



## THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of: )  
 ) Investigation Nos.:  
 SULFANILIC ACID FROM ) 701-TA-318 and  
 CHINA AND INDIA ) 731-TA-538 and 561  
 ) (Second Review)

Thursday,  
 January 26, 2006

Room No. 101  
 U.S. International  
 Trade Commission  
 500 E Street, S.W.  
 Washington, D.C.

The hearing commenced, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., before the Commissioners of the United States International Trade Commission, the Honorable STEPHEN KOPLAN, Chairman, presiding.

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In Support of the Continuation of Antidumping and  
Countervailing Duty Orders:

On behalf of Nation Ford Chemical Company (NFC):

JOHN A. DICKSON, Chief Executive Officer, NFC  
JAY DICKSON, President, NFC

GREGORY C. DORRIS, Esquire  
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I N D E X

	PAGE
TESTIMONY OF GREGORY C. DORRIS, ESQUIRE, PEPPER HAMILTON	5
TESTIMONY OF JOHN A. DICKSON, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NFC	12
TESTIMONY OF JAY DICKSON, PRESIDENT, NFC	22
CLOSING STATEMENT OF GREGORY C. DORRIS, ESQUIRE, PEPPER HAMILTON	110

P R O C E E D I N G S

(9:30 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning. On behalf of the United States International Trade Commission I welcome you to this hearing on Investigation Nos. 701-TA-318 and 731-TA-538 and 561 (Second Review), involving Sulfanilic Acid From China and India.

The purpose of these five-year review investigations is to determine whether the revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering sulfanilic acid from China and India would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.

Notices of investigation for this hearing, list of witnesses and transcript order forms are available at the Secretary's desk. I understand that those in support of continuation are aware of the time allocations. Any questions regarding the time allocations should be directed to the Secretary.

As all written material will be entered in full into the record it need not be read to us at this time. The parties are reminded to give any prepared non-confidential testimony and exhibits to the Secretary. Do not place any non-confidential

1 testimony or exhibits directly on the public  
2 distribution table. All witnesses must be sworn in by  
3 the Secretary before presenting testimony.

4 Finally, if you will be submitting documents  
5 that contain information you wish classified as  
6 business confidential, your requests should comply  
7 with Commission Rule 201.6.

8 Madam Secretary, are there any preliminary  
9 matters?

10 MS. ABBOTT: No, Mr. Chairman.

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I understand that counsel  
12 wishes to go directly to his presentation, as opposed  
13 to giving opening remarks, so if the witnesses have  
14 been sworn we can proceed.

15 MS. ABBOTT: Mr. Chairman, the witnesses  
16 have been sworn.

17 (Witnesses sworn.)

18 MS. ABBOTT: Would the panel members please  
19 come forward?

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

21 Good morning, Mr. Dorris.

22 MR. DORRIS: Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

23 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: If you're ready, you may  
24 begin.

25 MR. DORRIS: Better late than never, I

1       suppose.

2                   I am Greg Dorris with the law firm of Pepper  
3       Hamilton, counsel to the Nation Ford Chemical Company,  
4       or NFC for short.  NFC was the Petitioner in the  
5       original antidumping and countervailing duty  
6       investigations that resulted in the orders now under  
7       review.  NFC has for many years been the only producer  
8       of sulfanilic acid in the United States, and thus  
9       alone NFC constitutes the domestic industry.

10                   NFC would like to continue to be a U.S.  
11       producer of sulfanilic acid, but should the Commission  
12       determine to revoke the orders on sulfanilic acid from  
13       China and India, NFC legitimately fears that it no  
14       longer would be able to afford to produce sulfanilic  
15       acid here.

16                   In many respects these full second reviews  
17       are very similar to the expedited first review.  
18       Indeed, there are no new facts in these reviews that  
19       would warrant not finding the same like product and  
20       domestic industry as that found in the first reviews  
21       and in the original investigations.

22                   For this reason, NFC supports the  
23       determination that the like product is all sulfanilic  
24       acid regardless of form or grade and that the domestic  
25       industry is all domestic producers of sulfanilic acid,

1 which in these reviews, as I mentioned already,  
2 continues to be only NFC.

3 The same facts also are present in these  
4 reviews that led the Commission to conclude in the  
5 first review that the Chinese and Indian imports  
6 should be cumulated for purposes of assessing the  
7 volume and effect of these imports on the domestic  
8 industry.

9 The China and India sunset reviews of the  
10 three orders on sulfanilic acid were initiated on the  
11 same day, May 2, 2005. Sulfanilic acid imports from  
12 China and India have or would continue to compete  
13 directly with each other and the domestic like product  
14 in the U.S. market.

15 All four traditional factors evidence the  
16 reasonable degree of overlap, and the reasons stated  
17 continue to prevail in these second reviews as you  
18 found in the first review. There continues to be a  
19 reasonable degree of fungibility between the subject  
20 imports produced in China and India and between the  
21 subject imports and the domestic like product.

22 The subject imports and the domestic like  
23 product also would be simultaneously in the market as  
24 India would come in to the United States were the  
25 orders to be lifted, and China would increase its

1 imports into the United States should the orders be  
2 lifted.

3 Sulfanilic acid is sold nationwide, and the  
4 imports and the domestic like product would travel  
5 through the same channels of distribution, so on  
6 balance all the factors necessary to find that the  
7 Indian and Chinese imports should be cumulated, as was  
8 found in the first review, continue to exist in the  
9 second review.

10 The Commission in the first sunset reviews  
11 also emphasized the additional facts that the subject  
12 imports would likely compete in the U.S. market under  
13 similar conditions of competition. Noting  
14 specifically the substantial capacity and export  
15 orientation of the foreign producers in China and  
16 India.

17 That too also continues in these second  
18 reviews, as well as the fact that the Commission has  
19 discretion whether to cumulate. We still continue to  
20 say that the Commission should exercise that  
21 discretion and cumulate again in these second reviews.

22 The India company, Kokan, whose response was  
23 most likely responsible for the institution of these  
24 full sunset reviews, as opposed to an expedited  
25 review, has withdrawn without even submitting a

1 questionnaire response.

2           Given that there now is no foreign producer  
3 seeking to have the orders revoked, I was tempted just  
4 to say ditto in our opening statement and leave it at  
5 that, and indeed, as I pointed out earlier, some of  
6 the facts are the same in these second reviews as they  
7 were in the first review.

8           I will say the Commission again should  
9 determine not to revoke these orders. There are some  
10 different facts in these second reviews, and they  
11 present a stronger case for not revoking the orders  
12 than you actually found in the first review.

13           In the first reviews the Commission  
14 determined that the number of producers in China and  
15 India had increased since the original investigation.  
16 This fact remains true, but there also is evidence on  
17 the record in these second reviews suggesting that  
18 production in China and India continues to increase,  
19 and production capacity continues to expand in both  
20 countries.

21           The Commission also determined in the first  
22 review that the imports from China and India that  
23 would flow into the United States were the orders  
24 revoked would negatively impact prices. Despite  
25 similar limits in the available pricing data on the

1 record in these reviews as you had in the first  
2 review, there is information that supports that there  
3 would be significant underselling and that that  
4 underselling would be at large margins.

5 First, the staff believes, and the record  
6 supports, that there is a relatively high degree of  
7 substitutability between domestically produced  
8 sulfanilic acid and sulfanilic acid imported from  
9 China and India.

10 The prehearing staff report documents that  
11 even with the orders in place, the average unit values  
12 for the subject imports from China undersold the  
13 domestic like product at substantial margins of  
14 underselling. The staff report states that in five of  
15 six available price comparisons during six quarters of  
16 1999 and 2000, the Chinese product was priced below  
17 the domestic product with margins of underselling  
18 ranging from 9.2 to 72.3 percent.

19 The staff report states further that for  
20 price comparisons of sodium sulfanilate, one of the  
21 other forms of sulfanilic acid, the Chinese product  
22 was priced below the domestic product in each of the  
23 five quarters from October 1999 through December 2000  
24 with margins of underselling ranging from 14.1 to 45.2  
25 percent.

1           Perhaps most significantly, the Commission  
2           in the first reviews determined that NFC was not  
3           vulnerable. This determination in large part was  
4           based on the fact that in the first five years after  
5           the orders were put into place NFC benefitted  
6           considerably and was able to greatly improve its  
7           overall health.

8           These past five years, however, have been a  
9           somewhat different story. Though the orders at issue  
10          have been successful in disciplining the unfairly  
11          traded imports from China and India, NFC in 2001 faced  
12          increasing volumes of imports from Portugal and  
13          Hungary. NFC succeeded in obtaining orders against  
14          these imports by late 2002, but continues to recover  
15          from the material injury it suffered from those  
16          imports.

17          That recovery has been really hamstrung  
18          recently because of dramatic increases in NFC's raw  
19          material costs for aniline and its energy costs for  
20          natural gas used to produce steam in the production of  
21          the refined grade of sulfanilic acid.

22          NFC has not been able to pass these cost  
23          increases on to its customers in higher prices both  
24          because of stiff competition from fairly traded  
25          imports from France and Italy and also because it

1 doesn't want to force its customers to move their  
2 production offshore.

3 As a result, NFC is very vulnerable to  
4 material injury right now because its profits have  
5 dropped to an injurious level. The Commission will  
6 hear more about this issue and others from NFC's  
7 owners and principal management, namely the CEO, John  
8 Dickson, and the president, John's son, Jay Dickson.

9 Thank you.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, sir.

11 Either Mr. Dickson can proceed.

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Good morning.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning.

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I must say that I've been  
15 before the ITC on several occasions before. This is  
16 the first time in which all the Commissioners have  
17 been present, and I'm very honored and appreciate your  
18 interest in our case.

19 My name is John Dickson. I am the CEO of  
20 Nation Ford Chemical. NFC has been in business since  
21 1978 when we started producing a water treatment  
22 chemical for Hercules Corporation. In 1985, we  
23 acquired sulfanilic acid production equipment from  
24 American Cyanamid in Bound Brook, New Jersey, and  
25 moved it to our plant in Fort Mill, South Carolina,

1 beginning production that same year. Since that time,  
2 we have been the only commercial producer of  
3 sulfanilic acid in the United States.

4 In 1992, we filed the original antidumping  
5 petition against China and Hungary, and actually  
6 followed the next year with India. The Commission  
7 gave NFC relief against the unfairly traded imports  
8 from China and India, and these orders saved NFC and  
9 subsequently allowed it to prosper through the 1990s.

10 This hearing has given me the opportunity to  
11 review some old records regarding our sulfanilic acid  
12 business. In 1990, we made and sold about two million  
13 pounds of sulfanilic acid at an average selling price  
14 of about \$1 per pound. Our sales volume today is well  
15 over five times that amount, and the average selling  
16 price is down more than 20 percent.

17 In spite of increased cost, the antidumping  
18 protection against China and India has allowed us to  
19 increase volume while decreasing price, and this was  
20 the exact opposite of what Respondent consumers argued  
21 would happen at the time.

22 During the years 1994 through 1996, we  
23 invested over \$1 million in a completely new refined  
24 sulfanilic acid plant. Then, in order to keep the  
25 plant backed up with feedstock, we purchased the

1 Zeneca Technical sulfanilic acid plant located in  
2 France in 1998 and moved it to the United States. We  
3 completed the major part of the installation by March  
4 1999 and began production.

5 The new Zeneca plant was equipped with a  
6 continuous production reactor that allowed us to  
7 discontinue the old ball mill batch production and  
8 increase our existing capacity by over 60 percent.  
9 The combined investment for this move was almost \$2  
10 million, which is a very large amount for a company of  
11 our size.

12 Since that time we have continued to improve  
13 our efficiency and expand capacity to increase overall  
14 production. We have changed part of the plant from  
15 stainless steel to corrosion-resistant alloy and  
16 replaced the automated controls with a new, state-of-  
17 the-art computer system.

18 We have improved our infrastructure with a  
19 new and larger boiler and have switched from fuel oil  
20 to natural gas for steam production. We now pretreat  
21 our wastewater and send it by pipeline to a large  
22 municipal wastewater plant for further purification.

23 The Commission considered the impact of the  
24 original orders in the first sunset reviews that were  
25 instituted in October 1999. It correctly concluded

1 that the orders essentially had worked. Nevertheless,  
2 the Commission properly concluded that revocation of  
3 the orders would be likely to have a significant  
4 adverse impact on NFC within a reasonably foreseeable  
5 time.

6 This conclusion was based on your findings  
7 that revocation of the order would likely result in a  
8 significant increase in volume of subject imports at  
9 prices significantly lower than NFC's prices and that  
10 increased volumes of subject imports would likely  
11 depress or suppress the domestic industry's prices  
12 significantly.

13 You noted that these volumes and price  
14 effects would likely have a significant adverse impact  
15 on NFC's production, shipments, sales and revenue.  
16 You correctly concluded that such reductions would in  
17 turn have a direct adverse impact on NFC's  
18 profitability, as well as its ability to raise capital  
19 and make and maintain necessary capital investments.

20 These findings and conclusions in the first  
21 review hold true today, and indeed, as Jay Dickson  
22 will discuss in a moment, are even more likely this  
23 time around.

24 I had hoped that after the first sunset  
25 reviews that I would not be back before the Commission

1 for another five years. Unfortunately, that was not  
2 meant to be as NFC suffered material injury from  
3 unfairly low-priced imports from Hungary and Portugal  
4 that began to flood the U.S. market in the second half  
5 of 2000. I was forced to come back to the Commission  
6 again to seek relief from the dumped and subsidized  
7 products from Hungary and Portugal.

8 Again the Commission determined that relief  
9 was warranted, and antidumping and countervailing duty  
10 orders were issued against Hungarian imports and an  
11 antidumping order against Portuguese imports in  
12 November of 2002. These orders were successful in  
13 eliminating the unfairly traded imports from the U.S.  
14 market, and NFC began the slow climb back to health.

15 It was surprising how quickly the dumped and  
16 subsidized Hungarian and Portuguese imports entered  
17 the U.S. market in the second half of 2000, but this  
18 demonstrates that sulfanilic acid is sold primarily on  
19 price.

20 The imports from Hungary and Portugal were  
21 priced so unfairly low that they were able to swiftly  
22 capture U.S. market share. Their impact was so  
23 negative that it still lingers today in U.S. pricing.  
24 The same scenario will play out with respect to  
25 imports from China and India were the orders to be

1       revoked.

2                   During my 20 years of experience in the  
3       sulfanilic acid business, there have been a lot of  
4       changes. Prior to 1990, most of the world demand was  
5       supplied by producers in North America and Europe.  
6       Since then, plants have been closed in Mexico,  
7       England, France and Hungary, and the largest share of  
8       existing and potential world capacity is now in China  
9       and India.

10                   I have visited plants in China and have seen  
11       the primitive methods they use to make sulfanilic acid  
12       and believe similar techniques are used in India.  
13       There is no question that it costs must less to make  
14       this product in China and India, but no one is  
15       accounting for the tradeoff and damage done to the  
16       environment and the effect on human health.

17                   Coal is used to fire the boilers, with black  
18       smoke billowing out the stacks. Aniline and sulfuric  
19       acid, two extremely hazardous and toxic chemicals, are  
20       crudely mixed together to produce a toxic molten mass  
21       of aniline hydrogen sulfate that is then dumped out on  
22       the floor to harden. The hardened chemical is then  
23       broken up by pickax and shoveled into pans that are  
24       put in cold-fired ovens to convert to crude sulfanilic  
25       acid.

1           Now, I understand that environmental and  
2 safety considerations are not normally a factor in the  
3 Commission's deliberations, but I would like for you  
4 to understand how important this factor is in  
5 providing China and India such a large cost advantage.

6           Textile dyes using sulfanilic acid have  
7 shifted production from the United States and Europe  
8 to China and India, but a large part of sulfanilic  
9 acid demand has remained in the United States, Europe,  
10 Brazil and Mexico. There has been moderate growth in  
11 the use of sulfanilic acid in the production of  
12 optical brighteners for paper and yellow food colors.

13           A new concrete additive using sulfanilic  
14 acid was put on the market in 1990, but this has now  
15 largely been replaced by additives made by different  
16 chemistry.

17           NFC may be the only U.S. producer of  
18 sulfanilic acid, but we do not have a monopoly on the  
19 U.S. market. Substantial volumes of fairly traded  
20 imports continue to enter the U.S. market from France  
21 and Italy.

22           While there have been no significant imports  
23 from India during the past five years, there were some  
24 imports from China. Though these imports have been  
25 small due to the presence of the orders, the imports

1 have been at such low prices that NFC has felt the  
2 impact on the U.S. market.

3 NFC has worked hard over the last five years  
4 to increase its volume of export sales and with some  
5 success. The problem is that NFC faces high tariffs  
6 in some countries, particularly in India where the  
7 duty is over 30 percent. The duty in China is lower,  
8 but given the large production capacity and low cost  
9 in China there is no way NFC can compete.

10 Most of NFC's export success has been in the  
11 European Union. NFC would like to export to other  
12 large consuming countries -- Brazil, Mexico and  
13 Switzerland -- but cannot compete with the low-priced  
14 product from China and India.

15 For example, the price of Chinese and Indian  
16 imports of sulfanilic acid in these countries  
17 consistently are below NFC's average prices by as much  
18 as 25 percent. It is not difficult to understand why  
19 NFC simply cannot compete in these countries, nor does  
20 it require speculation to see what would happen to  
21 U.S. prices and NFC were the orders against China and  
22 India revoked.

23 Although NFC is able to export to Europe,  
24 these export prices are low and yield very little  
25 profit. The European Commission in 2002 imposed

1        antidumping and countervailing duties against imports  
2        from China and India, 21 percent for China and a net  
3        of over 25 percent for India. In 2004, the duty  
4        against China was increased to almost 44 percent. The  
5        European Commission found that China was simply  
6        absorbing the duty without increasing prices.

7                As expected, these duties have caused  
8        sulfanilic acid prices to increase in the European  
9        Union and allowed some increase in market share  
10       supplied by the domestic producers. Sulfanilic acid  
11       is now produced in Portugal, France and Italy. The  
12       Hungarian producer is in bankruptcy and may no longer  
13       be producing sulfanilic acid.

14               As noted earlier, France and Italy make  
15       regular exports to the United States. NFC has been a  
16       responsible supplier both to the U.S. market and  
17       overseas. We have not sat idly by, hiding behind the  
18       protection of the Chinese and Indian orders. Rather,  
19       we have consistently, year-after-year improved  
20       production efficiency and reduced pricing, offering  
21       the best possible value to our customers and the  
22       market in general.

23               There is simply no question in my mind what  
24       will happen to the domestic industry if the Commission  
25       were to revoke the orders. Imports from both China

1 and India would be invited back to become the major,  
2 if not only, suppliers to the sulfanilic acid  
3 customers.

4 I have read, and painfully, the public  
5 version of the prehearing staff report. What struck  
6 me most was that almost all of the U.S. importers and  
7 purchasers appeared to stress that they would import  
8 or buy sulfanilic acid from China or India were the  
9 orders to be revoked. In fact, most even suggested  
10 that it would be because they believed the Chinese and  
11 Indian products would be available at lower prices.

12 Of course, I have to agree with them since I  
13 am certain that the Chinese and Indian producers would  
14 dump their product in the U.S. market at low prices in  
15 order to capture U.S. market share.

16 Indian producers and importers in particular  
17 continue to enjoy very lucrative export subsidies that  
18 would allow them to offer product at below their full  
19 cost of production. Since even their unfairly low  
20 U.S. prices are still higher than they can get in  
21 other world markets, their shift to the United States  
22 is a no-brainer.

23 If these duties are revoked, the Chinese and  
24 Indian producers will immediately offer much lower  
25 prices to domestic consumers. NFC will be forced to

1 lower its price, at the same time losing market share.  
2 The net effect will be disastrous to the domestic  
3 industry.

4 On behalf of this industry that I have  
5 helped to create, nurture and grow over the past 20  
6 years, I respectfully ask that you not revoke these  
7 orders and leave NFC unprotected against the sure tide  
8 of unfairly traded sulfanilic acid imports from China  
9 and India.

10 Thank you. I'll turn it over to Jay.

11 MR. JAY DICKSON: Good morning. My name is  
12 Jay Dickson, and I'm the president of Nation Ford  
13 Chemical Company. This visit is the second time  
14 before the Commission.

15 As NFC president, I currently handle the  
16 company's day-to-day operations. I have worked at NFC  
17 now for 17 years, first in a capacity as chemical  
18 engineer, then later as technical manager and VP of  
19 operations. While I have not been with NFC as long as  
20 my dad, I have been around long enough to see the  
21 injury that can be caused by unfairly traded imports.

22 I saw firsthand the devastation we suffered  
23 when the Hungarian and Portuguese imports flooded into  
24 the U.S. market back in the second half of 2000. What  
25 struck me most was how quickly they entered the U.S.

1 market and consequently how swiftly NFC's financial  
2 health deteriorated. The unfairly low-priced  
3 Hungarian and Portuguese imports stole market share  
4 from NFC and drove prices down. NFC's sales and  
5 prices declined such that we were no longer  
6 profitable.

7 Before the unfairly traded Hungarian and  
8 Portuguese imports entered the U.S. market, NFC was  
9 doing well in 1999 and into early 2000 as a direct  
10 result of the orders imposed on sulfanilic acid from  
11 China and India. NFC's capacity utilization was high,  
12 sales and prices were doing well and overall  
13 profitability good. It is no wonder, therefore, that  
14 the Commission concluded in the 2000 sunset reviews  
15 that NFC was not vulnerable to imports.

16 I wish NFC were in the same good shape as it  
17 was in those first sunset reviews. That is not the  
18 case, however. After almost climbing completely out  
19 of the hole we were in due to the impact of the  
20 unfairly traded imports from Hungary and Portugal, we  
21 now are struggling to cope with the dramatic rise in  
22 oil and natural gas prices.

23 NFC, as a U.S. chemical manufacturer, has  
24 been hit harder than other U.S. producers of chemicals  
25 in two key ways. First, the main raw material for the

1 production of sulfanilic acid is aniline. It accounts  
2 for nearly half of the total cost to manufacture  
3 sulfanilic acid.

4 Benzene is the primary raw material used to  
5 produce aniline. The feedstock for benzene is crude  
6 oil, and the price of benzene has risen in line with  
7 the increases in crude oil prices. The price of  
8 benzene has risen from about \$1 per gallon in 2000 to  
9 its present value of \$2.80 per gallon. Consequently,  
10 NFC now pays close to double the price for aniline  
11 that it paid in 2000.

12 Second, production of the refined grade of  
13 sulfanilic acid is extremely energy intensive.  
14 Natural gas is used to generate steam for heating that  
15 is needed for the purification of the technical grade  
16 of sulfanilic acid. During the past five years, our  
17 price of natural gas has gone from approximately \$3 to  
18 \$4 per decatherm to recently as high as \$15 per  
19 decatherm.

20 This dramatic increase has caused the energy  
21 component for making refined grade sulfanilic acid to  
22 increase almost fourfold during this period, which is  
23 close to a one-quarter increase in the selling price  
24 of refined sulfanilic acid.

25 NFC would like to pass these increases in

1 raw material and energy costs directly on to its  
2 customers. However, NFC faces stiff competition from  
3 fairly traded imports from France and Italy. NFC has  
4 diligently worked to maintain its prices in order not  
5 to force its customers to move their production  
6 outside the United States. Thus, NFC must absorb much  
7 of these cost increases. This has caused our  
8 profitability to suffer considerably.

9           Given the volatility and uncertainty in oil  
10 and natural gas prices and the consequent increase in  
11 NFC's raw material and energy costs, NFC is extremely  
12 vulnerable and would not be able to cope with an  
13 influx of unfairly traded imports from China and India  
14 were the orders revoked.

15           So even though the record reflects that NFC  
16 currently enjoys relatively high capacity utilization  
17 and sales, that position would change quickly and  
18 drastically were the orders to be lifted. Given its  
19 present low profitability due primarily to the  
20 dramatic increases in its aniline and energy costs,  
21 even small losses in market share and minor declines  
22 in capacity utilization would turn NFC unprofitable.

23           NFC is not exaggerating the impact on its  
24 future financial health by revocation of the orders.  
25 The Commission should keep in mind that even a small

1 difference in the price of sulfanilic acid, as little  
2 as one percent per pound, less than a penny, has a big  
3 impact on NFC's tenuous profitability.

4 In fact, a one percent change in price is  
5 roughly equivalent to a 10 percent change in profits.  
6 Revocation of the orders most certainly would lead to  
7 a drop in prices that would cause NFC to suffer  
8 material injury.

9 As a final comment, I should add one point  
10 to this issue of production capacity in China and  
11 India that my father discussed. The Commission should  
12 understand that NFC produces sulfanilic acid using a  
13 continuous process. Continuous production is  
14 completely automated and requires equipment  
15 specifically designed for the process. It is capital  
16 intensive, but requires little direct labor to  
17 operate.

18 Almost like the pilot of a plane engaging in  
19 auto pilot, the sulfanilic acid operator takes  
20 specific actions upon start-up and shutdown, but the  
21 computer controlled automation does the rest. The  
22 production capacity is fixed by the maximum quantity  
23 that can be produced by the equipment, usually  
24 expressed in pounds per day. This maximum quantity  
25 represents a hard ceiling that cannot be exceeded

1 without investing in a completely new production  
2 facility.

3 In sharp contrast, the producers in China  
4 and India both use a batch process as opposed to a  
5 continuous process. Batch production of sulfanilic  
6 acid requires no automation and can be produced with  
7 inexpensive equipment routinely used to produce a wide  
8 variety of chemicals such as specialty dyes. It is  
9 labor intensive because all the steps in the process  
10 must be performed manually.

11 Production capacity is controlled by the  
12 size of the equipment, number of batches, days in  
13 production and the number of production lines that are  
14 being operated. Batch chemical operations are  
15 extremely versatile in making different chemicals.

16 Both China and India have a very well  
17 developed batch chemical industry so their capacity to  
18 make sulfanilic acid is almost entirely dependent upon  
19 getting customers to buy their product. Thus, there  
20 are many Chinese and Indian sulfanilic acid producers  
21 listed in the *Directory of World Chemical Producers*,  
22 some of which would claim that they are not currently  
23 producing sulfanilic acid.

24 In reality, all of them are able and willing  
25 to make sulfanilic acid. They just need purchase

1 orders from the United States that most assuredly  
2 would come if the orders were to be revoked.

3 I therefore join with my father and  
4 respectfully request that you not revoke the orders  
5 against sulfanilic acid from China and India.

6 Thank you. This concludes our direct  
7 presentation. We welcome any questions that you may  
8 have.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you all very much  
10 for your direct presentation. It's very much  
11 appreciated, and it's helpful.

12 I will begin the questioning. Mr. Dorris, I  
13 will I think start with your clients for this first  
14 one.

15 On page 3 of your prehearing brief you  
16 state, and I quote, "The facts in the present reviews  
17 clearly show that the domestic sulfanilic acid  
18 industry is very vulnerable to material injury were  
19 the orders to be revoked."

20 Later on pages 3 and 4 you state, and I  
21 quote again, "NFC currently is able to maintain a  
22 fragile market equilibrium that produces for it at  
23 present only a very modest profit margin. The U.S.  
24 industry is thus highly susceptible to material injury  
25 by reason of subsidized and dumped imports, and the

1 orders at issue should not be revoked."

2 You renewed your vulnerability argument in  
3 your direct testimony this morning. In your view,  
4 what operating profit level would NFC need to attain  
5 before you would not consider this firm to be  
6 vulnerable?

7 MR. DORRIS: I think I'll leave that to John  
8 to answer in terms of where they should be.

9 I have an old adage I think, and maybe I  
10 should not let you hear this since it comes from a  
11 lawyer's side, but many times in advising clients we  
12 talk about how the Commission looks at cases, and we  
13 say that any profitability around five percent or less  
14 they'll find material injury, and anything between  
15 five percent and 15 percent they're likely to find  
16 threat of material injury.

17 You know, every industry obviously is  
18 different in what they need in terms of profitability.  
19 It's different, but I would think that if you're not  
20 making much better than a CD right now --

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: You're not talking about a  
22 compact disc, are you?

23 MR. DORRIS: No, sir. -- or a Treasury note  
24 then you're really not that profitable. You're not  
25 generating income to sustain yourself and to grow your

1 company and to be able to buy infrastructure and  
2 continue the type of improvements they had over the  
3 past few years in terms of expanding capacity  
4 capabilities.

5 I'll let John talk a little bit more  
6 specifically about NFC

7 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It would seem to me that  
8 the important thing here is not so much the absolute  
9 number -- you have those absolute numbers -- but the  
10 trend that we've seen in that number over the past few  
11 years and the fact that it has gone down and is at a  
12 level that is uncomfortably close to not making a  
13 profit at all.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Can you throw a ballpark  
15 figure out? I mean, what would please you? There  
16 must be a number that would please you.

17 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Okay. Well, a number  
18 that --

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Where you wouldn't  
20 consider yourself vulnerable.

21 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The chemical industry, I  
22 would say as a general rule, would expect a profit in  
23 the neighborhood of 10 percent and would have a gross  
24 profit in the range of 30 percent.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Of what?

1 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Thirty percent.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Thank you.

3 Mr. Dorris, on page 10 of your prehearing  
4 brief you state, and I quote, "NFC is experiencing a  
5 dramatic rise in cost for aniline."

6 Later on pages 10 and 11 you state, and I  
7 quote, "NFC cannot pass through all this raw material  
8 and natural gas cost increase to its customers given  
9 the competition it faces from fairly traded imports  
10 and the strong desire not to force its customers to  
11 move their production outside the United States." You  
12 mentioned that in your opening as well today.

13 I'm going to refer you, and the reason I'm  
14 calling on you is because it's a bracketed table. I'm  
15 going to refer you to Table III-6 at pages III-8 and  
16 III-9 of the staff report which contains confidential  
17 information that was actually provided by your client.

18 It does not appear to be consistent with the  
19 statement that I just read. Now, I can't get into the  
20 numbers, but for purposes of a posthearing I'd like  
21 you to respond to that. To give you a little bit of  
22 guidance without getting into the numbers, on page 8  
23 I'm referring to the line item Gross Profit and the  
24 line item Operating Income or Loss, and on page 9 I'm  
25 referring to the Operating Income or Loss line.

1 I'd like you to concentrate, if you would  
2 for me, on the years 2003 and 2004. That's as far as  
3 I can go with you though in this public forum, so if  
4 you would do that for me and reconcile it with the  
5 statement I read from your brief I'd appreciate it.

6 MR. DORRIS: Yes, sir.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Let me stay  
8 with you.

9 On page 12 of your prehearing brief you  
10 state, and I quote, "The producers in both countries,"  
11 meaning China and India, "are export driven because  
12 there is little demand for sulfanilic acid in their  
13 own countries."

14 Indian producer Kokan, at pages 3 and 4 of  
15 its response to the Commission's notice of  
16 institution, stated, and I quote, "The demand in India  
17 continues to be robust given the consumption by the  
18 dye manufacturers. In fact, the Indian market for  
19 sulfanilic acid sees large imports from China to meet  
20 its requirements."

21 How do you respond to that?

22 MR. DORRIS: I must say that our  
23 understanding of the Indian and Chinese markets is  
24 certainly developing, but it's also always been sort  
25 of nascent. We've never really understood exactly.

1           In fact, having seen now that they've made  
2 the telegrams from the Embassies public and I was able  
3 to discuss the actual numbers that I had with John, he  
4 was quite surprised in terms of some of the domestic  
5 consumption in India.

6           We've been struggling trying to determine  
7 where that sulfanilic acid is actually going in terms  
8 of the end use. We expect that some of that is into  
9 the textile industries where the U.S. just doesn't  
10 compete now and has lost a lot of those sales  
11 offshore, so maybe some of that sulfanilic acid is  
12 being turned inward to the textile industries.

13           CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: So it's possible that the  
14 statement I read from their response to our notice of  
15 institution is accurate?

16           MR. DORRIS: Well, it's certainly much more  
17 consistent with the information from the Embassy,  
18 although that again came directly mainly from Kokan.

19           We have no evidence to controvert that. Let  
20 me put it that way. Our initial understanding was  
21 they were not consuming as much in India. It appears  
22 at least from the data that's reported by Kokan, who  
23 decided not to show up, that that may not be the case.

24           CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I appreciate your  
25 response. Let me stay with you again.

1           According to Table VI-1 of the staff report,  
2           there have been no imports of subject merchandise from  
3           India since 1999, but subject imports from China have  
4           continued to be present in the market. However, there  
5           were no imports of subject merchandise from China in  
6           2001 and 2002.

7           It appears that Commerce reviewed and raised  
8           the antidumping duty on firm specific Chinese imports  
9           in January 2002, and that's Table I-1 on page I-6 of  
10          our staff report, which may account for their absence  
11          in that year, but do you know what accounts for the  
12          absence of Chinese subject imports in 2001?

13          It's my understanding that the Department of  
14          Commerce did not apply the 2002 rates to the 2001  
15          imports, so I'm curious what you think accounts for  
16          them not being there in 2001.

17          MR. DORRIS: Let me just talk with John just  
18          a second.

19          CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly.

20          (Pause.)

21          CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: My clock is running.

22          MR. DORRIS: I'm sorry. It's a difficult  
23          question because of the timing of when imports come in  
24          and when the review process takes place and then what  
25          rate is applied.

1 I'm not going to try at least here to  
2 explain what rates were in effect at the time, but one  
3 issue we had with the Chinese in that period, and  
4 that's what I was trying to confirm with John, around  
5 2000 and 2001 was they were bringing in product  
6 through a circuitous route, in a sense committing a  
7 fraud on Customs.

8 Customs was able to find that situation and  
9 correct that and so there was a flow of imports in  
10 2000, and then once the fraud issue was uncovered it  
11 sort of clamped down and shut down any imports coming  
12 in at that point because at that point they weren't  
13 going to continue the fraud, and certainly importers  
14 weren't going to be involved in the sort of  
15 speculative type issue that was going on.

16 That's the best I can say now without  
17 actually studying that prior record.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: If you can expand on that  
19 in your posthearing I'd appreciate it.

20 MR. DORRIS: Yes.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

22 I think I can get one more short one in.  
23 This is for the Dicksons. I note from Table IV-1 at  
24 page IV-2 of our staff report that the unit value of  
25 subject imports from China doubled in the interim

1 period.

2 Do you know what might have caused such a  
3 dramatic price increase only in that period?

4 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Which period was this?

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's our interim period.  
6 That would be January to September 2005.

7 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. That would be  
8 almost the entire result of the world increase in  
9 benzene, which is used to make aniline, which is the  
10 main product.

11 There has definitely been large increases in  
12 the world price of sulfanilic acid to account for the  
13 huge increase in benzene and related aniline.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you for that.

15 I'll turn to Vice Chairman Okun.

16 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you, Mr.

17 Chairman.

18 Thank you to the panel, and welcome back to  
19 the Dicksons. I appreciate you being here. I've had  
20 the opportunity to participate in other cases  
21 involving sulfanilic acid, but it's always helpful to  
22 have you come and update us on what's going on in the  
23 business.

24 I think I'll start with a looking forward  
25 question for you. I know you've provided some

1 information in the staff report, but in terms of what  
2 you see when you look ahead in terms of demand in the  
3 U.S. market first, and then we'll turn to the world  
4 market, there was discussion in there about perhaps  
5 some increase because of the increasing use of  
6 sulfanilic acid for optical brighteners. As I  
7 understand, that's used in paper.

8 To help me understand what you see in the  
9 U.S. market on that side, is that going to be an  
10 increasing use for your product? Help me out there.  
11 What do you see on demand?

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We've been very happy to  
13 find that starting in the second half of last year  
14 that the use of sulfanilic acid for paper brighteners  
15 reversed a downward trend and started moving upward.

16 We understand it has something to do with  
17 the decision by paper manufacturers to match  
18 brightness standards that are used in Europe. We've  
19 known for years that a greater percentage of optical  
20 brighteners was used in paper made in Europe, and it  
21 was in fact brighter.

22 The difference in doubling or tripling the  
23 amount of brightener that's used in paper if I had  
24 examples here and could show you would be quite  
25 astounding. You would look at something and say well,

1     yes, this is white, and then you'd look at something  
2     that has double the brightener and say boy, what a big  
3     difference. That's really bright, but they're both  
4     white. That's the way it works.

5             However, we believe that that has reached  
6     its peak, but is somewhat higher than before. It  
7     represents in total probably 60 to 70 percent of the  
8     total business goes into paper brighteners.

9             The other part is the yellow food colors,  
10    both Yellow 5 and 6. We understand from our customers  
11    that they are under pressure from those same colors  
12    being supplied from India and China. This is one of  
13    their factors in saying you must keep your price down  
14    or we'll end up losing market share, or we may  
15    discontinue making the colors and start importing them  
16    from India and China just to resell them, which is an  
17    action that they definitely do not want to do.  
18    Nevertheless, there seems to have been moderate growth  
19    in the United States in the use of sulfanilic acid for  
20    the food colors.

21            There's been a decline in the use for  
22    concrete additives only because the chemistry of that  
23    particular concrete additive has changed to let's say  
24    a more advanced chemistry that doesn't use sulfanilic  
25    acid, so that application has been on the decline.

1           Our projections for business this year -- of  
2           course, assuming that there will be no revocation of  
3           the order -- indicate probably an overall increase in  
4           the neighborhood of five to 10 percent by volume, so  
5           it represents over 60 percent of our business is sort  
6           of the flywheel that keeps an operation going.

7           We operate seven days a week, 24 hours a  
8           day. We have to have full laboratory and maintenance  
9           coverage, et cetera, so it takes a certain level of  
10          business to get beyond the critical mass of being able  
11          to maintain an ongoing chemical operation.

12          The sulfanilic acid is absolutely key to the  
13          fact that we can also make smoke dyes for the Army.  
14          We're the only producer of smoke dyes for the U.S.  
15          Army and the only company that has the capability to  
16          perform the organic reactions and meet their highly  
17          rigid particle size specifications, so that's become  
18          an important part of our business.

19          Were it not for sulfanilic acid, we wouldn't  
20          be making smoke dyes for the Army because the business  
21          is far too small to sustain an operation just in its  
22          own right.

23          I hope that gives you sort of a feel for the  
24          company and the importance of where sulfanilic acid  
25          falls.

1                   VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: It's very helpful. In  
2 terms of the use in textile dyes, is that something  
3 that's completely gone in the United States, or is  
4 there still a portion?

5                   I mean, I don't know if the last thing you  
6 were mentioning with regard to the Army is considered  
7 a textile dye or something else, but just so that I  
8 understand where the different end uses are going.

9                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: An interesting question.  
10 I don't think there's a pound of sulfanilic acid that  
11 is made today that goes into making a textile dye.

12                   We do make a sulfanilic acid look-alike  
13 molecule in very small volume that does go to make a  
14 textile dye, but I think it's a highly specialized  
15 application that for some reason the production of  
16 which has been retained in Europe and the United  
17 States.

18                   It was through my knowledge that sulfanilic  
19 acid was never a large part of dye production in the  
20 United States that I assumed it was not a large part  
21 of production in China and India. Because we've never  
22 tried to participate in those markets -- it would be a  
23 totally worthless effort -- my assumption has always  
24 been that the demand for sulfanilic acid in those  
25 countries has been relatively low.

1           Also with the knowledge that these countries  
2           are not tree producers -- they don't have large forest  
3           and paper mills; they're largely dependent upon  
4           imports for paper type products and are not consumers  
5           of paper products -- so I'm actually sort of taken  
6           aback by the recent findings that apparently there are  
7           large domestic requirements in both China and India  
8           for sulfanilic acid far beyond what I would have  
9           projected, which particularly explains Chairman  
10          Koplan's previous question.

11           VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. That's helpful.  
12          I did want to get your sense of the world demand. I  
13          understand what you're saying about China and India  
14          and why that would be surprising.

15           What about for the other markets and the  
16          markets where you participate as an exporter? Is the  
17          trend with the optical brighteners, for example, is  
18          that increasing in other markets as well? You I think  
19          had indicated in your response that the Europeans had  
20          always done more of this I think.

21           Before you answer the question, my consumer  
22          question, when I go to buy printer paper for my home  
23          printer and you get the labels that say super bright,  
24          brighter, and it kind of goes up in price as you go up  
25          the brightness. Is that the kind of brightness we're

1 talking about?

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: That's exactly the  
3 brightness that you're talking about.

4 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. So now looking  
5 at not China and India, but looking at other export  
6 markets, trends there in terms of end uses or demand  
7 or what you see when you look at those?

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Interestingly enough, the  
9 use of the concrete additive was invented in Europe,  
10 and Europe has always used a lot more sulfanilic acid  
11 to make concrete additives than in the United States  
12 by factor of probably at least 10 or 20.

13 Most of the technical acid that we sell in  
14 Europe today goes into concrete additives. There's  
15 also one or two companies that have pharmaceutical  
16 molecules that have been invented for specific  
17 requirements that use sulfanilic acid, one of which is  
18 fairly large also in the EU and the other which is  
19 fairly small.

20 Beyond that, that pretty well summarizes the  
21 total world demand in terms of where it goes. There's  
22 some that obviously goes to textile dyes, apparently  
23 more than I thought. The largest percentages goes to  
24 brighteners for paper, the next are to make Yellow 5  
25 and Yellow 6 and then into the pharmaceutical

1 application -- concrete, dyes and pharmaceutical.

2 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. That's helpful.

3 In terms of prices to the different end use markets,  
4 has there been any change in that, and can you tell me  
5 a little bit about that? If it's anything  
6 proprietary, you can always put it in your posthearing  
7 brief.

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The prices are really not  
9 use related. They are related more to the form of  
10 sulfanilic acid that is required for the end use.

11 As you would imagine, in making food dyes it  
12 requires a purified grade of sulfanilic acid or  
13 requires that the person that buys it purify it before  
14 he uses it.

15 Then on the other extreme you'd go to  
16 concrete additives where the technical acid and the  
17 purity is not a major consideration. It's lower in  
18 price because it has a lower cost of production.

19 This largely holds true for the brightener  
20 customers as well, although interestingly enough we  
21 have seen one instance, and I think this has been  
22 brought about by the EU duties, in which one major  
23 brightener producer who said he could only purchase  
24 the refined grade brightener, couldn't use the  
25 technical, has now converted entirely to using

1 technical.

2 This doesn't mean that he doesn't perform an  
3 intermediate operation of purification prior to its  
4 use. It's just that it represents a better value,  
5 even given the fact that he's taking another step in  
6 order to be able to use it.

7 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. My red light has  
8 come on, but I'll have a chance to return to that.

9 Thank you very much. It was very helpful.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

11 Commissioner Hillman?

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you. I, too,  
13 would join my colleagues in welcoming you back to the  
14 Commission. We appreciate you taking the time to be  
15 with us this morning.

16 If I could follow up a little bit because I  
17 had some questions that related to this issue of the  
18 different grades of the product. As I understand, our  
19 like product definition includes the technical grade,  
20 the refined grade, as well as the sodium-based salt  
21 product.

22 Help me understand whether there are  
23 significantly different processes of production either  
24 for you or for the Chinese or the Indians to make the  
25 different grades, the different types of product.

1           MR. JAY DICKSON: Well, first we make the  
2 technical grade in continuous automated operation, and  
3 that becomes the feedstock that makes the other  
4 grades. Either we sell the technical grade as is --  
5 it has about 99 percent purity. It's got a little bit  
6 of gray color. It's maybe off-white to gray. Many of  
7 our customers use that because it's the most cost  
8 effective.

9           We can purify that in two ways. One is we  
10 can add sodium hydroxide, which increases the  
11 solubility of sulfanilic acid in water. That forms a  
12 product called sodium sulfanilate, which is just the  
13 sodium salt of sulfanilic acid.

14           We can sell that in two forms. We can sell  
15 that as a solution form in a 30 percent solution, or  
16 we can sell that as a dry form where we take that 30  
17 percent solution and evaporate the water.

18           VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay.

19           MR. JAY DICKSON: So there's the two forms  
20 of sodium sulfanilate. The dried form is very energy  
21 intensive because you have to evaporate. The 70  
22 percent of that solution, which is water, has to be  
23 evaporated. That uses a lot of natural gas. It's  
24 very energy intensive to make that particular grade as  
25 opposed to the salt solution.

1           Moving on to the refined grade, that is made  
2 without sodium hydroxide. It's just taking the  
3 technical acid, which is very insoluble in water. You  
4 have to dissolve it in large pieces of equipment using  
5 large amounts of water. You have to heat that water  
6 up. Then you have to chill it back down, and during  
7 that process you go through a filtration which  
8 purifies it.

9           That is probably one of the most energy  
10 intensive ways to produce a refined grade of  
11 sulfanilic acid versus the salt solution. We've had  
12 customers recently switch from our refined grade  
13 sulfanilic acid to a salt solution.

14           COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. That's  
15 extremely helpful.

16           Now help me understand. First, help me  
17 understand of the product that you produce what  
18 portion if sold in the technical form, the refined  
19 form, the solution sodium form and the salt, the dry  
20 sodium sulfanilate form? Do you have a sense of where  
21 the market is in terms of each one of these types?

22           MR. JAY DICKSON: I'd say roughly -- this is  
23 somewhat proprietary, but we sell more of the  
24 technical, the refined grade and the salt solution.  
25 Those three are our biggest sellers. The poorest

1 seller is the dry form of the salt.

2 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. And then in  
3 terms of imports from India or China, are they  
4 typically concentrated in any one of these particular  
5 forms?

6 Let me start with do you know whether the  
7 Chinese can produce all of these forms as well?

8 MR. JAY DICKSON: I don't think they're  
9 selling the technical grade because their technical  
10 grade is not a quality that's good enough to sell, so  
11 they have to refine it. Mainly they refine to the  
12 pure acid, but I'm sure some companies can make the  
13 sodium salt.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. So your  
15 understanding is the Chinese are primarily, if not  
16 exclusively, in the refined product?

17 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes.

18 MR. JOHN DICKSON: If I can add?

19 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Mr. Dickson?

20 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Back when I was  
21 describing the Chinese process and the crude method in  
22 which they produce the material, they end up with  
23 something that's really black. It's big chunks, and  
24 then they have to grind it into a powder, and then in  
25 the powder they put it into boiling water and add

1 activated carbon.

2 Then they filter it out, and amazingly the  
3 carbon and everything takes all of the impurity and  
4 everything out, and you have a clear solution that  
5 then is crystallized that produces refined grade  
6 sulfanilic acid.

7 The Chinese, by the very nature of making  
8 such a crude technical, are not active in the  
9 technical market. They're almost exclusively in the  
10 pure grade. That's also true with India.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I was just going to  
12 say, and how about the Indians?

13 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. So they're  
15 almost entirely in the refined as well? Okay.

16 From a pricing standpoint, help me  
17 understand the general difference in price for you for  
18 the technical, and again if it's proprietary  
19 information I'm happy to have you submit it in a  
20 posthearing.

21 I'm just trying to get a relative sense of  
22 as I hear you describe this process for you the  
23 technical product is your starting point, presumably  
24 the least costly of them to produce because everything  
25 else requires additional steps and some obviously

1 additional significant expenditures of energy cost to  
2 produce.

3 Help me get just a sense of how much more  
4 work it is, how much more costly it is to produce each  
5 of these different forms. What I'm trying to  
6 understand is are you able to fairly recoup all of the  
7 additional cost, or from your standpoint is one of  
8 these particular grades more profitable just because  
9 of the difference between what you can actually charge  
10 for it versus what it costs you to do these additional  
11 refining, drying, et cetera steps.

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We found in doing studies  
13 that our technical grade is probably the most  
14 profitable to us --

15 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

16 MR. JOHN DICKSON: -- because it is our  
17 lowest cost, and the theory is we can be the most  
18 competitive.

19 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

20 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The least profitable to  
21 us and actually losing money is the refined pure  
22 grade.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

24 MR. JOHN DICKSON: This is true now  
25 especially because it uses so much natural gas, as Jay

1 described the process. We are making efforts to try  
2 to increase our refined grade pricing to account not  
3 only for the aniline increases, but also for the big  
4 increase in natural gas.

5 If you were to choose a number in terms of  
6 relative cost and you were to say that technical  
7 sulfanilic acid was 60 cents, then you would say that  
8 the refined would be I would say 85 in terms of  
9 relative cost.

10 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

11 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It's substantially  
12 expensive to purify technical sulfanilic acid.

13 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Is it equally  
14 expensive to dry the sodium salt?

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Excuse me, Commissioner.  
16 I need to interrupt for a second. I'm sorry.

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: It's come to my attention  
19 that we have a visitor who I believe has been using a  
20 recording device. Am I correct, Mr. Secretary?

21 MR. BISHOP: Yes.

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I'm afraid that you're  
23 precluded from doing that because of the contract that  
24 we have with the reporting company, so you are not  
25 permitted to record this proceeding.

1 MALE VOICE: Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I've observed that you  
3 have been doing that, so --

4 MALE VOICE: (Inaudible.)

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I appreciate that, but  
6 you're not permitted to record. You're permitted to  
7 observe. You can also purchase a transcript, but you  
8 cannot record during the proceeding.

9 MALE VOICE: (Inaudible.) I cannot just  
10 write something or say something based on my --

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I checked, and what I'm  
12 advised is that you're not permitted to record.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Chairman, could I  
14 just raise a question?

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Are TV cameras  
17 allowed to record in this room?

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: We have had TV cameras in  
19 the room, yes.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: And was that an  
21 exception to the policy that you've just stated?

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's a good question.  
23 Mr. Secretary, can you tell me?

24 MR. BISHOP: Yes, that is an exception with  
25 the direct permission from the court reporting

1 service.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: So without the direct  
3 permission of the court reporting service, that's not  
4 permitted either?

5 MR. BISHOP: That is correct. They need to  
6 purchase the transcript.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. I guess my question  
8 is did you seek permission of the court reporting  
9 service before you started?

10 MALE VOICE: I work for the (inaudible), so  
11 I didn't know that I needed permission. When we  
12 contacted someone (inaudible) if we are not allowed to  
13 record something I think we should be made aware of  
14 that because (inaudible).

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I will tell you I've been  
16 here over seven years, and this is the first time it's  
17 occurred to my recollection and so I did not know the  
18 answer to the question.

19 Before I asked you to stop, I checked. This  
20 is the response that I'm getting, so I need to abide  
21 by that certainly.

22 Sorry, Commissioner Hillman. If you would  
23 proceed?

24 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. Very helpful.  
25 To complete this discussion just to make

1 sure I understand this relative cost versus price, I  
2 appreciated all the answers that you've just given me  
3 on the technical versus the refined.

4 If we then go to the issue of the salt, the  
5 solution first, where does that fall in this continuum  
6 of how expensive it is to produce, to take the  
7 technical product and make it into the solution? Is  
8 that a significant expense, this adding of the sodium  
9 hydroxide to it?

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: We have the expense of the  
11 sodium hydroxide.

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

13 MR. JAY DICKSON: But the energy cost is  
14 relatively insignificant compared to the other  
15 purified forms. It's somewhere in between the price  
16 of the technical and the price of the refined. I  
17 don't think we should get into real specifics.

18 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: No. I was not  
19 asking. I'm just trying to understand just generally.

20 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes.

21 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And then the issue of  
22 then drying the solution to produce the solid salt  
23 product. Is that the same equipment that you dry it  
24 on that you would use after you've purified the  
25 technical going to the refined, or is it completely

1 separate equipment?

2 MR. JAY DICKSON: We use separate equipment,  
3 but some of that equipment is interchangeable. We  
4 have specialized equipment that we're using.

5 In terms of relative cost it's about the  
6 same to produce the refined free acid as it is the  
7 dried sodium salt or the sulfanilic acid.

8 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay.

9 MR. JAY DICKSON: There may be subtle  
10 differences.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And then generally  
12 this equipment, can it be used to produce lots of  
13 other chemical products, or is it pretty much confined  
14 to producing the sulfanilic acid products?

15 MR. JAY DICKSON: We could use it for other  
16 chemical processes, and we have, yes. You know, a  
17 certain type of chemistry or processing, but not all.

18 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. But in  
19 general, as I heard your testimony, it is much harder  
20 for you to switch to making other products than it  
21 would be for the Indians or the Chinese that are doing  
22 this, putting the whole solution out on the floor?

23 Whatever they put out on the floor can vary  
24 fairly easily as I understood it. For you it's  
25 harder, as I hear it, to --

1                   MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes, and especially with  
2 the technical grade. That is highly specialized  
3 equipment. The purification can be interchanged with  
4 other products.

5                   COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I appreciate  
6 those responses. Thank you very much.

7                   CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner  
8 Hillman.

9                   Just for the record, the person who had been  
10 recording has apparently chosen to leave the  
11 proceeding, so that's no longer going on.

12                   Commissioner Lane?

13                   COMMISSIONER LANE: Good. I wouldn't want  
14 my questions to be recorded by anybody but an official  
15 court reporter.

16                   Good morning. Mr. Dickson, Mr. John  
17 Dickson, in response to a question by Chairman Koplan  
18 you equated profit levels to CD returns. However, in  
19 making that comparison I believe you were comparing  
20 operating margin or the ratio of operating income to  
21 sales to a return on a CD investment.

22                   If you are talking about returns on  
23 alternate investments, wouldn't the proper comparison  
24 be to look at your return on assets, which is quite  
25 different than the ratio of net operating income to

1 sales?

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I'm afraid to admit my  
3 ignorance on return on investment and return on  
4 assets. Typically when we're looking at profitability  
5 or lack of profitability that has not been one of our  
6 considerations.

7 The reference to the CD, which I suppose is  
8 in the range of three percent or four percent or  
9 something like that, is relative to our bottom line  
10 profit in sulfanilic acid, which we consider to be  
11 low.

12 As I mentioned before, a typical bottom line  
13 profit for a chemical operation is 10 percent and  
14 typical gross profit is 30 percent, but I'm a  
15 little --

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: What do you mean by  
17 gross profit? I guess that's the part that had me  
18 confused.

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Okay. Gross profit  
20 includes the cost of manufacturing. It takes the  
21 price and cost of manufacturing, and the difference as  
22 a percentage on the sales represents the gross profit.

23 Cost of manufacturing does not include  
24 sales, general and administrative costs and interest  
25 costs or taxes.

1           COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you. This  
2 may be a question that you will want to answer in your  
3 posthearing because I'm trying to get a handle on your  
4 profits also.

5           What is your capital structure overall? In  
6 other words, what is your ratio of debt capital and  
7 equity capital to total capital, and what is your  
8 average cost of debt?

9           MR. JOHN DICKSON: These are questions  
10 probably we can best answer in the postconference  
11 brief.

12           COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

13           Now, in response to Commissioner Hillman you  
14 indicated that some of your product is sold in dry  
15 form, and some is sold in liquid solution. Have there  
16 been changes from year-to-year in the amount of dry  
17 product you sell as compared to the solution product?

18           MR. JOHN DICKSON: Sorry. I turned myself  
19 off. The solution product.

20           COMMISSIONER LANE: I'm sorry. Say that  
21 again.

22           MR. JOHN DICKSON: There has been less --  
23 when we're speaking about dry, we think in solution.  
24 We think in terms of sodium sulfanilate or the salt of  
25 sulfanilic acid that can be sold in two different

1 forms, either a dry powder or the solution.

2           There are substantial uses for the solution  
3 for customers that are close enough at hand to bear  
4 the freight cost of shipping water to their  
5 destination, but it offers an advantage to them  
6 because they don't have to put it -- it has to go into  
7 water anyway, so in this instance it's already there,  
8 and using a liquid in a chemical plant operation is a  
9 much easier and safe thing to do than working with a  
10 powder.

11           COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Now, when you  
12 report the quantities of product sold in pounds, have  
13 you adjusted the weight of solution product that you  
14 sell to the dry weight equivalent?

15           MR. JOHN DICKSON: It's always the dry  
16 weight equivalent so that you're always comparing a  
17 pound per pound.

18           That's even true in the case of sodium  
19 sulfanilate. Although it contains a sodium ion and  
20 has a higher molecular weight than sulfanilic acid, we  
21 report it as equivalent sulfanilic acid, not as its  
22 real weight, which is actually higher.

23           COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Now, these next  
24 two questions may be for the other Mr. Dickson because  
25 I heard him say that he was a chemical engineer, so

1 maybe he will be the person to answer this.

2 The raw materials for sulfanilic acid are  
3 aniline and sulfuric acid. I would like to know the  
4 weight of these raw materials that make up the  
5 finished sulfanilic acid. In other words, to produce  
6 1,000 pounds of sulfanilic acid, how many pounds of  
7 aniline are used and how many pounds of sulfuric acid?

8 MR. JAY DICKSON: Did you say 1,000 pounds?

9 COMMISSIONER LANE: Yes.

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: Okay. That would be  
11 roughly 550 pounds of aniline and 600 pounds of acid,  
12 but the aniline costs about 10 times as much as the  
13 acid roughly.

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Right.

15 MR. JAY DICKSON: Most of the cost comes  
16 from the aniline.

17 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Follow-up. Is  
18 sodium hydroxide a significant cost component in the  
19 production of sulfanilic?

20 MR. JAY DICKSON: It is, and sodium  
21 hydroxide prices have been on the rise as well. With  
22 some of our customers we've worked an agreement where  
23 we can adjust the price based on the changing price of  
24 sodium hydroxide.

25 In the case of the optical brightener

1 customers, they're going to use sodium hydroxide  
2 anyway so the fact that we add it means that they  
3 don't have to add it so they're okay with essentially  
4 paying a little bit more because that's one less  
5 ingredient that they will not have to add.

6 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

7 Would it be correct to assume that the cost  
8 of the basic raw materials, aniline and sulfuric acid,  
9 in 1,000 pounds of either crude sulfanilic acid or  
10 refined sulfanilic acid would be the same?

11 MR. JAY DICKSON: You have some yield loss  
12 going from the technical to the refined, you know, on  
13 the order of magnitude of five or seven percent.  
14 Therefore, the refined would have an increased cost  
15 for raw materials versus the technical grade.

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: The staff report  
17 suggests that technical grade sulfanilic acid has the  
18 lowest market price, that sodium sulfanilate -- I'm  
19 really butchering that -- has a higher value and that  
20 refined sulfanilic acid generally has an even higher  
21 market value.

22 Do you agree with this evaluation?

23 MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes. The dry form of the  
24 sodium sulfanilate would have a higher value of the  
25 solution form though.

1           COMMISSIONER LANE: To follow up, I would  
2 like to refer to the pricing data that is reflected in  
3 Tables V-1, 2 and 3 of the staff report. This data is  
4 BPI so you may have to fully respond in your  
5 posthearing brief.

6           I am not sure that the prices reported  
7 support the assumed relative value of the three  
8 products, particularly in recent years. I would like  
9 you to address the relative value as reflected in the  
10 pricing tables and give me your views on the relative  
11 value of the three products as shown in those tables.

12           Like I said, that would probably be best  
13 done posthearing.

14           MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes. We'll respond in the  
15 posthearing brief.

16           COMMISSIONER LANE: Can you briefly explain  
17 the basic source and availability of aniline and what  
18 companies supply that product in the United States?

19           MR. JAY DICKSON: I'm sorry. Can you repeat  
20 the question?

21           COMMISSIONER LANE: What's the basic source  
22 and availability of aniline and the companies that  
23 produce it in the United States?

24           MR. JAY DICKSON: It is available, and there  
25 are two or three companies -- and the reason I say two

1 or three, one has bought one of the other companies.  
2 Do you want me to state the companies or not?

3 COMMISSIONER LANE: Yes, if you can.

4 MR. JAY DICKSON: DuPont makes it in Texas  
5 at two or three different facilities. First Chemical,  
6 who was bought by DuPont, makes it in Louisiana, and  
7 then there's a joint venture between two companies.  
8 Crompton is one of them and another company. They've  
9 got a joint venture, and they also produce aniline.

10 We've got a contract with one customer or  
11 one vendor, and we are buying from them solely based  
12 on the contract so we're not interested in all the  
13 other producers.

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I'd like to add that the  
15 aniline market is really controlled by the MDI market.

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: The what market?

17 MR. JOHN DICKSON: MDI, methylene  
18 diisocyanate. The MDI is used as the primary  
19 isocyanate or the primary raw material in rigid  
20 urethane foam and also in automotive elastomer  
21 systems. This is really big business. We're talking  
22 about hundreds of millions of pounds of MDI.

23 Aniline is used to make MDI, so it's not  
24 uncommon for the people that make MDI to also make  
25 their own aniline or enter into large make or buy

1 contracts with other large companies.

2 This whole business of making aniline and  
3 MDI represents large-scale chemical operations with  
4 plants on a world scale basis to be productive.  
5 DuPont happens to be our supplier, and they are  
6 interested in both the internal market of supplying in  
7 Dow MDI, but also the external market, the merchant  
8 market, which is relatively small compared to what the  
9 captive market is.

10 The big names are DuPont, Dow, Bayer, BASF.  
11 All are major factors in making aniline MDI.

12 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

14 Commissioner Pearson?

15 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you, Mr.

16 Chairman. Let me extend my welcome to the panel.

17 Would I be correct to assume that currently  
18 all of the audience is related to the Dickson family?

19 FEMALE VOICE: Yes.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Welcome to the  
21 audience also.

22 This may have been mentioned already, but  
23 just so that I understand. Does the Dickson family  
24 have an ownership in Nation Ford Chemical?

25 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. It has a 100

1 percent ownership in the company.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. So it's a  
3 family company that you have started and grown over  
4 time?

5 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I was not the founder,  
6 but I came with it about two years later and became  
7 the 100 percent owner over a period of time.

8 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Good.  
9 Congratulations on your effort and what you've been  
10 able to build.

11 Mr. Dorris, you mentioned in your statement  
12 earlier that you thought India and China should be  
13 cumulated for purposes of this review and you went  
14 quickly through the factors, yet I wasn't sure that  
15 the record supported all of your comments.

16 The presence of sales or offers in the same  
17 geographic market, which in this case I guess we would  
18 define as the United States. Did we have that going  
19 on? Simultaneous presence in the market. Did we have  
20 that? Then even common channels of distribution. Is  
21 there enough on the record so that we can be confident  
22 of that?

23 Could you comment, please?

24 MR. DORRIS: Yes, sir. Most of those  
25 references were back to the time of the original

1 investigations and the conclusions in the first review  
2 that the same would result if the orders were lifted.  
3 Certainly you're right --

4 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Which first  
5 investigation?

6 MR. DORRIS: I'm talking about the first  
7 review.

8 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: The first review.  
9 Okay.

10 MR. DORRIS: Yes. You're right. Without  
11 actual Indian imports present in the market you can't  
12 make those conclusions based on the facts of Indian  
13 imports in the market, but you can draw those  
14 conclusions from the original investigation.

15 The other issues, such as substitutability,  
16 where the customers lie, where the imports came in  
17 during the original investigation, I mean those types  
18 of factors can help you draw those conclusions.

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: All right. I can see  
20 how one could draw those conclusions, but just  
21 compared to most records that we look at there's a  
22 certain amount of -- what shall we say -- speculation  
23 involved in getting to the comfortable conclusion that  
24 we are better off cumulating than decumulating in this  
25 case.

1           MR. DORRIS: It's true that you don't have  
2 the data it's not that it hasn't been supplied either.  
3 I mean, the data just doesn't exist in the sense that  
4 the Indians have not been in the market and the  
5 Chinese have been in the market some, but not that  
6 much.

7           Certainly the way the factors are derived  
8 you can still draw conclusions based on the historical  
9 record and based on the type of product that you're  
10 dealing with and where the customers lie.

11           COMMISSIONER PEARSON: If we were to  
12 decumulate, what determination should we make on India  
13 and China decumulated as compared to cumulated?

14           MR. DORRIS: Well, obviously I believe the  
15 conclusion should be the same with respect to both in  
16 the sense that each have a well-developed industry.  
17 Each has a market-oriented direction. Each has a  
18 significant volume of production that's been at least  
19 shown.

20           We unfortunately don't have the actual  
21 capacity numbers to know whether there's used or  
22 unused capacity. Our feeling is that there's  
23 significant unused capacity, and certainly given the  
24 fact that you could have batch production going into  
25 sulfanilic acid production if needed there's somewhat

1 unlimited capacity in both countries the same.

2 I think the key also is that pricing by both  
3 countries into other markets is significantly lower  
4 than the prices in the U.S. so that if the opportunity  
5 were given to come back into the U.S. market to either  
6 country both would enter that market for those higher  
7 prices.

8 Now, they may still and would undersell the  
9 U.S. producer, but they'd still be getting more money  
10 for those products than they're getting in either  
11 their home market or in the other world markets.

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Could I make it clear  
13 that in the market or out of the market, what does  
14 that mean? That does not mean that India is not  
15 making regular quotes to the United States. It's just  
16 that when they add on the deposits that are required  
17 those quotes are so high it doesn't make sense for the  
18 customer to buy.

19 Believe me, the Indians are active and would  
20 be happy to sell in the United States. It's just that  
21 their resulting price with the duties is more than  
22 what the customer can buy from other sources,  
23 including NFC.

24 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. As you meet  
25 with your customers they advise you that they're

1 hearing from Indian producers? It was compelling to  
2 hear you say that. I'm just wondering how is it that  
3 you know that the Indians are doing that?

4 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Well, the subject of  
5 India doesn't usually come up, but we deal with Indian  
6 companies, and we know that on all of the chemicals  
7 that they are advertising that they make they will  
8 happily provide you quotes into the United States and  
9 would be happy to sell it.

10 It's not as if they have made a decision  
11 we're not going to sell in the United States. It's a  
12 matter that their resulting price is too high, and  
13 they're not getting business.

14 The simple fact that you don't see sales by  
15 India into the United States doesn't mean that they  
16 haven't made quotations or that they wouldn't be happy  
17 to make quotations or that if they could possibly get  
18 the orders they would. They're there in the market.  
19 It's just that their price, their resulting price, is  
20 too high.

21 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Mr. Dorris,  
22 you no doubt have a chance to look at Table 1-3 on  
23 page 1-14 of the confidential staff report. The line  
24 of particular interest to me the one that shows the  
25 value of imports from India over the period of review.

1           Could you for purposes of the post-hearing  
2 unless you have anything that you'd want to add now  
3 take a look at the value of Indian imports and then if  
4 possible cite examples of any other product from any  
5 other country that's been in front of us for an anti-  
6 dumping countervailing duty case that has had a lower  
7 value of imports than we see in this record for  
8 sulfanilic acid from India?

9           MR. DORRIS: I will look at that. You're  
10 talking about value as opposed to volume?

11           COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Yes. I mean, if  
12 there's anything we should know about volume that's  
13 fine, too, but if we import widgets it may not be in  
14 pounds so the value comparison is probably the easiest  
15 to understand in terms of just trying to get a sense  
16 of the importance of those imports into the U.S.  
17 market.

18           MR. DORRIS: I will try to look at that. I  
19 think an issue of course with respect to value is this  
20 is a small market, a small industry, and it makes the  
21 comparisons very difficult.

22           COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Right, but there may  
23 be other small markets and small industries. I've  
24 been trying to think of one and in my time on the  
25 Commission I don't think I can.

1           So if I've missed something let me know or  
2 if you have to go back a few years to find it -- if  
3 there's something that comes to mind please let me  
4 know just because otherwise this may be the low point  
5 that I've dealt with in terms of --

6           MR. DORRIS: I'll do my best.

7           COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Thanks.  
8 Another point. I regret that the Indian producers  
9 aren't here. When we made the adequacy determination  
10 we expected India to be represented and they're not,  
11 so we don't have the benefit of their input. It  
12 occurred to me that it may be somewhat costly for an  
13 Indian or for any foreign producer to be represented  
14 at one of our proceedings.

15           For the post-hearing could you kind of  
16 compare for me the costs of representation that might  
17 be required and compare that to the value of imports  
18 that we have from India in this record? I'm just  
19 wondering is their lack of presence explained by what  
20 they would see as a poor balancing of outlay for  
21 potential benefit?

22           MR. DORRIS: Well, I'm sure John would agree  
23 with you in terms of what cost is involved in bringing  
24 one of these cases whether you're in the U.S. or  
25 coming from India, but one thing I would say is that

1 just completing a questionnaire can't be that costly.  
2 I think you'll probably look through all your  
3 responses. When someone fills out a questionnaire  
4 they indicate how much the cost is.

5           It's usually an insignificant amount. I  
6 mean, yes, it might be difficult for them to be  
7 involved directly in the case, and to hire attorneys  
8 and be involved in the case, but they didn't even  
9 complete the questionnaire and those questionnaires  
10 are important especially in terms of the capacity.

11           Based on the Indian Embassy data for Kokan  
12 specifically you saw a 2,000 metric ton increase from  
13 2004 to 2005 in terms of production. What does that  
14 indicate in terms of their capacity and their ability?

15           That's what I think they're not wanting to  
16 come here and show because I think that will show such  
17 unused capacity, and such ability to make product, and  
18 such an increase from over what they had from the  
19 original investigation and even an increase over from  
20 what they had in the first review that the data was  
21 just so compelling to them that they just thought it  
22 wasn't worth the effort to try.

23           COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you. My time  
24 has expired.

25           CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

1 Commissioner Aranoff?

2 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.  
3 Chairman.

4 I'll join all of my colleagues in welcoming  
5 you here before the Commission this morning. In  
6 responding to the Commission's questionnaire a number  
7 of purchasers indicated that they have no other  
8 source, that they only buy I assume from your company  
9 as the sole domestic producer.

10 Do you have a sense -- and if it's  
11 proprietary you can respond in your brief -- of what  
12 percentage of your sales or of your customers are  
13 single-sourcing from you not considering other price  
14 bids before they make a purchase, and do you have a  
15 sense of why that would be? Is it someone who is only  
16 buying in small quantities for example?

17 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We can do that in the  
18 post-hearing brief.

19 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. I appreciate  
20 that. If you're able to in your brief give us a sense  
21 of how much of your production you think is going to  
22 customers who only source from you that would be  
23 helpful. I notice in looking through our staff report  
24 that your company's capital expenditures and research  
25 and development have decreased over the period of

1 review.

2           You've touched on that some in your direct  
3 testimony this morning. Can you give me a sense, do  
4 you feel that this is now a mature industry and that  
5 you probably can't anticipate any major improvements  
6 that would require substantial capital or research and  
7 development expenditures in the near future?

8           MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. I think it is a  
9 mature business for us now. The growth rate is not  
10 substantial, there are no big new applications, so we  
11 anticipate that there will be no new increased capital  
12 expenditures or efforts involved.

13           Actually, looking into the future I would  
14 say that within the next five years we'll need to look  
15 toward replacing the continuous reactor system with a  
16 new unit, but we would essentially duplicate that  
17 system just because all of this equipment eventually  
18 wears out and needs to be replaced.

19           So that would be our next largest  
20 consideration in terms of capital and we'd probably be  
21 talking in the neighborhood of \$2 million.

22           COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: When you purchase  
23 that technology from Zeneca that's patented  
24 technology? Did you get all the rights at the time to  
25 replicate it or how does that work?

1                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: It was not patented  
2                   technology, but it's within the realm of what Zeneca  
3                   would call proprietary know-how which was passed on to  
4                   us under a secrecy agreement so that they are not  
5                   allowed to sell it again if you will. They have sold  
6                   the business and the technology to NFC. We could  
7                   replicate it.

8                   We could build a plant in China if it made  
9                   any sense exactly like that, but it is a unique piece  
10                  of equipment. Making sulfanilic acid is -- I can make  
11                  sulfanilic acid easily in my kitchen or you could in  
12                  yours. You wouldn't want to because it has some odors  
13                  and there would be some problems associated with it.

14                  If you can imagine it's the chemical  
15                  engineering problem that you're bringing two liquids  
16                  together that make a molten salt, and then you apply  
17                  heat to it, and it dries off a mole of water, and then  
18                  it moves from molten to a dry material in a stirred  
19                  reactor and then everything wants to break apart  
20                  because now the viscosity of something that's solid  
21                  inside is very huge.

22                  So it's a significant technical  
23                  accomplishment to be able to achieve what I've just  
24                  said and a continuous reactor as I have described and  
25                  the know-how is substantial. We don't believe that

1 anyone else will be able to invent or duplicate what  
2 we have done without the blueprints and the operating  
3 manual.

4 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Well, that actually  
5 leads me to my next question which is what process are  
6 your European competitors using? Are they using a  
7 batch process like you described in China and India or  
8 are they using something closer to what you do? Are  
9 you free to sell technology to them if you wanted to?  
10 Are they looking into your technology trying to  
11 reinvent it themselves?

12 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Well, if it were not for  
13 the batch processes that operate in such abundance in  
14 India and China there would be a lot more interest on  
15 the part of European producers and others in our  
16 technology.

17 There would be a lot more interest in the  
18 worldwide use of our technology, but as it is with  
19 labor and the environment virtually free especially in  
20 China this material can be made for much less cost  
21 even using 30 times the amount of people.

22 So in answer we don't look at sulfanilic  
23 acid as a growth business for which even though we  
24 have good and special technology that's going to lead  
25 us anywhere other than maintaining our position in the

1 United States.

2 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. So just to  
3 clarify the European producers are using a batch  
4 technology --

5 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: -- albeit it a  
7 cleaner one?

8 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I didn't get to that.  
9 All of the European producers are using a batch  
10 process, but a much more controlled and automated  
11 batch process that does not expose the workers to the  
12 chemicals or the atmosphere that happens in China and  
13 India, but they are batch processed.

14 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Would you say then  
15 that their cost of production is relatively comparable  
16 to yours given the comparable level of environmental  
17 regulation and that sort of thing or do you think  
18 yours is lower?

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Jay points out that our  
20 volume of production is such significantly larger than  
21 any one of the producers in Europe, probably are  
22 almost double that size, it causes our large fixed-  
23 cost to be spread over a larger volume and therefore  
24 would result in somewhat lower cost in the United  
25 States than we would see in Europe.

1                   COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay, but you would  
2 say that's attributable to the hire volume of  
3 production as opposed to the nature --

4                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. Absolutely.

5                   COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: -- of the technology  
6 involved.

7                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: The share of market that  
8 we have in the United States, which is large, and the  
9 fact that our business has grown from two million  
10 pounds to well over five times that is the reason that  
11 we've been able to bring our prices down, become a  
12 more efficient producer, et cetera. So I can't  
13 emphasize enough how important it is that we maintain  
14 the level of production that we have achieved.

15                   COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Well, going back to  
16 my first question on single-source customers and  
17 asking you to sort of provide some other information  
18 in your brief as you go into that in sales where you  
19 are competing against fairly traded imports from  
20 France or Italy that you've mentioned are in the  
21 market if you could provide us with any information to  
22 describe how that bid process works, what your  
23 experience has been in terms of competing for sales  
24 with producers just so we can understand in a  
25 competitive sale how the dynamics of the market work

1 that would be helpful.

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Well, I can explain  
3 exactly one dynamic in one of the food grade accounts.

4 There's not a subject of the fact that  
5 you're the only supplier, but typically there's a  
6 complaint made that your price is higher than what I  
7 can buy it if I'm in Mexico, and can't you do  
8 something on price, and if you can't do something and  
9 lower the price we may have to move all of our  
10 production to Mexico, or we may lose business in the  
11 United States to the other dye manufacturers in China  
12 and India that are competing against us.

13 So you see that discussion is not just your  
14 price is higher or lower than the competitor it has a  
15 lot of other facets and is a lot more complex.

16 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: I understand that.  
17 Certainly it's a factor of the times. Have any of  
18 your customers actually moved offshore?

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: There have been a lot of  
20 threats of moving offshore, but the customers that  
21 have actually moved offshore have been the ones that  
22 we had 20 years ago that were using sulfanilic acid to  
23 make textile dyes.

24 That wasn't caused by sulfanilic acid, that  
25 was caused by the fact that (1) the textile market

1       itself moved offshore; and also the textile dyes  
2       themselves could be made so much cheaper in China and  
3       India than they could in the United States. So that  
4       was a natural evolution of things that was not related  
5       to the fact that sulfanilic acid was more expensive in  
6       the United States.

7               MR. JAY DICKSON: May I add something  
8       quickly? There was one case where a global customer  
9       shut down an operation in England and they had the  
10      option of moving it to the United States or to Mexico  
11      and they chose Mexico because they're lower cost.

12             COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. I assume  
13      you're not referring to lower cost just for sulfanilic  
14      acid or was that the reason?

15             MR. JAY DICKSON: Well, that's a part of it.  
16      Mexico can buy from China without duties and other  
17      lower costs, lower cost labor.

18             COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much  
19      for your answers.

20             CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.  
21      I just have a few matters left.

22             Mr. Dickson, at Table 2-3 on page 8 of  
23      Chapter 2 of our staff reports it indicates the only  
24      purchaser to rate both countries are rated the United  
25      States is inferior to China in the category of

1 reliability of supply. Have there been any occasions  
2 during the current period of review in which your  
3 company was unable to supply sulfanilic acid in  
4 response to customer requests?

5 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Absolutely none.

6 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Next, let me  
7 stay with you. Do you hedge your natural gas costs?

8 MR. JAY DICKSON: No. We do not.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: You do not.

10 MR. JAY DICKSON: We really haven't had that  
11 opportunity based on our agreement. We've had one  
12 opportunity where our natural gas customer or supplier  
13 has come to us and said, you know, do you want to buy  
14 at a certain price and it ended up that it would not  
15 have been an advantage. We do not play that market I  
16 guess.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. On pages 15  
18 and 16 of your prehearing brief you state that China  
19 and India both have batch chemical producers that  
20 could produce sulfanilic acid and you've just been  
21 talking about that in the hearing. Are there batch  
22 chemical producers in the United States that could  
23 easily begin production of sulfanilic acid?

24 MR. JOHN DICKSON: No. There are not.  
25 Unfortunately the diverse batch chemical industry that

1 did exist in the United States no longer exists.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. How difficult  
3 is it to become a domestic producer of sulfanilic  
4 acid? I mean, why are you the only domestic producer  
5 remaining? I note on page 15 of your prehearing brief  
6 you discuss the potential for product shifting in the  
7 foreign countries. Does such product shifting occur  
8 domestically?

9 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The United States I think  
10 is typical and has often been envied by European  
11 countries in that there's a substantial market here  
12 and substantially few companies supply it. Therefore,  
13 they're able to reach volume levels that it makes  
14 sense. We need the volume that we have in order to  
15 keep our costs down and be competitive with the  
16 overall world market.

17 Anyone coming in and looking at sulfanilic  
18 acid may or may not conclude that NFC is successful in  
19 making a profit, but what they would have to look at  
20 is that if we're selling, just pick an arbitrary  
21 figure which is not real, 10 million pounds it's  
22 likely that their break even point on any sort of  
23 plant would at least be five million pounds.

24 So if they come into the market expecting to  
25 quickly take five million pounds from NFC it's an

1 unlikely venture that anybody is going to want to pass  
2 on. So the economic barrier or capital investment  
3 that's required, the environmental considerations,  
4 getting the permits and everything else, usually don't  
5 lead toward the idea that someone in this specialized  
6 business would try to come in and be a competitor.

7 Also, there are higher expectations of  
8 investors, more sophisticated expectations of  
9 investors in the United States as to what their  
10 expected return and intelligence of the investment is.  
11 So given our relatively dominant position and the fact  
12 that our prices are very competitive really  
13 discourages another producer coming into the business.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you very much for  
15 your answer, and to all of your answers to my  
16 questions.

17 I'll turn to Vice Chairman Okun.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you. I just  
19 wanted to go back to the nonsubject imports. I heard  
20 some responses, but just a question in terms of what  
21 grades they're selling here. Do they sell the same  
22 mix of the refined technical that NFC sells in the  
23 U.S. market? Again, I think that's primarily France  
24 and Italy as I heard you.

25 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The French are primarily

1 selling technical. They do incidentally make the  
2 solution for a large customer in Europe, but usually  
3 the solution is not something that makes any sense to  
4 ship overseas so they're not competing with us with  
5 solution in the United States. The Portuguese make  
6 the pure acid only.

7 I believe all of their technical feed stock  
8 goes into making the pure acid, but the anti-dumping  
9 duties against them prevent them from being a factor  
10 in the market now. Hungarians were offering the pure  
11 material, but our unconfirmed information is that they  
12 have gone bankrupt and are no longer making sulfanilic  
13 acid.

14 We believe that there is production in Italy  
15 now of technical sulfanilic acid. It is primarily our  
16 only forecasted production by one of the major  
17 brightener companies and that material is coming into  
18 the United States and in that sense we're competing  
19 with the Italian technical material.

20 On the refined market because it is  
21 primarily supplied by India, and China and the  
22 Portuguese and there are anti-dumping duties in effect  
23 then NFC is usually the first supplier of choice in  
24 terms of relative value to the customer.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: In response a long time

1       ago now my first question you were talking about a  
2       European customer who had switched what they were  
3       using because of the price advantage, and I wanted to  
4       make sure I understood that. That was they would  
5       purchase and then further refine it for their uses?

6               MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. As a major optical  
7       brightener --

8               VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: The optical brightener.  
9       Okay.

10              MR. JOHN DICKSON: -- customer that had  
11       traditionally used refined material purchased  
12       primarily from China and India, but once the dumping  
13       margins went into affect in 2002 they decided to make  
14       -- well, first they switched to technical sulfanilic  
15       acid and bought technical acid from the European  
16       French supplier and later as far as we can tell  
17       they've actually started making technical sulfanilic  
18       acid themselves using it in Europe and shipping it to  
19       their plant in the United States.

20              VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Appreciate that.  
21       I needed to understand that.

22              Then just one request, Mr. Dorris, for post-  
23       hearing just in terms of I know the Chairman asked you  
24       several questions with regard to the vulnerability, if  
25       you can also just look at other cases and point me to

1 cases where we've had single producers in the United  
2 States and when we have found those vulnerable and  
3 under what circumstances? I'd appreciate that.

4 MR. DORRIS: Yes, ma'am. Do you want it  
5 limited to single producers? Is that a key point?

6 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Well, just you know  
7 large market -- I mean, understand it's in terms of  
8 trying to understand how I would evaluate  
9 vulnerability in a market where we talked about the  
10 operating income market share in this case where  
11 you've got a supplier. I just want a sense of what we  
12 looked at if you can.

13 MR. DORRIS: Yes, ma'am.

14 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Always helpful. With  
15 that I have no further questions, but I do want to  
16 thank you for appearance here today and your answers  
17 to our questions. It's been very helpful. Thank you.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

19 Commissioner Hillman?

20 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you. I guess I  
21 would love to finish a little bit of this discussion  
22 of the different grades and how they play in the  
23 market.

24 First let me start with asking a question  
25 that I'm sure should be best answered in the post-

1 hearing which is just help me understand the portion  
2 of your shipments that are of each of the technical,  
3 the refined, the sodium-based solution and the sodium  
4 salt solid version of the product.

5 I'm just trying to understand your most  
6 recent, you know, so shipments would be what  
7 percentage of those? I would be happy to take that in  
8 a post-hearing brief. Then help me understand are  
9 there end uses that can only use one form or another  
10 or can most processes convert themselves, and most of  
11 your end users can they change their process to use a  
12 different form of sulfanilic acid?

13 MR. JAY DICKSON: Well, each case is  
14 different. There are some cases where they can use  
15 any product they choose. Some customers just choose  
16 not to, but they could if they wanted to, but they  
17 just for one particular reason or another they just  
18 choose a particular product and they say that's what  
19 we want to buy from you.

20 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Let me say this --

21 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I'm sorry. I was  
22 intrigued, again, by this comment that at least in  
23 Europe that there was a purchaser who had been using  
24 the refined that moved if you will downstream, or  
25 whatever, offstream, to use the technical product

1 because they were able to figure out a way to do a  
2 little bit of their own purification somewhere else in  
3 the process.

4 I'm just trying to understand how common a  
5 phenomenon that is of people switching from one form  
6 to another and why they would do it.

7 In other words is there a cost -- once you  
8 get to a certain price differential say between the  
9 refined and the technical are a lot of customers out  
10 there looking to try to make that switch just because  
11 your cost differential between the two is such that  
12 they would rather try if they could to use the  
13 technical grade and do the purification on their end  
14 rather than having you do it at a certain amount of  
15 additional price?

16 MR. JOHN DICKSON: It's very unusual for a  
17 customer to make a switch like that.

18 As a matter of fact it's something that I  
19 would have never predicted would have happened  
20 anywhere in the world, so I was very surprised to  
21 learn that this company (1) did it, but it's also a  
22 privately-held company in which the ownership has more  
23 of a hands on type management and could clearly see  
24 that given the much higher price or the significantly  
25 higher price of buying the Chinese refined grade

1 material than they could buy the technical grade  
2 supplied by a producer in France that the owner just  
3 told his plant to do it.

4 To do it is actually relatively simple  
5 because they have to convert it into the salt solution  
6 anyway before it goes on to become a brightener. So  
7 they take the technical acid, drop it in a caustic  
8 solution and dissolve it, throw in some activated  
9 carbon, filter it -- this is called clarification --  
10 and then it goes directly on into the process.

11 So they've had to add a step that might cost  
12 five cents that otherwise would have cost them 20  
13 cents or so, but as long as the refined Chinese  
14 material was available at such a low price the  
15 economic decision was clearly why should we bother  
16 doing that operation?

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. I  
18 understand exactly what you've said in terms of this  
19 customer. What I'm trying to understand is how unique  
20 is that?

21 From what you've described this process of,  
22 again, once it goes into solution and I guess maybe I  
23 don't understand what portion of your customers -- I  
24 would have assumed from food coloring and paper  
25 whiteners that everybody at some level puts this into

1 solution for an end use and those people are not  
2 actually using it as a solid.

3 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Right.

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: So if everybody is  
5 putting it into solution before they're finishing  
6 whatever their use is for it why wouldn't you assume  
7 that a lot of them would go down this road? Once  
8 they've already put it into solution, run it through  
9 carbon and do the purification themselves rather than  
10 paying you a significant differential to do so.

11 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Here you're a matter of  
12 economics scale. We're doing it on a large scale, a  
13 customer would be doing it on a much smaller scale.  
14 So in most cases the total cost to the customer would  
15 be less by us doing it rather than them doing it.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. I  
17 appreciate that answer. Then help me on the  
18 environmental side. Throughout this case we've spent  
19 a little bit of time trying to understand the high  
20 environmental costs associated with this product. Is  
21 the major environmental concerns and costs on the  
22 making of the technical?

23 I mean, in other words is it initial  
24 chemical reactions or are your environmental costs  
25 more incurred on the refined or the solutions end of

1 the process?

2 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Most of our environmental  
3 cost is associated with the type of specialized  
4 equipment that is used to make the technical acid that  
5 protects the workers and the atmosphere from being  
6 contaminated with aniline and sulfuric acid. So we  
7 have a large investment that makes it in a manner that  
8 minimizes the environmental and human exposure to the  
9 chemicals and to the sulfanilic acid.

10 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: As you described that  
11 that's mostly making the actual crude product to start  
12 with? That's where the aniline and the sulfuric acid  
13 are reacted is at the beginning part of the process?

14 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Jay has --

15 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Go ahead.

16 MR. JAY DICKSON: When you refine the  
17 technical grade from the technical grade to any of the  
18 high purity grades you have to do this in water and  
19 there's a certain amount of waste water that is  
20 generated. We pretreat this water and then we send it  
21 to a municipal water treatment facility whereas in  
22 China or India that may not be the case.

23 I don't have any evidence that says they're  
24 not treating their waste water, but there's certainly  
25 anecdotal evidence to that fact.

1                   COMMISSIONER HILLMAN:  Then you talked a  
2                   little bit about your exports.  Obviously if we look  
3                   at the data exports are relatively significant for  
4                   your company.  I think you said earlier in your  
5                   testimony that they're primarily going to Europe.  I'm  
6                   trying to understand the pricing in the U.S. versus  
7                   the pricing in Europe and also how comfortable we  
8                   should be looking at averaging the values.

9                   Obviously for all import and export data we  
10                  can always look at average unit values, but they're  
11                  only useful if there isn't a big product mix  
12                  difference between what you're selling in the U.S.  
13                  versus what you're exporting to Europe.

14                 Can you help me understand how you see  
15                 prices in Europe versus the U.S. and whether what  
16                 you're shipping over there is the same relative mix of  
17                 product that you're selling in the U.S. market?

18                 I would assume from your earlier testimony  
19                 about not wanting to ship a lot of water that you're  
20                 not shipping the solution product over to Europe, but  
21                 are you selling the same mix of technical and refined  
22                 in Europe?

23                 MR. JOHN DICKSON:  I think as I may have  
24                 mentioned before most of our sales in Europe are the  
25                 technical product because we're the large producer of

1 the technical material and have generally low cost  
2 associated with that and can compete in the technical  
3 market in Europe.

4 We have had the pure refined acid sales in  
5 Europe, but with the recent increases that we've had  
6 in natural gas primarily we backed away from -- well,  
7 we quoted.

8 It's like saying before it's not that we're  
9 not in the market trying to sell refined grade in  
10 Europe, it's that our prices are higher than what they  
11 can be and actually, material imported from India even  
12 paying the duties in India our price ends up being  
13 higher. So the two commodity markets that move across  
14 the waters are the technical acid and the refined free  
15 acid.

16 There's actually not a large market anymore  
17 in Europe or even in the United States for the sodium  
18 sulfanilic powder. Most of the market is in the salt  
19 solution form. As I mentioned there's a parallel in  
20 France to a producer making technical acid, converting  
21 it to a salt solution and shipping it to an optical  
22 brightener producer similar to the way we do here.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Then just generally  
24 on the price side you mentioned that your costs  
25 particularly the aniline, and the benzene derivatives

1 and the gas costs are what are going up.

2 Can you readily just pass those costs on  
3 and/or is there a time lag in terms of you see a cost  
4 increase for your input products to the time in which  
5 it gets translated into prices at which you're  
6 actually selling your product? I mean, do your  
7 customers, you simply go to them and say my aniline  
8 went up X therefore you have to take a price increase  
9 of the equivalent of X?

10 MR. JOHN DICKSON: The culture has changed  
11 over the past two years. The culture that we had been  
12 working in was that we would negotiate a price for our  
13 customer that was constant for the year and then  
14 suddenly find to our consternation that our aniline  
15 price had doubled. So Jay made many trips to  
16 customers saying we're going to have to get -- it's  
17 like a force majeure.

18 No one ever expected aniline to do what it's  
19 going to do. Then you get a lot of whining, but we  
20 can't bring our prices up, et cetera. So that induces  
21 the induction time of actually being able to do  
22 something that's very hurtful.

23 As time goes on with the aniline prices and  
24 benzene prices remaining where they are and still  
25 being very volatile we're trying to educate our

1 customers that we cannot offer a constant price for  
2 the year. At best we can offer like quarterly price  
3 protection and say depending upon where aniline is at  
4 the end of the next quarter our price will adjust up  
5 or down.

6 So that's our policy is to try to get the  
7 aniline adjustment built into the agreement.

8 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: You've been  
9 successful in doing that?

10 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We're maybe 75 percent or  
11 80 percent of the way.

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I appreciate  
13 those answers. Thank you very much.

14 MR. JAY DICKSON: In most cases we have not  
15 been able to recoup all of the costs and when we do  
16 raise our prices it usually has been delayed.

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Appreciate that.  
18 Thank you.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Commissioner Lane?

20 COMMISSIONER LANE: You talked a lot about  
21 your natural gas prices. Is electricity a factor in  
22 your cost to do business also?

23 MR. JOHN DICKSON: I'm glad you asked that  
24 question because I have been studying energy costs a  
25 lot over the past couple of months or so. Electricity

1 is a factor, but it's not nearly as large a factor as  
2 natural gas. It's probably one-third the affect of  
3 natural gas.

4 The interesting thing about electricity and  
5 I've sort of been away from the day-to-day details of  
6 the business is that there have been very  
7 insignificant price increases in electricity for us  
8 over the past five years or so.

9 I have to attribute that to the fact that  
10 Duke Electric, which is the power company, the main  
11 supplier to us -- has mostly a nuclear plants in the  
12 area, so it's a regulated industry and they have no  
13 justification to bring up prices.

14 COMMISSIONER LANE: So you're paying pair  
15 rates rather than a negotiated rate with Duke Energy?

16 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. It's definitely a  
17 carrier's rate. There's no negotiation, but it's a  
18 relatively low rate.

19 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you. Your  
20 website advertises that your facilities are available  
21 for toll production. What chemicals or products would  
22 you be capable of toll producing and have you  
23 contracted for any toll production in the last five  
24 years?

25 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Jay's right on this.

1           MR. JAY DICKSON: Yes. That's where our  
2 business is growing is in the toll manufacturing  
3 business. We toll for many different chemical  
4 companies in the United States. We've had a lot of  
5 growth in the past year or two in this area. Do you  
6 want any examples?

7           COMMISSIONER LANE: Well, I'd like to know  
8 do you use the same facilities and the same workers  
9 that you use for the production of sulfanilic acid?

10          MR. JAY DICKSON: For the most part no, but  
11 we have used some of the sulfanilic equipment that is  
12 used to make refined grade sulfanilic acid to do a  
13 toll project and that was only because one of our  
14 customers had switched from refined grade free acid to  
15 the salt solution, so that opened up some capacity in  
16 our refined grade equipment.

17          The typical answer is no. Our sulfanilic  
18 equipment is mainly used for sulfanilic. All of our  
19 other equipment is used for toll manufacturing or a  
20 few other products that we make and market ourselves.

21          COMMISSIONER LANE: What percentage would  
22 you say is the toll production of product as compared  
23 to your sulfanilic acid production?

24          MR. JAY DICKSON: I'll let John answer that.  
25 He just looked at the year-end financials.

1                   COMMISSIONER LANE: Is that what you call  
2 him on the job? You call him John rather than dad?

3                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. As a matter of  
4 fact. That's always the way it's been.

5                   COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

6                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: Even then at home I'm  
7 called by my grandfather's name, so it's not dad.  
8 Anyway I've lost my train of thought. The question  
9 is?

10                  COMMISSIONER LANE: The percentage of toll  
11 production to sulfanilic acid?

12                  MR. JOHN DICKSON: Sulfanilic acid  
13 production is 60 percent and the toll production is  
14 about 40.

15                  COMMISSIONER LANE: Now, how difficult would  
16 it be for the Chinese and Indian sulfanilic acid  
17 producers to enter the United States market with large  
18 volumes of subject imports? Where would they enter  
19 the United States, and what channels of distribution  
20 would be used to ship orders of subject imports?

21                  MR. JOHN DICKSON: The channels of  
22 distribution would be either direct sales, by this  
23 who's doing the selling on the importer.

24                  There are a lot of importers that would  
25 bring the material in and make the quotations to our

1 customers let's say for the refined sulfanilic acid  
2 and those customers would then present us with the  
3 facts -- of course by this time we already know what's  
4 beginning to happen -- and in all likelihood they  
5 would decide to purchase certain quantities from the  
6 Chinese and Indians just to show us that they can and  
7 then even if we met the price we would lose volume and  
8 would run the double jeopardy of lower volume and  
9 lower prices all at the same time.

10           Considering our financial status of the  
11 business and our low prices already you can see what  
12 affect that would have. You might argue the solution  
13 that there is something of a barrier that the company  
14 has in offering and making the solution because that's  
15 the type of service that would be provided.

16           All of the companies that buy the solution  
17 from it buy it because it's the best value, not  
18 because they can only use solution. For sure they  
19 could use the dry salt or they could use the dry  
20 material itself.

21           So with the low priced pure acid on the  
22 market from China or India either in the form of the  
23 dry sodium sulfanilate, the refined pure acid it would  
24 still go to the solution accounts and the solution  
25 accounts would then say well, we'd like to keep buying

1 from you because you're offering solution, et cetera,  
2 but you're going to have to bring the price down  
3 because we can do this, or we can have somebody else  
4 make the solution.

5 I mean, that's no big deal. So hope that's  
6 answered your question.

7 COMMISSIONER LANE: Yes. Thank you.

8 Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.  
10 Commissioner Pearson?

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Dorris, my lack  
12 of training in the law occasionally leads me to ask  
13 questions or make observations that cause my  
14 colleagues to cringe. Nonetheless I'm going to try it  
15 again. There are times when I see the role of the ITC  
16 in five year reviews as somewhat like that of a parole  
17 board.

18 In the original investigation we lock some  
19 people up, and we keep them there, and after five  
20 years we look and see if because of good behavior do  
21 they deserve to get let out and we do let some of them  
22 out, okay? In this case it's complicated further  
23 because at least with respect to India yes, they've  
24 been locked up, but because it was a threat finding  
25 they didn't even commit a crime in the first place.

1           It looked like they were going to do  
2 something wrong, they got thrown in the slammer and  
3 now we're considering whether they deserve to stay  
4 there. Basically all of us are capable of committing  
5 crimes, but most of us choose not to.

6           So the reason for my earlier questions about  
7 accumulation and about whether there's a basis for  
8 keeping India subject to the orders has to do with  
9 this whole question of does the record support that  
10 they have done inappropriate things, that they're  
11 likely to do inappropriate things in the future?

12           I mean, what kind of burden of proof is  
13 needed here? I'm really wrestling with this and I  
14 frankly don't know what to do with it, so anything  
15 that you can provide either now or in the post-hearing  
16 would be helpful.

17           Mr. Chairman, I have no further rambling  
18 observations to make.

19           MR. DORRIS: Well, if you wanted an answer  
20 at all to your rambling observations?

21           COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Please.

22           MR. DORRIS: We certainly will provide  
23 something in the brief. I understand where you're  
24 coming from in a sense that if someone is found in a  
25 threat situation 10 years or 15 years later how do you

1 really evaluate that threat situation again? I think  
2 two things.

3 One is I would have to disagree with you  
4 about being innocent. It's true that perhaps their  
5 volumes hadn't reached levels that were causing  
6 injury, but they were found dumping and they were  
7 found getting export subsidies. I think maybe you  
8 could discount the dumping because well, that was way  
9 back then and who knows what they might do now, but I  
10 don't think you can discount the export subsidies.

11 Those programs still exist and they're still  
12 available to them which give them in the range of a 40  
13 percent price advantage coming into the U.S. market.  
14 So they weren't innocent and they don't continue to be  
15 innocent in that sense. So it's not just a  
16 propensity, it's an actual.

17 For your latter part in terms of threat I  
18 think you have to look at it and I'm going to look at  
19 this, too, just as a concept, but I think you have to  
20 look at it in terms of well, why were they found to be  
21 threatening at that time and what are the basic threat  
22 factors because obviously there is a similarity  
23 between these determinations and just a general threat  
24 case when you think about how the factors are  
25 analyzed.

1           I think in this context you have to look at  
2 well, if at that time we thought that they were  
3 increasing production, increasing capacity, well, did  
4 they? The answer here is yes, they did considerably.  
5 Much more than we thought they would or be able to.  
6 At that time perhaps they weren't as big in the world  
7 market and maybe there was a chance that they were  
8 going to be just a domestic player.

9           Have they moved into the world market?  
10 Well, of course they have. We've talked about that  
11 today of how they moved into the market.

12           So I think when you look at this thinking,  
13 well, we only found the threat at the time and so  
14 maybe they're not such a threat anymore, in my mind  
15 they're actually a bigger threat now than they were  
16 then mainly because of those production increases and  
17 volume increases.

18           Not only that they still have the same  
19 ability with the export subsidies and the same ability  
20 with just pure dumping because of the cost differences  
21 and the eagerness to get into this market whereas we  
22 discussed today and there's been no contrary evidence  
23 that the prices are better. Why not come to this  
24 market?

25           I mean, there have been cases where the

1 Commission looked at it and said well, we don't know  
2 whether there's a lot of unused capacity because we've  
3 had problems determining that and maybe there wasn't  
4 any unused capacity. Maybe there was a significant  
5 amount of capacity utilization in the foreign markets.  
6 Maybe that's true for India here. We don't know.

7 We could have known, we don't know. We  
8 should have known. Even if it weren't true if there  
9 was not a lot of unused capacity in India they're  
10 going to shift that production here because the prices  
11 are better and there's a market to be had if they're  
12 allowed back in because of export subsidies and  
13 because of their ability to dump and get that product  
14 into this market and undersell NFC.

15 I think I will look at this in terms of a  
16 legal concept, but I think just from a practical point  
17 of view you have to look at why did you make  
18 determinations before, did those factors play out,  
19 have things changed, did India dry up and they're no  
20 longer there? No. They grew. They got bigger.  
21 They're much more of a threat now than they were then.  
22 Sorry to ramble, too.

23 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: No, no. That's fine.  
24 I appreciate those observations. Do what you can in  
25 the post-hearing to help me understand the legal

1 ramifications of what we're up to here.

2 With that I'd like to thank the Dicksons for  
3 making the trip to Washington.

4 Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner  
6 Pearson. I might just ramble for a second with you.  
7 For the record you don't cause me to cringe. In fact  
8 I would have to say that describing me as, you know,  
9 equating me to a member of a parole board is one of  
10 the kinder ways that I think I've been described on  
11 occasion since I've been here, so I have no problem  
12 with that. Thank you.

13 Now, I'll turn to Commissioner Aranoff.

14 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.  
15 Chairman.

16 A couple of quick follow-ups. Since the  
17 original investigation NFC's productivity as reflected  
18 in our prehearing report has increased quite a few  
19 times over since 1989 and also increased significantly  
20 since the first year in the current period of review.

21 The decrease in the number of workers and  
22 hours worked wouldn't seem to account for all of this  
23 improvement. Can you tell us what else happened  
24 during this period that resulted in the productivity  
25 numbers that we see?

1                   MR. JOHN DICKSON: I guess the single  
2 largest thing that's happened in recent times is an  
3 increase in the amount of sulfanilic acid that is  
4 being used by the customers. Our production of course  
5 is just a reflection of what our sales are and what  
6 the demand are.

7                   We have seen less of China as a competitor  
8 because the order keeps their prices high. We haven't  
9 seen India as a competitor because the orders keep  
10 their prices high. We also have seen significant  
11 imports begin to come in from Italy and have been  
12 coming in from France.

13                   The very nature of our operation is capital  
14 intensive, so if we can increase our production from  
15 say 10 million pounds to 11 million pounds the  
16 marginal profitability is much higher and contributes  
17 greatly to the overall overhead of the operation.

18                   COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: I appreciate those  
19 answers. I wanted to check and see because there are  
20 cases in which either there's been a technological  
21 change, which it doesn't sound like there's been here,  
22 or sometimes even an accounting change that accounts  
23 for those numbers, but it sounds like neither of those  
24 is the case here.

25                   Let me just ask you to clarify. When you

1 were talking about imports from Italy I thought that I  
2 heard you say that the producer in Italy was producing  
3 this product captively and using it in a downstream  
4 product and it was the downstream product that was  
5 being sold in the U.S. Did I hear you wrong?

6 MR. JOHN DICKSON: No. You heard me  
7 correctly, but his selling in the U.S. is also  
8 captive. In other words he has plants in Italy and in  
9 the United States that make optical brighteners and  
10 it's believed, or we've been told, or we see and it's  
11 hard to confirm these things that sulfanilic acid is  
12 in fact coming from Italy.

13 So he has actually begun to captively  
14 produce sulfanilic acid for his own requirement.

15 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: So in fact it's not  
16 the downstream product, the brightener, but the  
17 sulfanilic acid being sent to a related facility in  
18 the U.S. to be turned into an optical brightener?

19 MR. JOHN DICKSON: Yes. It would be like  
20 make sulfanilic acid in Italy and ship it to his own  
21 plant in Italy that makes brightener and also his  
22 plant in the United States that makes brightener.

23 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay.

24 MR. JOHN DICKSON: We believe this is  
25 happening now and accounts for the imports that we see

1 from Italy to the United States.

2 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: In post-hearing if  
3 you can take a look at whatever that are the most  
4 recent import statistics that are available and see if  
5 there's something that shows us that phenomenon with  
6 respect to Italy that would be helpful.

7 In Chapter 2 of the staff report the  
8 Commission staff indicates that they believe the  
9 demand for sulfanilic acid is inelastic and that  
10 customers wouldn't change the amount that they buy  
11 very much with the changes in price. Is that  
12 consistent with the scenario that you're giving us of  
13 your inability to raise your prices to cover your cost  
14 increases?

15 Can you show me how you reconcile those or  
16 do you think that the staff's assessment of  
17 inelasticity is not really right?

18 MR. DORRIS: We can give that some further  
19 thought for the post-hearing brief, but I would point  
20 out that it's one thing to say that they're going to  
21 threaten to go offshore or go offshore because at some  
22 point their price for sulfanilic acid gets too high  
23 and they just can't purchase it versus whether or not  
24 they can find some other physical product that they  
25 can use in place of sulfanilic acid.

1           I think the answer to that is there's not  
2 one, which is where the inelastic determination comes  
3 from which I would agree with. Whether they're there  
4 to be sold to, that's a whole different question.

5           COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Appreciate that  
6 answer. One last one. Throughout your brief you make  
7 your vulnerability argument in using the term that we  
8 often use around here of a cost price squeeze.

9           Obviously in this case we have some evidence  
10 that costs have gone up, prices have also gone up and  
11 if you look at the numbers for cost of goods sold as a  
12 ratio to net sales they show that in the most recent  
13 period that number is within the range within which it  
14 has fluctuated over the entire period of review and  
15 not really an outlier at this point.

16           Either now or in your post-hearing can you  
17 just take a look at that number and reconcile for us  
18 how that's consistent with the way that you're  
19 describing a cost price squeeze?

20           MR. DORRIS: Yes, ma'am.

21           COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much,  
22 and I believe that concludes my questions. Thank you  
23 very much to the panel for being here this morning.

24           CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.  
25 If I've tracked it correctly I'm not sure,

1 Commissioner Hillman, whether you were finished. You  
2 had more questions? You don't. Okay. I don't think  
3 anyone else does either from the dias.

4 So, Mr. Deyman, does staff have questions?

5 MR. DEYMAN: George Deyman, Office of  
6 Investigations. The staff has no questions.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I think we have an  
8 amendment to that.

9 MR. ASCIENZO: I have a comment. This is  
10 John Ascienzo, Office of Investigations.

11 It's clear from the questions this morning  
12 that the Commission is very interested in the detailed  
13 cost data of this industry, perhaps more detail than  
14 is already on the record, so rather than ask a lot of  
15 questions right here, right now I'll just say that  
16 I'll be contacting you either today or tomorrow with  
17 some follow-up questions so we can get the information  
18 the Commission wants.

19 Thank you very much. With that the staff  
20 has no more questions.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. I want to  
22 thank each of the members of this panel for their  
23 presentation. You've been I feel very direct and  
24 forthright.

25 I can excuse you from the table and ask you,

1 Mr. Dorris, if you have closing remarks you'd like to  
2 make.

3 MR. DORRIS: I don't think so. We'll make  
4 sure that we make all our remarks in the post-hearing  
5 brief.

6 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. I understood you  
7 were going to reserve that right depending on how  
8 thorough you thought our questions were, so I'll --

9 MR. DORRIS: they were very thorough.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: -- take that as a passing  
11 grade. With that, again, I want to compliment all of  
12 you for your responses to our questions and your  
13 directness. Very much appreciated.

14 Post-hearing briefs, statements responsive  
15 to questions and requests to the Commission and  
16 corrections to the transcript must be filed by  
17 February 6, 2006; closing of the record and the final  
18 release of data to parties by March 1, 2006, and final  
19 comments are due March 3, 2006. With that this  
20 hearing is concluded.

21 (Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m. the hearing in the  
22 above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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25 //

**CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTION**

**TITLE:** Sulfanilic Acid from China and India

**INVESTIGATION NO.:** 701-TA-318 and 731-TA-538 and 561 (Second Review)

**HEARING DATE:** January 26, 2006

**LOCATION:** Washington, D.C.

**NATURE OF HEARING:** In Support of the Continuation of the Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders

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