is a major U.S. purchaser and industrial
7 user of citric acid. We estimate that P&G accounts
8 for more than 10 percent of the citric acid consumed
9 in the United States and that P&G is one of the top
10 four purchasers of this product. We use citric acid
11 in detergents, including Tide and Gain, beauty care
12 products, including Head & Shoulders and Pantene, and
13 oral care products, including Crest and Scope.
14 Detergents for fabric care account for more than 90
15 percent of the citric acid we consume on an annual
16 basis.

17 P&G purchases citric acid from all of the
18 domestic manufacturers, from JBL in Canada, and from
19 two plants making this product in China. All of the
20 suppliers of citric acid of P&G must be qualified to
21 supply the product. That process can require six to
22 nine months for citric acid used in detergents and
23 much longer for oral care and beauty care products.
24 No Chinese supplier is qualified to supply to our oral
25 care or beauty care products. The qualification

1 process involves acquiring the input, producing the
2 final product, and testing the final product for a
3 period of time to ensure stability and effectiveness.

4 P&G tries to source its inputs from a
5 variety of producers, in order to ensure diversity of
6 its supply sources. It does so primarily to ensure
7 reliability of supply, minimizing the risk of plan
8 disruption. P&G is also in a global supply
9 relationship with a number of the U.S. and foreign
10 suppliers it seeks to maintain over the long term.
11 P&G has two plants making detergents for fabric care
12 in the United States, one at Lima, Ohio, and the other
13 at Alexandria, Louisiana.

14 One hundred percent of the citric acid used
15 in detergents is fed into our process as a solution.
16 P&G purchases citric acid in three forms: citric acid
17 in solution, monohydrate, and anhydrous. Both
18 monohydrate and anhydrous forms must be converted to
19 solution prior to entering our process at our fabric
20 care detergent plants. Most of what we purchase from
21 Canada and three domestic producers is in solution
22 form. All of the citric acid produced from China are
23 in anhydrous or monohydrate form. For citric acid in
24 solution form, the active ingredient, citric acid, is
25 50 percent of the total solution; for citric acid in

1 monohydrate, the active ingredient is 92 percent of
2 the weight of the product; and for anhydrous citric
3 acid, the active ingredient is 100 percent of the
4 product.

5 Citric acid is priced roughly on based on
6 the anhydrous equivalent of the form in which that it
7 is sold. That is, solution is normally priced at one-
8 half of the price of anhydrous for the gross weight of
9 the product and monohydrate is only priced at eight to
10 10 percent less than the price of anhydrous for the
11 same gross weight of the products.

12 We are concerned that this investigation
13 that the U.S. and Customs statistics do not reflect
14 the true quantity or average unit value of citric acid
15 entering the United States and anhydrous equivalent
16 basis. We know that we purchase a substantial
17 quantity of citric acid from JBL in Canada in solution
18 form and that the Customs statistics probably reflect
19 the gross weight of the product entering the United
20 States, rather than the anhydrous equivalent weight.
21 Moreover, most of the citric acid that we source in
22 China is monohydrate from which overstates the
23 anhydrous equivalent weight by eight percent.

24 There is a significant difference in the
25 citric acid that is available to us from Canada and

1 the citric acid that is available to us from China.
2 As I mentioned, most of the citric acid that we buy
3 from Canada is purchased in solution form. There is a
4 direct rail connection between JBL's plant in Canada
5 and our plants in Ohio and Louisiana, enabling us to
6 purchase the citric solution from JBL, especially line
7 tanks on railcars. In addition, the lead time
8 purchases from JBL is typically two weeks or less.
9 This allow a minimization of inventory at our
10 detergent plant producing plants.

11 In the case of our purchases from China, on
12 the other hand, all of the product is shipped to P&G
13 in monohydrate or anhydrous form. This product must
14 then be dissolved in liquid before it enters our
15 process, adding cost and complexity to the use of the
16 China's product. The lead time between order and
17 delivery is a minimum of 60 days. The product from
18 China must also be warehoused in the United States,
19 increasing its cost.

20 At P&G, we do not use any Chinese or
21 Canadian citric acid in any potentially ingestible
22 products, such as Crest and Scope, made in the United
23 States. However, we believe the U.S. food and
24 beverage purchases see a difference between citric
25 acid source in China and citric acid source in Canada,

1 primarily because JBL is an established European
2 producer of food and beverage grade citric. It can
3 also be assumed that JBL is capable of producing
4 equivalent products at its new facility in Canada.

5 Because P&G takes citric acid in solution,
6 some of the U.S. manufacturers can minimize their cost
7 and price to P&G by shipping solution to P&G and then
8 thereby eliminating the energy costs necessary to
9 fully dry the product. Other U.S. manufacturers can
10 also increase output and reduce scrap by dissolving
11 anhydrous citric acid that does not meet mandated
12 particle sizes and ship the solution to P&G. This
13 allows them to dry the batches of citric acid faster,
14 lowering their cost of overall production, knowing
15 that the off spec particles produced in this way can
16 be dissolved and sold to P&G. Otherwise, these
17 particles would have to be reprocessed for sale in the
18 markets that require standard grade citric acid. Some
19 U.S. producers take advantage of this process
20 flexibility more than others, allowing them to offer
21 lower prices in the market.

22 During the period of investigation, P&G
23 agreed to multi-year contracts with its U.S.
24 suppliers. All of these supply agreements were for
25 more than one year and one was for a period of three

1 years. The contracts specifically affix -- the
2 contracts specify a fixed price and a fixed quantity
3 that can be ordered by P&G at that price. P&G then
4 issues purchase orders against the contract for supply
5 its manufacturing plants. We believe that all of the
6 domestic suppliers heads their cost of corn or
7 dextrose or other feedstock to ensure that they can
8 sell us citric at a profit over the course of these
9 long-term contracts regardless of the movement of the
10 feedstock price. We were surprised to learn that the
11 domestic producers are claiming that they have
12 operated at a loss throughout this period and wonder
13 whether they have correctly attributed the lower cost
14 corn or other feedstock purchase through these hedging
15 contracts to their citric acid financial results.

16 P&G has found that its U.S. suppliers are
17 offering the lowest prices in the market. Between
18 2005 and 2007, the average delivered price from our
19 domestic suppliers was lower than the average delivery
20 price for citric acid from Canada and China in every
21 year. Furthermore, there was a significant difference
22 in the price being offered by suppliers in the market.
23 Each year of the period of investigation, at least one
24 U.S. suppliers was a clear price leader in the market.
25 Partly for this reason and because the U.S. suppliers'

1 ability to deliver solution to our plants, P&G would
2 like to increase its purchases of domestic citric
3 acid, but is unable to do so because of lowering
4 constraints imposed on P&G by the domestic industry.

5 Thank you for the opportunity to testify
6 here today. I would be pleased to answer any
7 questions you may have.

8 MR. LAFAVE: My name is Arthur Lafave on
9 behalf of -- a lawyer for P&G. I just want to say
10 that we're not going to say much today about
11 causation, other than based on the larger record,
12 other than what Matt has just told you, because the
13 data is proprietary. But, there is, in the
14 proprietary data, a much different story to tell about
15 what is really going in this industry and we'll have
16 to wait until we file our post-conference brief to
17 give you that information. Thank you.

18 MR. HSU: Good morning. My name is Hsu.
19 I'm the President of United Food Corporation. United
20 Food is a distributor of various food products in the
21 United States. One of the products that I sell is
22 citric acid. I've been selling citric acid for the
23 last 25 years. I, also, want you to note that I'm a
24 chemist by training. I would like to offer my
25 comments and thoughts today on the competitive nature

1 and dynamics in the citric acid market in the United
2 States.

3 Before I begin, though, I want to tell you
4 that I'm very aware that our sponsor importer's
5 questionnaire was missing quite a bit of data. I
6 apologize for that. We have very few office staff
7 members and I've been out of the country for the last
8 two weeks. I just came back from China two nights ago
9 and I drove down to Washington, D.C. the following
10 day. I promise that I will send you a completed
11 questionnaire response by the end of this week.

12 The first point I want to talk about is the
13 difference between Jungbunzlauer, JBL, the sole
14 Canadian supplier, and the Chinese. From my
15 standpoint, JBL is equivalent to a domestic supplier.
16 Although JBL built their plant in Canada, there is no
17 question that the primary purchase of the plant was to
18 service the U.S. market. The plant is located, as far
19 as I know, in Ontario, Canada, just a few miles from
20 the U.S. border. And my experience is that all U.S.
21 Customs treat JBL as the exact same supplier as
22 Cargill, ADM, or Tate & Lyle. They do not consider
23 JBL to be a foreign supplier. Needless to say, my
24 suppliers, the Chinese suppliers are not treated that
25 way. There is no question that the U.S. Customs

1 consider my suppliers to be foreign suppliers.

2 Now, let me turn to the nature of
3 competition between the Chinese and the three U.S.
4 producers and by extension, JBL. You heard a lot of
5 the testimony earlier today that citric acid from
6 Chinese suppliers, from JBL, and from three domestic
7 producers is all the same, "interchangeable," the
8 Chinese product being able to meet USB and FCC
9 standards. Such testimony imply that the citric acid
10 from China is used by any customer in the United
11 States. This is just not true. In fact, there is a
12 very large segment of the U.S. citric acid market that
13 excludes Chinese suppliers. This segment is the soft
14 drink segment. It is very, very difficult for Chinese
15 producers to supply U.S. soft drink customers.

16 In order to understand this fundamental
17 point, you need to understand a little bit about how
18 citric acid is used by soft drink producers. U.S.
19 soft drink producers insist on purchasing citric acid
20 in anhydrous form, meaning that the citric acid cannot
21 have any water. It must be free-flowing, fine
22 granular, or powder. The reason is that the soft
23 drink producers, they use material conveyance systems
24 and a tubular vacuum for conveying systems that feed
25 citric acid to their soft drink concentrates. As

1 everyone knows, U.S. companies like to minimize labor
2 costs, so they prefer use of automated mechanical
3 systems as much as possible. U.S. soft drink
4 producers are no exception. Virtually all U.S. soft
5 drink producers utilize vacuum conveying systems to
6 feed materials into the soft drink concentrate tanks.
7 The use of such mechanic machinery requires a very
8 free-flowing non-caked citric acid.

9 The trouble for the Chinese producers, they
10 have to ship the citric acid across the ocean to the
11 United States and citric acid is very hygroscopic. It
12 absorbs moisture from the air. This means it is
13 virtually impossible to ship citric acid across the
14 ocean without having the material absorb moisture.
15 When the citric acid absorbs moisture, it cakes up
16 into solid blocks and chunks. These blocks and chunks
17 clog the vacuum conveying tubes, causing massive
18 problems for the soft drink producers. So, the issue
19 has nothing to do with the underlying quality of the
20 citric acid. It has to do with the very simply
21 chemical nature, that you cannot transport citric acid
22 in the anhydrous form from across the ocean, far away
23 on the other side of the world. That is why U.S. soft
24 drink companies do not want to buy Chinese citric
25 acid.

1 I know this for a fact. The chairman of one
2 of the largest producers in China told me personally
3 on my trip to China that his company had tried to sell
4 citric acid from their brand new plant to Pepsi, but
5 his company's shipments were rejected because of the
6 hard caking problem. If this company, which is among
7 the newest and best citric acid manufacturers in
8 China, cannot supply Pepsi, and I really doubt any
9 other producers can, this means that the Chinese
10 producers are effectively excluded from the single
11 largest segment of the U.S. market, which is the soft
12 drinks.

13 Now, let me tell you about the flip side.
14 Customer accounts are serviced by Chinese producers
15 for which the domestic producers and JBL have little
16 interest. You need to understand that citric acid is
17 used in a vast array of different food products,
18 everything from ice cream, to pickled vegetables, to
19 jams and jollies, and puddings. What this means is
20 that citric acid is used by anyone or company that
21 makes these products. Citric acid is not just for big
22 conglomerates. Mom and pop small establishments use
23 citric acid, as well.

24 What you also need to understand that
25 overall, U.S. demand is much more than three U.S.

1 producers can supply. My estimate that three domestic
2 producers only have the capacity to supply half of the
3 total market demand. What does this mean? This means
4 that the three domestic producers are able to and, in
5 fact, focus all of their efforts on the largest
6 accounts. Those accounts demand railcar volumes and
7 multiple truckloads for each shipment. Needless to
8 say, from an administrative standpoint, it is much
9 easier to service large accounts and that is why the
10 domestic producers love them. With these accounts,
11 you do not need an army of salespeople wearing out
12 their shoes looking for small customers. This focus
13 on the largest accounts means that there are a lot of
14 small customers, who need citric acid, but cannot get
15 the domestic suppliers' attention.

16 This is where I come in. I service these
17 small accounts. I have a slew of customers, who have
18 never, ever been approached by domestic producers or
19 JBL. Honestly, I really have no competition in this
20 segment of the market. The domestics and JBL leave me
21 completely alone.

22 I, also, want to tell you that I believe
23 this business has grown significantly over the last
24 few years. I know this because I have had to turn
25 down customers away repeatedly. I have received many

1 phone calls, but I just cannot handle for lack of
2 staff. What I know is that this business has gone to
3 other distributors and importers of Chinese citric
4 acid.

5 I, also, want to talk about overall demand
6 for citric acid. My estimate is that over the last
7 few years, total U.S. demand grew by at least 10
8 percent. Now what is behind this demand growth?
9 Perhaps, the biggest demand driver is the increased
10 crackdown on use of hazardous materials, such as
11 phosphoric acid. Very simply, more and more states
12 are prohibiting the use of phosphoric acid in water
13 treatment applications. The states are trying to
14 control the allergy created by the presence of
15 phosphorous substances in public waterways. So, more
16 and more states have either passed environmental
17 regulations limiting the use of phosphoric acid in
18 many applications or have expressly announced their
19 intention to do so. My understanding is that in 2006,
20 the State of Washington was the first state to enact a
21 statewide ban on the use of phosphates in detergents
22 and other products. Since then, many more states have
23 followed. My guess is about between 12 and 13 states
24 of enacted similar regulations or have announced their
25 intention to implement such regulations soon. Indeed,

1 just three weeks ago, I got a call from a potential
2 customer, a paper mill in Maine. The paper mill said
3 they had just received a letter from the State of
4 Maine limiting the use of phosphoric acid in their
5 water treatment application. I will be happy to get a
6 copy of this letter.

7 Citric acid is perhaps the best replacement
8 for phosphoric acid, given that citric acid can
9 perform many, if not most of the same functions, but
10 without the negative side effects. So, the increased
11 regulation of phosphoric acid has increased overall
12 demand for citric acid, in particular the industrial
13 segment of the market. And because the domestic
14 suppliers have only available capacities to supply
15 half of the market, which means virtually all of the
16 food and beverage market, so the increased demand
17 needs to be supplied by imports, in particular, the
18 industrial segment, imports from China.

19 And I hope my comments are very helpful and
20 I will be happy to answer any questions that you may
21 have. Thank you.

22 MR. WAITE: Good afternoon, Mr. Carpenter,
23 members of the Commission staff. Again for the
24 record, my name is Fred Waite. I'm with the firm of
25 Vorys, Sater, Seymour, and Pease. With me is my

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1 colleague Kimberly Young. Together, we represent
2 Jungbunzlauer Technology, the only producer of citric
3 acid in Canada.

4 Jungbunzlauer, or JBL, has been selling
5 citric acid to customers in the United States since
6 the 1970s, when it supplied the market from its plant
7 in Austria. In 1999, however, JBL decided to
8 construct a plant in Canada, in order to better serve
9 its customers in North America and throughout the
10 western hemisphere.

11 I would like to begin by providing some
12 background information about the company. JBL is a
13 privately-held family-owned company, which dates back
14 to 1867. Today, it has manufacturing operations in
15 Austria, France, Germany, and Canada. However, only
16 the Austrian and Canadian plants produce citric acid.
17 And I want to emphasize that the Canadian plant, which
18 is the Respondent in this investigation, produces only
19 citric acid. It does not produce citric salts, citric
20 sodium citrate, or potassium citrate.

21 This morning, Mr. Carpenter, you heard from
22 a witness in the domestic industry alleging that JBL
23 constructed the plant in Canada, in part to service
24 the oil sands industry in Canada. That is incorrect.
25 That was never the intention of JBL and, indeed, it

1 cannot serve that market, because the oil sands
2 industry uses sodium citrate in its processing. And
3 as I've just mentioned, JBL Canada produces only
4 citric acid. It does not produce sodium citrate.
5 However, JBL believes that that market in Canada is
6 served by Chinese imports and also by U.S. producers,
7 particularly ADM.

8 As I mentioned, JBL decided in 1999 to
9 construct its second citric acid plant in Port
10 Colborne, Ontario, in response to increasing global
11 demand for citric acid. In making this investment,
12 JBL sought to promote its objectives of supply
13 security, supply flexibility, short lead times,
14 logistical simplification, and nearby technical advice
15 and technical services for its customers when they
16 were needed.

17 JBL explored potential locations in both the
18 United States and Canada, but it selected the Port
19 Colborne site for several reasons. First, Corn
20 Products International, or CPI, which is the main
21 supplier of JBL's primary input, has a production
22 facility in Port Colborne adjacent to the site of
23 JBL's plant. Second, the largest consumers of citric
24 acid in North America are located within 800 miles of
25 Port Colborne. Third, JBL's plant has access to ample

1 supply of water for its production operations and it
2 has its own water treatment facility, as well as its
3 own power generation plant. In addition, JBL is
4 committed to being environmentally responsible and it
5 has reduced carbon dioxide emissions at its Canadian
6 plant by 50 percent since it started operations in
7 2002. JBL believes that its plant in Canada is the
8 most modern facility in the world for the production
9 of citric acid and you heard this morning from
10 witnesses from the domestic industry that it is
11 certainly the most modern plant in North America.

12 When Port Colborne began production, JBL
13 ceased shipping citric acid to the U.S. market from
14 its Austrian facility, replacing it with citric acid
15 produced at its state-of-the-art plant in Ontario.
16 The plant is actually located very close to Niagara
17 Falls in Buffalo, New York.

18 JBL estimates that global consumption of
19 citric acid is increasing at approximately five
20 percent per year. The United States is the world's
21 largest per capita consumer of citric acid and, as you
22 have heard, demand is growing. JBL estimates that the
23 U.S. market for citric acid is approximately 800
24 million pounds per year. On a global basis, about 40
25 percent of all citric acid goes to the beverage

1 market, another 20 percent or so is for food
2 applications, and one-quarter of all citric acid is
3 consumed in the production of detergent and related
4 cleaners. Pharmaceuticals make up an additional, but
5 small percentage of total consumption of citric acid.
6 As you might expect, the highest quality of citric
7 acid is the food grade product and 100 percent of
8 JBL's production in Canada is food grade. JBL takes
9 pride in producing citric acid that has consistent
10 purity, color, and quality.

11 When the Commission looks at the volume and
12 pricing of Canadian imports of citric acid, as I
13 mentioned this morning, it is looking at JBL; JBL, a
14 reliable, responsible, and high-quality supplier that
15 has benefitted, but not harmed the U.S. market. In
16 fact, U.S. customers, as you've just heard, consider
17 JBL to be an additional domestic supplier, along with
18 ADM, Cargill, and Tate & Lyle. In short, JBL is an
19 integral part of the North American market for citric
20 acid.

21 JBL sells to customers on the basis of long-
22 term contracts, often two or three years, and short-
23 term contracts. It does not make spot sales. The
24 majority of JBL's sales are to end users, such as food
25 processors, beverage companies, and manufacturers of

1 consumer products. JBL understands that Petitioners
2 also sell largely to these same end users, indeed as
3 they confirmed in their testimony this morning. Like
4 the Petitioners, JBL makes truckload deliveries to
5 customers in the United States and, in some instances,
6 it makes deliveries by railway tanker care. Like the
7 Petitioners, JBL has announced periodic price
8 increases in the market, particularly during the so-
9 called mating season at the end of the year and it has
10 tried to realize those increases. In fact, JBL tried
11 to raise prices in each year of the period of
12 investigation; but, in most cases, was undersold by
13 lower-priced product from other customers -- other
14 suppliers.

15 When the Commission considers the facts in
16 this case, it will see that JBL is not injuring or
17 threatening to injure the domestic industry. First,
18 JBL's prices for citric acid in the U.S. market are
19 consistently higher than other suppliers' prices,
20 including the Petitioners. In fact, the pricing data,
21 which the staff has collected, shows that JBL oversold
22 the domestic industry in all 39 comparison periods for
23 each of the pricing products that JBL produced.

24 Second, JBL is producing at virtually full
25 capacity, as shown in its response to the Commission's

1 foreign producers' exporters questionnaire. In fact,
2 during the period of investigation, JBL actually
3 produced citric acid for one of the Petitioners, whose
4 production had been disrupted. JBL even packed the
5 citric acid into bags supplied by that U.S. producer
6 with the producer's own logo and other identifying
7 characteristics, so that the U.S. producer could
8 continue to meet its obligations to its customers.
9 And we will provide documentation on this in our post-
10 conference brief.

11 Finally, I would urge the staff to review
12 carefully Petitioners' allegations of lost sales and
13 lost revenues with respect to Canada. Some of the
14 products identified by Petitioners in their
15 allegations are not even made by JBL in Canada.

16 The last point that I want to address is the
17 supply and demand situation in the U.S. market. JBL
18 understands that U.S. producers are operating at very
19 high rates of capacity utilization and that they have
20 relatively little available unused capacity.
21 Nevertheless, even at those levels of production, the
22 three domestic producers of citric acid cannot meet
23 the full demand for this product in the U.S. market.
24 We note that Petitioners filed their antidumping
25 petition at the beginning of the seasonal peak in

1 demand for citric acid. The months of April through
2 August are the beverage season, when consumption of
3 soft drinks and other beverages increases in the
4 United States. Beverage companies, as you have heard,
5 are one of the largest end users of citric acid, so
6 this five-month period is critical to the citric acid
7 market in the United States.

8 In addition, it appears that this peak
9 period also will be adversely affected by the recent
10 announcement of Cargill, that it will be unable to
11 meet its supply commitments to its citric acid
12 customers. According to Cargill, its Eddyville, Iowa
13 plant recently suffered a complete shutdown of
14 electrical service, which also caused collateral
15 damage to the plant's equipment. As a result,
16 according to Cargill, production at the plant was
17 entirely shut down. Cargill has notified customers
18 that their purchases of Cargill's products will be
19 limited to about 70 percent of their contractual
20 amounts until "approximately September 2008." Thus,
21 Cargill will have to allocate its shipments to U.S.
22 customers for at least the next four to five months.
23 We will include a copy of Cargill's announcement in
24 our post-conference brief.

25 We know that negative determinations are

1 unusual in the preliminary phase of the investigation,
2 but we submit that there are unusual conditions in
3 this case, which warrant such a result. How can JBL's
4 Canadian plant be a cause or a threat of material
5 injury to the domestic industry when: (1) JBL has
6 consistently oversold the U.S. producers throughout
7 the period of investigation; (2) JBL is producing at
8 virtually full capacity; (3) JBL was asked by one of
9 the Petitioners to supply citric acid to its customers
10 during a period when the U.S. producer's operations
11 were disrupted; (4) JBL consistently tried to increase
12 prices in every year of the period of investigation;
13 and (5) JBL sells a premium product at a premium price
14 and customers in the United States know that.

15 For these reasons, we urge the Commission to
16 make a negative determination with regard to Canada.
17 Thank you. And I believe that concludes our panel's
18 presentation and we are available for questions.
19 Thank you.

20 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you, very much, panel
21 for your presentation. It was very helpful. We will
22 begin the questions with Mr. Cassise.

23 MR. CASSISE: Well, I will start with one
24 that Petitioners asked. And since you, Mr. Waite,
25 ended on that point, we might as well continue it.

1 What makes the Canadian product a premium product
2 worth a premium price?

3 MR. WAITE: First -- for the record, my name
4 is Fred Waite. First, I want to make it clear that we
5 are not arguing that the Canadian product is of a
6 higher quality than the U.S. product. What we are
7 arguing is that for a number of reasons, the market
8 sees our product as a premium product.

9 The consistency of the product is an
10 important issue for many customers, particularly end
11 users in the food and beverage and, as we just heard,
12 in the consumer product sectors. JBL prides itself in
13 the consistency of its product, as I testified,
14 concerning color, concerning quality, concerning its
15 purity.

16 Secondly, the reliability, the
17 dependability, the speed with which JBL can respond to
18 customers' demand, both for product and also for
19 technical advice or assistance, if they require it.

20 So, we are not arguing that the JBL product
21 has a quality that is higher or exceeds other products
22 in the market. What we are arguing is that the entire
23 package of product that surrounds the product supplied
24 by JBL presents to a customer a premium product. And
25 since we are able to sell in the U.S. market and we

1 are able to sell at prices higher than other suppliers
2 in the U.S. market, that must resonate with some
3 customers.

4 MR. CASSISE: So would it be fair to say
5 that your product consistently meets FCC and USB
6 standards and you have a premium customer service?

7 MR. WAITE: Absolutely.

8 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

9 MR. WAITE: And I would also mention that we
10 often hear, and it's a campaign season, we all
11 recognize that, about the burdens under which U.S.
12 industries suffer in terms of environmental, in terms
13 of consumer, in terms of labor requirements in this
14 country. JBL's flagship plant is located in the
15 European Union and its second plant, as we've
16 discussed, is located in Canada, two regions which
17 have environmental, safety, labor standards that are
18 the equivalent and, in many cases, superior and even
19 more demanding than the requirements in this country.
20 So, it's not surprising that a company like JBL can
21 provide a product that is consistently of the highest
22 quality and consistently meets its customers every
23 needs.

24 MR. CASSISE: Okay, thank you. I did have
25 one further question for you regarding the data that

1 was submitted by JBL in their importer's
2 questionnaire. I just want to verify, is JBL the sole
3 importer of record of U.S. imports from Canada and,
4 therefore, any other reported imports from Canada
5 would be purchases from your company?

6 MR. WAITE: Not entirely. As Mr. Lafave
7 pointed out in his notice of appearance in this case,
8 starting this year, Proctor & Gamble has become
9 importer of record on solution products that it
10 purchases from JBL in railroad tank cars. But, by and
11 large, JBL is the only producer in Canada and it
12 should be during the period of investigation the only
13 importer. There could always be instances where it
14 may sell to a Canadian customer, who subsequently
15 decides that he wants to sell it into the U.S. market.
16 But, we would consider that to be very remote.

17 MR. CASSISE: So, it would be reasonable for
18 the Commission staff to use JBL's import numbers as
19 Canadian imports? That's a reasonable thing to do?

20 MR. WAITE: Yes, yes.

21 MR. CASSISE: Okay. And Mr. Smith, when did
22 the P&G begin doing their direct importing from
23 Canada?

24 MR. SMITH: It's been about three weeks now.

25 MR. CASSISE: Okay, very recently.

1 MR. SMITH: Recently.

2 MR. CASSISE: And the issues you had with
3 the import numbers, that's all very recently, because
4 you've been directly importing in the last three
5 weeks?

6 MR. LAFAVE: No, no. The issue that we have
7 with the import numbers is if you calculate an AUV for
8 Canada, for example, based on the import statistics,
9 since the weight is going to be the solution weight,
10 at least in terms of the shipments to P&G, which did
11 occur during the period of review, where JBL was the
12 importer of record, if you look at that solution
13 weight and then you look at the value and you divide,
14 you're going to end up with a price that's one-half of
15 the anhydrous equivalent AUV.

16 MR. CASSISE: No, I understand that, Mr.
17 Lafave. But, we requested that imports be given in
18 1,000 dry pounds and if JBL has answered their
19 questionnaire properly, we won't have these problems
20 that you point out. Is that correct?

21 MR. LAFAVE: From JBL's perspective, that is
22 correct. They responded in terms of dry pounds. We
23 cannot speak to the official import statistics and to
24 what Customs may have put into their database.

25 MR. CASSISE: Well, since -- we have the

1 sole U.S. importer from Canada here. Why would we use
2 import statistics?

3 MR. LAFAVE: No, no, I agree with you. It's
4 fine. If what Mr. Waite says is correct, which is
5 that they converted everything to a dry weight basis,
6 then using the JBL importer questionnaire numbers
7 should be fine.

8 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

9 MR. LAFAVE: But, I will also point out that
10 monohydrate comes in a crystal form and so an importer
11 could confuse that instruction by assuming that as
12 long as they're reporting the weight of monohydrate,
13 that they're reporting it in a dry form.

14 MR. CASSISE: No, I understand your concern.
15 That's why I asked Mr. Smith, this has just occurred
16 three weeks ago, which is not in our period of
17 investigation.

18 MR. LAFAVE: No, I think you're
19 misunderstanding. P&G has purchased solution form
20 from JBL throughout the period of investigation. But,
21 JBL was the importer of record for all of those
22 shipments through the end of March. And as far as
23 China is concerned, P&G is not the importer of record,
24 but P&G purchases monohydrate, which the importers
25 could interpret they had properly reported simply by

1 reporting the gross weight of the shipment. But, that
2 would still give you an incorrect comparison on an AUV
3 basis or even on an importer questionnaire basis, give
4 you an improper comparison to an AUV that's based on
5 an anhydrous weight basis.

6 MR. CASSISE: No, I understand that. But, I
7 had thought, and maybe we should clarify, I had
8 thought that Mr. Waite had said that JBL was the --
9 virtually almost all of the U.S. imports during the
10 period of investigation, JBL was the importer of
11 record. And that what you had described is a recent
12 phenomena. It must be, because I did not receive an
13 importers questionnaire from Proctor & Gamble. So,
14 unless you -- I would like to move on unless you still
15 think this is an issue. I just wanted to establish
16 that JBL's import numbers would be the best indication
17 of what U.S. imports from Canada are.

18 MR. LAFAVE: I was agreeing with you -- I
19 agree with you on Canada. I was making a separate
20 point, which is that although the importer
21 questionnaire calls for reporting on a dry weight
22 basis, that doesn't distinguish between monohydrate
23 and anhydrous. And we know, P&G knows that a lot of --
24 -- most of what it buys from China is monohydrate. So,
25 the AUV figures and the importer questionnaire figures

1 from China will give a false AUV.

2 MR. CASSISE: And that was your eight
3 percent that you had mentioned in the testimony? You
4 believed that imports from China could off by as much
5 as eight percent because of this issue?

6 MR. SMITH: That's correct, eight percent
7 high on volume and the equivalent low on price.

8 MR. CASSISE: Okay. You plan on arguing
9 with a different set of Chinese imports than the
10 Commerce statistics in your brief?

11 MR. PORTER: If I may, Mr. Cassise, I think
12 my suggestion on how to get at this issue is for
13 simply the Commission staff, and I hate to ask
14 Commission staff to do more than they're already
15 doing, but just to go back to the importers and ask
16 them -- I mean, they're not that many of them, ask
17 them how they reported it. I think Mr. Lafave, his
18 principle point is sort of the official import
19 statistics, the utility of using AUV information from
20 the official import statistics could be questionable,
21 because of the point that he is raising. And,
22 obviously, you can't go back. So the best thing to do
23 is just to go -- there's probably a handful of large
24 importers that count for the vast majority of the
25 product from China. So, I think it's probably a

1 narrow universe that you need to have.

2 MR. CASSISE: Okay. Well, I'll move on. We
3 can brief that issue about your eight percent and we
4 can move on.

5 Mr. Porter, I have a quick question for you
6 about the clients that you represent. In the 2000
7 investigation, there was a list, a short list of
8 Chinese exporters and producers in China that were
9 deemed the large ones, if you will. Are those the
10 same -- has that changed in eight years? Are those
11 companies still the major players in China?

12 MR. PORTER: I don't have that list in front
13 of me.

14 MR. CASSISE: Okay. If you could address
15 that, that would be --

16 MR. PORTER: Address it right now?

17 MR. CASSISE: Absolutely.

18 MR. PORTER: What I would like to say is
19 that according to official Chinese export statistics,
20 four, only four producers account for more than 92
21 percent of the exports to the United States. So,
22 although I represent quite a large number of
23 individual companies, the exports to the United States
24 are concentrated in just a few.

25 MR. CASSISE: Okay. And I'm sure you will

1 tell us who those four are in your brief.

2 MR. PORTER: Yes, and you have the -- you
3 will have all of their foreign producer questionnaire
4 responses, as well.

5 MR. CASSISE: Mr. Hsu, you had mentioned
6 that the Chinese product was kind of locked out of the
7 beverage market because of this caking issue.

8 MR. HSU: Yes.

9 MR. CASSISE: Are you aware -- is there any
10 type of shipping method that exists that could prevent
11 that caking issue and thus make the Chinese product
12 usable in the beverage market?

13 MR. HSU: Not that I know of.

14 MR. CASSISE: But, the caking issue doesn't
15 disallow Chinese product to be used in the food
16 industry, does it not?

17 MR. PORTER: Let me clarify, Mr. Cassise.
18 You want to be clear on this, you're saying
19 "beverage." Mr. Hsu's discussion was only with
20 respect to soft drinks.

21 MR. CASSISE: Okay.

22 MR. PORTER: Okay. The beverage market,
23 itself, is broken down into segments, the soft drinks
24 being the overwhelming driver of that, according to
25 the data Petitioners, themselves, put on the record.

1 MR. HSU: Correct.

2 MR. CASSISE: Okay. But the Chinese product
3 would be used in all other sub-segments of the food
4 and beverage except for soft drinks? That caking
5 issue is only for the soft drink market.

6 MR. HSU: The caking problem is a major
7 problem by all the food and beverage users that use
8 the particular anhydrous form, fine granular or
9 powdered citric acid.

10 MR. CASSISE: So, it expands to the entire
11 segment? It's not just soft drinks, then. Soft
12 drinks is just the --

13 MR. HSU: That's just the majority --

14 MR. CASSISE: -- most prominent example.

15 MR. HSU: -- overwhelming portion, but it
16 does expand to other segments.

17 MR. CASSISE: Okay. I think this was Mr.
18 Smith. You had talked briefly about the qualification
19 process that P&G goes through to certify citric acid
20 producers. You said it takes six to nine months to
21 qualify a citric acid producer for your detergent
22 market. And then I didn't -- I thought I heard you
23 say that you don't have any Chinese producers
24 certified for what you call the oral care and beauty
25 product segment. Could you just expand on that a

1 little bit, your certification process and what
2 segments are certified in China and which are not?

3 MR. SMITH: The Chinese are only qualified
4 to supply to our fabric care, our detergents, so Tide
5 and Gain. Our oral care products, Crest and Scope,
6 they're not qualified, as well as our beauty care
7 products, Pantene, Head & Shoulders. Those products
8 touch the skin or it could be ingested and so they
9 require more elaborate testing, which we have never
10 done with Chinese product. The testing for fabric and
11 home care, for our fabric care products primarily is
12 six to nine months, because it's easier to get that
13 qualification done than the beauty care or oral care
14 products. That could be upwards of two years
15 possibly.

16 MR. CASSISE: Now, your qualification
17 process, does it go beyond what these FCC and USB
18 standards are? I'm assuming you have almost a unique
19 certification process. Is it above and beyond the
20 standards that we see in the FCC and USB?

21 MR. SMITH: It is above and beyond. I don't
22 have the specifics of the technical tests that are
23 required. A big part of it is just the stability on
24 the shelves for our beauty care and oral care products
25 and having that product be the same finished product

1 months down the road. But, yes, the testing is more
2 stringent than the normal testing that we would use
3 for our fabric care.

4 MR. CASSISE: I mean, a Chinese producer
5 couldn't come up to you and say, well, we've passed
6 these standards, these FCC and USB standards. You
7 would say that doesn't matter. We have an additional
8 requirement. We need to do a formal certification
9 process.

10 MR. SMITH: Yes, that's true.

11 MR. CASSISE: Okay. And I asked the
12 Petitioners to break out their 2007 shipments by
13 market segments. If you could do that, as well, for
14 Canada and China, estimate the end use segments, Mr.
15 Porter?

16 MR. PORTER: Yes, Mr. Cassise, we intend to
17 do so. We intend to, for at least all of the major
18 Chinese exports, to break out their U.S. shipments by
19 segment. However, I would -- I respectfully ask that
20 the Commission send this out in writing and specify
21 the segments. And I would ask that the Commission
22 break out the segments. For example, Petitioners want
23 you to believe there are only two segments, food and
24 beverage, industrial, and their own materials
25 supported in the petition break out beverage between

1 soft drinks, ready-to-drink teas, other. And then in
2 food, they have for cheese and dairy processing and so
3 forth. Now, we don't need to do maybe 16, but I
4 really think that we need to break out soft drinks,
5 other beverage, and then food, maybe one and two, and
6 then so forth. And that's all right there in the
7 petition. It's very easy to do and I suggest that the
8 Commission send out a list of what it wants to see and
9 everyone is on the same page. Otherwise, you're going
10 to get different interpretations of segments and it's
11 not going to be useful.

12 MR. CASSISE: No, I agree. And as long as
13 we keep it reasonable, I agree with you and we'll send
14 that out.

15 MR. WAITE: And Mr. Cassise, Canada will
16 respond to that question.

17 MR. CASSISE: Great, thank you. I believe
18 that's all I have for right now. Thank you, very
19 much.

20 MR. CARPENTER: Ms. Alves?

21 MS. ALVES: Good morning. Mary Jane Alves
22 from the General Counsel's Office again. Thank you
23 all for coming. It's been very helpful already. I
24 have some additional questions. As I mentioned this
25 morning, anything that I ask this morning's panel, I

1 would appreciate getting answers to you in your post-
2 conference briefs. Vice versa for the afternoon
3 panel, if I've asked questions of the afternoon panel,
4 I would be interested in getting responses from the
5 domestic industry, as well.

6 Let me just start with domestic like product
7 before we get into a lot of cumulation issues. It
8 appears from your testimony this morning that you're
9 not going to contest the domestic like product.

10 MR. PORTER: On behalf of the Chinese, that
11 is correct. For the purpose of summary determination,
12 we will accept the Petitioners' definition of like
13 product.

14 MR. WAITE: We, also, accept the
15 Petitioners' definition of like product.

16 MS. ALVES: Okay, thank you. Second, if you
17 could examine the information that you have under the
18 protective order and let me know if you believe if
19 there are any related party issues and, if so, whether
20 or not any appropriate circumstances exist excluding
21 any of the domestic producers.

22 MR. WAITE: We will do that.

23 MR. PORTER: And we will do that, as well.

24 MS. ALVES: Also, in the last case, the
25 Commission examined whether converters were engaged in

1 sufficient production related activities, to include
2 them in the domestic industry. In the last case, the
3 Commission concluded they were not engaged in
4 sufficient production related activities. Would you
5 agree with that assessment or, if not, what has
6 changed since then?

7 MR. PORTER: On behalf of the Chinese, we
8 don't anticipate disagreeing with the prior
9 Commission conclusion.

10 MR. WAITE: On behalf of JBL, we, also, do
11 not anticipate contesting that at this stage.

12 MS. ALVES: Okay, thank you. Okay. Let's
13 move to cumulation. Let's spell it out very cleanly
14 using the Commission's typical four-factor test.
15 Let's just talk present material injury for purposes
16 of the immediate discussion. Mr. Porter, if you could
17 walk through each of the four factors and just let me
18 know what your position is as to whether or not the
19 Commission should cumulate the Chinese and the
20 Canadian imports.

21 MR. PORTER: Needless to say, this will be
22 an extensive part of our post-conference brief. But,
23 I really think what you heard today goes to the
24 essence of the competition between the Chinese
25 suppliers and JBL. I mean, I was quite intrigued that

1 Petitioners, themselves, put forth a chart that
2 indicated that but for Lake Erie, the JBL would be a
3 domestic producer. I mean, if you look at it and you
4 look at the chart, I mean, you couldn't really get any
5 closer to the United States than that. And that is
6 essentially our point. For all intensive purposes,
7 JBL is part of the domestic industry. And I think we
8 heard very dramatic testimony from Mr. Waite that, in
9 fact, the domestic industry considers JBL to be so
10 much one of their own, they asked JBL to impersonate
11 them on several occasions. And the testimony we heard
12 from Mr. Hsu indicates that the Chinese suppliers are
13 really focused on different segments of the market.

14 And so when you step back and look at the
15 competition, there's not a sufficient overlap really
16 between the Chinese suppliers and the domestics, but
17 by extension JBL to allow cumulation.

18 MS. ALVES: Okay. So, as I understand your
19 arguments, are they limited to differences in the
20 fungibility between the imports from the two sources?

21 MR. PORTER: The fungibility with respect --
22 at the customer level. I think a little bit of the
23 confusion that is happening here is that in many other
24 cases, that arguments have been made with respect to
25 cumulation with inherent product differences, okay.

1 This product has these. Here, I'm not so sure the
2 argument is that inherently, the citric acid, itself,
3 is different. What is different is the fact that you
4 can't transport long ways without caking and that very
5 much affects the use of the product.

6 You see, Petitioners are doing a little bit
7 sleight of hand. They're saying that the Chinese
8 suppliers, especially the new plants, can produce the
9 grade, meaning, I guess, FCC and USB standards. No
10 one is disputing that. When it comes off the factory
11 line, it meets those standards. The question is, can
12 the customer use it. And that's the essence of
13 competition.

14 MS. ALVES: Okay.

15 MR. PORTER: Okay and that's what we're
16 getting at.

17 MS. ALVES: Playing devil's advocate,
18 there's been information in the petition where they
19 have said it doesn't really matter what the form is.
20 It can come in, in anhydrous or it can come in the
21 monohydrous or it come in, in solution form. If you
22 needed to be in solution, you make it into solution.
23 If you need to convert your production process -- it's
24 all really competing against one another. And your
25 argument is that that's not the case?

1 MR. PORTER: Absolutely. The fact that it
2 is physically possible to ship, let's say, liquid from
3 China and then someone could then convert it doesn't
4 mean that that is, in fact, being done, okay. The
5 point of the matter is that the big soft drink
6 companies, and we had an example about Pepsi, require
7 it in a form so that they can use it easily. Just
8 because it's theoretically possible to ship Pepsi
9 something else and they then can do something to get
10 it to where they can use it doesn't mean that Pepsi
11 wants it like that. So, again, where is the focus?
12 The focus should be on what the customer requires, not
13 what physically could be used.

14 MR. LAFAVE: May I add something to that?
15 We, also, perceive a difference in the products, in
16 that the product that's coming from China is all
17 anhydrous or monohydrate. It's not coming in, in
18 solution. And P&G is able to purchase solution from
19 JBL. That's very important to them. More than a
20 majority, a large portion of what they buy from JBL is
21 in solution form. And so, the products are not
22 fungible and the difference is important.

23 MS. ALVES: Is it not the case, though,
24 there was testimony this morning that it's fairly easy
25 to convert the dry form into a solution form. It

1 would take a 10-year old to do it. Is that not the
2 case?

3 MR. SMITH: I don't think I personally could
4 do it. But, we have tollers that are set up to do it
5 at additional cost and we're set up at our Alexandria
6 plant, best, versus our Lima plant, to handle the
7 powder that comes in, the monohydrate or the
8 anhydrous. But, I think when you look at the
9 different applications, such as the food and beverage
10 industry, they require the anhydrous form to be
11 received at their plants, because of the way their
12 production process is set up and they're not set up as
13 well as P&G. It would probably require capital, I
14 would guess, for them to be able to receive solution
15 and I'm not even sure if they can have solution in
16 their final product. So --

17 MS. ALVES: So for certain purchasers,
18 because of their existing capabilities, they couldn't
19 do it. But for other purchasers, that possibility is
20 out there, including yourself.

21 MR. SMITH: I think for P&G, we can do it at
22 an additional cost.

23 MS. ALVES: And have you done it during the
24 period of investigation, since 2005?

25 MR. SMITH: Have we taken powder and made it

1 into solution? Yes, certainly.

2 MS. ALVES: And what is the relationship in
3 terms of pricing of the powder versus the solution?

4 MR. SMITH: Well, typically, if you're
5 talking anhydrous base, it's an anhydrous powder, it
6 would be twice as much of a 50 percent solution
7 received at our plant. The advantage of receiving
8 solution is we don't have to do the additional
9 processing, the additional costs, to bring it in. Our
10 process requires solution for the production.

11 MS. ALVES: But, there's certainly a
12 relationship in terms of how you would ask for a price
13 quote for the dry versus the solution form? If
14 somebody is going to supply you with the dry form and
15 you need to put it into solution, you're going to
16 factor that in when you're asking for the product?

17 MR. SMITH: I would say that normally the
18 negotiations are based on the citric price regardless
19 of solution or powder and then we absorb that cost of
20 putting it into solution. It's not -- we can leverage
21 and subtract that cost out of the powdered cost, if
22 that's what you're asking.

23 MS. ALVES: Okay. So, you have converted
24 some of the dry form into solution. Have you done the
25 reverse and just purchased solution and not -- for the

1 facility where you're currently converting the dry
2 into solution, was there a time when you were only
3 purchasing solution for that facility?

4 MR. SMITH: No, there was not a time.

5 MR. LAFAVE: May I add something? This is
6 Arthur Lafave. It's both -- it's cheaper on both
7 sides of the equation; that is it's cheaper for the
8 manufacturer to produce liquid form citric acid,
9 because they don't have to fully dry it. Or if they
10 do fully dry it, they can use off spec particles to
11 make the solution. So, it's cheaper on their side.
12 Certainly cheaper on P&G's side to buy the solution.
13 They wouldn't go to the trouble of railcarring it from
14 JBL to their plant in Louisiana in specially lined
15 railcars if it wasn't a better solution for them, to
16 use that word too often.

17 MS. ALVES: Understood. Okay. Let me just
18 give Mr. Waite and Mr. Lafave an opportunity to flesh
19 out some of the -- if there's anything more that you
20 want to add to the fungibility discussion.

21 MR. WAITE: Well, we certainly -- this is
22 Fred Waite. We will certainly address the
23 fungibility, as well as the other four statutory
24 factors, in cumulation, as well as other factors that
25 are, in our judgment, very important in this case,

1 volume trends and pricing data, in our post-conference
2 brief. I must confess that although we have a great
3 deal of anecdotal information on the four points, we
4 only received questionnaire responses that would
5 enable us to look into the same record that you will
6 be looking at yesterday. So, we will do that between
7 now and next Monday and hopefully that would enable us
8 to give you a completely full analysis on our
9 decumulation issue, relying both on information that
10 we have obtained from JBL, as well as the information
11 that you will have in the record.

12 MS. ALVES: I'm just trying to get a sense
13 of where some of the issues are heading, given that
14 there's an even longer delay before I get the post-
15 conference briefs, just so that we can have a sense of
16 where things are going, if you're primarily focusing
17 on the fungibility issue, as opposed to channels of
18 distribution, if there are differences there.

19 MR. WAITE: Well, JBL sells most of its
20 production directly to end users, for example.

21 MS. ALVES: Which you indicated you believed
22 was also the case for the domestic producers.

23 MR. WAITE: And that is the case for the
24 other domestic producers. Also, JBL participates in
25 the so-called mating season at the end of the year

1 with the major customers, the 10 to 20 largest
2 consumers of citric acid, and it fully participates in
3 that process, again in the same way that the domestic
4 producer does, and receives from its customers the
5 same information domestic producers receive, in terms
6 of how the customer can get a better price elsewhere
7 unless JBL is willing to be more aggressive on its
8 pricing.

9 MS. ALVES: Are you encountering customers,
10 who are telling your client that they can get better
11 Chinese product?

12 MR. WAITE: It depends on the customer and
13 from what we understand many customers will simply say
14 the price you gave me is close, the price you gave me
15 is out of the ball park, you're going to have to do
16 better. It's not the case where they're shown
17 competing offers from other producers or even have the
18 other producers either by company or by country
19 identify to them.

20 MS. ALVES: They just know that there's
21 somebody who's more competitive without necessarily
22 knowing the source or --

23 MR. WAITE: They are told by the customer
24 that there's somebody more competitive, yes. Which is
25 not unusual, I think, in many industries. Market

1 information is always imperfect. Customers should be
2 one of the most reliable sources of pricing
3 information in the market, and particularly
4 information from large customers. I don't mean to
5 suggest that customers are misleading their suppliers,
6 it's a dance, it's a negotiation. We've all been
7 through it when we've bought homes or bought cars. On
8 this level it's multinational companies talking to
9 each other about service contracts going for 12
10 months, perhaps 24 months. So there is a lot of
11 signaling back and forth within the constraints of the
12 antitrust and fair competition laws as to what prices
13 are acceptable and what aren't.

14 I believe as one of the industry witnesses
15 from the Petitioners said this morning, you certainly
16 know the result after you've been told you didn't get
17 the sale.

18 MS. ALVES: You've made two references this
19 morning to the mating season, and you mentioned at one
20 point that for the beverage industry it's your
21 understanding that April to August is the key period
22 there. Can you talk more specifically, are you
23 alleging, not that there's seasonality but there's
24 some sort of equivalent in this industry? If so, if
25 you could break down the distinctions by segment.

1 MR. WAITE: Of course. Actually the mating
2 season is the period, and I've used that term and I
3 apologize, because I've been in a number of cases
4 where at the end of the year there is this process of
5 negotiation and it's called the mating season in the
6 magnesium industry and the silicon metal industry.
7 I'm not sure if you use the same term in the citric
8 acid industry. It might just be negotiating time.

9 That's when the contracts are negotiated.
10 What you will also see among the major consumers, and
11 particularly from what we could see in the public
12 record, from the beverage companies, they're often
13 sourcing globally. If you look at some of the
14 beverage companies as to who is the customer in a
15 beverage company, it may not be an office in the
16 United States. It may be an office elsewhere, and
17 that's because that company, and it could be other
18 types of major consumers too, are sourcing globally
19 and they're going through one office in order to make
20 their purchases.

21 So the contract --

22 MS. ALVES: So are they not specifying then
23 the point of delivery?

24 MR. WAITE: I beg your pardon?

25 MS. ALVES: They're not specifying where the

1 product would be delivered? They're asking for a
2 global price --

3 MR. WAITE: No, that's not my understanding,
4 but it's handled globally. That would certainly give
5 a multinational a much better handle on their costs
6 and on the availability of raw materials that they are
7 procuring for their production. But no, different
8 pricing and different markets, obviously, and in
9 different currencies and different quantities and
10 perhaps even different delivery schedules. It's
11 simply that the multinationals will have global
12 sourcing.

13 I think at many recent hearings before this
14 Commission when you have purchasers come in,
15 especially large multinational purchasers, often the
16 title of the witness will be Global Sourcing Manager
17 or International Procurement Manager. That's all I'm
18 saying. They're negotiated for particular markets as
19 I understand it, and the pricing and delivery terms
20 and schedules are different.

21 When I was talking about seasonality, that
22 has to do with consumption. Obviously in the United
23 States during the summer we consume a great deal of
24 soft drinks. You just have to go to National Stadium
25 or any other venue and you can see how much Coke or

1 Pepsi, whoever has the franchise, is consumed.

2 That's simply a question of shipment, of
3 production and shipment schedules. Prices are not
4 established during that season. That's the
5 consumption season as opposed to the contractual
6 season.

7 MR. BUTTON: Ken Button from Economic
8 Consulting Services.

9 As your question is focused a bit on the
10 negotiating process that takes place at the end of
11 the year, I thought a comment would be appropriate to
12 address an issue that was related by the Petitioners
13 this morning. I'd make a comment about that and then
14 invite P&G to carry on.

15 It was said this morning that in these
16 negotiations, in this mating period, this compacted
17 period of time, the US producers feel somewhat
18 vulnerable because they're dealing with some large
19 customers who seem to have all the market power from
20 their perspective. It's basically the US producers
21 offer a price, the consumers say nope, you've got to
22 go lower, and the US producers are somehow trapped.

23 There's another side to it, in fact, and I
24 think that P&G perhaps can address this point. It
25 includes, one, the short timeframe is not set by the

1 customers, it's set by the US producers. It's short
2 by their choice.

3 Secondly, the US customers are equally
4 concerned to obtain available supply to keep their
5 plants running and they have concerns, and
6 particularly this year that can be discussed, of
7 getting adequate supply.

8 Perhaps I'd invite P&G to comment about that
9 further.

10 MR. SMITH: We actually prefer not to have
11 all of our contracts ending on the same date because
12 it leaves our company exposed to more risk. And price
13 aside, supply is number one as far as a purchaser for
14 a company of raw materials. We have to keep our
15 plants operational.

16 So we would prefer to keep our contracts
17 staggered often on many of our materials including
18 citric acid. We've approached producers early, prior
19 to the end of the year, to see if we can have
20 negotiations. Typically those negotiations have been
21 delayed until the end of the year.

22 I don't think it's ever been P&G that's
23 driving the delay to the end of the year. We would
24 prefer to actually land our contracts early on so we
25 can focus on maybe some other contracts that end

1 towards the end of the year.

2 MS. ALVES: And you mentioned, Mr. Smith,
3 that your contracts have recently been anywhere from a
4 year to, there was one that was a three year term.
5 What is the experience of the others in the industry?
6 Petitioners in their petition and again in their
7 testimony this morning said there are approximately 25
8 large players. That there are these long-term, fixed
9 term contracts. Is that your understanding of the
10 market as well?

11 MR. SMITH: I can address a bit of that.

12 We prefer to have long term contracts.
13 Especially in markets like the market that we have
14 right now for citric acid. Recently we have not been
15 able to obtain long term pricing. If that was the
16 question you were asking.

17 MS. ALVES: If you have any other thoughts -
18 -

19 MR. PORTER: I just wanted to mention --

20 MS. ALVES: -- obviously you don't have all
21 of your clients here.

22 MR. PORTER: Mr. Hsu mentioned, there's a
23 whole other side to the market. Petitioners heard
24 today that they're very intent, they're just laser-
25 like focus on these very large customers that can buy

1 rail volumes and truckload volumes. Certainly JBL is
2 like that too. But we heard that there's a lot of
3 small customers out there and they need to be
4 serviced. Those small customers do not buy on a long
5 term contract basis.

6 MS. ALVES: But they do buy on a contract
7 basis?

8 MR. HSU: Small customers buy on a spot
9 basis only.

10 MS. ALVES: At least looking at the import
11 statistics, though, there's certainly a lot of Chinese
12 product in the US market. Is it your position that
13 all of that is going to these mom and pop type
14 producers?

15 MR. HSU: Yes, the importers that they sell
16 to, distributors and distributors will sell to the mom
17 and pop establishments who require many other
18 ingredients, they want delivered on the same pallet,
19 in the same container. Maybe five bags or 20 bags of
20 citric acid, but a slew of other ingredients of 30 to
21 40 items in very small quantities. It's a totally
22 different market.

23 MS. ALVES: And are there attempts to sell
24 at some of the other larger purchasers, even if
25 they're not successful sales? Are there --

1 MR. HSU: No. I believe attempts were made.
2 As I testified earlier, there was a large, the largest
3 Chinese producer attempted to sell Pepsi, but they
4 were not successful.

5 MS. ALVES: But that was within the period
6 of investigation since 2005?

7 MR. HSU: Correct.

8 MS. ALVES: To your knowledge that's the
9 only major area where there were attempts of sales?

10 MR. HSU: Yes, attempts were made but they
11 did not succeed.

12 MS. ALVES: Okay.

13 There's been some reference, in your
14 testimony today you referenced the Kenbuckle Economics
15 Handbook from August 2006 that was put out by SRI. I
16 wondered if you had any comments on the utility of
17 this information. It's included in the petition as
18 one of the exhibits. It's copyrighted so it's in the
19 confidential version.

20 MR. LAFAVE: I think that was mentioned by
21 the Petitioners as a proprietary exhibit in their
22 petition.

23 MS. ALVES: Do you have any thoughts on the
24 utility of the source? If others in the industry are
25 familiar with it --

1 MR. LAFAVE: -- my client so it's pretty
2 difficult to have a thought on it.

3 MS. ALVES: Are they aware, I'm just trying
4 to get a sense of whether or not this is a publication
5 that's readily available to others.

6 MR. SMITH: It is. We're aware of the
7 publication. You have to subscribe, pay for the
8 publication.

9 MS. ALVES: It's something that people in
10 the industry use?

11 MR. SMITH: It is. It's not published every
12 year, so therefore the data is not always completely
13 up to date.

14 MS. ALVES: There was some discussion this
15 morning with Chris Cassise about the datasets that we
16 should be looking to and modifications that may be
17 needed to be made in order to accommodate conversion
18 factors and things like that from the monohydrate to
19 the anhydrous version or the solution version. If you
20 can provide as much detail as you can on whatever
21 thoughts you may have as to conversion factors that we
22 need or which datasets are preferable and why, that
23 would be helpful.

24 MR. LAFAVE: I think I can answer that right
25 now.

1 From solution to anhydrous you have to
2 divide in half for the quantity. For monohydrate to
3 anhydrous you multiply by .92.

4 MS. ALVES: So if we had a sense of which
5 portion of imports from China were one form or another
6 we could apply that formula.

7 MR. LAFAVE: Yes, you could.

8 MS. ALVES: Okay. And if the Petitioners
9 could comment on the utility of that formula as well
10 in the post-conference briefs that would be helpful.

11 My last question for now relates to Bratsk.
12 I know you're all familiar with it. Petitioners have
13 conceded this morning that they believe that this does
14 involve a commodity product. Do you have any response
15 to their arguments on the Bratsk issue?

16 MR. PORTER: A quick response. I believe
17 Petitioners were focusing sort of on the wrong issue.
18 They look at 2007 import volumes and say see, how
19 could non-subjects possibly be a factor in the market?
20 By their own admission, you only go back a few years
21 and non-subjects were a huge part of the market.

22 So unless they demonstrate that all of that
23 capacity has shut down, and we heard about one or two,
24 but not all. Unless all the capacity is shut down, by
25 their own admission that capacity could come back into

1 the market if the Chinese and Canadians were kicked
2 out.

3 So again, I think the issue under Bratsk is
4 the capability of supplying the US market in the
5 future, and not necessarily what has happened in the
6 last year of the POI.

7 MS. ALVES: Mr. Waite or Mr. Lafave?

8 MR. LAFAVE: I will just say on behalf of
9 P&G that Mr. Waite testified this morning that the JBL
10 plant in Canada replaced imports from Austria.
11 Obviously if there was a significant antidumping duty
12 placed on product from Canada it's quite possible that
13 that product would be shipped to Europe and the
14 European product would be shipped to the United
15 States.

16 MS. ALVES: Do you have any thoughts on the
17 types of products that are coming in from the non-
18 subject sources? Are there similar questions in terms
19 of the utility of the average unit values?

20 MR. LAFAVE: P&G doesn't source from any of
21 those places so it doesn't have very good knowledge
22 about those.

23 MR. WAITE: We will take a look at the
24 import data and hopefully be able to give you some
25 more information in our post-conference brief as to

1 what those products may be. We'd also note that
2 pricing and quantity often have a relationship and if
3 they're small quantities you tend to have higher
4 prices. Also if they're small quantities they could
5 be specialized products or there could be a special
6 relationship that brings them in.

7 So we'll address that the best that we can
8 in our post-conference brief.

9 MS. ALVES: That's all the questions I have.

10 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Benedetto?

11 MR. BENEDETTO: Thank you all very much for
12 your testimony and if I ask any questions about any
13 proprietary information, please just indicate that and
14 if you can address it in your briefs.

15 I guess first for Mr. Smith, I understood
16 from your testimony you said that it's costlier for
17 your firm to use Chinese product. Aside from the
18 overall cost to your firm, are the Chinese and the
19 Canadian products, citric acid products, actually less
20 expensive than the US product or more expensive? On
21 an anhydrous equivalent basis when you just look at
22 the sale, not the overall cost to your firm?

23 MR. SMITH: The comparison that we've done
24 is on the overall cost. That's how we negotiate and
25 compare, based on a delivered price to our plants.

1 The Chinese and Canadians have always been more
2 expensive, we know that.

3 MR. BENEDETTO: Mr. Hsu, is that consistent
4 with what you've observed also? That the Chinese and
5 Canadian product is more expensive --

6 MR. HSU: We do not compete with the
7 domestic producers in those smaller accounts. Our
8 price is always like 20 to 30 percent higher than the
9 market for large accounts.

10 MR. BENEDETTO: Mr. Hsu, do you distribute
11 domestic at all? I was going to ask you if you
12 compete with distributors who also distribute
13 domestic. You're saying the domestic is not present
14 in those markets at all?

15 MR. HSU: I actually purchase domestic
16 citric acid from their distributors as well.

17 MR. BENEDETTO: Do you compete with other
18 distributors who are distributing domestic also?

19 MR. HSU: Not really.

20 MR. BENEDETTO: Do you sell that domestic to
21 some of those same customers that you --

22 MR. HSU: We actually sell not a single
23 product, we sell a package of ingredients.

24 MR. BENEDETTO: But to the same customers as
25 you sell the imported --

1 MR. HSU: Correct. The imported tends to be
2 more expensive.

3 MR. BENEDETTO: I think I know the answer
4 for Canada since JBL put its plant next to Corn
5 Products International., but we heard this morning
6 that Petitioners thought that the raw materials used
7 in China and Canada were also mostly corn. Is that
8 correct?

9 MR. WAITE: That is correct, yes.

10 MR. BENEDETTO: For Canada, that's correct.
11 Is that true for China also, or --

12 MR. HSU: Excuse me?

13 MR. BENEDETTO: Is the raw material used in
14 China to produce citric acid mostly corn? Or is it
15 something else?

16 MR. HSU: I think it's split between corn
17 and tapioca.

18 MR. BENEDETTO: Is it half and half do you
19 think?

20 MR. HSU: It's about half and half.

21 MR. BENEDETTO: Do you know anything about
22 trends in tapioca pricing in China?

23 MR. HSU: Tapioca prices have I think
24 quadrupled.

25 MR. BENEDETTO: So something like corn, it's

1 gone up a lot like corn.

2 MR. HSU: I think the tapioca demand in the
3 Asian food applications have quadrupled.

4 MR. BENEDETTO: In terms of quality --

5 MR. HSU: Both demand and price quadrupled.

6 MR. BENEDETTO: Thank you. That's helpful.
7 In terms of the quality comparison between
8 the US and Chinese product, is caking due to
9 absorption of water the only issue? Are there other
10 differences? I understand that could be a very
11 significant issue, but --

12 MR. HSU: The Chinese in general is
13 inferior, although it does meet USP or FCC standards.
14 Color is not specified in the USP. The acidity level
15 is not consistent. The pH value is not consistent
16 from batch to batch among the Chinese suppliers. In
17 that respect the imported materials are not consistent
18 and are of inferior quality, but they do meet USP or
19 FCC specs.

20 MR. BENEDETTO: So there's a wider range of
21 issues there then.

22 I guess both Mr. Hsu and Mr. Waite, you said
23 that JBL is not considered a foreign supplier, or that
24 it is considered a domestic supplier in the US market.
25 I understood your example that you say you're going to

1 submit documentation on about how they actually
2 produced for a US producer.

3 Is that what you mean by saying they are
4 considered a US supplier? I guess I'm confused. What
5 does it mean to be, they're not a US supplier, so what
6 do you mean, they're considered a US supplier?

7 MR. WAITE: A number of things. As Mr. Hsu
8 indicated, and as we've been told by our customers,
9 customers consider JBL no differently than they
10 consider the three domestic producers. The fact that
11 JBL is located across the border from Niagara Falls is
12 not an important consideration to customers given the
13 terms of the NAFTA which permit duty-free entry in
14 terms of transportation hubs and links in the
15 northeast of the United States that then feed into the
16 Midwest and the rest of the country.

17 But in terms of being a US supplier there
18 are a number of factors and I went through them in my
19 testimony. JBL acts like a domestic supplier.
20 Indeed, its marketing officer is located in Newton
21 Center, just outside Boston, Mass. And when it enters
22 the market it acts like an American producer in so
23 many ways. It ships directly to end users in the
24 United States. It engages in the so-called mating
25 season the same way American producers do. It offers

1 a consistently high quality product, what we termed a
2 premium product in terms of purity and color and grade
3 and quality. It operates under many and indeed more
4 constraints than US producers in terms of its own
5 operations in Canada and the standards that it must
6 meet.

7 So by being a US supplier it's both customer
8 perception and also the way JBL enters the market.
9 They decided to come to North America in order to be a
10 North American producer, and not to continue to source
11 from their Austrian plant for their customers in the
12 United States.

13 MR. BENEDETTO: IS it a corollary that non-
14 subject imports and Chinese imports don't do those
15 things that you just described?

16 MR. WAITE: Tehre's no non-subject or
17 Chinese production on the border of the United States.
18 As far as I know, tehre's no longer any citric acid
19 production in North America. There had been
20 production in Mexico by affiliates of some of the
21 domestic producers but we understand that those have
22 been shuttered.

23 There may be some local Mexican producers
24 but the quality is probably not of a level that would
25 enable them to enter the US market.

1 So in terms of Chinese, obviously Chinese
2 cannot operate the same way we do. They can't ship
3 tank cars across the Pacific. They can't ship the way
4 that we do on the North American rail and road net.

5 Whether there are other producers in North
6 America that might operate the way we do, we're not
7 aware of them. And I don't think the domestic
8 industry mentioned it or any other producers in North
9 America that operated the way they and JBL operate.

10 MR. BENEDETTO: That's helpful.

11 Have there been any exchange rate affects
12 over this period that have affected the citric acid
13 imports from the two subject countries?

14 MR. HSU: Yes. The revaluation of the
15 Chinese currency I believe about 18 to 20 percent --

16 MR. BENEDETTO: What affect has that had on
17 the citric acid market?

18 MR. HSU: -- has resulted in significant
19 increases of Chinese citric acid prices.

20 MR. BENEDETTO: And for Canada?

21 MR. WAITE: The Canadian currency has
22 obviously appreciated against the US dollar the way so
23 many currencies of industrialized countries have. And
24 that's simply an issue that has to be addressed.

25 Most producers, and again, we're a producer

1 in North America. Most producers try to hedge on
2 currency as they try to hedge on their raw materials.
3 JBL does what you would expect any multinational
4 company to do in that regard. Indeed, as the
5 Petitioners themselves do.

6 In terms of actual affect, we can look at
7 that. I would say that when you're selling into the
8 US market you're selling into the US market and the US
9 market is really driving the conditions in this
10 market.

11 MR. BENEDETTO: Going to one of the charts
12 that the Petitioners gave us, the growth of citric
13 products, subject imports since 1999, it shows an
14 increase in the value of both Canadian and Chinese
15 imports over 2005 to 2007. I guess my question is, if
16 the prices are higher for the imports as you're
17 saying, and there's been these exchange rate issues,
18 why are the imports increasing? What's going on in the
19 US market or wherever? Why are subject imports
20 increasing over 2005 to 2007?

21 MR. WAITE: I can only speak of JBL and its
22 production and shipments from Canada. One of the
23 reasons, of course, as I mentioned is that
24 historically JBL had served its customers in North
25 America from its operations in Europe. When the

1 Canadian plant started production, moved into
2 operation, that production replaced production coming
3 out of Europe. So you would see an increase coming
4 from Canada and a decrease coming out of Europe.
5 That's what indeed the import statistics show.

6 Incidentally, JBL moved into production in
7 about 2002 and that correlates very closely with the
8 chart that the Petitioners provided you this morning.

9 In terms of how can a company that sells at
10 higher prices and your data shows that do that? How
11 can it stay in the market? Again, there are other
12 non-price factors that are obviously driving
13 purchasing decisions, particularly these large
14 purchasers.

15 You have heard so many times in this room
16 from large consuming companies, particularly
17 multinational companies, tell you that many of them
18 even have corporate rules that require them to multi-
19 source and to multi-source basic significant inputs.
20 I think you heard a little of that, or it was
21 intimated, today. That these companies cannot rely on
22 just one supplier. They don't like to rely on
23 contracts that will expire on the same date. They
24 have a production schedule that is important that it
25 not be interrupted because they incur tremendous costs

1 both in terms of their production and also in terms of
2 their presence in the market.

3 So there are many reasons why companies may
4 be willing to pay, as I said earlier, a premium price
5 including the consistency of the product, the
6 dependability of the supply, the willingness of the
7 supplier to work with the customer in terms of any
8 technical issues or delivery or terms that may come
9 up.

10 MR. BENEDETTO: Any response for China?

11 MR. HSU: The increase of Chinese imports
12 primarily is from the industrial sector. Especially
13 the water treatment sector.

14 MR. BENEDETTO: Why has there been an
15 increase in that sector?

16 MR. HSU: As I said, states have been
17 limiting, as far as I know, the state of Washington,
18 the state of Maine, there are at least 12 to 13 states
19 that are regulating the use of phosphoric acid.
20 They're eradicating the phosphoric acid from the water
21 treatment plants, and users, industrial water
22 treatment companies and also the paper mills, the
23 sewage plants, they are switching to citric acid.

24 MR. BENEDETTO: When you spoke about a
25 demand growth of ten percent was that just for the

1 industrial segment? Or was that for --

2 MR. HSU: Ten percent in relation to the
3 total consumption.

4 MR. BENEDETTO: Total consumption of all
5 citric acid across all segments.

6 MR. HSU: Right.

7 MR. BENEDETTO: Is that an annual number or
8 is that for 2005 to 2007 or --

9 MR. HSU: For the POI.

10 MR. BENEDETTO: Is ten percent growth over
11 two years or so, is that a good rate, considered a
12 good rate of growth?

13 MR. HSU: It is a very good rate of growth.

14 MR. BENEDETTO: Is that consistent with what
15 the Petitioners said this morning, that there has sort
16 of been demand growth at the same rate as population
17 growth? There hadn't been anything particularly --

18 MR. HSU: If I remember correctly the
19 Petitioners said the growth has been five percent
20 every year.

21 MR. BENEDETTO: You think that's consistent
22 then with that? Or --

23 MR. HSU: Yes.

24 MR. BENEDETTO: Do you agree with that as
25 well?

1 MR. WAITE: JBL believes that global
2 consumption is increasing about five percent a year.
3 Within various segments in the US market some are
4 probably increasing faster than that and some not as
5 quickly.

6 MR. BENEDETTO: One more question for JBL.
7 Are there any other Austrian producers besides JBL?
8 Or are we going to be able to see very clearly in the
9 import data the Austrian shipments switching over to
10 Canadian shipments?

11 MR. WAITE: We are not aware of any other
12 Austrian producer of citric acid, but we will confirm
13 that to you, Mr. Benedetto.

14 MR. BENEDETTO: Thank you all very much for
15 your testimony.

16 I don't have any further cadence.

17 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Ascienzo?

18 MR. ASCIENZO: Thank you, I have just one
19 question for Mr. Hsu.

20 The product that comes in from China prior
21 to caking, the way I understand it, meets the FCC and
22 the UCC, all of the specifications.

23 After caking does it still meet these
24 specifications?

25 MR. HSU: No. The USP and FCC has a

1 moisture content limit of half a percent. The
2 resulting moisture at arrival at the US ports probably
3 excess the USP, FCC standard.

4 MR. ASCIENZO: So it does not meet them
5 after it cakes.

6 MR. HSU: Correct.

7 MR. ASCIENZO: Thank you. That's my one
8 question.

9 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Clark?

10 MR. CLARK: Thanks for your testimony. I
11 just have a couple of questions about the product
12 that's produced regarding JBL's production. Why only
13 citric acid? Why not the salts?

14 MR. WAITE: The decision was made to focus
15 on citric acid. I'm not sure I can say anything
16 further than that in the public forum, but if there
17 are other reasons I will put those into our post-
18 conference brief.

19 MR. CLARK: Okay, I appreciate that.

20 MR. WAITE: Of course.

21 MR. CLARK: For the Chinese producers, are
22 there plants that focus only on citric acid or only on
23 the salt forms?

24 MR. HSU: Are there any Chinese plants
25 solely focused on citric acid?

1 MR. CLARK: Yes. They don't bother making
2 the salts, they only make the acid form.

3 MR. HSU: As far as I know, yes.

4 MR. CLARK: If you could provide some
5 information on that. There seems to be enough market
6 in the US, again we talked about potassium citrate
7 being used in, I guess not with the Chinese at this
8 point, not being able to get --

9 MR. HSU: China is a net importer of sodium
10 carbonate and sodium hydroxide. China is also a net
11 importer of potassium hydroxide. So the salts are
12 imported and more expensive than what US producers can
13 source.

14 MR. CLARK: Thank you.

15 MR. WAITE: Mr. Clark, if I could interrupt
16 for a second. I just wanted to confirm that my
17 response referred to JBL Canada only in terms of
18 production of citric acid. JBL does produce the
19 citrates in its plants in Europe.

20 MR. CLARK: Thank you.

21 Those are all the questions I have. Thank
22 you.

23 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Deyman?

24 MR. DEYMAN: George Deyman, Office of
25 Investigations.

1 The Petitioners contend that the industry in
2 China has excess capacity, that capacity in China far
3 exceeds internal demand and that producers in China
4 are increasing their capacity.

5 Do you dispute the Petitioner's assessment
6 of the industry and capacity in China?

7 MR. PORTER: We certainly dispute their
8 implications.

9 There's no question that capacity in China
10 has increased since the last case. In fact you will
11 see, I believe, that the capacity probably increased
12 over the POI.

13 The good news is you're going to have all of
14 this data, Mr. Deyman, because the clients that we
15 represent, and each one will give a complete and full
16 answer to the foreign producer questionnaire, giving
17 capacity, production and so forth.

18 The one thing that I'd like to ask you to
19 consider is that I don't think the dumping law
20 requires a focus solely on internal consumption. You
21 will see that the Chinese do export a lot but they
22 export to a lot of different countries. In fact the
23 latest statistics from the Chinese export statistics
24 show that in 2007 exports to the United States were at
25 the lowest level compared to the percent of total

1 exports than at any time for the past eight years.

2 So in fact they're exporting, but they're
3 exporting to other countries as well as the United
4 States, an increasing amount besides the United
5 States.

6 When we look at capacity we need to think of
7 both internal consumption as well as exports to other
8 markets.

9 MR. DEYMAN: Okay.

10 MR. HSU: May I add a comment to it?

11 I believe your 1999 and 2000, at that time
12 there were more than 100 citric acid producers.
13 Nowadays those plants theoretically counted as
14 capacity, they have been idled or shuttered because of
15 pollution, not meeting environmental standards. So
16 theoretically the capacity is still there, but legally
17 they cannot reopen.

18 What new producers and Mr. Porter was
19 representing before, is probably the one-third of the
20 fuel radical capacity.

21 MR. DEYMAN: Thank you.

22 To the extent that producers of citric acid
23 in China use corn or tapioca as their raw material
24 substrate, what has been the effect of large increases
25 in the prices of corn and tapioca on the producers'

1 pricing and on their ability to export?

2 MR. HSU: The increase in corn and tapioca
3 prices have a negative impact on Chinese producers'
4 ability to export. So the answer is yes.

5 MR. LAFAVE: I think we can say from P&G's
6 perspective that the price of the Chinese citric has
7 gone up steadily through the period of investigation.

8 MR. DEYMAN: All right.

9 According to Petitioners the subject imports
10 of citric acid increased during 2005 to 2007.

11 Assuming that there was an increase in subject imports
12 what were the principle reasons for the increase?

13 They claim that the product essentially is dumped, but
14 other than that, why would the imports be increasing
15 from both Canada and China?

16 MR. WAITE: If I can go first on behalf of
17 Canada, it's because the Canadian plant of JBL was
18 built in 2000 to 2002. It began production in 2002,
19 so by 2005 it was reaching its full capabilities as a
20 company. As a result of that and replacing the
21 production from Austria which had been coming in
22 through the United States to meet US demand for JBL
23 products, you saw the replacement and the increase
24 from Canada occur during that time period.

25 MR. PORTER: I would echo that, Mr. Deyman.

1 I think -- Don't forget, subject imports is an
2 artificial construct. Obviously a legally important
3 one, but still an artificial one. So the two driving
4 things, the increase in subject imports are import
5 substitution, they're replacing imports from other
6 sources, and increased demand.

7 As we heard from Mr. Hsu today, there's been
8 an increased, probably larger than the average
9 increase in the industrial segment where the Chinese
10 supplies have historically been. So demand for their
11 product has increased.

12 MR. DEYMAN: Now to what extent, if any, do
13 importers or end users blend citric acid from
14 different sources. Does this occur in this product?

15 MR. SMITH: As far as P&G, the blending
16 happens in the campaign, so we never commingle product
17 from two different sources. But we can do product
18 from different sources separately.

19 MR. DEYMAN: All right. Mr. Hsu?

20 MR. HSU: The answer is no. No commingling
21 or domestic/import citric. They cannot be blended.

22 MR. DEYMAN: Mr. Hsu, earlier you mentioned
23 selling a package of products. I took that to mean
24 that sometimes you will sell to a customer citric acid
25 but also some other products that kind of go with it.

1 Is that correct?

2 MR. HSU: Yes.

3 MR. DEYMAN: When that happens is the price
4 of the citric acid influenced by the price of the
5 other products with which it's sold?

6 MR. HSU: Yes, to a certain degree. The
7 citric acid price and relative to other ingredients, a
8 distributor will look at the total bottom line
9 profitability.

10 MR. DEYMAN: So when you report your prices
11 of citric acid, is it an estimate or is it an
12 actual price for --

13 MR. HSU: It would be an estimate.

14 MR. DEYMAN: It would be an estimate.

15 My last question is, as I understand it in
16 July of last year China reduced its export tax rebate
17 on a number of industrial products. Would the export
18 types rebate reduce for citric acid? And if so, by
19 how much was it reduced and when did the rebate become
20 effective?

21 MR. HSU: China charges an export value
22 added tax on all exports but they would rebate to
23 exporters certain percentages. As far as I believe,
24 and I may not be correct on this issue, the export
25 rebate has been reduced to five percent.

1 MR. DEYMAN: By five percent? To five
2 percent?

3 MR. HSU: It was 13 or 12 percent. Now the
4 rebate is five percent.

5 MR. CARPENTER: That's as of last summer.

6 MR. HSU: It's actually a burden on
7 exporters. In the United States, actually, they don't
8 pay sales tax. They don't pay value added tax. The
9 Chinese exporters have to pay the government a 17
10 percent value added tax. They only get five percent
11 back from the government and they are paying 12
12 percent, which the United States exporters do not have
13 to pay.

14 MR. DEYMAN: Has the price of --

15 MR. HSU: It is a significant disadvantage
16 to the Chinese export industry.

17 MR. HSU: Has the price of the product from
18 China increased not only because of the exchange rate
19 but because of the lesser rebate that they're getting
20 since last summer?

21 MR. HSU: The Chinese citric acid prices
22 have increased between 30 and 40 percent from the
23 level in 2005, 2006. We saw significant increases in
24 2007 and the first quarter of 2008, almost a 40
25 percent increase compared to the prices of two years

1 ago.

2 MR. DEYMAN: I have no further questions.

3 Thank you.

4 MR. CARPENTER: Ms. Alves?

5 MS. ALVES: Mr. Porter, if you wanted to
6 take a quick moment and comment on the pending EC
7 investment against imports from China?

8 MR. PORTER: I'll be happy to address it in
9 post-conference brief. I do not know any more than
10 was said today. There is an investigation, but I
11 agree with Mr. Ellis, there have been no provisional
12 duties imposed yet but DC is going through their
13 process. I believe they're under some sort of time
14 deadline as well.

15 MS. ALVES: That's all.

16 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Benedetto?

17 MR. BENEDETTO: One more quick question, I'm
18 sorry.

19 Mr. Smith and Mr. Hsu, we heard this morning
20 that the percentage of end use product,s the
21 percentage of the cost of an end use product accounted
22 for by citric acid was very low. Is that consistent
23 with what you know from your experiences?

24 MR. SMITH: I guess it depends what you mean
25 as low. I heard one percent.

1 MR. BENEDETTO: Is that consistent with your
2 experience?

3 MR. SMITH: P&G is more than one percent.
4 We'd have to submit that post-hearing.

5 MR. HSU: They value of citric acid in a
6 food or beverage product is very low. I would say
7 less than two percent.

8 MR. BENEDETTO: And in a cleaner or
9 detergent product?

10 MR. HSU: I'm not aware of the detergent,
11 but in food and juice products I would say the acid
12 cost, citric acid cost relative to the total price of
13 that particular product per unit is less than two
14 percent.

15 MR. BENEDETTO: Thank you all very much.

16 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you again very much,
17 panel, for your testimony and for your very thorough
18 responses to our questions. We very much appreciate
19 it. It was very helpful to us.

20 At this point we'll take a short break of
21 about ten minutes to allow parties to prepare their
22 closing statements and we'll begin those with the
23 Petitioners.

24 (Whereupon, a brief recess was taken).

25 MR. CARPENTER: Mr. Ellis, please proceed

1 whenever you're ready.

2 MR. ELLIS: Good afternoon, I appreciate
3 your patience and your attention and your effort you
4 put in through this long hearing conference. I'm glad
5 to give my final thoughts on this preliminary
6 investigation.

7 What I'd like to do is start with a few
8 rebuttal points. I understand I have about ten
9 minutes, is that correct?

10 MR. CARPENTER: Correct.

11 MR. ELLIS: I'll give a few rebuttal points
12 and then a closing.

13 First we heard a great deal today from Mr.
14 Waite about how the Canadian industry considers it
15 basically a part of the US industry or part of the
16 North American industry. I would just remind
17 everybody in the room that Canada is a foreign
18 country. They're very proud of their sovereignty. JBL
19 in fact is not part of the US industry. They were
20 specifically located in Canada for whatever
21 combination of reasons, but the fact is that they are
22 not a US producer.

23 Nonetheless, the plant was built as close as
24 you can get to the United States specifically for
25 reasons of intending to compete and to participate in

1 the US market.

2 So for purposes of cumulation, at least, we
3 would say that the Canadian producer clearly competes
4 across the board with the US industry and therefore it
5 meets that criteria for cumulation.

6 So does China. We heard a lot today about
7 the Chinese producers allegedly not producing up to
8 the quality required of the US food and beverage
9 industry and the soft drink industry. That simply
10 does not match the reality of what we understand is
11 going on in the US market.

12 One small thing we showed in the slide
13 earlier today, the US non food and beverage industry,
14 that is the industrial sector, is smaller than the
15 total amount of Chinese imports. So if the Chinese
16 imports even met 100 percent of the requirements for
17 the industrial sector there would still be some
18 Chinese left over that has to be going to the food and
19 beverage industry.

20 The notion that the Chinese industry is not
21 sufficiently like the Canadian, not sufficiently like
22 the United States industry so therefore should not be
23 cumulated, simply does not fly.

24 Going back to the Canadian pricing, we heard
25 about there was a lot of confusion about the prices.

1 Admittedly we share some of that confusion. The fact
2 is that the average unit values reported by customs
3 and commerce are much lower than the reported data in
4 the imported questionnaire responses. We think the
5 latter is strange, we don't understand it, we will try
6 to deal with it in BPI in our post-conference brief to
7 the extent we can figure this out, but I would note
8 that the peers data shows that 90 percent of imports
9 are anhydrous. So this idea of conversion of
10 monohydrate to anhydrous or liquid or whatever is
11 causing the problem, can't be the problem. It just
12 statistically can't work out to be that significant.

13 The other point I would mention about Canada
14 is that although I'm sure JBL is very proud of its
15 product, it is not a premium product that would
16 warrant the kind of overselling ratios we're seeing.

17 It meets the same quality standards as the
18 US product. It meets the same USP and FCC
19 requirements. While they are proud of their customer
20 relations, so are the US producers. In fact this is
21 not an industry that requires intensive post-sale
22 technical or quality service, so the idea that
23 customers would be paying more for that I would submit
24 is unlikely.

25 Back to the Chinese production for a moment,

1 I would note, as I said a moment ago, they must be
2 servicing the soft drink and beverage industry because
3 of the sheer volume of what's coming in from China.
4 But in addition we noted, we have a list of importers
5 in our petition and it shows that there are major
6 beverage companies who are directly importing from
7 China including Pepsi, one of the ones that was
8 mentioned this afternoon.

9 In addition we note that the caking problem
10 that was talked about is highly exaggerated. Chinese
11 product is shipped around the world. It's shipped to
12 Africa, it's shipped to the Middle East, so is
13 American product. People have learned to deal with
14 caking, to suppress that problem over the years. It
15 is simply not a big enough problem that Chinese
16 product somehow fails to meet the US beverage
17 standards because of caking of the product.

18 Finally on rebuttal point, my final rebuttal
19 point, I would note that the Chinese witness you had,
20 although I'm sure he is very knowledgeable, has a very
21 narrow view of the industry. He is basically a
22 repackager. It sounded like he sells to very small
23 quantities to very small purchasers in the United
24 States A few bags here, a few bags there. The fact
25 is that 180 million pounds of Chinese citric acid were

1 shipped to the United States in 2007. They did not
2 come in here a bag at a time and they were not sold to
3 customers a bag at a time. There are very major US
4 importers who you have not heard from and hopefully
5 we'll be getting, we've gotten some importer
6 questionnaire responses, maybe we'll get a few more.
7 But their story and the story told by Mr. Hsu this
8 afternoon I think are very different in terms of how
9 they service the US industry, how they compete with
10 the US suppliers. So this is not a vision of the way
11 that China competes in the United States that you
12 should take away from this hearing.

13 A few final points, general points I'd like
14 to make.

15 First, material injury is being suffered by
16 the US industry which is reflected across a range of
17 the financial indicators that the Commission
18 traditionally considers. Capacity utilization,
19 inventories, profitability, investment, return on
20 assets, employment trends, across the board.

21 Also, this is true for all of the US
22 companies. There's no one US company that for
23 idiosyncratic reasons has dragged down the statistics.
24 It's across the board, all three companies.

25 Second, as I think has been agreed, this is

1 pretty much a commodity product. Competition is on
2 the basis of price. Again, contrary to what we may
3 have heard this afternoon, the Chinese are qualified
4 to sell to the food and beverage industry, they do
5 sell to the food and beverage industry. Quality is
6 not really a problem for JBL, of course, or for the
7 major exporters of China product to the United States,
8 and therefore the only remaining method or basis on
9 which there is competition is on price.

10 Third, production capacity in Canada and
11 China it cannot be disputed has expanded dramatically.
12 In Canada the details are proprietary so we will talk
13 about that in our post-conference brief.

14 In China, as we've already mentioned,
15 capacity has increased massively and it continues to
16 increase with new investments. It's projected to
17 continue increasing for the next few years.

18 There's a 2007 update of the CEH report
19 which we will submit with our post-hearing brief we
20 just obtained. It shows in 2006 the total capacity in
21 China had grown to over one million metric tons and
22 while production in China is 700,000 metric tons, that
23 still leaves about 500,000 of unutilized capacity. In
24 addition, of the 700,000 metric tons, half a million
25 were exported because, again, there's only about

1 200,000 metric tons of domestic demand in China.

2 Mr. Porter mentioned this capacity may not
3 necessarily come to the United States. I would point
4 out that Southeast Asia or wherever else, Africa, that
5 China may ship, is simply not a big enough part of the
6 world to command half a million tons. Again, if
7 Europe gets closed off there's going to be additional
8 pressure due to the shipments in Europe having to be
9 diverted elsewhere.

10 So in conclusion, the US industry has
11 suffered material injury throughout the three year POI
12 and into the present. That can't be denied.
13 Meanwhile capacity and production in Canada and China
14 have increased significantly. That also can't be
15 denied. The causal connection between the two
16 likewise cannot be denied.

17 As unfairly traded imports have increased to
18 assume a large percentage of the US market and they
19 have invaded the food and beverage sector of the
20 market despite what we heard this afternoon. The US
21 industry has suffered injury across a range of
22 financial indicators that the Commission considers.
23 This is a classic situation, I would submit, for
24 operation of the trade remedy laws.

25 Petitioners submit, therefore, that the

1 Commission should issue an affirmative determination
2 and permit this investigation to continue.

3 Thank you very much.

4 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you, Mr. Ellis.

5 Mr. Porter or Mr. Waite?

6 MR. WAITE: Thank you, Mr. Carpenter.

7 I just want to reiterate several of the
8 points that we discussed. I don't think it's
9 necessary to elaborate them at this point. We
10 discussed them at length and they will certainly be
11 fully addressed in our post-conference brief.

12 We pointed out that the record evidence in
13 this case shows that the products produced by JBL in
14 Canada are consistently priced higher than the
15 domestic market. The domestic producers. JBL is
16 operating at virtually full capacity. When JBL began
17 production in Canada it displaced production from
18 Europe and simply replaced Austrian citric acid with
19 Canadian citric acid for JBL's American customers.

20 We've heard I believe from all panels today
21 that demand for citric acid is growing, certainly
22 globally. It's growing in the United States and in
23 particular in certain segments of the market.

24 JBL in Canada produces 100 percent of its
25 product to the food grade standard which means it can

1 be used throughout the marketplace. That it produces
2 a consistent and quality product. And that customers
3 in the United States consider JBL to be simply an
4 additional domestic supplier.

5 We believe when the Commission considers
6 these and the other salient facts in this
7 investigation it will see that JBL is not injuring or
8 threatening to injure the domestic industry.

9 Thank you very much.

10 MR. PORTER: Mr. Carpenter, I hope to be
11 very brief.

12 For the record, again, my name is Daniel
13 Porter.

14 A couple of quick rebuttal points in
15 response to Petitioner's testimony and to Mr. Ellis'
16 comments a moment ago.

17 First, the issue is, again, less about
18 quality coming off the production line than, if you
19 will, how the product arrives at the customer. Mr.
20 Ellis tried to say that the caking problem was
21 overstated because the Chinese ship to the Middle East
22 and to Africa. Yes, they may ship there. However,
23 those customers don't have the sophisticated,
24 automated machines that require that the forum be no
25 moisture and so there's no clogging.

1 So the fact that it could be shipped
2 somewhere else and be used doesn't mean that the
3 customers here can't take it when it comes off the
4 boat. The focus, of course, is customers here. Issue
5 number one.

6 The next thing, again, is the argument is
7 not that the Chinese don't compete at all in the
8 entire food and beverage segment. There are certain
9 segments within the all important food and beverage,
10 certainly very important segments, that they ra not
11 in.

12 Again, you heard testimony about Pepsi. I
13 urge you to contact Pepsi and speak to them yourself.

14 Finally, I want to note that it was quite
15 unusual this morning that the Petitioner's witnesses
16 actually admitted two critical points of our argument.
17 First, this morning Petitioners said they are intently
18 focused on the very large customers in the market.
19 The customers that they can provide the container
20 loads and the truck loads.

21 At the same time, Petitioners acknowledge,
22 and this is a quote, "that tehre's a tremendous number
23 of customers out there in the market for very many
24 different end uses."

25 So there you have it. You have different

1 segments in which different suppliers are
2 concentrated. I think when you've stepped back and
3 looked at this you'll see that the Chinese suppliers
4 are not competing in such a head to head fashion on an
5 entire market basis as to cause them material injury.

6 Thank you.

7 MR. CARPENTER: Thank you, gentlemen, for
8 those comments.

9 ON behalf of the Commission and the staff, I
10 want to thank the witnesses who came here today, as
11 well as counsel, for helping us gain a better
12 understanding of this product and the conditions of
13 competition in this industry.

14 Before concluding let me mention a few dates
15 to keep in mind. The deadline for the submission of
16 corrections to the transcript and for briefing
17 investigations is Monday, May 12th.

18 If briefs contain business proprietary
19 information, a public version is due on May 13th.

20 The Commission has tentatively scheduled its
21 vote on the investigations for May 28th at 11:00 a.m..
22 It will report its determinations to the Secretary of
23 Commerce on May 29th.

24 Commissioners' opinions will be transmitted
25 to Commerce on June 5th.

1 Thank you for coming. this conference is
2 adjourned.

3 (Whereupon, at 2:04 p.m., the preliminary
4 conference in the above-entitled matter was
5 concluded.)

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CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTION

TITLE: Citric Acid
INVESTIGATION NOS.: 701-TA-456
HEARING DATE: May 7, 2008
LOCATION: Washington, D.C.
NATURE OF HEARING: Preliminary Conference

I hereby certify that the foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete record of the above-referenced proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission.

DATE: May 7, 2008

SIGNED: LaShonne Robinson
Signature of the Contractor or the
Authorized Contractor's Representative
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Washington, D.C. 20005

I hereby certify that I am not the Court Reporter and that I have proofread the above-referenced transcript of the proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission, against the aforementioned Court Reporter's notes and recordings, for accuracy in transcription in the spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and speaker-identification, and did not make any changes of a substantive nature. The foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete transcription of the proceeding(s).

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I hereby certify that I reported the above-referenced proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission and caused to be prepared from my tapes and notes of the proceedings a true, correct and complete verbatim recording of the proceeding(s).

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