

UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:)
) Investigation Nos.:
BRASS SHEET AND STRIP FROM) 701-TA-269 and 270 and
BRAZIL, CANADA, FRANCE,) 731-TA-311-314, 317 and 379
GERMANY, ITALY, AND JAPAN) (Second Review)

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Tuesday,
 January 24, 2006

Room No. 101
 U.S. International
 Trade Commission
 500 E Street, S.W.
 Washington, D.C.

The hearing commenced, pursuant to notice, at
 9:30 a.m. before the Commissioners of the United States
 International Trade Commission, the Honorable STEPHEN
 KOPLAN, Chairman, presiding.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the International Trade Commission:

Commissioners:

CHAIRMAN STEPHEN KOPLAN
 VICE CHAIRMAN DEANNA TANNER OKUN
 COMMISSIONER JENNIFER A. HILLMAN
 COMMISSIONER CHARLOTTE R. LANE
 COMMISSIONER DANIEL R. PEARSON
 COMMISSIONER SHARA L. ARANOFF

APPEARANCES: (cont'd.)

Staff:

MARILYN R. ABBOTT, SECRETARY TO THE COMMISSION
WILLIAM R. BISHOP, HEARINGS AND MEETINGS
COORDINATOR
SHARON BELLAMY, HEARINGS AND MEETINGS ASSISTANT
VINCENT HONNOLD, INVESTIGATOR
CHRISTOPHER MAPES, INDUSTRY ANALYST
KELLY CLARK, ECONOMIST
DAVID BOYLAND, ACCOUNTANT/AUDITOR
CHARLES ST. CHARLES, ATTORNEY
GEORGE DEYMAN, SUPERVISORY INVESTIGATOR

In Support of the Continuation of the Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Orders:

On behalf of the Domestic Industry:

JOSEPH L. MAYER, President, Copper & Brass
Fabricators Council, Inc.
JOSEPH D. RUPP, Chairman, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Olin Corporation
JEFFREY J. HAFERKAMP, President, Olin Brass, A
Division of Olin Corporation
THOMAS G. BAKER, Vice President, Marketing and
Sales, Olin Brass, A Division of Olin
Corporation
WARREN E. BARTEL, President, Outokumpu American
Brass
MICHELE A. POTTER, Marketing Manager, Outokumpu
American Brass
DOUGLAS W. BURKHARDT, General Manager, Sales and
Marketing, PMX Industries, Inc.
MICHAEL T. KERWIN, Economist, Georgetown Economic
Services
WILLIAM B. HUDGENS, Economist, Georgetown Economic
Services

DAVID A. HARTQUIST, Esquire
JEFFREY S. BECKINGTON, Esquire
KATHLEEN W. CANNON, Esquire
GRACE W. KIM, Esquire
Collier Shannon Scott, PLLC
Washington, D.C.

Heritage Reporting Corporation
(202) 628-4888

APPEARANCES: (cont'd.)

In Opposition to the Continuation of the Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Orders:

On behalf of Wieland-Werke AG, Prymetall GmbH & Co. KG,
and Schwermetall Halbzeugwerk GmbH & Co. KG:

WERNER TRAA, Director, Wieland-Werke AG
MARKUS SCHULER, Executive Vice President, Wieland
Metals
ED PAGES, President, Guarantee Specialties
BRUCE MALASHEVICH, President, Economic Consulting
Services, LLC
KLAUS GUTTENBERG, General Counsel, Wieland-Werke
AG
DR. JOERG HANISCH, Executive Board Member,
Wieland-Werke AG

MICHAEL T. SHOR, Esquire
Arnold & Porter LLP
Washington, D.C.

On behalf of Eluma S.A. (Eluma):

VALMIR BAIALUNA, Sales Manager, Eluma

PHILIPPE M. BRUNO, Esquire
Greenberg Traurig, LLP
Washington, D.C.

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P R O C E E D I N G S

(9:30 a.m.)

CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning. On behalf of the United States International Trade Commission I welcome you to this hearing on Investigation Nos. 701-TA-269 and 270 and 731-TA-311-314, 317 and 379 (Second Review) involving Brass Sheet and Strip From Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan.

The purpose of these five-year review investigations is to determine whether the revocation of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders covering brass sheet and strip from Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy and Japan would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.

Notices of investigation for this hearing, list of witnesses and transcript order forms are available at the Secretary's desk. I understand the parties are aware of the time allocations. Any questions regarding the time allocations should be directed to the Secretary.

As all written material will be entered in full into the record, it need not be read to us at this time. Parties are reminded to give any prepared

1 non-confidential testimony and exhibits to the
2 Secretary. Do not place any non-confidential
3 testimony or exhibits directly on the public
4 distribution table. All witnesses must be sworn in by
5 the Secretary before presenting testimony.

6 Finally, if you will be submitting documents
7 that contain information you wish classified as
8 business confidential, your requests should comply
9 with Commission Rule 201.6.

10 Madam Secretary, are there any preliminary
11 matters?

12 MS. ABBOTT: Yes, Mr. Chairman. With your
13 permission we will add Klaus Guttenberg, General
14 Counsel, and Joerg Hanisch, member of the Executive
15 Board, Wieland, to the afternoon panel.

16 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Without objection.

17 Let us proceed with the opening remarks.

18 MS. ABBOTT: Opening remarks in support of
19 continuation of orders will be by David A. Hartquist,
20 Collier Shannon Scott.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning.

22 MR. HARTQUIST: Good morning, Mr. Chairman,
23 members of the Commission and staff. I'm David A.
24 Hartquist of Collier Shannon Scott representing the
25 Petitioners in this case.

1 The record in this case provides strong
2 support for a finding that if the orders are revoked
3 subject imports of brass sheet and strip are likely to
4 increase significantly in volume to undercut and
5 depress U.S. prices and to injure an already
6 vulnerable U.S. industry.

7 Let me recount for you a few of the key
8 points supporting this conclusion. First, both of the
9 foreign mills that are covered by the orders have
10 refused to participate in this review and have not
11 responded to the Commission's questionnaires. The
12 Brazilian and German producers who are participating
13 predicate their arguments on their reported capacity
14 and production, ignoring entirely non-responding
15 producers in their own countries.

16 Second, although those producers that have
17 provided information have professed to have no desire
18 or ability to export much, if any, brass sheet and
19 strip to the United States, the evidence of record
20 leads to the opposite conclusion. Our prehearing
21 brief substantiates that the capacity to produce brass
22 sheet and strip in Brazil, France, Germany, Italy and
23 Japan is substantial and has even increased since the
24 time of the original investigation.

25 The brass mills in these countries have more

1 than ample capacity to export large volumes of brass
2 sheet and strip to the U.S. in the event of
3 revocation, augmented by their ability to shift
4 capacity from other copper-based products to brass
5 sheet and strip.

6 Third, if revocation is granted, the foreign
7 brass mills will almost certainly divert their exports
8 of brass sheet and strip from third country markets
9 like China to the United States. China's emergence as
10 a major producer of brass sheet and strip will hasten
11 this change.

12 Fourth, many brass mills in the countries
13 under order are geared for export and advertise
14 themselves as such. KM Europa, for example, a company
15 that has chosen not to participate in these sunset
16 reviews, is a multinational company run by a
17 management team from Germany with major brass mills in
18 France, Italy and Germany, among other countries, and
19 is but one example of this export-oriented outlook.

20 Fifth, during the period of review, the
21 countries under order continued to sell brass sheet
22 and strip in the U.S. market, demonstrating both a
23 continuing interest in doing so and, aided by low
24 prices, the ability to do so.

25 Sixth, thanks to the discipline of the

1 orders, the volumes of these imports have been far
2 below their levels during the periods of the original
3 investigations. Indeed, in its 1994-1995 annual
4 administrative review at the Commerce Department,
5 Wieland, the German producer, commented in relevant
6 part that it had "complied with the order by
7 eliminating sales of product which it could not sell
8 at fair value." This category has covered practically
9 all of Wieland's U.S. sales.

10 Seventh, if the orders were revoked the
11 price of subject imports would likely undercut U.S.
12 prices of this fungible product, leading to depression
13 and suppression of U.S. prices at a time of rising
14 cost, which you'll hear a lot about today.

15 Finally, as the data in the Commission's
16 prehearing report indicate, the domestic industry is
17 in an extremely vulnerable state. Profits for this
18 industry have been minimal during each of the past
19 five years.

20 Further, the U.S. market for brass sheet and
21 strip is declining because the industry's customers
22 are moving offshore to countries like China and India
23 and Mexico. Although the U.S. market is still
24 substantial and attractive to foreign producers, this
25 phenomenon is extremely worrisome to the domestic

1 industry.

2 For all of these reasons, we respectfully
3 submit that now is not the time to revoke the orders
4 against unfairly traded imports from Brazil, France,
5 Germany, Italy or Japan.

6 Thank you.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

8 Madam Secretary?

9 MS. ABBOTT: Opening remarks in opposition
10 to continuation of orders will be by Philippe M.
11 Bruno, Greenberg Traurig.

12 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Good morning.

13 MR. BRUNO: Good morning, Chairman, members
14 of the Commission, Commission staff. I am Philippe
15 Bruno with Greenberg Traurig for the Respondents in
16 this case.

17 The Petitioners' script for this case is
18 like one more rerun of the same old movie. In the
19 original investigations, the Commission had before it
20 a greater number of subject countries and different
21 conditions of competition. The orders were terminated
22 for three countries in the first sunset review,
23 leaving a group of countries in this review that the
24 Commission has not previously analyzed communitively.

25 The market conditions in the industry too

1 have changed since the original investigation. Under
2 these conditions, the domestic industry's simplistic
3 back-to-the-future scenario is just implausible.

4 Let's flash back to 20 years ago. For the
5 six countries now before you, subject imports fell 60
6 percent before the orders were imposed. They were
7 falling before petitions were even filed. There is no
8 upward trend that would show likely significant
9 increases if the orders are terminated. Indeed, it is
10 doubtful that this Commission would have even found
11 injury by reason of these imports.

12 Now let's fast forward to 20 years later.
13 The U.S. industry is back claiming again that it is
14 vulnerable to those subject imports which in the
15 meantime have dwindled to commercially insignificant
16 levels, yet the reasons offered by the U.S. industry
17 have nothing to do with the subject imports.

18 The short-lived downturn of the U.S. economy
19 that further depressed U.S. demand in the early 2000s
20 has nothing to do with the subject imports. The
21 rising cost of copper and other raw materials that has
22 contributed to the higher cost of production for this
23 industry has nothing to do with the subject imports.

24 The increasing volume of non-subject imports
25 into the United States, largely under the control of

1 the domestic industry, again has nothing to do with
2 the subject imports. However, we all agree on one
3 thing. The convergence of all three factors in the
4 2001-2004 timeframe created a perfect storm
5 unprecedented in the last 20 years and unlikely to
6 recur in the foreseeable future.

7 Far from caving in under the weight of these
8 negative market developments, the U.S. industry has
9 shown extraordinary resilience. It maintained
10 operating profits every year. With the wave of these
11 negative market conditions receding, the situation can
12 only improve with or without the orders.

13 The real reason subject imports will not
14 increase to significant levels is not hidden in some
15 20 year old data, but is right under our eyes in the
16 information collected by the Commission in this
17 review. The Canadian industry is gone entirely. The
18 German capacity to produce brass has declined in half
19 since the 1980s as German producers have shifted to
20 higher value alloys. Brazil's capacity is almost
21 entirely devoted to supplying a growing domestic
22 market.

23 Unlikely many reviews in which the U.S.
24 market has been shielded from competition for so many
25 years, the U.S. market price is not higher than world

1 market levels. Respondents' information shows that
2 prices in Europe and other markets generally are
3 higher than the United States.

4 Finally, there is no evidence of any adverse
5 price effects. The limited price comparison data
6 collected by the Commission show only overselling.
7 The underselling data from the original investigations
8 included weighted average prices from what are now
9 non-subject country imports, and those are legally
10 irrelevant.

11 In sum, what will happen if the orders are
12 revoked. The most likely scenario is that subject
13 imports will not have any adverse impact on the U.S.
14 industry because there is little unused capacity in
15 the subject countries, the prices in the U.S. market
16 do not rate an incentive to shift sales, and negative
17 market developments will continue to recede in the
18 future.

19 Add to this declining capacity in Germany,
20 rising domestic sales in Brazil and growing markets in
21 other countries, and the gloom and doom, back-to-the-
22 future scenario proposed by Petitioners loses all
23 credibility.

24 Let me end by asking you to consider
25 credibility. When Petitioners pontificate about the

1 dire consequences of any increase in imports, this is
2 a skeptic call of a domestic industry that complains
3 about the adverse impact of low-priced, non-subject
4 imports without even telling you that it controlled
5 much of those imports.

6 Consider also the credibility of the
7 reported capacity numbers which mysteriously have
8 increased since the last review so that it can now
9 claim low capacity utilization. This case would have
10 been weak in 1987. It is even weaker today. The
11 back-to-the-future theory might be plausible five
12 years after an order, but not 20. Too much has
13 changed.

14 Thank you.

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

16 Madam Secretary?

17 MS. ABBOTT: The first panel in support of
18 the continuation of orders, please come forward and be
19 seated.

20 Mr. Chairman, the witnesses have been sworn.

21 (Witnesses sworn.)

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: You may proceed.

23 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 I'll introduce first those witnesses who are going to
25 present direct testimony, and then we'll have several

1 witnesses also who are available for the Q&A session.

2 Our first witness will be Joseph L. Mayer,
3 who is president of the Copper & Brass Fabricators
4 Council; next, Joseph D. Rupp, Chairman, President and
5 CEO of Olin Corporation; Warren Bartel, President,
6 Outokumpu American Brass; Douglas W. Burkhardt,
7 General Manager, Sales and Marketing, PMX Industries,
8 Inc.; Kathleen W. Cannon of Collier Shannon Scott; and
9 Michael T. Kerwin, Economist with Georgetown Economic
10 Services.

11 In addition to those presenting direct
12 testimony, Jeffrey J. Haferkamp, who is President of
13 Olin Brass, the Brass Division of Olin Corporation;
14 Thomas G. Baker, Vice President, Marketing and Sales,
15 for Olin Brass; Michele A. Potter, Marketing Manager
16 for Outokumpu American Brass; and William B. Hudgens,
17 Economist with Georgetown Economic Services.

18 With that we'll start with Mr. Mayer this
19 morning.

20 MR. MAYER: Thank you. Chairman Koplan,
21 members of the Commission, thank you for allowing me
22 to --

23 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Is your microphone on? It
24 is now. If you could pull it closer to you, and you
25 could start again?

1 MR. MAYER: Chairman Koplan, members of the
2 Commission, thank you for allowing me to participate
3 in this hearing. I am Joe Mayer, and I appear before
4 you today in my capacity as president of the Copper &
5 Brass Fabricators Council.

6 The Council's members collectively account
7 for approximately 85 percent of the total volume of
8 copper-based, semi-fabricated product produced in the
9 United States, including CDA 200 series brass sheet
10 and strip.

11 Since my arrival at the Council in 1985, I
12 have worked extensively with this U.S. industry and
13 have observed at close range the important roles that
14 these antidumping and countervailing duty orders have
15 played in limiting the volume of unfairly priced,
16 injurious imports that have entered the United States
17 and in making possible modest profits that have helped
18 to maintain this domestic industry to the advantage of
19 our national economy.

20 I recognize that these orders have been in
21 place for some years and that their very longevity
22 might seem to some to be sufficient reason to warrant
23 revocation. That assessment, however, would be
24 unjustified for a number of reasons.

25 Our companies have been confronted since the

1 first sunset reviews in 1999-2000 with extremely tough
2 business conditions and can expect more of the same in
3 the time ahead. While our upcoming witnesses will
4 describe these serious problems in more detail, it is
5 fair to say that the U.S. producers of brass sheet and
6 strip are undergoing a period of great challenge.

7 China particularly looms as a tremendously
8 disruptive factor both in terms of U.S. customers of
9 our brass mills relocating there and in terms of
10 China becoming a net exporter rather than a net
11 importer of brass sheet and strip. Further, it is
12 virtually a certainty -- not simply likely -- that
13 revocation of any of these orders would swiftly lead
14 to a resumption of unfairly priced, injurious imports.

15 In addition to the conditions just noted, we
16 have been able to document with substantial evidence
17 in our prehearing brief that the brass mills in the
18 countries under order, apart from Canada, both
19 individually and collectively, have tremendous
20 capacity to inundate the U.S. market with brass sheet
21 and strip.

22 While U.S. demand has declined somewhat, it
23 is still substantial, and the U.S. market continues to
24 be far more open than any other country's market.
25 With their capacity and the incentive of keeping their

1 equipment and workers employed, there is every reason
2 to expect that the brass mills in the countries under
3 order would move quickly to target the United States,
4 as they did before the orders were in place.

5 Brass sheet and strip is a vital component
6 of the product mix of a brass mill. A brass mill's
7 viability to produce flat-rolled product is
8 strengthened or put in jeopardy to the extent volume
9 for CDA 200 series brass sheet and strip is gained or
10 lost.

11 It is imperative that these orders be
12 extended. In that event, our U.S. mills will still be
13 faced with difficult circumstances, but we are
14 competitive, and without renewed dumped and subsidized
15 imports from the countries under order we will have
16 the opportunity to survive and prosper.

17 Our U.S. producers of brass sheet and strip
18 are world class companies. This statement is true not
19 only of the companies before you -- Olin, Outokumpu
20 American Brass and PMX -- but it is also true of
21 Revere, Scott Brass, Acco and Eagle Brass.

22 Despite what the few foreign mills that are
23 here might say, we are convinced that the quality of
24 our brass sheet and strip matches or exceeds any brass
25 in the world.

1 Thank you.

2 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Mayer.

3 Mr. Rupp?

4 MR. RUPP: Good morning. I am Joseph Rupp,
5 and I'm the Chairman, President and Chief Executive
6 Officer of the Olin Corporation. I've been in the
7 brass industry for over 33 years, and I appeared
8 before the Commission in early 2000 in conjunction
9 with the first sunset reviews in these cases. I
10 appreciate the opportunity to do so again.

11 Olin Brass has been producing large
12 quantities of a wide range of copper-based flat-rolled
13 products, among them Copper Development Association
14 200 series brass sheet and strip. We've been
15 producing these since our original brass mill was
16 built during the first world war to supply brass for
17 military cartridges. We take great pride in our
18 company, our heritage, our technical and metallurgical
19 capability.

20 Over the years, we've been able to establish
21 ourselves and our products on a global basis, and I
22 and my colleagues at Olin and from other brass mills
23 on this panel are familiar with most of the major
24 brass mills around the world.

25 I would like today to make several comments

1 in support of these orders' continuation. Above all,
2 our U.S. brass industry is under considerable pressure
3 and in a precarious position, and this condition would
4 deteriorate further if the massive capacity that is
5 available in the subject countries were turned again
6 toward the United States' market.

7 Brass mills, as others on this panel will
8 comment, are capital intensive operations that depend
9 for their success on the use of their equipment to the
10 maximum extent possible. That equipment can produce a
11 broad spectrum of copper-based, flat-rolled product,
12 some of which are like CDA 100 series, which is
13 copper; also CDA 200 series, which is brass. These
14 alloys are much easier to produce and are
15 interchangeable on the equipment. Some series of
16 alloys are not, such as the 300 series leaded brass.

17 As a result of these factors, the capacity
18 of a brass mill to produce any particular product is
19 somewhat a fluid concept. Moreover, exactly what a
20 brass mill's equipment is used to produce on any given
21 day and over the course of a year will depend upon the
22 needs and the demand of the brass mill's customers.
23 The product mix of a brass mill, therefore, will
24 fluctuate over time.

25 What is evident from Olin's experience,

1 however, is that brass sheet and strip must as a
2 practical matter constitute a substantial portion of a
3 brass mill's total output of all products for that
4 mill to be able to keep its equipment and its
5 facilities up-to-date and to realize an adequate
6 return on its investments.

7 Brass sheet and strip is the baseload
8 product of brass mills here and abroad. Any
9 significant loss of volume results in lower capacity
10 utilization, and this capacity cannot be replaced in
11 similar volumes by other products.

12 Since the time of the first sunset reviews,
13 there have been some major events and changes in the
14 United States and global markets for brass sheet and
15 strip, all of which have negatively affected our
16 United States industry and all of which have increased
17 our company's vulnerability.

18 First, in the 2001-2003 time period the
19 United States experienced a widespread recession, and
20 demand for brass sheet and strip is still far below
21 the levels that we experienced in the 1999 and 2000
22 time period. During the period of review, Olin Brass
23 eliminated approximately 1,000 jobs, which represented
24 close to 25 percent of our workforce.

25 Second, over the last two years we have seen

1 the prices of copper, zinc and other raw materials, as
2 well as the prices of energy, spiral upward. This
3 trend appears likely to continue for the reasonably
4 foreseeable future.

5 Third, more and more of our United States
6 customers have been relocating abroad, especially to
7 low-cost countries like China, India and Mexico. With
8 their departure, we have been losing important
9 portions of our United States customer base. There is
10 no reason to think that this trends will be reversed
11 in the short term.

12 Finally, we are bracing for the day that we
13 believe will come when brass mills in China supply all
14 home market demand and begin to export brass sheet and
15 strip to the United States and to other countries.
16 Rather than see China import brass from countries such
17 as Brazil, France, Germany, Italy and Japan,
18 therefore, we can expect that those countries' exports
19 to China will need to find an alternate market.

20 We also anticipate, based upon the rapid
21 increase in Chinese capacity, that before long China
22 will cease being a net importer and will become a net
23 exporter of brass sheet and strip. As set forth in
24 our prehearing brief at Exhibit 11, China's own
25 importer data, which shows decreasing volumes of brass

1 sheet and strip imported from the countries under
2 order during the period of review, indicate as much.
3 The speed with which this shift has been occurring is
4 striking and I would say almost breathtaking.

5 While we have often faced in this country
6 economic slowdowns and spikes in the cost of raw
7 materials and energy, these historically have been
8 followed by upturns in the business cycle and
9 reductions in cost. We have, however, never seen in
10 our industry the sort of relocating offshore of our
11 customer base and the installation of huge amounts of
12 capacity in China that we have been witnessing in the
13 past few years.

14 These last phenomena and even the latest
15 rises in costs of our raw materials and energy which
16 we believe really reflect China's surging demand -- in
17 other words, we believe China has a huge impact on
18 what's going on with raw materials and energy. These
19 last phenomena represent extraordinary adjustments in
20 our competitive environment and tremendous challenges
21 not only to the United States industry, but also to
22 brass mills in the countries currently under order and
23 elsewhere around the world.

24 In my opinion, the scenario that I've just
25 presented is a realistic evaluation of the current

1 state of the brass mill industry and what can be
2 anticipated ahead. It is a scenario which Olin has
3 been basing its planning for the future.

4 Of central important to the ability of Olin
5 and other United States brass mills to weather this
6 powerful and brewing storm is the continuation of the
7 orders being reviewed. In the face of very incomplete
8 information and silence generally of the foreign mills
9 in the countries under order on their capacities, we
10 have provided the Commission in our prehearing brief
11 our best estimates of the foreign mills' capacity and
12 their ability to shift production and to produce brass
13 sheet and strip.

14 It is evident from this material that these
15 foreign mills have the capacity to produce an
16 overwhelming volume of brass sheet and strip for sale
17 in the United States. In addition, the United States
18 market for brass sheet and strip continues to be
19 sizeable and accessible. Our tariffs on imports of
20 this brass are very modest, and, unlike many other
21 countries, we do not charge any value-added tax on
22 imports.

23 If the orders were to be revoked, therefore,
24 we expect that large volumes of low-priced imports
25 from the countries under order could and would return

1 to the United States market very quickly. Driving
2 this resurgence would be, first, the economic
3 realities I've described of the capital intensive
4 nature of brass mills and the central role that brass
5 sheet and strip play in enabling brass mills to be
6 financially viable.

7 Second, the stating of China as a practical
8 destination for brass sheet and strip from the
9 countries under order, and, third, the mature nature
10 of markets for brass sheet and strip in those
11 countries and their loss of some customers to
12 relocation.

13 I would make one final observation. Brass
14 sheet and strip is a fungible product. With all
15 respect, we take issue with any claims that German or
16 any other foreign brass sheet and strip is somehow of
17 higher quality than the brass sheet and strip that is
18 produced in the United States brass mills. In terms
19 of grain structure, surface quality and otherwise, we
20 feel our product is at least the equal of any other
21 mills' product.

22 Thank you for your attention.

23 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Rupp.

24 We move to Mr. Bartel.

25 MR. BARTEL: Good morning. I am Warren

1 Bartel, the president of Outokumpu American Brass.
2 Outokumpu American Brass, or OAB, is located in
3 Buffalo, New York, and is one of the largest producers
4 of brass sheet and strip in the United States and a
5 major employer in western New York State.

6 This morning I'd like to discuss the market
7 conditions that we are facing in the U.S. market for
8 brass sheet and strip and the importance of
9 maintaining the current unfair trade orders on this
10 product.

11 As you might have heard, Outokumpu's
12 Fabricated Products Division, Outokumpu Copper
13 Products, was sold by our Finnish parent to a private
14 equity firm called Nordic Capital in June of 2005.
15 Outokumpu based this decision on a desire to
16 concentrate on its role as a producer of stainless
17 steel.

18 The successor company will retain the rights
19 to the Outokumpu Copper Products name for a 12-month
20 period, but our name will soon change, probably by mid
21 2006.

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Could you pull that
23 microphone a bit closer to you? Thank you.

24 MR. BARTEL: We at OAB are currently in a
25 period of transition from our old to our new ownership

1 structure. However, our new owner has made it very
2 clear that it is committed to succeeding in this brass
3 sheet and strip market and making the investment
4 necessary to do so.

5 Capital improvements that were planned at
6 our Buffalo facility are going forward, and the new
7 owners have made it known their intention to make OAB
8 the preeminent producer of copper and brass flat-
9 rolled products in North America.

10 While we are very happy to have such a
11 strong corporate backing, we remain concerned about
12 the future of our company and the U.S. industry
13 producing brass sheet and strip. As your staff report
14 shows, consumption of brass sheet and strip in the
15 U.S. market has declined significantly during the
16 period examined in this review. In fact, consumption
17 in 2004 was lower than in any year of the original
18 investigation or in the years of the previous sunset
19 review.

20 The market for brass sheet and strip is
21 mature, and many of the fabricators that use this
22 product as an input material have been either moving
23 offshore to produce in markets like China or closing
24 down altogether in the face of foreign competition
25 from low-wage countries.

1 On top of a contracting customer base, we've
2 also been facing large cost increases. Most notably,
3 copper cathode and copper scrap prices have reached
4 all-time highs. While we are generally able to pass
5 through the increased copper costs to our customers,
6 as the total price for brass sheet and strip rises we
7 run the long-term risk of pushing our customer base
8 toward alternative products made from other material.

9 Further, we've been unable to completely
10 pass through our other increased costs, such as
11 electricity, natural gas and transportation. The end
12 result has been a substantial decline in our
13 profitability over recent years. In the face of our
14 contracting customer base and the declining
15 profitability, the last thing we need is to have the
16 current unfair trade orders revoked.

17 I would like to describe one other important
18 concept to you. While OAB and the other producers of
19 brass sheet and strip produce other non-subject
20 products on the same equipment, our ability to turn
21 production of these other products as an alternative
22 to brass sheet and strip is limited.

23 Brass sheet and strip is the backbone of our
24 overall operation and historically has been our
25 largest product. Our production operations are highly

1 capital intensive and are set up to handle large runs
2 of throughputs of commodity products like 200 series
3 brass sheet and strip.

4 Our mills are designed to be run 24 hours a
5 day, seven days a week, and we have to keep the
6 production volumes up in order to keep down our fixed
7 costs per unit of production and turn a profit.

8 As you can see from our financial data,
9 we've been struggling to do this in the face of our
10 reduced production of brass sheet and strip. While we
11 produce many specialty alloys that sell at higher
12 prices than brass sheet and strip, the markets for
13 these products are relatively quite small.

14 Given the massive quantities of brass sheet
15 and strip that we do produce, it is simply not
16 feasible or realistic to transfer any significant
17 portion of our capacity to produce brass to these more
18 specialized niche products.

19 The vast majority of production of brass
20 sheet and strip that we lost over the period that
21 you're examining was not replaced by the production of
22 other alloys. Simply put, if we lose brass sheet and
23 strip production entirely, our mill will not be
24 viable.

25 Despite the fact that brass sheet and strip

1 production is extremely capital intensive, your staff
2 report shows that the domestic industry is currently
3 in a barely break-even position financially. Your
4 report also shows that during the period you are
5 examining the cashflow of the domestic industry has
6 not even covered its capital expenditures.

7 A capital intensive industry simply cannot
8 continue to exist long-term if it does not generate
9 sufficient cashflow to finance the expenditures needed
10 to maintain efficiency and product quality. If we've
11 been struggling to cover our capital costs in recent
12 years, we will certainly not be able to cover these
13 costs if the unfair trade orders are revoked and we
14 are again exposed to large volumes of imports from the
15 subject countries.

16 Let me conclude by saying that the
17 statements of the German and Brazilian producers that
18 they have no intention to return to this market if
19 their orders are revoked are unbelievable. Despite
20 recent contractions, the U.S. remains one of the
21 largest markets for brass sheet and strip in the
22 world.

23 Further, the consumption declines that we
24 have witnessed in our markets have also occurred in
25 Europe and the Japanese markets, making export of

1 excess capacity from these markets to the United
2 States a very attractive option.

3 Finally, while demand in China for brass
4 sheet and strip has been increasing rapidly, China's
5 capacity to manufacture the product has increased at
6 an even faster rate. Export opportunities to China
7 are already starting to decline, which will make
8 exports to the U.S. market from the subject countries
9 even more attractive. Our industry and our market are
10 extremely vulnerable to the revocation of these
11 orders.

12 Thank you for the opportunity to address you
13 this morning.

14 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Warren.

15 Our next witness is Doug Burkhardt of PMX.

16 MR. BURKHARDT: Good morning, Mr. Chairman
17 and members of the Commission. My name is Doug
18 Burkhardt, and I'm the General Manager of Sales and
19 Marketing at PMX Industries. I have been with PMX
20 since 2003, and I've worked in the brass industry for
21 over seven years.

22 My testimony this morning will address
23 issues relating to the future of my company and the
24 brass sheet and strip market in the United States and
25 why the antidumping duty and countervailing duty

1 orders on brass sheet and strip should be continued.

2 First let me begin with a brief background
3 of the history of PMX. In 1989, our parent company,
4 Pun Song, headquartered in Seoul, South Korea, began
5 construction of a U.S.-based facility to produce brass
6 strip located in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, with the intent
7 of serving the U.S. market. Construction of this
8 greenfield facility was completed in 1992. It was the
9 first brass and copper rolling mill greenfield
10 facility to be built in the United States in over 50
11 years.

12 A significant amount of capital was invested
13 by Pun Song to ensure the successful operation of this
14 production facility, which became operational in 1992.
15 Not long after its establishment, PMX quickly became a
16 world-class producer of copper and brass products,
17 including brass sheet and strip.

18 Our equipment and facility are state-of-the-
19 art, and we have continuously made capital investments
20 to modernize and increase production efficiencies. In
21 our capital-intensive industry, brass mills must
22 maximize the utilization of the casting and rolling
23 equipment to spread fixed costs over as wide a base as
24 possible.

25 Because the equipment used to produce brass

1 sheet and strip can also be employed to produce any
2 number of copper and copper alloy flat-rolled
3 products, our company is like many other brass mills
4 in that we can switch production between various
5 products to meet demand.

6 Brass sheet and strip is a critical element
7 to the product mix at PMX and the other mills by
8 virtue of the high volume entailed. Thus, a certain
9 production level of brass products must be achieved in
10 order to sustain our operations.

11 Brass sheet and strip is a commodity product
12 and highly fungible. It competes in the U.S. market
13 on the basis of price. PMX competes head-to-head with
14 other domestic producers and importers selling brass
15 sheet and strip with price being the key factor
16 determining who gets the sale.

17 Given the decline in demand for brass sheet
18 and strip in recent years, the U.S. market for this
19 product has become extremely competitive. Even a
20 small difference in price results in winning or losing
21 a sale.

22 As I previously mentioned, PMX makes ongoing
23 capital investments to increase our efficiencies.
24 Despite our continuing effort to remain a highly
25 efficient producer, I am very apprehensive about the

1 future of my company if any of these orders were to be
2 revoked.

3 While the orders have allowed PMX to justify
4 the sizeable capital investment we have made in our
5 Cedar Rapids facility and have given us the ability to
6 make additional capital improvements, the ability to
7 generate a return on investment from our mill would be
8 minimized if revocation occurred, putting future
9 investment, production and employment at serious risk.

10 Given the large capacity to produce brass
11 sheet and strip that exists in the subject countries
12 and the attractiveness of the U.S. market, it is
13 reasonable to expect increased exports from these
14 countries if the orders are revoked. Any claims by
15 Respondents that they would not return to the U.S.
16 market or would only sell a limited volume, are simply
17 unrealistic. If the orders are revoked, there will be
18 nothing to prevent the unrestrained imports from
19 increasing in the U.S. market. An influx of subject
20 imports into the U.S. market at unfair prices will
21 have consequences for our industry.

22 These dumped and subsidized imports will
23 undercut our prices, making it impossible for our
24 products to compete and for PMX to be profitable. The
25 deterioration in prices that would be caused by

1 revocation of the orders would lead to a reduction in
2 our revenue, our profits and our ability to continue
3 to invest in capital improvements.

4 The intensely competitive nature of the U.S.
5 market for brass sheet and strip reinforces my
6 concern. Current low profit margins for the U.S.
7 industry demonstrate that the U.S. brass sheet and
8 strip industry is in a vulnerable condition.

9 If these orders were revoked, low-priced
10 offers from importers of the foreign product would
11 become the price that PMX and other domestic producers
12 would have to meet. We cannot afford any further
13 reduction in our prices and profit margins.

14 In sum, revocation of any of the orders
15 would lead to history repeating itself. On behalf of
16 PMX, I urge you not to revoke the outstanding orders
17 on brass sheet and strip.

18 Thank you.

19 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Doug.

20 We now move to Kathy Cannon.

21 MS. CANNON: Good morning. I am Kathleen
22 Cannon of Collier Shannon Scott. My testimony today
23 will address the issue of cumulation, including the
24 arguments Respondents have raised in an attempt to
25 prevent cumulating imports from Brazil and Germany in

1 this review.

2 Let me clarify from the outset. We are only
3 urging the Commission cumulate imports from Brazil,
4 France, Germany, Italy and Japan, but have not
5 included Canada in this group. Data available to us
6 at this point indicate that there is no capacity to
7 produce brass sheet and strip in Canada. If that is
8 confirmed, there is no longer a need for the order.

9 Despite the Commission's decision to
10 cumulate subject imports both in the original
11 investigations and in the first sunset review, both
12 Eluma and the German producers urged the Commission
13 not to cumulate imports here. Their objection to
14 cumulation is not surprising, given the massive
15 collective foreign capacity and import volumes that
16 could and likely would be redirected to the U.S.
17 market if revocation occurs.

18 Their attempts to justify decumulating
19 imports from Brazil and Germany, however, have no
20 merit. Both Respondents begin by claiming that there
21 would be no discernable adverse impact from imports of
22 either country because imports from each country alone
23 are not likely to cause injury.

24 Indeed, the Eluma argument that there would
25 be no discernable adverse impact of imports from

1 Brazil in its cumulation analysis which appears at
2 pages 6 to 9 of its brief is virtually identical to
3 its argument that these imports would not cause
4 injury, which appears at pages 23 to 26 of its brief.

5 These identical arguments in both the
6 cumulation context and the injury context misapprehend
7 the legal standard. As the Court of International
8 Trade stated in the Yusnor IndoSteel case, "The no
9 discernable adverse impact test in a cumulation
10 context cannot be treated as tantamount to a
11 requirement of proving injury on an individual country
12 basis as such an approach would defeat the purpose of
13 cumulation."

14 Moreover, the reasons Respondents give as to
15 why these imports would have no discernable adverse
16 impact are unfounded. Both Respondents assert that
17 imports from the subject countries were declining in
18 the original investigation over the 1984-1987 period,
19 while the U.S. industry's condition was improving.

20 In fact, in looking at the information
21 presented in their briefs one would wonder how an
22 affirmative decision was reached initially. The
23 answer is Respondents are looking at the wrong time
24 period and are looking at only a part of the
25 Commission's analysis in the original investigations.

1 Most notably, the period at issue in the
2 original investigations of Brazil and Germany began in
3 1983, not 1984, and extended through 1985 and interim
4 1986. Based on an examination of the actual period of
5 investigation, the Commission found subject imports
6 were increasing. The Commission also found that
7 imports from Germany were by far the largest single
8 source of imports at that time.

9 As to the U.S. industry's condition during
10 this period, the Commission found "adverse trends in
11 almost all of the indicators traditionally considered
12 by the Commission."

13 In the second set of cases filed against
14 imports from Japan and the Netherlands in July 1987,
15 the Commission also found that subject imports were
16 increasing over the time period at issue.
17 Respondents' arguments are based on data from the
18 wrong time period.

19 Another flaw in Respondents' arguments on
20 the volume trends in the original investigations is
21 that they are based only on the six countries at issue
22 here and aggregate all of those imports. The
23 Commission, however, properly cumulated imports from
24 the countries subject to each of the original
25 investigations, including those not at issue here.

1 Respondents' analysis improperly aggregates
2 volumes of imports from two different investigations
3 spanning different periods of investigation. It is
4 improper to try to compare the collective volume
5 effect of subject imports across different
6 investigations just as it is wrong to ignore the
7 original effect of imports from Korea, Sweden and
8 later from the Netherlands simply because the
9 Commission subsequently revoked those orders.

10 The German Respondents go on to cite zero or
11 de minimis dumping margins by Wieland in the early
12 1990s as the basis for a no discernable adverse impact
13 finding. Wieland argues that Commerce departed from
14 its normal practice by refusing to revoke the German
15 order despite three years of zero margins and claimed
16 that because the German producers did not increase
17 imports at a time when dumping margins were zero the
18 Commission should find no increase in imports would
19 occur if the duties were revoked here.

20 This argument fails on several counts.
21 First, Commerce refused to revoke the order because it
22 found that Wieland was able to sell without dumping
23 only by selling very small quantities of subject brass
24 in the United States. In fact, in the review period
25 Wieland cites, Wieland had only a single U.S. shipment

1 that was a mere fraction of Wieland's preorder volume.

2 Commerce also found that Wieland was likely
3 to resume dumping if revocation occurred, particularly
4 because it would want to supply its related U.S. re-
5 rolling facility with strip at dumped prices. This
6 result is fully consistent with Commerce's practice of
7 only revoking an order if it finds no likelihood a
8 company will resume dumping.

9 Second, Wieland's arguments have the
10 situation exactly backwards. As Wieland itself has
11 stated, Wieland sold very small quantities of brass in
12 the U.S. market at non-dumped prices in the early
13 1990s because it could not sell other types of brass
14 without dumping.

15 Commerce recognized that Wieland's small
16 volume of non-dumped sales does not show what would
17 happen if the orders were revoked and Wieland were
18 free to sell large quantities of brass unrestrained in
19 the U.S. market.

20 In fact, it was Commerce's finding that
21 Wieland had an incentive to resume dumping to supply
22 its U.S. re-roll facility and to maximize its capacity
23 utilization that led Commerce to refuse to revoke the
24 order. Rather than supporting Wieland's claim that
25 this case showed Wieland would be unlikely to increase

1 dumped sales if the orders were revoked, the Commerce
2 finding indicates just the opposite.

3 Finally on this issue, I note that the zero
4 dumping margins applied only to Wieland. Commerce did
5 not find that the other German brass producers were
6 not dumping. Both Eluma and Wieland predicate
7 arguments on their own data while ignoring other
8 producers in their countries, particularly non-
9 responding producers.

10 As Mr. Kerwin will discuss, the massive
11 capacities to produce brass sheet and strip in both
12 Brazil and Germany, coupled with other information
13 showing likelihood of increased imports from both of
14 those countries if revocation occurred, demonstrate
15 that imports from Brazil and Germany would have a very
16 discernable adverse impact.

17 Once the Commission resolves this inquiry,
18 it must determine whether there would be a reasonable
19 overlap of competition. Although the German producers
20 contend that their product is of higher quality and
21 does not compete with the U.S. product, that view is
22 not shared by either U.S. producers or most
23 purchasers.

24 As the prehearing report indicates, six of
25 seven U.S. producers and 10 of 11 responding

1 purchasers stated that the U.S. and German products
2 were interchangeable. Overall, the Commission found a
3 "high degree of substitution between brass sheet and
4 strip produced in the United States and subject
5 countries."

6 Record data also indicates that there has
7 been and would be an overlap in channels of
8 distribution, geographic markets and a simultaneous
9 presence of subject imports from the five subject
10 countries, as well as the U.S. product.

11 Finally, common conditions of competition
12 support cumulation here. The volumes of all subject
13 imports have declined substantially from preorder
14 levels, none showing an ability to sell into the U.S.
15 market at preorder levels without dumping.

16 All five subject countries have maintained
17 or even increased capacity to produce the product and
18 likely would export their excess capacity or would
19 divert exports from third countries, including China,
20 to the U.S. market if revocation occurred.

21 Let me make one final point on the record
22 data. At the risk of repeating myself from the
23 hearing last week on Polyester Staple Fiber, we are
24 again in a case in which very few foreign producers
25 have been willing to respond to Commission

1 questionnaires, leaving you to determine what
2 information to rely upon and whether the use of
3 adverse inferences is appropriate.

4 While the German Respondents would have you
5 just use the information they have given you and
6 essentially ignore the existence of non-responding
7 producers, you can't do that, nor can you assume, as
8 Eluma urges, that any non-responding Brazilian company
9 is small and uninterested in this market, particularly
10 in light of record evidence we have submitted as to
11 other significant production in Brazil.

12 Information submitted for the record from
13 both public and proprietary sources shows substantial
14 capacity in non-responding companies and incentives to
15 export that capacity to this market. Once again I
16 urge you to consider the use of adverse inferences in
17 this case as the statute contemplates, as the Federal
18 Circuit has approved in the Matsushita case and,
19 frankly, as is deserved where major foreign producers
20 subject to these orders refuse to answer
21 questionnaires or otherwise cooperate in these cases.

22 Thank you.

23 MR. HARTQUIST: Thanks, Kathy.

24 Our last witness is Michael Kerwin of
25 Georgetown Economic Services.

1 MR. KERWIN: Good morning. I'm Michael
2 Kerwin of Georgetown Economic Services. This morning
3 I'd like to discuss some of the conditions of
4 competition in the U.S. market for brass sheet and
5 strip and the likely volume and price effects of the
6 subject imports in the event of revocation.

7 In making your assessment of the likely
8 impact of the subject imports if the orders were
9 revoked, it is important to bear in mind some of the
10 conditions of competition prevailing in the U.S.
11 market.

12 First, consumption of brass sheet and strip
13 declined significantly during the period of review.
14 While the Respondents would have you believe that an
15 upturn in the U.S. market in 2004 brought a good year
16 for the domestic industry, it was actually only an
17 improvement in relation to 2003, which was a dismal
18 year for the industry.

19 U.S. consumption in 2004 was actually lower
20 than that in any year of the original investigations
21 or in the first sunset review. In fact, between 1999
22 and 2004, U.S. consumption fell by 100 million pounds
23 or 16.5 percent. The brass sheet and strip market is
24 in long-term decline, and the position of the domestic
25 industry is difficult even with the current orders in

1 place.

2 Given the long-term contraction of the
3 market, the domestic industry has taken steps to
4 reduce its productive capacity. While the prehearing
5 report shows that the industry's capacity increased in
6 relation to the first sunset review, last week a
7 revision was submitted to the Commission to correct
8 the misunderstanding by one domestic producer which
9 had reported its total capacity to produce all flat-
10 rolled copper and copper alloy products rather than a
11 product specific allocation.

12 The revised figures show that the industry
13 has not increased its capacity in relation to the
14 first sunset review and that capacity fell
15 significantly over the current period of review.

16 Contrary to the assertions of the German
17 Respondents that the problems of the domestic industry
18 can be attributed to an overcapacity problem of its
19 own making, individual U.S. companies have taken
20 action to reduce capacity in line with demand trends.

21 Even with the downward revision in domestic
22 industry capacity, however, the industry maintains
23 ample capacity to produce brass sheet and strip. In
24 fact, the industry not only has sufficient capacity to
25 produce the entire volume of the product currently

1 being imported from all source countries; it could
2 actually produce enough to cover total imports from
3 the peak period from the time of the original
4 investigation. In short, the domestic industry is
5 taking action to reduce capacity when it is feasible
6 and necessary, but it has more than ample capacity to
7 meet domestic demands.

8 The second major condition of competition
9 prevailing in the U.S. market has been the major
10 increase in the cost of production experienced by the
11 domestic industry. As you've heard, the cost for
12 basic raw materials, such as copper cathode and copper
13 alloy scrap, has increased dramatically over the last
14 two years.

15 While the industry's pricing mechanism
16 allows the increased metal cost to be generally passed
17 through to customers, high metal prices over the long
18 term can have the effect of encouraging the use of
19 alternative materials by users of brass sheet and
20 strip.

21 Further, the domestic industry has faced
22 large increases in production costs such as
23 electricity and natural gas and has not been able to
24 completely pass these through. As a result, industry
25 operating profits declined substantially over the

1 period of review both in absolute terms and as a
2 percentage of sales value. Increased finished product
3 prices have not been an indicator of improved
4 conditions for the domestic industry.

5 In the face of these conditions of
6 competition, the domestic industry is extremely
7 vulnerable to the likely effects of the subject
8 imports, and there's ample evidence the subject
9 imports can and will increase if the orders are
10 revoked.

11 While the Respondents have provided numerous
12 reasons as to why they can't or won't increase their
13 shipments in the event of revocation, these claims can
14 be refuted fairly readily.

15 As an initial point, the central fallacy
16 embodied in arguments of both the German and the
17 Brazilian Respondents is that they're speaking on
18 behalf of their respective industries. In point of
19 fact, less than half of the known manufacturers of
20 brass sheet and strip in Germany are participating in
21 this review, and only one of the two known Brazilian
22 producers is participating.

23 The brief filed on behalf of the
24 participating German producers never even acknowledges
25 that two large producers in Germany, MKM and KM

1 Europa, have not responded to the Commission's
2 questionnaire.

3 Further, the German Respondents' brief
4 asserts that its industry has consolidated and
5 significantly reduced its capacity without
6 acknowledging that the universe of German Respondents
7 is larger now due to the inclusion of East Germany
8 under the order in contrast to the limitation to West
9 German mills at the time of the original
10 investigation.

11 According to Petitioners' sources of
12 information, MKM, located in the former East Germany,
13 had a large increase in its flat-rolled capacity
14 during the period of review. Petitioners' sources of
15 information also show that the responding German
16 producers have not had reductions in their overall
17 capacity to produce copper and brass flat-rolled
18 products over the period of review.

19 Both Wieland and Schwermetall showed
20 capacity expansions, and Schwermetall's own materials
21 describe it as the largest mill producing flat-rolled
22 copper and copper alloy products in the world. As to
23 Brazil, earlier this year Eluma announced a major
24 capital investment intended to increase its output by
25 20 percent and expand its exports.

1 In contrast to the U.S. industry, there have
2 been no brass mills that have been shuttered in Brazil
3 or Germany since the time of the last sunset review.
4 Even if the revised data of the responding German
5 producers are taken at face value, however, the public
6 figures show that these participating producers had an
7 average of 51.4 million pounds of excess capacity in
8 the last two years of the period of review.

9 Given that U.S. imports from Germany peaked
10 at 69.5 million pounds in 1984 and that responding
11 producers represent only part of the true industry
12 producing brass sheet and strip in Germany, it is
13 clear that in the event of revocation the German
14 industry could readily resume shipping the subject
15 products in volumes above those during the period of
16 investigation.

17 The Respondents in this review also assert
18 that they will not ship significant volumes to the
19 U.S. market because the Asian market, most notably
20 China, has become far more attractive. In point of
21 fact, however, Chinese import statistics show that
22 imports of brass flat-rolled products from Germany,
23 Brazil and each of the subject countries other than
24 Italy actually declined between 1999 and 2004.

25 There's also ample information showing that

1 China is rapidly developing its own industry to
2 produce brass sheet and strip and will require far
3 fewer imports in years to come.

4 Respondents also argue that the recent
5 weakness of the U.S. dollar essentially prohibits
6 foreign producers from shipping to the U.S. market in
7 significant quantities. Obviously historical trends
8 and exchange rates do not preclude the opposite trends
9 from taking hold in the future.

10 Even under the recent trend in dollar
11 depreciation, however, exports of many commodities
12 from the subject countries to the United States have
13 increased contrary to any arguments as to the
14 centrality of exchange rates in the calculus of
15 whether or not to ship to the U.S. market.

16 Specifically, U.S. imports of copper sheet
17 and strip from Germany, a product made primarily by
18 the same companies that make brass sheet and strip,
19 nearly tripled between 1999 and 2004, despite a
20 depreciation in the U.S. dollar in relation to the
21 euro of 16.8 percent over that period.

22 As to Brazil, the dollar has actually
23 strengthened substantially in relation to the real
24 over the period of review making Brazilian imports
25 significantly more attractive in the event of

1 revocation.

2 The German Respondents have also made some
3 arguments that are specific to their industry. First,
4 Wieland has argued that its establishment of a U.S.
5 subsidiary means that the German parent company no
6 longer needs to export from Germany to supply its U.S.
7 customer base.

8 This line of reasoning overlooks one
9 critical point. The U.S. subsidiary, Wieland Metals,
10 is a re-roller, not an integrated brass mill, and thus
11 has every incentive to import re-roll material from
12 its German parent to further process in the United
13 States. Because re-roll is subject material, Wieland
14 is likely to take advantage of any revocation by
15 importing the product from Germany, an action which
16 would directly reduce U.S. producers' shipments.

17 The German Respondents have also asserted
18 that they will not ship significant quantities of
19 brass sheet and strip to the United States because
20 they have made quality their principal focus, and
21 their business model is now geared around high
22 performance alloys.

23 As noted by Mr. Rupp and Mr. Bartel,
24 however, it is simply not feasible to succeed as a
25 large copper and brass flat-rolled producer by making

1 niche products exclusively. Production runs for niche
2 products are simply too short to allow economic
3 functioning of these productive assets without being
4 supplemented by some substantial amount of commodity
5 throughput, most notably brass sheet and strip.

6 Finally, I'd like to say a quick word about
7 the likely price effects of the subject imports. The
8 Respondents in this review have asserted that the
9 extremely limited pricing evidence shown in the
10 prehearing report is somehow indicative of a pattern
11 of overselling by the subject imports.

12 In fact, an extremely small amount of
13 pricing data have been presented for a single product
14 from a single subject country, so the pricing data in
15 the current sunset review are of no broader
16 significance.

17 Because of the limited volumes of subject
18 imports currently entering the United States market,
19 the only meaningful import pricing data to analyze are
20 those from the original investigation, which indicated
21 clearly that the subject imports were underselling the
22 domestic industry on a regular and significant basis.
23 Those data should be taken as an indication of the
24 likely price effects in the event of revocation.

25 In summary, the evidence on the record in

1 this review shows that the domestic industry is in an
2 extremely vulnerable condition, but the import volumes
3 from the subject countries are likely to be
4 significant in the event of revocation and that the
5 return of those substantial quantities of subject
6 imports would have significant adverse effects on
7 domestic producer pricing.

8 In the face of the industry's vulnerability,
9 the effects of the subject imports in the event of
10 revocation would be extremely destructive.

11 Thank you for allowing me to address you
12 this morning.

13 MR. HARTQUIST: Mr. Chairman, that completes
14 are affirmative testimony, and I, before we move to
15 Q&A, would just like to introduce Jeffrey S.
16 Beckington, who is also on our panel. I was remiss in
17 not introducing my partner during the initial
18 introduction.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly. Welcome.

20 Before we begin the questioning, let me just
21 say because of the number of witnesses if you would
22 reidentify yourselves each time you respond to a
23 question it would make it much easier for the
24 reporter.

25 With that we'll begin the questioning with

1 Commissioner Pearson.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you, Mr.
3 Chairman. Permit me to welcome the panel. It's
4 always a pleasure to have people in front of us who
5 know so much about an industry about which I know
6 relatively so little.

7 My direct exposure to brass largely has been
8 through musical instruments and so my first inquiry is
9 is it brass sheet and strip that's used to make
10 trumpets and tubas and saxophones and trombones?

11 MR. BARTEL: Warren Bartel. Yes, sir.

12 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Good. I
13 assume there's a variety of thicknesses and whatnot
14 depending on the instrument that's being manufactured?

15 MR. BARTEL: That is true.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Good. Well,
17 then I do know something about this product.

18 I'm wanting to follow up a little bit on the
19 discussion of what's happened to U.S. apparent
20 consumption. A number of you have mentioned this. I
21 take it that you anticipate that there will be some
22 continued movement of consuming industries offshore
23 such that the domestic demand for brass sheet and
24 strip may decline.

25 Has there been any study or analysis of this

1 trend such that you might have a sense of how much
2 further that trend can go before you might reach the
3 floor level of support of industries that aren't
4 likely to leave?

5 Mr. Mayer, has your trade association looked
6 at that?

7 MR. MAYER: As a matter of fact, we have
8 looked at it to some extent. We participated in
9 hearings before the Small Business Committee of the
10 House of Representatives chaired by Chairman Manzullo,
11 who is very concerned about this.

12 They didn't examine in particular our
13 downstream customers, but Chairman Manzullo, his
14 district represents tool and die makers to a greater
15 extent.

16 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Mr. Mayer, I think
17 people are having a hard time hearing in the back. If
18 you can pull that closer to you?

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you, Madam Vice
20 Chairman.

21 MR. MAYER: In any event, Chairman Manzullo
22 has some statistics on tool and die manufacturers in
23 his district who have moved offshore or gone out of
24 business, and I think it was on the order of from a
25 total of 4,000 down to 1,500.

1 I don't know if it's that dire in our
2 industry, but I do know that our brass rod producers,
3 for example, with a market of roughly a billion pounds
4 a year feel that 200 million pounds have moved
5 offshore.

6 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: So what types of
7 customers are most likely to move overseas? You
8 mentioned tool and die. Is that an obvious customer
9 that would shift out of the U.S.?

10 Mr. Rupp?

11 MR. RUPP: Commissioner, the types of
12 industries that have moved offshore and some of the
13 markets that our products go into, our products go
14 into electrical products. They go into home building
15 products.

16 Like the musical instruments, we make
17 doorknobs and kickplates and hinges and those kinds of
18 things. They go into plumbing for faucets, faucet
19 manufacturing in your home, so what we call building
20 products. They also go into automotive connectors and
21 into electronic type of connectors, which would be in
22 your laptop computer and in your automobile.

23 There has been in the home building type of
24 products a migration of manufacturing out of the
25 United States into the Asian region, as well as we're

1 starting to see electrical products that are now being
2 manufactured in that region.

3 Coinage and ammunition products continue to
4 be manufactured in North America, and automotive
5 electrical is in flux. Obviously with what's
6 occurring with the automotive industry and what's
7 happening with their tier one suppliers, there is some
8 of that that has moved and a question as to how much
9 of it will.

10 Just to recap, there has been a fair amount
11 of migration of consumption out of the United States
12 into primarily China, but into the Asian region.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. In the
14 domestic industry's brief that was submitted on page
15 22 it was indicated that U.S. consumption of brass for
16 automotive electronics is likely to decline in the
17 near future. I think you just made reference to that.
18 Could you elaborate?

19 I mean, what is it that we see in the near
20 future? Do we expect a decline in the production of
21 automobiles in North America, or do some of the
22 companies use brass that came from overseas to
23 manufacture automobiles in the United States?

24 MR. RUPP: I think that the statement is
25 originally I think there was a sense that automotive

1 electrical connectors probably would remain in the
2 United States because of the just-in-time inventories
3 that are required by the U.S. automotive
4 manufacturers.

5 I think really what the concern here is is
6 with what's happened with the Delphi bankruptcy, with
7 what's happened with Ford, et cetera. I think the
8 concern is that their drive to lower their costs will
9 force them to manufacture more components offshore.

10 You know, what we're saying here is the U.S.
11 consumption for automotive will likely decline,
12 leading to severe negative consequences. I think
13 that's really why we believe that there's the
14 potential for that to occur.

15 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: So as a practical
16 matter if more of the automotive parts industry shifts
17 overseas and the supply chain adjusts in order to
18 provide those products --

19 MR. RUPP: There is a sense that that can
20 occur.

21 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: -- then we would
22 expect whatever brass is in those products to probably
23 have originated overseas and then come in as part of
24 the product, part of the component?

25 MR. RUPP: There is a concern that that

1 could occur, Commissioner.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay.

3 MR. BARTEL: Excuse me, Commissioner.

4 Warren Bartel. If I could just add? I believe also
5 with the change in fuel standards, emission standards,
6 there is an increase in the temperature under the hood
7 of the automobile forcing a technology change away
8 from 200 series brass products to higher performance
9 alloys, which are beyond what is covered in the scope
10 of this investigation, so that is also a negative
11 trend for 200 series brass consumption in the
12 automotive area.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Would it still
14 be likely a brass alloy of some sort; just a different
15 grade?

16 MR. BARTEL: Yes, that is correct, but a
17 higher performance alloy is not something that is
18 covered under this order.

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Is it possible
20 without jumping into conjecture to give some sense of
21 how great the decline in demand might be over the next
22 five or 10 years?

23 I really don't have a sense of that, whether
24 we're likely to see 10 percent of the demand dwindle
25 or 50 percent. Do you have anything you could say to

1 comment on that?

2 MR. RUPP: I think that the only reference
3 that we could give, Commissioner is that in the 1990s
4 we had an industry that was growing and went from a
5 consumption rate of 1.1 or 1.2 billion pounds -- I'm
6 talking about the total strip consumption as a proxy
7 for what's happening with brass sheet and strip -- up
8 to a total consumption level of like 1.6 billion
9 pounds.

10 In 2001, that market dropped down to the 1.1
11 billion pound range, and we have not seen restoration
12 of those volumes.

13 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. If there is
14 any industry study that could be put on the record
15 talking about the prospects for demand I would be
16 pleased to see it.

17 I understand the difficulty of projecting
18 forward. For heaven's sake, I can barely explain the
19 past, much less predict the future. Knowing that
20 industries often do these types of things, if there is
21 one please have it on the record.

22 Okay. Given that we have been for several
23 years in an environment of declining demand, why has
24 this industry been able to maintain its capacity and
25 then to some degree suffer from relatively high levels

1 of unused capacity as the demand has tended to
2 dwindle? What has kept capacity running in this
3 industry or kept capacity existing in this industry?

4 Excuse me.

5 Mr. Kerwin, are you seeking the floor?

6 MR. KERWIN: Yes. Thank you. One of the
7 things, as I mentioned in my testimony, is that we
8 have made a revision to the industry statistics, and
9 it's fairly substantial.

10 I think what you will find with those
11 revisions is that at the beginning of the current
12 period of review capacity is roughly comparable to
13 that at the time of the first sunset review and that
14 capacity to produce brass sheet and strip has
15 contracted over the current period of review.

16 Now as to your question as to why it is that
17 you've maintained capacity in the face of declining
18 production or declines in demand for the particular
19 product, I'll throw that back to some of the industry
20 experts, but I will mention one factor, which is that
21 these are massive, massive facilities. They are
22 designed to run 24 hours a day, seven days a week, and
23 they are extremely large investments.

24 You don't shut down some element of the
25 overall production. You maintain the total capacity

1 on your hot-rolling mills or your casting
2 capabilities.

3 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Right.

4 MR. KERWIN: As well as the subject product,
5 these mills also produce a number of non-subject
6 products so as the demand for brass sheet and strip
7 might decline it's not something that you can do
8 incrementally. You have to shut down an entire mill
9 or leave the mill at the rated capacity.

10 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Kerwin, you
11 probably can't see that my light has changed and so
12 let me pass.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

14 Commissioner Aranoff?

15 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
16 Chairman. I want to join my colleagues in welcoming
17 such a large panel of industry witnesses. We
18 appreciate your taking the time to be with us this
19 morning.

20 I want to start by asking some questions
21 about the way that you price your product in this
22 market to make sure that I understand the different
23 components that go into the pricing.

24 First, I understand that there is a
25 mechanism that is used to pass on raw material prices

1 to your customers. I'm hoping that one or more of you
2 can explain to me how that works, what index it's
3 based on, how often that surcharge, if that's what you
4 call it, is reevaluated and how it fits into the
5 overall price negotiation when you make a sale.

6 MR. BARTEL: Warren Bartel. Our raw
7 material is priced on the COMEX exchange, part of the
8 U.S. Mercantile Exchange. COMEX is the basis for the
9 commodity price. The producers, the refiners and
10 smelters, put a premium on top of the daily commodity
11 price that they charge us for the raw material, and
12 that is a pass-through to our customers.

13 As a fabricator, we take the acquisition
14 price, and then we will adjust the premium on the
15 metal upwards slightly and then add a fabrication
16 charge for our value-added. That becomes the basis of
17 the sale.

18 It's a similar mechanism, but the LME metal
19 exchange is used for the commodity price, and they use
20 a metal premium on top of that plus the fabrication
21 charge as well.

22 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: So just to make sure
23 I understood you correctly, you said you start with
24 the index price for the metal. There's a premium
25 that's added by the producer of the metal that's

1 charged to you which you pass on. You add your own
2 premium to that.

3 MR. BARTEL: Correct.

4 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: And then your
5 conversion cost?

6 MR. BARTEL: That is correct. Recently
7 there have been a series of efforts for us to recoup
8 escalations in transportation charges and energy
9 charges, so generally in many cases, if not all, there
10 will be a transportation surcharge, and very recently,
11 and by recently for my company only in the last month,
12 we've started an effort to collect an energy surcharge
13 to help us offset the escalation in the cost of energy
14 that we're paying to our energy suppliers.

15 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: I appreciate that
16 answer. In fact, it anticipated my next question.

17 Let me just understand. The way that you
18 charge for raw material, that's been consistent
19 throughout this period of review and perhaps before
20 that?

21 MR. BARTEL: That is correct. However, the
22 producer surcharge that we pay to our cathode
23 suppliers had been stable in the early years of this
24 review and would move only slightly and generally only
25 once a year. That situation has changed during the

1 last two years where the moves are occurring more
2 often and they have been more aggressive in moving the
3 premium.

4 That was the initiation of a metal surcharge
5 where we attempt with our customers to recoup the
6 premium changes that are within the terms of our
7 agreements with our customers.

8 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. I appreciate
9 that. Now, it's the timing of all of that that I'm
10 trying to wrap my arms around. When you negotiate a
11 sale with a customer, what metals price are you
12 charging them, the price on the day that you agree to
13 the sale? The price on the day that you actually buy
14 the raw materials that are going to be processed for
15 them?

16 MR. BARTEL: The customer has the option of
17 taking the price on the day of the order or the price
18 on the day of delivery, and if they choose to take on
19 the price on the day of delivery they order it for a
20 specific period to be delivered, and generally that's
21 a week. We will sell the material to them on the
22 future price that we would pay to replace that
23 material in that week of delivery.

24 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. You indicated
25 to me that at least for your company you only just

1 began an energy surcharge. You mentioned a
2 transportation surcharge. Is that a recent industry
3 practice as well?

4 MR. BARTEL: The transportation surcharge is
5 less than two years old in our company's instance, and
6 it is what we experienced with the run up in the price
7 of fuel.

8 Our trucking companies delivering our
9 product were hitting us with energy surcharges or,
10 excuse me, transportation surcharges. We make an
11 effort to recoup as much of our cost escalation as we
12 can, but all of this becomes part of the price
13 negotiation with our customers. It is not uniform.
14 It is not even.

15 At the end of the day, the customer is
16 concerned about what is the total acquisition price
17 that they're going to pay, and that's what they're
18 taking to the market to our competitors.

19 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Right. I was going
20 to say, in a number of industries where we've seen
21 similar kind of raw material and energy surcharges and
22 we've said to people are your customers paying the
23 surcharge, and you get an answer like yes, they're
24 paying 100 percent of the raw material surcharge, but
25 they're negotiating a 20 percent decrease in the base

1 price.

2 I'm trying to figure out obviously how all
3 of this goes together. In a way you're sort of
4 charging separately for all the pieces that go into
5 your product now. What elements are left in terms of
6 your costs that are being covered by the conversion
7 price that you're charging? When you go into a
8 negotiation, which of the pieces, the surcharges or
9 your conversion cost, is getting negotiated?

10 MR. BARTEL: Everything that is above the
11 commodity price is negotiated, and it is the total of
12 the value that is above the commodity price that is
13 subject to negotiation.

14 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: And that's just
15 because the commodity price piece is so well
16 established in the industry that people don't argue
17 about that one?

18 MR. BARTEL: We cannot negotiate that with
19 our suppliers and so we can't negotiate it with our
20 customers. We can't control it. It changes daily.
21 It in fact changes during the course of the day.

22 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: When you say that the
23 commodity price piece is not negotiable, are you
24 including the pass-through of the premium that your
25 supplier charges or of the premium that you put on?

1 Are those in the negotiable or the not negotiable
2 category?

3 MR. BARTEL: Everything that is above the
4 published commodity price is negotiable.

5 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. Thanks.
6 Thanks for clarifying that. That helped.

7 Looking at it from the cost side -- and this
8 is a conversation that I was having with our staff
9 here yesterday -- once you start sort of separating
10 out your price into separate elements and you've got
11 the commodity cost, and you've got the energy, and the
12 transportation and then you're charging up a
13 conversion price what other costs are left that go
14 into the conversion price?

15 There's the labor cost. What else is there?

16 MR. BARTEL: Well, there's labor, there's
17 R&M, there's tools and supplies, but please don't
18 misunderstand when we talk about transportation
19 surcharge it is only the increment of escalation.
20 There is the basic transportation cost is there. The
21 basic cost of energy is in the fabrication.

22 It's only the recent escalation. The same
23 with the metal premium. It's only the escalation that
24 is very recent that we're attempting to recoup.

25 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Well, Mr. Bartel, my

1 yellow light is on, and I appreciate all your answers.

2 If any of the other domestic producers who
3 are here today have slight differences or
4 modifications in the way that your companies go about
5 this pricing equation please feel free to put that in
6 your post-hearing brief. It would be very helpful.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

9 MR. HARTQUIST: We'll do so. Thank you.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Actually, I was going to
11 ask Mr. Rupp and Mr. Burkhardt whether they did have
12 anything to add or was Mr. Bartel speaking for them as
13 well?

14 MR. RUPP: Commissioner, our methodology is
15 very similar to what Mr. Bartel has described.

16 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Mr. Rupp.

17 Mr. Burkhardt?

18 MR. BURKHARDT: Yes. I'm in agreement also.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. German producers
20 argue at page 3 of their brief "whatever problems the
21 domestic brass sheet and strip industry faces have
22 nothing to do with imports, nonsubject or subject, but
23 instead appear to result from increasing raw materials
24 and energy costs and an apparently substantial
25 overcapacity problem entirely of its own making."

1 I've heard your discussion just now about
2 how you treat these yourself. Tell me, do subject
3 producers face comparatively similar increased costs
4 for their raw materials and energy that has occurred
5 over the same period?

6 MR. RUPP: Commissioner, I would think that
7 they have the same issues that we have. The raw
8 material for the copper is basically a universal issue
9 whether it's COMEX, or LMA-based, or Shanghai-based.
10 Energy is an issue both in Europe and here as well and
11 fuel for transportation is an issue, so I would assume
12 that they have the exact same issues that we have.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

14 Mr. Burkhardt and Mr. Bartel, do you agree
15 with that?

16 MR. BARTEL: Yes.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I see you both nodding
18 yes. Thank you. Let me stay with the domestic
19 producers if I could. The German producers state at
20 page 10 at footnote 13 of their brief that on January
21 6 they corrected their capacity data. They explain
22 the capacity data first reported was total rolling
23 capacity, but that slitting and scrap losses limit
24 actual capacity to a much lower figure.

25 "An efficient producer will lose about 20

1 percent of its production volume through such cutting,
2 although the resulting scrap can be remelted and
3 reproduced." Do you agree with their estimate of the
4 relationship of actual capacity to rolling capacity?

5 Mr. Bartel? Mr. Rupp? Mr. Burkhardt?

6 MR. BARTEL: Yes, there is yield loss that
7 comes from slitting and processing of the raw material
8 produced at casting, but when we speak of capacity we
9 speak of capacity out the door that is net of the
10 yield loss. So when we respond to the questionnaires
11 from the Commission and we talk about capacity we talk
12 about yielded capacity. Those are the numbers that
13 you see from us.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Let me see if I
15 understand this then. So I think what you're saying
16 is that that scrap loss is taken into account in your
17 estimate of capacity that's reported.

18 MR. BARTEL: That is correct.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I see, Mr. Rupp and Mr.
20 Burkhardt, you're nodding in the affirmative as well.
21 Thank you for that. I appreciate it. I wasn't sure
22 how that worked.

23 Mr. Kerwin, Eluma asserts at page 7 that
24 "Brazil has historically not been and is unlikely to
25 become a commercially significant presence in the U.S.

1 market." They go on and say "imports from Brazil were
2 on a downward trend long before any trade relief
3 petition was filed and the countervailing and anti-
4 dumping duty orders against Brazil were imposed in
5 1987."

6 That's the end of their quote. I note that
7 Brazil did not participate in the first review. Your
8 brief includes import statistics for the period 1983
9 to interim 2005, January and October of that year, at
10 Exhibit No. 2 and with regard to Brazil the quantity
11 of imports in 1985 was lower than in 1983.

12 How might a factor in that decline trend
13 when I am assessing the beneficial affect of the
14 orders with respect to Brazil?

15 MR. KERWIN: Let me make sure I understand
16 your question. Your question is how would you analyze
17 the benefit of the orders if the imports from Brazil
18 were already on the decline before the order was put
19 into place? Is that correct?

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: And that trend is
21 continued. Yes.

22 MR. KERWIN: Well, it's not surprising that
23 the trend has continued since the order has been put
24 into place.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: No. I understand that,

1 but I'm going back and coming all the way forward from
2 the original.

3 MR. KERWIN: Yes. You're correct that the
4 imports from Brazil did peak in 1984.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay.

6 MR. KERWIN: As far as the timing of the
7 investigation and the filing of the petition my memory
8 doesn't serve me exactly what the date of that filing
9 was and what impact the filing of the petition --

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Do you want to go back for
11 purposes of post-hearing and take a look at all
12 that --

13 MR. KERWIN: Yes.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: -- and maybe respond in
15 more detail?

16 MR. KERWIN: I would appreciate that. Yes.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: No problem. I'd
18 appreciate you doing that. Thank you.

19 Mr. Hartquist, Eluma asserts at page 13 that
20 U.S. domestic demand for brass sheet and strip has
21 declined over the period of review and that the cost
22 of raw materials and energy has significantly
23 increased as well leading to lower profits that cannot
24 be blamed on import competition.

25 They go on to assert at page 14 that imports

1 from nonsubject sources have captured an increasing
2 share of the U.S. domestic market and exceeded subject
3 imports in 2004. What is your response to the thrust
4 of their argument that the poor performance of the
5 domestic industry over the period of review is due to
6 these factors and that revocation really would not be
7 a significant factor?

8 I know I'm going to be hearing that this
9 afternoon.

10 MR. HARTQUIST: Yes. I'm sure you are, Mr.
11 Chairman. Well, our response would be they're correct
12 in terms of the decline in the demand in the industry
13 as we have testified in the affirmative testimony and
14 that's a condition of competition in the U.S.
15 marketplace, but our point is that these foreign
16 producers have considerable capacity that is available
17 to ship into the U.S. market but they have --

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Are you addressing the
19 nonsubject sources? Because remember I asked you to
20 address that. That was part of their argument.

21 MR. HARTQUIST: Yes. Imports from
22 nonsubject sources have increased also contributing to
23 the conditions of competition in the U.S. marketplace,
24 but our concern essentially is that if these orders
25 are removed those producers in the subject countries

1 that have remained in the marketplace, although at
2 relatively small levels, have the current capacity to
3 come back in and every incentive to do so.

4 So the combination of these factors, the
5 ability of the subject countries to come in without
6 the discipline of the dumping orders along with the
7 presence of nonsubject imports and the decline in the
8 market for these products puts the domestic industry
9 in a very vulnerable situation.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

11 MS. CANNON: Mr. Koplan, might I just add,
12 too, on that?

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes, Ms. Cannon.

14 MS. CANNON: As a legal matter both Eluma
15 and the German statement on page 3 that you cited
16 earlier seem to suggest that there is a requirement
17 that the subject imports be injuring the U.S. industry
18 at present and tend to argue that any problems the
19 industry has had over the period of review are not due
20 to subject imports, but legally that is an incorrect
21 analysis because the presumption is that with the
22 orders in place the industry should not be currently
23 experiencing injury from subject imports.

24 The real inquiry is is the industry
25 vulnerable as the result of other factors such that if

1 subject imports were permitted to return at dumped
2 levels injury would recur. So I think the analysis
3 that both have presented is somewhat predicated on a
4 false legal assumption.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I appreciate what you're
6 saying. It was actually pages 13 and 14 that I was
7 referring to, not three.

8 MS. CANNON: Yes, of the Eluma brief and I
9 was referring to page 3 of the German brief you had
10 cited earlier where a similar point is made by them,
11 but for the reasons Mr. Hartquist gave the factors
12 that show we are currently vulnerable place us in such
13 a position that if they were to come back in injury
14 would recur, not that they're causing us injury at
15 present.

16 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

17 Mr. Hartquist, I'm going to stay with
18 Eluma's brief for a moment if I could. At pages 7 and
19 8 they argue that "Brazilian producers remain heavily
20 oriented to the home market and thus do not have the
21 incentive to divert sales to the United States.
22 Shipments to home market have continued to grow during
23 the POR representing more than" and the percentage is
24 bracketed "of production in 2004."

25 "As a result Eluma's export to third-country

1 markets have declined steadily during the same
2 period." They claim that their increasing sales for
3 their home market occurred in spite of the fact that
4 average unit values for brass sheet and strip in
5 Brazil were much lower than in its export markets.

6 If you could respond to that and when doing
7 so tell me first whether you dispute the bracketed
8 percentage of their shipments they say went to their
9 home market in 2004? Also, they claim that this trend
10 with respect to their domestic shipments actually
11 increased in interim 2005 and do you dispute that? I
12 see my light's about to go off, so --

13 MR. HARTQUIST: I presume we should probably
14 do that in the brief since we're talking about
15 bracketed data.

16 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes. You can do that.

17 MR. HARTQUIST: We'll be happy to do that.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That will save me from my
19 red light going on, and it just did go on. Thank you.
20 I look forward to your response in the post-hearing.

21 Vice Chairman Okun?

22 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you, Mr.
23 Chairman.

24 I join my colleagues in welcoming you here
25 today, welcoming back several of you. We appreciate

1 you, again, taking the time to be with us and to
2 answer our questions.

3 It's good to hear, again, the discussion of
4 the conversion factor that we had talked about before
5 and Commissioner Aranoff's questions helped me
6 remember how it is that this particular industry sets
7 its prices and that was important to be reminded of
8 that.

9 Let me start or let me continue I guess with
10 the questions about Brazil. I did want to just
11 follow-up which we can talk about publicly here just
12 in terms of whether you think the importance of the
13 home market to Brazil, which we see in our statistics
14 here, whether you think there's any reason that would
15 shift in the near future.

16 Maybe actually, before you comment on that
17 perhaps you had referenced in the brief, Mr.
18 Hartquist, the Brazilian Trade Association data which
19 will appear on our final staff report, so we now have
20 that information and the foreign producer
21 questionnaire response from Eluma.

22 I wanted to know from you, or Ms. Cannon, or
23 Mr. Kerwin, whether you think that means we have a
24 fairly complete picture of the Brazilian industry or
25 not?

1 MR. HARTQUIST: No. As we've testified we
2 don't think you have a complete picture of the
3 industry because the Trade Association data does not
4 include any proprietary information of at least one
5 other significant Brazilian producer. So we think you
6 really have fragmentary information from Brazil based
7 on just Eluma's data.

8 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I want to go
9 back and look at that Trade Association data. I had
10 one other question on that.

11 In terms of, and I don't know if the
12 producers would have any sense of this or Mr. Mayer,
13 but one of the issues we've talked about is automobile
14 production in Brazil and whether you have information
15 with regard to domestic laws in Brazil that require
16 that the Brazilians are going to be buying autos built
17 in Brazil and whether that would in your view increase
18 the attractiveness of the Brazil producers, whether
19 it's Eluma or the other ones, staying in their home
20 market to feed auto demand and if you have any sense
21 of how big that is.

22 Obviously I'm going to be asking them --
23 because it's not in their brief either -- this
24 afternoon, but I did want to get your reaction to the
25 auto industry part of it.

1 Mr. Bartel?

2 MR. BARTEL: Yes. Commissioner, I'm not
3 able to answer your question directly because our
4 efforts to enter the Brazilian market with 200 series
5 brass sheet and strip have been thwarted due to their
6 duty and tariff organization, and so we have not been
7 able to participate in that marketplace from my
8 company.

9 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Any other experience
10 from any of the producers of Brazil?

11 (No response.)

12 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: All right. Well, if
13 there is anything, and obviously I think that is a
14 major portion, Mr. Hartquist, of the Brazilians
15 argument with regard to why they wouldn't ship to this
16 market, anything you could provide would be helpful.

17 MR. HARTQUIST: We'll be pleased to do so.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay.

19 MR. KERWIN: Vice Chairman Okun, if I could
20 --

21 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Yes, Mr. Kerwin?

22 MR. KERWIN: -- add one point? We did place
23 on the record an article, actually two articles. One
24 in which Eluma announced it was increasing its
25 capacity by 20 percent and that was from 2005 and a

1 separate article in which it stated that it had
2 intended to increase its exports. So that's obvious
3 evidence to the contrary.

4 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: On the export part. I
5 mean, I guess my question is just I'm trying to get a
6 better understanding of demand in Brazil and what it's
7 likely to be in the future.

8 Then, Mr. Hartquist, I just did want to go
9 back on the Trade Association data. Was your response
10 that you don't believe that all the producers in
11 Brazil are part of that general data set, that they
12 have nonresponding, or you just don't know?

13 MR. HARTQUIST: I don't know the answer to
14 that.

15 I'll ask my colleagues whether we have such
16 information.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Ms. Cannon?

18 MS. CANNON: I believe it is not clear from
19 the face of the document exactly who that includes.
20 That was one of the questions we were trying to
21 ascertain from the record, and I believe it's a
22 question your staff has been probing and I don't think
23 it's been resolved as yet.

24 As you know we had put separate information
25 on the record about the other major Brazilian

1 producer, Trimomoconica, the information that was
2 available to us and I'm not sure that it jives with
3 what that Trade Association data shows.

4 So I think the answer to your question is
5 that your staff is still trying to look into it, but
6 at least as far as we can tell now it isn't clear that
7 it includes everybody. You certainly did not get
8 anything specific from Trimomoconica in terms of
9 responding to your questionnaire.

10 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Right. I understand
11 that part. Okay. I appreciate those comments. Then
12 I wanted to turn to the arguments you've raised with
13 regard to China and whether as China becomes a bigger
14 domestic producer that what would have been German and
15 Brazilian exports will need to find other homes. I
16 wanted to ask specifically with regard to Brazil.

17 Again, I understand that you're saying we
18 don't have complete data on Brazil, but if I look at
19 what's in the staff report with regard to Eluma it
20 would not appear to me that China has been a very
21 important market for Brazil, and so I want to make
22 sure that is your China argument focused on Brazil or
23 is this just generally if I were to accumulate all the
24 subject producers that generally that argument would
25 -- and I know you attach this exhibit in your brief,

1 but I just want to make sure that you think it's as
2 important to Brazil as it is to the other countries.

3 MR. KERWIN: I'm not going to comment on the
4 specific proprietary information that's in their
5 questionnaire response, but yes, it is a general
6 proposition that in relation to all the subject
7 countries, the general proposition being that China
8 has acted as a sponge for the excess capacity globally
9 in the brass sheet and strip industry, and that it has
10 drawn in a lot of the excess production that's gone on
11 in the world generally and that as it's developing its
12 own indigenous industry that level of intake there is
13 very much likely to decline.

14 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Then with regard
15 to the China data -- I know you had pulled, there were
16 a number of news articles attached in the exhibits you
17 had -- is this an industry where there is analyst data
18 available on China that would help put some of the
19 numbers in perspective with regard to China's both
20 capacity, consumption numbers, to help me better
21 understand your argument?

22 We don't have access to that data, but I
23 wonder if there's anything that can be provided for
24 us.

25 MR. KERWIN: I'll start on that question.

1 It's a little difficult to grapple with because the
2 data that are maintained typically are in relation to
3 the broader market for copper and copper alloy flat-
4 rolled products. A lot of the information that we've
5 gleaned about, expansions and proposed expansions in
6 China, have come from press sources.

7 As helpful as they are and sometimes they're
8 incongruous with each other they're not always
9 relaying the same information. So one article that I
10 know we submitted claimed that China was very close to
11 becoming self-sufficient in terms of its own
12 consumption of production and consumption of flat-
13 rolled copper and copper alloy products.

14 In my opinion in relation to some of the
15 other industries that we've looked at the data here
16 are not as well-developed as say the steel industry or
17 the stainless steel industry, but I think we can make
18 a good faith effort in the post-hearing brief to kind
19 of put the numbers together and maybe do our own
20 analysis of where we would see that heading and when
21 China might reach a point of self-sufficiency.

22 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I would appreciate
23 that. I know you make a good point and staff had
24 raised that as well that with this industry because
25 you have just the general production numbers, capacity

1 numbers, that anything we would get would be
2 overstated in that sense. If you can take a look at
3 it and give any sense of what you would look at I
4 think that would be particularly helpful.

5 The other thing was --

6 MR. BARTEL: Excuse me, Commissioner? If I
7 could add?

8 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Yes, Mr. Bartel?

9 MR. BARTEL: Yes. There is copyrighted
10 material published by a consultant named Simon Hunt,
11 who is a Chinese expert, and he has regular
12 publications and can speak directly to the Chinese
13 investments and capacity growth, but it is copyrighted
14 material.

15 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Perhaps we can
16 work with staff to understand whether that's something
17 we have access to or that you could make available to
18 us.

19 My red light's come on, Mr. Chairman.

20 Thank you very much for those answers.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

22 Commissioner Hillman?

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I would join my
24 colleagues in welcoming all of you and thanking you
25 for taking the time to be with us.

1 Just because we've just finished a little
2 discussion on China I wanted to go back to just one
3 issue to get your sense of it because as I hear it Mr.
4 Rupp and a number of you have really commented on this
5 issue of China and its role, and you've submitted
6 Chinese import data that would show where these six
7 countries have been exporting and as you've described
8 it that there's been this big decline in the volume of
9 product coming from the six subject countries going
10 into China.

11 I will say in looking at the numbers that is
12 true if you count 1999 data, but I will say if you
13 look at it more broadly I have to say I don't see this
14 decline that you're talking about.

15 I mean, if you look at the numbers you're
16 seeing these six countries exporting on average
17 somewhere between 9,000 and if you annualize the data
18 in 2005 to me it would show 2005 being the second
19 largest year of exports going into China.

20 So to the extent that your argument is
21 really dependent on this notion that China is drying
22 up as a purchaser of product from these countries like
23 I said I'm needing something more because at least as
24 I read the data these six countries sold more into
25 China in 2005 than almost at any other period with the

1 possible exception of 1999, which looks from the
2 numbers to be somewhat aberrational in that there was
3 a single large set of shipments out of Japan.

4 So part of me says this may be the case that
5 China is going to become a net exporter, but it does
6 not appear from the data that we have that that is
7 something that has happened or that is likely to
8 happen in the very near future in that it appears to
9 me that China is still a very significant and larger
10 importer from these countries than it had been say in
11 2000, 2001, 2002.

12 I mean, if you just look at it it's not
13 clear to me. I can understand the trend may occur,
14 but help me understand why you think it's already
15 having an affect on the market.

16 MR. BARTEL: May I go first?

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Sure.

18 MR. BARTEL: I believe in the materials
19 submitted to the Commission you'll see a Metal
20 Bulletin report that speaks to 1.7 million tons of new
21 Chinese flat-rolled capacity that will come onstream
22 in the next two to three years. It's a Metal Bulletin
23 report.

24 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I guess part
25 of my concern is the will come onstream in the next

1 two to three years.

2 MR. BARTEL: These are projects under
3 construction.

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Again, that's for us
5 -- again, the issue is because if I just look at the
6 hard data that we have it is actually showing China
7 increasingly importing this product. So that's where
8 I'm struggling would be when do we think this is going
9 to happen?

10 So if there is, again, Mr. Rupp, I'll let
11 you respond as well.

12 MR. RUPP: No. I would just, Commissioner,
13 amplify what Warren is saying is that there are brass
14 mills under construction as we speak that will be, you
15 know, one for example will be starting up in the first
16 quarter of this year. It's the intention of the
17 Chinese to become self-sufficient.

18 Our concern is we believe that it will
19 parallel what has occurred in the steel industry and
20 what has occurred in the aluminum industry over in
21 China is that they will over build capacity to take
22 care of their consumption and ultimately will find
23 some of that backing up over here.

24 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Well, again, I
25 realize there's a lot of sort of anecdotal information

1 on the record. Whatever could be pulled together
2 along with perhaps the information from this Mr. Hunt,
3 if there's some way to pull this together because I've
4 heard it and I've heard you referring to this exhibit.

5 I'm just being honest with you. This
6 exhibit does not say to me what you've suggested which
7 is that there is a big decline in the volume from
8 these countries going into China.

9 So anything further you would want to add in
10 the post-hearing, Mr. Hartquist or Mr. Kerwin, would
11 be welcome.

12 MR. HARTQUIST: We will be pleased to do so.

13 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: If I can then go to
14 the issue of nonsubject imports. A couple of issues I
15 would like you to address.

16 A number of you commented on the issue of
17 the total capacity and/or excess capacity in the U.S.
18 industry to produce this product, that there is extra
19 capacity out there, yet Respondents are clearly
20 arguing that it's the U.S. producers that are bringing
21 in these nonsubject imports.

22 So my question to you all is why? If there
23 is excess capacity in the U.S. market why are you
24 bringing in significant volumes of nonsubject imports?

25 MR. BARTEL: If I could take that question,

1 Commissioner, because Outokumpu Copper has a factory
2 in the Netherlands that produces 200 series brass
3 sheet and strip for automotive radiator applications
4 and this product was covered by the original order,
5 was subject to dumping duties. During the time it was
6 covered by the order Outokumpu did not withdraw from
7 the market.

8 It continued to produce and supply that
9 product to the domestic market because it is the
10 world's lowest cost producer of 200 series brass sheet
11 and strip for automotive radiator application.

12 It has unique technology that specializes in
13 producing this product for radiator applications, it
14 has the dominant market share of this product
15 throughout the world and it's because of its unique
16 technology and its low-cost position in the
17 marketplace that the order was vacated during a sunset
18 review.

19 They continue to produce the product for
20 radiator applications as they did during the period
21 that they were covered by the order, but that's all
22 that they do at that factory. That's the only product
23 they produce, and they're the best in the world in
24 doing it and have technology unequalled by anyone else
25 in the world.

1 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. Thank
2 you. I appreciate that answer.

3 Are there other comments? Yes?

4 MR. BURKHARDT: Just a quick comment,
5 Commissioner.

6 Our parent company, Pun Song, in 2004 when
7 the market was on the increase PMX was in the process
8 of manning up to take care of that increase in demand
9 and for a very short period of time we brought in some
10 small amounts of 200 series alloy from our parent
11 company only until the time when we were manned up and
12 able to handle the increase in demand ourselves.

13 So it was a very short-lived situation and
14 just something to carry us over until they got the new
15 people hired and trained.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Any other comments?
17 Generally, if we look at the data on nonsubject
18 imports we have -- again, I'm trying to make sure I
19 understand from your perspective the role of
20 nonsubject imports.

21 I hear your answer with respect to the Dutch
22 imports and I understand the answer on the Korean
23 side, but we've seen increases in nonsubject imports
24 from Mexico, from Poland, from other places. I'm
25 trying to understand how we should view the

1 competition from those nonsubject imports versus what
2 could happen if the order would be revoked with
3 subject imports.

4 I hear you telling me the Dutch imports are
5 different in both product mix, et cetera. They're
6 different, they compete differently, but with respect
7 to the other nonsubject imports how would you describe
8 how they compete or would compete in the market versus
9 subject imports?

10 MR. BARTEL: Well, I believe in the U.S. we
11 have the largest market for copper and brass sheet and
12 strip in the world, we are a target market for all
13 producers around the world and they bring their
14 product to market and we have to compete with them.
15 If it's done on a fair basis and a level playing field
16 that's part of the world we live in, and we have to
17 compete and we do on a daily basis.

18 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: To the extent, again,
19 in the post-hearing brief if it should involve any
20 confidential information if there is any other
21 information that the domestic producers could put on
22 the record to the extent that the domestic producers
23 are the ones doing the importing I would like some
24 sense of why.

25 I've heard the answer on the Dutch imports.

1 If there's anything else that could be put on the
2 record to help us put these nonsubject imports into
3 context that would be helpful. Then more on the legal
4 side of it there is a part of me, I look at this order
5 and I say okay, we revoked the orders on Korea,
6 Netherlands and Sweden.

7 Part of me says we heard a lot of arguments
8 at the time that we did the first review on what would
9 happen if we revoked orders. Obviously there's some
10 special differences there, but on the other hand why
11 shouldn't what happened after the revocation of those
12 three orders say something to us about what might
13 happen if these six orders were revoked?

14 MS. CANNON: I would answer that by you have
15 to look at the facts of each of those cases and why
16 you revoked those orders. Sweden you revoked the
17 order because they shut down production.

18 Here we have one country that's shut down
19 production, Canada, as far as we can tell and we are
20 not asking you to maintain that order, so that's a
21 unique situation and revoking the order on Canada
22 absent other information would be consistent.

23 For Pun Song, they established a U.S.
24 integrated facility, PMX, and while arguments may have
25 been made as to what might or might not happen that's

1 a fairly unique situation. While Dieland is
2 attempting to analogize itself to that and claiming
3 that it has a U.S. facility as we testified that
4 facility is a rerolling facility that will import the
5 subject product from Germany.

6 So that's quite different. I think that
7 makes it a very different scenario, not to mention
8 that you have a lot of other German producers both
9 participating and nonparticipating. So the German
10 situation is quite different.

11 Then you have the Netherlands situation
12 which as Mr. Bartel just testified involved a very
13 discreet product, the radiator strip, and again, a
14 related U.S. facility, Outokumpu American Brass, that
15 was producing and supplying this market. You don't
16 have that from any of the other subject countries.

17 You don't have a U.S. facility here that is
18 supplying the U.S. market as you did with respect to
19 both Korea and the Netherlands in the earlier case.
20 So I think that the facts of those cases and the
21 reasons the Commission gave to revoke those orders are
22 very different from the facts you're seeing presented
23 to you today.

24 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I appreciate that
25 answer.

1 Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

3 Commissioner Lane?

4 COMMISSIONER LANE: Good morning. I would
5 like to start with Mr. Kerwin. In looking at the
6 pricing data for the U.S. production and the pricing
7 for subject country product what conclusion do you
8 reach as to whether the United States would be an
9 attractive market versus the existing market for the
10 subject countries based upon the existing pricing
11 data?

12 MR. KERWIN: I think that as I mentioned in
13 my testimony we have a limited amount of comparable
14 pricing data between the subject imports and the
15 domestic pricing information. Clearly the domestic
16 pricing information shows that the fully loaded price
17 for this product has been going up recently.

18 It's gone up significantly in the last
19 couple of years and that's not surprising given what's
20 gone on with the price of copper and input metals
21 during this period.

22 On the other hand that's a common industry
23 issue globally, and I couldn't say that is any
24 indication in itself that the U.S. market would be
25 more attractive than other markets in the world

1 because copper is a global price, and so all producers
2 around the world have been facing this same situation.

3 I think what's more salient is to go back to
4 the pricing data from the original investigation as an
5 indication of what would go on in this market in the
6 event of revocation.

7 I do think that as a general proposition
8 that the pricing in the U.S. market is generally
9 reasonably attractive to many markets in the world and
10 we do not have the types of barriers to entry such as
11 someone mentioned the tariff into Brazil being 30 some
12 percent or into China there are as I understand very
13 significant tariffs and value added taxes.

14 So in that sense when you consider the lack
15 of barriers to entry into this country in some ways
16 this is indeed a very attractive market on a price
17 basis.

18 MR. HARTQUIST: Commissioner Lane, if I may
19 respond just a moment further the data in the staff
20 report on pages V, XI, et cetera, are very mixed and
21 very scant in some circumstances.

22 We can't comment on a lot of it because it's
23 proprietary, but there seems to be a lot of
24 disagreement about the relative level of prices in the
25 U.S. market versus other markets and frankly I think

1 that the data in the report makes it very difficult to
2 draw any generalized conclusions because it's just not
3 sufficient.

4 COMMISSIONER LANE: Well, actually, I may
5 have been cheating.

6 Mr. Kerwin is an expert and probably has
7 more access to information than what is in the report,
8 and so I was just going to ask him in what you know
9 about world markets for this product and what we've
10 heard about Brazil exporting to other countries, and
11 the Asian market and all of that have you drawn any
12 conclusions as to whether it would be more profitable
13 for the subject countries to be selling their product
14 to other markets versus what they could get in the
15 United States?

16 MR. KERWIN: Well, in some instances I don't
17 think it's even that feasible for the producers to
18 ship to other markets. As I said the omnipotence of,
19 and the size of this market and the transparency of
20 this market make it certainly one of the most
21 attractive --

22 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Mr. Kerwin, I
23 hear you on that. Let's just focus on price.

24 MR. KERWIN: I think I we could probably put
25 something together for you. Again, this does come

1 back to the limitations of even these proprietary
2 studies that may be put together. Are they
3 specifically analyzing this specific product? Again,
4 the materials that I've seen are not as satisfying and
5 as useful as some of the information that is
6 maintained on say the stainless steel industry.

7 I have not seen hard numbers maintained by
8 independent analysts on this. What I'm basing my
9 previous comments on was our discussions with the
10 people in the industry, but I have found it difficult
11 to precisely quantify from independent analysis. We
12 will see if we can put together some information like
13 that for the post-hearing brief.

14 COMMISSIONER LANE: I would appreciate it,
15 and I, too, have a hard time remembering what is
16 proprietary and what's not and that's why my question
17 was somewhat vague because I didn't want to overstep
18 the line, so post-hearing would be fine.

19 Now, I'd like to go to members of the
20 industry. You were talking about how the facilities
21 that you own can be used for brass strip and sheet and
22 other products and that because the facilities are so
23 large and they're so capital intensive that it doesn't
24 make sense that you shut the facilities down, so I am
25 assuming then that when you said that they can be run

1 24 hours a day, seven days a week that you are running
2 them a lot more than just what you need for this
3 particular product.

4 So could you tell me for all of the
5 production at your facilities how much you're running
6 them? Are you allowed to do that or is that
7 proprietary also?

8 MR. BARTEL: I think capacity utilization is
9 considered proprietary. I think we can answer that in
10 the post-hearing brief.

11 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

12 MR. RUPP: Just to add to that,
13 Commissioner, during the period of investigation from
14 an Olin perspective we had a facility that we totally
15 shut down -- I think that's in the brief -- in an
16 attempt to try to adjust to capacity and that's in my
17 earlier comments where we lost a large quantity of
18 people that we laid off.

19 One of the other things that is done in some
20 of these facilities is you have multiple pieces of
21 equipment, and so you try to run it as efficiently as
22 possible on a 24/7 basis, but you don't run all the
23 equipment. For example we're not running all of our
24 equipment as we speak, although we are running most of
25 the facility on 24/7.

1 So I think, as Warren says, we can get more
2 detail there.

3 COMMISSIONER LANE: When you do this in
4 post-hearing would it be possible for you to quantify
5 the percentage of your facility that is the capacity
6 that is devoted to the BSS as compared to your total
7 production?

8 I see, Mr. Bartel, that you're saying yes.
9 Thank you.

10 In your opinion should rerollers which have
11 no casting capability be included in the domestic
12 industry producing brass sheet and strip?

13 MS. CANNON: Yes, Commissioner Lane. The
14 Commission found that rerollers were part of this
15 industry in the original investigation, and we agree
16 with that conclusion.

17 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Are there types
18 of brass sheet and strip that you cannot or do not
19 produce in the United States?

20 MR. BARTEL: Of the 200 series brass sheet
21 and strip products we produce all of them.

22 COMMISSIONER LANE: I have another question,
23 but it's somewhat long, so I will wait until my next
24 round.

25 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

2 Commissioner Pearson?

3 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: The brass sheet and
4 strip industry exports some product. My sense is that
5 the numbers show no increase in exports, probably a
6 decrease during the period of review. Is there some
7 prospect that exports would increase to Canada if
8 indeed Canada no longer has the brass sheet and strip
9 industry?

10 MR. RUPP: I think there is the possibility
11 of that, although Canada is a very small market, but I
12 think it would be reasonable to assume that there
13 would be more exports that would go to Canada without
14 their producers, although their producers have been
15 gone for the last two to three years so there is
16 export that's going in up there now.

17 MR. BARTEL: We do export to Canada and if
18 you have any customer leads for us we'll be glad to
19 take them.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Well, Canada
21 does have a substantial automotive industry, and so I
22 thought that the demand for brass sheet and strip in
23 Canada might be disproportionate relative to their
24 overall population.

25 MR. BARTEL: Well, that is true,

1 Commissioner, but the exports of 200 series brass
2 products to Canada do not go necessarily to the
3 automotive industry. Those products go into
4 components made in North America that go to the
5 Canadian automotive industry. So it's an indirect
6 export by our customers.

7 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: If Canada is
8 importing brass sheet and strip from somewhere other
9 than the United States what's the likely source? Any
10 idea what the likely source is?

11 MR. BARTEL: I don't have direct knowledge.
12 I know that other than to say Canada does export from
13 global sources, and I am aware of exports from the
14 Netherlands to Canada for radiator products
15 specifically.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: I have a question
17 about futures markets. You indicated that there are
18 active futures markets for copper in New York, London
19 and Shanghai. Is the arbitrage between New York and
20 London sufficient that those two markets track each
21 other quite closely?

22 MR. BARTEL: Yes, Commissioner, they do
23 track and whenever the spread becomes wide it is very
24 short-lived because the material would move to
25 normalize the difference. So they do track together

1 in a very narrow band of arbitrage.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: How about Shanghai?
3 Is that market sufficiently liquid and transparent so
4 that it also tracks closely with New York and London?

5 MR. BARTEL: It isn't so obvious to us and
6 personally I don't have direct information to comment
7 on that. Perhaps my colleagues could.

8 MR. RUPP: I don't have enough information
9 to comment on the Shanghai market other than I think
10 it would be a little bit more confusing than the other
11 markets that we're aware of.

12 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Kerwin, you have
13 any knowledge of that question?

14 MR. KERWIN: Not directly. We've kind of
15 heard rumors over the years that there's a bit of a
16 disconnect between the Shanghai exchange, and the
17 London metals exchange and the COMEX, but it's not a
18 very ompant system and it's difficult for those on the
19 outside to really understand how it works.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Would there also be
21 issues with moving foreign exchange back and forth in
22 financial transactions involving Shanghai or is that
23 not an issue?

24 MR. KERWIN: I can't really answer that
25 question. I'm not sure.

1 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr.?

2 MR. BECKINGTON: Beckington.

3 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Beckington.

4 MR. BECKINGTON: Yes. Mr. Pearson, I think
5 the answer to that is yes. We've done a pretty fair
6 amount of study over the last couple of years with the
7 Yuan's undervaluation and its manipulation we would
8 style it by the Chinese government.

9 Essentially, as you've probably read in a
10 number of articles over the last couple of years if
11 you have any foreign exchange at all that you bring
12 into China in some way or another it's controlled by
13 the Chinese Government. Basically Yuan are printed,
14 and put in circulation and through that so-called
15 sterilization process that's how the Yuan is
16 essentially undervalued as badly as it is.

17 We think that the undervaluation to date
18 remains in about the 40 percent area even though the
19 Chinese in July moved the Yuan by about 2.1 percent to
20 be stronger vis-a-vis the dollar, but it looks as
21 though that shift is more of a cosmetic approach than
22 anything else.

23 We don't know exactly what waiting there is
24 in the basket of currencies that the Chinese use to
25 value the Yuan, but it looks as though it's very much

1 a heavily weighted basket if you will still very much
2 so toward the dollar so that it's really not been
3 detached from the dollar's movements.

4 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you. Would I
5 be correct to infer then that none of the firms
6 represented here are hedging in Shanghai futures?

7 (No response.)

8 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Good. Another
9 question about hedging. Do you hedge most or all of
10 your copper inventories in the New York futures market
11 or some percentage? Explain to me how you try to
12 guard against price fluctuations in copper.

13 MR. BARTEL: In my company, Commissioner, we
14 have a base stock which is the inventory floats within
15 the confines of the factory that is not hedged because
16 there is no intent to sell it. It is the working
17 inventory that stays in the factory. Every
18 transaction that we conduct with our customer is
19 hedged daily so that our metal exposure risk is
20 minimized.

21 So we price on the commodity exchange with
22 our customers, then we in fact buy the contracts to
23 cover that exposure on a daily basis.

24 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. So when you're
25 hedging the brass product are you hedging in copper

1 futures the copper component of the brass?

2 MR. BARTEL: Both copper and zinc.

3 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Pardon my ignorance.

4 Is there a futures market for zinc?

5 MR. BARTEL: Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Also in New York?

7 MR. BARTEL: Zinc is on LME.

8 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Rupp, did you
9 have something?

10 MR. RUPP: I was just saying that it's on
11 the LME as he was answering.

12 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Good. So you have
13 then sophisticated mechanisms for trying to manage the
14 price risk. The risk is always there, it's just a
15 question of how you deal with it.

16 MR. BARTEL: Well, the effort and the goal
17 is to minimize commodity price risk.

18 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Right. Okay. Good.

19 Mr. Kerwin, going back to you Commissioner
20 Lane was raising the question about prices in various
21 countries and you may have agreed to do this already,
22 but is there data that we don't now have on the record
23 that you could provide that would give us some price
24 comparisons among the various countries for brass
25 sheet and strip?

1 MR. KERWIN: I have not come across such
2 data, so it is not on the record currently. After the
3 hearing today we can discuss this with the members of
4 the industry, but to my knowledge as I said there's
5 not a comparable system in relation to brass sheet and
6 strip as there may be to say stainless steel flat-
7 rolled products, that these are maintained by industry
8 analysts.

9 We'll see if we can get anything on the
10 record if it exists.

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thanks. Perhaps my
12 last question. In your brief there's a mention of job
13 shops as being part of the customer base. What is a
14 job shop?

15 MR. RUPP: One type of job shop would be a
16 custom stamper who would develop tools to make a
17 specific part and then may have -- for example the
18 automotive electrical stampers. A lot of times when
19 they have a new part they might hire you to develop
20 the tool and to make the prototype parts and then at a
21 certain volume level then the Tier 1 supplier would
22 take that over. So that is a job shop.

23 Also, a job shop is a guy that just does
24 lots of little bitty different things, but he's not an
25 OEM, original equipment manufacturer.

1 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Is it someone who
2 would do a lot of unique applications or whatever?

3 MR. RUPP: Right. Right.

4 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Or the --

5 MR. RUPP: Right. As an example.

6 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Then someone else
7 would do the larger run?

8 MR. RUPP: That's an example of it. Yes.

9 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Any sense how large a
10 percentage of your customer base is comprised by job
11 shops?

12 MR. RUPP: I wouldn't venture to guess. I
13 think we could get an idea of that information and put
14 it in the brief.

15 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Burkhardt, did
16 you have?

17 MR. BURKHARDT: Same. I'd prefer to put
18 that in a post-hearing brief.

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. That would be
20 fine. My light is changing. I'm running out of
21 questions.

22 Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this panel,
23 but I think I'm done.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.
25 Let me just remind you all to continue to

1 reidentify yourselves for the reporter as you respond
2 to questions.

3 Commissioner Aranoff?

4 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
5 Chairman.

6 I don't think anyone has gotten to this
7 question yet, but I wanted to ask if you would comment
8 on the German producers' Exhibit No. 5 and on their
9 basic assertion that operating income as a percentage
10 of fabrication charges is a good way to assess the
11 industry's financial condition.

12 MR. KERWIN: Michael Kerwin. I'll take a
13 first stab at that. I think what's important here is
14 to look at the operating income of the industry in
15 both contexts whether it's as a percentage of sales
16 value or as just an absolute dollar value.

17 In reviewing the data that are on the
18 record, the aggregate data for the industry, even
19 looking at the simple dollar values of operating
20 income during the period of review it's pretty obvious
21 that operating income has gone down very substantially
22 over the period of review. The bottom line is the
23 bottom line.

24 One thing I would mention as to why it does
25 make sense to analyze operating income as a percentage

1 of overall sales value is that these companies are
2 buying these materials. If the price of copper goes
3 up they have to purchase those materials, they have to
4 hold those inventories of materials. They are out-of-
5 pocket for the purchase of those actual materials.

6 So the price of copper is a cost that they
7 are bearing. So I think it is important to look at
8 the overall sales value in looking at the operating
9 income, but as I said in the first place even looking
10 at just the simple values of the operating income you
11 see a very substantial decline during this period.

12 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thanks, Mr. Kerwin.
13 What I think I'm hearing you saying is the trends are
14 the same no matter how you do it, but you still think
15 it's better to look at it the way we have it in our
16 report?

17 MR. KERWIN: Yes. In a nutshell.

18 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. If I
19 understand it and I don't want to overstate their
20 case, but one of the premises that underlies the
21 Respondents' argument about why to look at it this way
22 is that the raw material costs are a direct path
23 through, there's really no risk involved and my sense
24 from the witnesses I've heard this morning is that's
25 not really true.

1 There's a lot done to minimize the risk, but
2 there is in fact still an inevitable fluctuation there
3 that you need to take account of.

4 MR. BARTEL: Commissioner, if I could
5 comment on that specific point there is the working
6 capital impact of the raw material acquisition cost.
7 So we have the raw material inventory carrying costs
8 at the front of the process and then also the working
9 capital associated with accounts receivable that is
10 not reflected in either of the measure that was cited
11 as an alternative.

12 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
13 Bartel. That's very helpful. Let me also ask all of
14 the industry witnesses there is a point in the German
15 producers' brief where they contend that there have
16 been shortages in the U.S. market and that certain
17 customers were placed on allocation. I think they
18 refer to 2000 and 2004.

19 Could any of you comment on what was going
20 on that accounts for those comments?

21 MR. RUPP: Commissioner, my name is Joseph
22 Rupp and let me just comment on a couple of those.

23 In 2000 was a year in which total
24 consumption of all sheet and strip products including
25 brass sheet and strip were at record volumes and there

1 was a fairly significant ramp up that occurred, and so
2 there was a period of allocation as mills brought on
3 their people, trained their people and tried to react
4 to the spike in demand.

5 In 2004 speaking for my company we had a
6 serious outage where we actually had a fire on what
7 was called our hot strip line that was burned up and
8 out of commission for a period of time, and so we had
9 a temporary situation where we had people on
10 allocation for a while until we got ourselves sorted
11 out.

12 I think that would be my response from our
13 company's perspective.

14 MR. BURKHARDT: Commissioner, Doug Burkhardt
15 with PMX Industries. I won't speak to 2000, I wasn't
16 with PMX in 2000, but I will speak to 2004.

17 There was a rapid ramp up as far as the
18 economy and the demand for our products were concerned
19 early in 2004, so we were in a short period where --
20 call it allocation controlled cell -- we were not able
21 to keep up with orders not because we did not have the
22 capacity or the equipment, but because we did not have
23 the manning necessary.

24 So we quickly hired more people and trained
25 them and very quickly we were in a position where we

1 were not in an allocation mode, but it was very short-
2 lived and it was due to a manning issue.

3 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, both.

4 MR. BARTEL: Commissioner, Warren Bartel.
5 We were very happy to take advantage of our colleagues
6 misfortune in 2004 and didn't have any of our
7 customers on allocation at that point.

8 In the year 2000 as Mr. Rupp stated demand
9 came on very strong, very quickly and it took the
10 industry and certainly my company a period of time to
11 go out and actually recruit, train people to man up to
12 higher capacity levels.

13 So there was some capacity constraint in the
14 early parts of the year and that was taken care of by
15 the second half of the year and then unfortunately
16 demand fell off very precipitously in 2001.

17 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Let me follow-up on
18 that. To of you gentlemen just tell me that in 2004
19 you needed to hire people, and train them and bring
20 them on. There's a fair bit of argument in the
21 Respondents' briefs about capacity in the U.S.
22 exceeding demand and that capacity hasn't adjusted
23 itself to declining demand trends.

24 Can you explain to me the role that taking
25 on and then sometimes having to lay off employees

1 plays in the ability to adjust capacity to demand?

2 MR. BARTEL: If I could start perhaps. In
3 our company case we have one factory and one set of
4 equipment. As the customer demand rises or falls we
5 add machines or we reduce numbers of machines that we
6 operate within our factory.

7 Labor is a variable cost, and we have union
8 contracts and we have obligations to our union
9 employees, but we have the ability to adjust labor
10 through lay off in slack times or through hiring in
11 more robust times, and so there is a period of
12 adjustment as we adjust our labor force.

13 I would just comment further that this is
14 why we're concerned about the revocation of the order
15 because we know that the Respondents have excess
16 capacity, unutilized capacity. We know that certainly
17 in German and Japan -- I can't speak for Brazil, I
18 don't know, but in Germany and Japan labor is
19 considered a fixed cost, it's not a variable cost.

20 They don't have the ability to take people
21 out, so for them factory utilization rates is
22 paramount. It's the most important thing for them.
23 So that as other market opportunities dry up or as
24 doors open up the attractiveness of our market is not
25 just based on price it's the opportunity to utilize

1 unutilized capacity and take advantage of the labor
2 cost that they're already paying for.

3 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thanks. I want to
4 turn while I still have time left to some questions to
5 follow-up on questions that Commissioner Hillman was
6 asking about the extent to which domestic producers
7 have imported nonsubject product or purchased
8 nonsubject product that has been imported into the
9 United States.

10 I think it's mostly confidential, so I just
11 want to read these questions into the record and ask
12 you to please respond to them. As I said I think some
13 of these were asked by Commissioner Hillman, but I
14 wanted to ask in a little more detail if you could
15 provide for each domestic producer what nonsubject
16 imports that producer has either imported or purchased
17 and the reasons for such imports or purchases.

18 I'm trying to connect that with the official
19 import statistics that we have on the record for
20 example showing that the six largest sources of
21 nonsubject imports were the Netherlands, Poland,
22 Mexico, Switzerland, India and Korea. I think we've
23 already had some explanations about what was going on
24 with imports from the Netherlands and Korea, but the
25 other countries remain of interest.

1 In particular I want to try and get at the
2 issue about whether these purchases or imports were
3 made in order to reduce the cost of production of
4 downstream products that are produced by related
5 companies in order to avoid the need that has been
6 described to us for some of your customers to move
7 production operations overseas, and in the event that
8 is the purpose of such imports how we should weigh
9 those concerns in assessing the likely volume of
10 subject imports in the event of revocation.

11 Hopefully the transcript will make all those
12 questions sufficiently clear.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

15 I want to come back to the question I asked
16 toward the end of my first round -- I'm not going to
17 go through the whole thing, but just this one quote
18 out of the German producers' brief at page 10, and
19 that is, "An efficient producer will lose about 20
20 percent of its production volume through such cutting,
21 although the resulting scrap can be remelted and
22 reproduced."

23 What I wanted to ask Mr. Kerwin is, is this
24 scrap loss taken into account in your estimate of
25 German producers' capacity, as discussed at pages 37

1 and 38 of your brief? I'm referring to the last full
2 paragraph, the last paragraph that begins on 37, and
3 then you go over to 38.

4 MR. KERWIN: The discussion at 37 and 38 is
5 based on, obviously, a source of information other
6 than the questionnaire responses.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's why I'm asking the
8 question.

9 MR. KERWIN: As testified to by the members
10 of the domestic industry, ordinarily capacity is
11 reported on the basis of out-the-door products.

12 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I appreciate that. I
13 remember their response, but I didn't ask about how
14 you computed when you used the numbers for the German
15 producers' capacity. That's what I'm asking.

16 MR. KERWIN: Well, what's at issue here at
17 37 and 38 comes from an independent source of
18 information, and I can't say categorically whether the
19 scrap loss would or would not be accounted for there,
20 but my point is that the industry standard worldwide
21 is to report capacity on the basis of what is going
22 out the door, not on the basis -- in other words,
23 after the scrap losses come off --

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: If I understand you
25 correctly, you're saying it should take it into

1 account, but you can't verify if it does. Is that
2 right?

3 MR. KERWIN: That is correct.

4 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. I appreciate that.
5 Thank you.

6 Let me stay with you, if I could. Eluma
7 asserts at page 8 that, and I'm quoting, "during the
8 POR, U.S. average unit prices were lower than Eluma's
9 average unit prices in its export markets." Do you
10 disagree with that, and if not, what incentive would
11 Brazilian producers have to shift exports from these
12 other third-country markets to the United States?

13 MR. KERWIN: Sir, I'm trying to determine
14 the source of the information that they are citing to
15 here, and I'm looking at the public version, and there
16 is a lot of information missing.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Do you want to do that
18 post-hearing?

19 MR. KERWIN: I think that would probably be
20 the most effective way to do it, yes. Thanks.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: But you do know where I'm
22 referring to on page 8.

23 MR. KERWIN: I'm sorry. Is it close to the
24 bottom of the page?

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes. The exact quote is:

1 "During the POI, U.S. average unit prices were lower
2 than Eluma's average unit prices in its export
3 markets."

4 MR. KERWIN: Okay.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Do you see it?

6 MR. KERWIN: Yes, I do see that, but what's
7 not clear to me from that quote is what is the source
8 of the information that he is citing to.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. So do you want to
10 do this post-hearing?

11 MR. KERWIN: Yes, please.

12 MR. HARTQUIST: We need to do that post-
13 hearing because I think the quote that you just read
14 contains proprietary information.

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: They lifted the bracket --

16 MR. HARTQUIST: Oh, they did? I apologize,
17 Mr. Chairman.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: -- on the word "lower."

19 MR. HARTQUIST: Okay.

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Is that what you were
21 referring to?

22 MR. HARTQUIST: I was. Thank you, Mr.
23 Chairman.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That bracket has been
25 lifted, Mr. Hartquist.

1 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's why I was able to
3 ask the question -- just lifted, but it has been
4 lifted. Okay. Good try, though.

5 So why don't I just stay with you for a
6 minute? If the subject country sourced its re-rolled,
7 and this is a follow-up to Commissioner Lane, if a
8 subject country sourced its re-rolled input materials
9 from outside its country, should such material be
10 considered subject product if re-rolled in that
11 subject country?

12 I'm asking this because of a bracketed
13 footnote in your brief, and I'm asking, do you know
14 if, in fact, this was happening during the POI, or is
15 that merely conjecture on your part, and if it was
16 happening, could you elaborate on that in your post-
17 hearing submission?

18 MR. KERWIN: I'm sorry. Where is that in
19 our brief?

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Pages 44 and 45, and it's
21 footnote 31.

22 MR. KERWIN: And your question is, if a re-
23 roller in one of the subject countries purchased its
24 re-rolled input from a nonsubject country and then
25 added value to that product, further processed it in a

1 subject country, and sent it to the United States,
2 would that be considered subject product?

3 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Right. You see what I'm
4 referring to is it starts on line 6 of that footnote
5 that's on page 45 and runs to line 7, and it's that
6 that triggered my asking you whether or not you had
7 specific examples of this happening. Do you follow
8 me?

9 MR. KERWIN: My first answer would be, yes,
10 the product would be subject product because it would
11 be the product of Germany, any of the subject
12 countries, after having that value added in that
13 country.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay.

15 MR. KERWIN: And then do we have specific
16 examples of that happening?

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes.

18 MR. KERWIN: We may be able to develop some
19 because some of these companies in Europe are
20 essentially multinationals in that they have locations
21 in several different countries.

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: If you can, I would
23 appreciate it because we don't have examples of that,
24 to my knowledge. Okay? So if you are able to do
25 that, I would appreciate it.

1 MR. KERWIN: Sure. We'll see what we can
2 put together.

3 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

4 Mr. Hartquist, the German producers argue at
5 page 3 that, and I'm quoting, "because BSS is an
6 intermediate product accounting for much of the cost
7 of the finished manufactured products produced from
8 it, which finished products themselves face import
9 competition, attempts to maintain U.S. prices for BSS
10 above global market prices are not sustainable as they
11 simply will drive customers out of business or
12 overseas. Nonsubject imports have simply replaced
13 subject imports, and the condition of the domestic BSS
14 industry is largely as it was. The orders are no
15 longer effective, and after 18 years, should be
16 terminated." That's the end of their quote.

17 At page 24, they argue: "Changes in the
18 condition of competition that have occurred since 1987
19 and 1999 preclude a finding that underselling margins
20 determined 20 years ago would return absent the
21 orders. Most significantly, nonsubject imports have
22 grown in importance to the U.S. market." Could you
23 respond to their argument?

24 MR. HARTQUIST: Yes. We'll be happy to do
25 that in the brief, if we may.

1 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes, you may.

2 For domestic producers, Eluma asserts at
3 page 20 that, and I'm quoting, "the presence of
4 tolling arrangements in this industry further
5 attenuates competition between domestic and foreign
6 producers." Some data in the staff report, at Chapter
7 2, page 3, and part 5, supports this assertion that
8 points out, and I quote, that "total arrangements have
9 an effect on pricing as well as an effect on
10 competition between domestic and foreign producers."

11 Do you agree that the existence of tolling
12 arrangements and scrap buy-back programs provides an
13 advantage to domestic producers over subject imports?
14 Mr. Bartel?

15 MR. BARTEL: I disagree on the basis that we
16 do very little of our business on the tolling
17 arrangement, and by "little," less than 5 percent of
18 our sales to customers is done on a toll basis.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Mr. Rupp?

20 MR. RUPP: My answer is basically the same
21 as Mr. Bartel's. We do very little tolling.

22 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Mr. Burkhardt?

23 MR. BURKHARDT: We also do very little
24 tolling. Most of our business is selling the metal
25 price in effect time of shipment.

1 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Do any of you
2 foresee such arrangements increasing in the
3 foreseeable future? Mr. Bartel?

4 MR. BARTEL: We would like to increase
5 tolling, but our customers would not like to increase
6 tolling, and it runs to the whole issue of capital
7 employed, and no one wants to have their money tied up
8 in upper units at this high value.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Mr. Rupp?

10 MR. RUPP: We see it the same as Mr. Bartel.

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: And Mr. Burkhardt?

12 MR. BURKHARDT: From a working capital
13 standpoint, it would be good to do more tolling, but
14 our customers are not willing.

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you very much. I
16 see my red light is about to come on. I'll turn to
17 Vice Chairman Okun.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you.

19 A question for the producers and Mr. Mayer
20 as well. In looking into the reasonably foreseeable
21 future for your industry, where do you see yourself in
22 the business cycle? Mr. Bartel or Mr. Rupp?

23 MR. BARTEL: This is Warren Bartel. We are
24 seeing 2005 start stronger than 2004, but certainly
25 much, much lower than the year 2000.

1 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I think you've probably
2 testified to this, but much lower than 2000, in terms
3 of the end use customers, do you attribute that to a
4 particular end use in particular or more generally the
5 movement of customers overseas and the other things
6 you've talked about today?

7 MR. BARTEL: I think, currently, the U.S.
8 economy seems to be doing well for the customers that
9 we sell to, and we see a small, incremental increase
10 in business. Business seems to be tending up rather
11 than down in speaking to the cycle.

12 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Mr. Rupp?

13 MR. RUPP: I would say that this current
14 business cycle, from 2000 to 2005, would be something
15 that we would characterize as something that's been
16 very choppy. 2001 was a disastrous year. 2002, the
17 first half of the year, there was what we later
18 believe is a replenishment of inventory that was
19 offset by a decline for about 18 months in the last
20 half of '02 and '03. We saw a pickup in '04. We saw
21 it drop back in '05, and now we're starting to see a
22 little bit of a pickup in '06.

23 So I would characterize what we're seeing as
24 a lower level of consumption in the U.S. that is very
25 choppy, and it's being impacted by inventory

1 replenishment and also by offshoring of product that
2 continues to leave this country. What's making our
3 situation even worse from an inventory perspective is
4 the fact that the price of copper has basically gone
5 from \$1.00, \$1.20 to over \$2.00 a pound, and it's
6 making the desire by our customers to hold inventory.
7 They would like to have none if they could, so that
8 makes this even a more difficult time for us, but we
9 see it as a very choppy time.

10 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Is '06 as far
11 out as you would look in terms of that?

12 MR. RUPP: Yes. I would say that I don't
13 think that we have the visibility that we used to
14 have. Years ago, we used to have visibility where we
15 would have six, nine, 12 months of visibility. We
16 don't have that visibility any longer.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I appreciate
18 that.

19 Mr. Mayer, do you have any comments from the
20 association?

21 MR. MAYER: Commissioner, I would defer
22 entirely to the judgment of our company
23 representatives.

24 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Then I'll go
25 back to Mr. Burkhardt.

1 MR. BURKHARDT: Definitely, the brass strip
2 market is not nearing the overall economy as far as a
3 steady pickup. I think uneven, choppy, is a good
4 description, and the fact that our customers' products
5 leaving the States and going to primarily China is
6 going to continue, and it's probably going to
7 accelerate. So as far as the future is concerned,
8 it's going to be a very difficult environment to
9 compete in.

10 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I appreciate your
11 perspectives on that question.

12 A couple of things that I just wanted to
13 have follow-up for the post-hearing. In response to
14 Commissioner Hillman's further questions with regard
15 to the situation in China, and I know, Mr. Bartel, you
16 had referenced in my question some other information.
17 Maybe you'll put it on the record, which would be
18 helpful. If you can make sure when you're doing that,
19 I know you had focused on facilities that you're aware
20 of or that there have been indications of capacity
21 that may be coming on line, if, Mr. Hartquist, if you
22 can make sure that you also try to pull together
23 consumption data for China, as I think it's most
24 helpful to see those two put together.

25 And, again, as I've listened to you, the

1 reason I'm focused on that is when we talk about your
2 customers moving to China, it's bad for this industry.
3 I understand that part. I'm not sure that it is
4 increasing the demand in China. I understand that
5 capacity is coming on line, but I'm just trying to get
6 a better perspective of that with whatever information
7 you're able to collect.

8 MR. HARTQUIST: We'll do our best.

9 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I wanted to go
10 back to Brazil for one moment because I did get from
11 staff the Brazilian Trade Association's responses to
12 the Commission, and that confirms that the data that
13 they have submitted includes all Brazilian producers.
14 So for purposes of post-hearing, if you can please
15 analyze a larger data set and explain if your
16 arguments still hold and anything else you would like
17 me to take into account in looking at that additional
18 data, I would appreciate that.

19 And I guess I should say on that, Ms.
20 Cannon, if you would, for purposes of post-hearing,
21 discuss -- I assume you would oppose decumulating
22 Brazil. I understand that, but if I were to choose to
23 decumulate Brazil using discretionary factors based on
24 conditions of competition, whether you believe that
25 the order on Brazil should remain in effect.

1 MS. CANNON: I'll be happy to do that.

2 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Mr. Kerwin, on
3 that, I would note, I did go back and look at the
4 article that you were citing to as support that Eluma
5 was going to increase its exports. To me, that
6 article is very general about the holding company,
7 which also includes tin producers, fertilizer raw
8 producer, that overall they were going to be
9 increasing exports. So if there is any other
10 additional specific information you could provide, I
11 would appreciate that as well.

12 MR. KERWIN: We will do that.

13 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. The CVRD
14 Company; I heard rumors that they had planned to enter
15 the copper and brass industry because of their mining
16 operations. Anything any of you are aware of or have
17 information about? I'll ask the Brazilians this
18 afternoon. I was just wondering if there was
19 something in the news. With all of the talk about
20 scrap prices and who is in the mining industry, I
21 assume that there is a lot of interest in that. Okay.
22 I'll ask some this afternoon.

23 I guess my final question: In terms of the
24 analysis of the capacity of the foreign producers to
25 ship to the United States, I think you've responded a

1 little bit today, but just for post-hearing, in
2 helping us understand, in looking at what we
3 understand is everybody reporting capacity for the
4 whole mills, what would be the best way to analyze how
5 much of that would be available in the subject product
6 and whether we should look at the historical split
7 between the different products. If you're producing
8 80 percent brass sheet and strip, you can produce
9 other products, but are you likely to shift and why?
10 I know you've done some of that, but just help me
11 understand if it matters for the different subject
12 countries or not or the different mills, how they
13 operate.

14 MR. HARTQUIST: We will look at that as
15 well.

16 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. And with that, I
17 have no further questions, but I really want to take
18 this time to say thank you for all of the answers
19 you've given. It's been very helpful this morning and
20 this afternoon.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

22 Commissioner Hillman?

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you. Just a
24 couple of, I hope, follow-ups. Specifically on this
25 issue of product shifting and what's the total

1 capacity, the German Respondents are claiming that of
2 the products that can be made on the same equipment,
3 this particular form of brass sheet and strip is the
4 lowest-value product, thereby making product shifting
5 into this brass sheet and strip unlikely.

6 I guess I wanted to hear from the industry's
7 perspective. Help me understand the sort of value
8 hierarchy, if you will, of the products that you can
9 make on this same equipment that you do make, that you
10 routinely could make, and where do you think brass
11 sheet and strip falls within that value hierarchy?

12 MR. RUPP: There is a variety of alloys,
13 Commissioner, that can be manufactured on the same
14 equipment, and we have an industry group that divides
15 them in chemical composition, so there is a 100
16 series, which is primarily copper; there is 200
17 series, which is brass; there is 300 series, which you
18 have lead in it; and 400 series, which is a type of
19 bronze, et cetera. And I would say that brass is the
20 commodity piece of the business, as are some of the
21 100 series alloys, which are commodity pieces of the
22 business that would fit in the middle, sometimes to
23 the lower end, of your margin scale.

24 That can be changed by what you're doing
25 specifically with that brass. If the brass goes into

1 what we call a plate-and-polish type of application,
2 goes into an electrical connector with a special
3 coating on it, it can become a more higher-margin
4 product.

5 So what they are saying is that the
6 commodity brass is not the highest margin. I'm saying
7 that within brass there are some higher-margin brass
8 products, depending upon the application.

9 Our argument is that the important element
10 is just to have that equipment, as you understand,
11 having that equipment fully utilized, and while we,
12 too, would love to make nothing but higher-margin
13 material on our equipment, the fact of the matter is
14 that we have more capacity than the market is for
15 those types of products, so we have the need to make
16 the brass to be able to absorb our cost structure and
17 improve our profitability, which I would think that
18 they would have a similar situation.

19 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. Mr. Bartel?

20 MR. BARTEL: As Mr. Rupp said, there are
21 certain products made from 200 series brass
22 products -- elevator panels, polished panels, polished
23 burial caskets -- that have quite high unitary value.
24 I think, for us, the more important factor, however,
25 is the majority of our revenue, the majority of our

1 earnings, the majority of our profitability come from
2 the production of 200 series copper and brass
3 products. The size of the markets for the higher-
4 valued alloys is much smaller, and the competition is
5 more global, and so the magnitude of the opportunity
6 is much smaller than the production of the 200 series
7 brass products that we've produced.

8 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I appreciate that.

9 Mr. Burkhardt, did you want to add
10 something?

11 MR. BURKHARDT: Just quickly. When we made
12 our investment into this country to begin with, it was
13 investing into equipment to handle the brass and
14 copper sheet and strip market, and brass sheet and
15 strip now makes up about 45 percent, depending upon
16 the year, the total market, and that is, for the most
17 part, a fixed-cost-spreading business. When you have
18 that kind of a major investment in equipment, you have
19 to run the equipment as many hours as possible. You
20 have to maximize the amount of time that equipment is
21 running.

22 So the brass sheet and strip, and there are
23 items that are plated, there are brass items that do
24 bring value added to the marketplace where you can get
25 a little higher price, but, for the most part, it's

1 the lower-margin business that does allow us to spread
2 our fixed costs, and if it went away, there isn't
3 enough of the other business to sustain our mill.

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. A related
5 issue. Mr. Bartel, in your testimony, you said that,
6 again, prices are at all-time highs for a lot of the
7 metals, and if they go too high, that there will be
8 alternate products using other materials. Help me
9 understand what those alternate products and/or other
10 materials likely be.

11 MR. BARTEL: Well, the obvious one that we
12 spent the most time looking at was aluminum. What's
13 happened with aluminum in the automotive radiator is a
14 good example.

15 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. Then if
16 we can get back to some of the pricing issues, as I
17 heard your discussion with Commissioner Pearson in
18 terms of how the COMEX versus the LME markets were
19 very similar, which, to me, then suggests that it does
20 come down to fabrication prices in terms of trying to
21 understand it. How would you describe fabrication
22 prices in the United States compared to fabrication
23 prices in the EU or Latin America or Asia?

24 MR. BARTEL: Historically, in my opinion,
25 they have been comparable. The wild card is currency

1 exchange rates, so that the prices in Europe today are
2 relatively high because the euro value is higher than
3 the dollar value.

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: So, today, you would
5 describe fabrication prices in Europe as higher than
6 in the United States.

7 MR. BARTEL: Because of currency exchange
8 rates. A year ago, the opposite would have been true.

9 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: How about Latin
10 America or Asia? Also comparable?

11 MR. BARTEL: Well, there, I would say
12 comparable to the extent that those markets are
13 available to us. The Japanese market is not
14 available. It's a closed market, and the Brazilian
15 market is not available. It's a closed market.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Mr. Rupp, did you
17 want to add something?

18 MR. RUPP: Yes, Commissioner. I think that
19 we should clarify in the brief when we talk about
20 fabrication prices because I think that in Europe and
21 in North America the terminology is a little bit
22 different. In other words, their fabrication price in
23 Europe would be a higher price, and their metal would
24 be the same, but there would be limited metal, what we
25 call "adder," on that pricing. In the United States,

1 you would have a lower fabrication price, the same
2 metal and a higher metal adder. At the end of the
3 day, what the customer is looking at is if you take
4 the metal piece out, what are they paying? That is,
5 in essence, what the real fabrication price is.

6 I would think that we should make sure that
7 we make that clearer in our post-hearing brief so that
8 that's understandable. My concern is that we give you
9 numbers that say fabrication and our numbers here and
10 their numbers there, and we're not really talking
11 apples and apples with that.

12 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I, obviously,
13 am trying to understand. I heard Mr. Bartel describe
14 very clearly with Commissioner Aranoff exactly how
15 this price is determined, --

16 MR. RUPP: Right, right.

17 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: -- and you're saying
18 everything other than the COMEX metal price in your
19 book is negotiable.

20 MR. RUPP: That's correct.

21 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: That is part of what
22 you're negotiating on, and that's what I'm trying to
23 understand, is how the prices for what you can
24 negotiate on compare between the United States,
25 Europe, Latin America, and Asia. So if there is

1 anything further that you want to add on that issue in
2 the post-hearing brief, I think it would be helpful.

3 Obviously, we have some limited pricing
4 data. The pricing data in our staff report tries to
5 break down metal prices versus fabrication prices, but
6 we have very little comparative data. So whatever can
7 be put on the record to help us understand, however
8 we're going to describe it, the nonmetal part of the
9 prices, you know, again, I am trying to understand how
10 we assess the relative attractiveness of the U.S.
11 market versus anyplace else in the world.

12 If I step back for a minute, and I look at,
13 as you've described it, this is a declining market in
14 terms of demand. You have demand arguably up in lots
15 of other places where your end use customers have
16 moved. If the prices aren't pretty high, it's not at
17 all clear to me why the U.S. is such an attractive
18 market.

19 So if there is something that you want to
20 add, again, to understand why it is that we should
21 assume the U.S. is, relative to other places, an
22 attractive enough market that if these orders were
23 revoked, it would draw in imports, I think that would
24 be very helpful.

25 MS. POTTER: Commissioner, Michele Potter

1 from American Brass. If I could just add one more
2 thing.

3 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Sure.

4 MS. POTTER: Some of our customers do have
5 contracts, and we're talking about the attractiveness
6 of the market, and with the fluctuation in exchange
7 rates, it can make the U.S. market very attractive at
8 times and not at others, and although we have pricing
9 agreements that may last a few months, a year, or a
10 few years, most of them with our customers can be
11 renegotiated upon their request at any time.

12 So if the exchange rate fluctuates one way
13 or the other, there may be a very big incentive for
14 some of the subject countries to approach our
15 customers with more favorable pricing.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Those changes; are
17 they determined in any way by the portion of the total
18 cost of the product that brass sheet and strip makes
19 up? Again, I'm trying to understand where that price
20 fits into it. I can imagine for these end uses we
21 have a wide range of how much of the total value brass
22 sheet and strip constitutes. Where does that play
23 into this?

24 MS. POTTER: I'm sorry.

25 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: I can imagine

1 products that have a very small amount of brass sheet
2 and strip -- again, the total value of the product,
3 brass sheet and strip is very minor, and other
4 products where the value that brass sheet and strip
5 connotes to the total amount is, in fact, very high,
6 and I'm trying to understand whether that affects this
7 issue of the relative attractiveness of the U.S.
8 market.

9 MS. POTTER: I don't really believe that
10 that has that great of an impact.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. With that, I
12 think I have no further questions at this time, Mr.
13 Chairman. Thank you very much.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.
15 Commissioner Lane?

16 COMMISSIONER LANE: Thank you. I just have
17 a few questions.

18 The first one is addressed to the industry.
19 What percentage of the nonsubject imports are imported
20 by you, and other imports by the domestic industry,
21 what percentage are those imports to your total
22 domestic production of this product? I hope I've got
23 all of the identifiers in there correctly so that you
24 can figure out exactly what percentage it is that I'm
25 asking for.

1 MR. HARTQUIST: Commissioner Lane, a similar
2 question was asked by another commissioner, and we
3 will --

4 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay.

5 MR. HARTQUIST: -- deal with that in the
6 brief and expand the answer to cover your specific
7 issues that you've just mentioned.

8 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay, okay. And this
9 may have been asked, too, but I don't remember it.
10 Can you give me a percentage of your business that you
11 have lost due to your customers moving offshore?

12 MR. HARTQUIST: Again, there is a similar
13 question that has been asked, and we will respond to
14 that as well.

15 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you. And,
16 Mr. Hartquist, I'll address this to you. In the
17 prehearing brief, at pages 27 and 63, you refer to the
18 domestic BSS industry facing a cost-price squeeze. If
19 you pass on the copper and zinc price increases
20 through the metal price component of the total price,
21 and if you have instituted surcharges for fuel,
22 transportation, and energy price increases, how are
23 you facing a cost-price squeeze?

24 MR. HARTQUIST: Well, I'll take an initial
25 crack at that, Commissioner Lane, and ask the industry

1 witnesses to respond further, but I think that the
2 simple answer to that is that while there is an
3 attempt to pass these prices through to the customers,
4 the key really is what is the final price that the
5 customer is going to have to pay, regardless of the
6 components of that price: fabrication cost versus
7 material cost, metal cost, for example.

8 So, in the end, the customer says, "Okay.
9 You have this passthrough. That's fine. Your price
10 is a dollar a pound. That's fine, but I can buy that
11 from another source for 95 cents a pound. Are you
12 going to meet the price or not?" And that's the issue
13 that the producer has to grapple with.

14 So it's not, in essence, a perfect
15 passthrough because, in the end, the amount of
16 additional fab price component to the ultimate price
17 may be reduced, and so the profitability goes out of
18 the sale of the product. Maybe Mr. Bartel or Mr. Rupp
19 or Mr. Burkhardt would like to expand on that.

20 MR. BARTEL: I would just add -- this is
21 Warren Bartel -- I would just add that the impact on
22 working capital and the cost of carrying working
23 capital cannot be passed through in any way.

24 In answer to an earlier question, I stated
25 that our ability to collect surcharges -- everything

1 above the commodity cost of the metal is negotiable,
2 and our customers negotiate on those things, so we are
3 not 100-percent successful in collecting the
4 increments that we attempt to collect.

5 The biggest missing element is the impact on
6 working capital that is on both payables and on the
7 receivables side where we have to bear the increased
8 cost of the high commodity price.

9 MR. RUPP: I would just add, Commissioner --
10 this is Joseph Rupp -- that our total cost structure,
11 because of this situation in the industry, we're
12 unable to get price increases, so we're unable to pass
13 labor increases, medical cost increases, environmental
14 costs, what we call "legacy costs." All of those
15 things are piling up on us, and we don't have the
16 ability to pass all of those costs on. So what we're
17 attempting to do is pass some of these energy costs
18 and surcharges, but the full weight of the costs on
19 us, we're unable to pass those on through pricing.

20 MR. BURKHARDT: Doug Burkhardt. I'll just
21 reaffirm or agree with Mr. Bartel as far as the
22 working capital. It's a tremendous squeeze on us as
23 far as the price of copper going from the seventies
24 into the \$2 per pound, as well as zinc increasing in
25 price also. So that cost component is real, and it's

1 a very large constraint for us.

2 As far as the surcharges are concerned,
3 again, it's an uneven situation. There is a
4 competitive marketplace as far as what you're able to
5 accomplish with the surcharges. The energy surcharge
6 is a very recent phenomenon. It just came into effect
7 in the industry late last year, the last two months of
8 last year, and, again, it's not a situation where you
9 get it across the board. The cathode premium that's
10 been in place for a while doesn't capture all of the
11 increased costs of cathode premiums to the industry.
12 It just captures a portion of those, and, again,
13 that's to be negotiated individually with our
14 customers.

15 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

16 Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.

18 Commissioner Pearson, have you changed your
19 mind? Commissioner Aranoff?

20 I do have a couple of short matters left.
21 First of all, with regard to the issue of comparative
22 fabrication prices -- this is a follow-up to
23 Commissioner Hillman -- where you're going to respond
24 in the post-hearing, Mr. Hartquist and Mr. Kerwin, if
25 in responding to that question, you could take into

1 account that portion of Exhibit 3 of the German
2 producers' brief that's headed "Comparison of U.S.
3 Producer Domestic Fabrication Price and Wieland
4 Fabrication Price," and it runs from Product 1 through
5 Product 6. The contents of those tables are business
6 proprietary, but you have access to those tables, and
7 if you could take that into account in providing your
8 response for the record, I would appreciate that.

9 MR. HARTQUIST: We certainly will do so.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: And one last question, and
11 this is for the domestic producers, and it's a follow-
12 up to questions from Commissioner Pearson and
13 Commissioner Aranoff.

14 Domestic basic producers' capacity
15 utilization has declined over the period of review.
16 Between 1999 and 2004, U.S. apparent consumption fell
17 16 and a half percent, and basic producers' capacity
18 fell about 4 percent. Do domestic basic producers
19 face barriers to exit in this industry? Are there EPA
20 or state regulations that would make it difficult or
21 expensive to shutter a facility? If I could hear from
22 Mr. Bartel and Mr. Rupp and Mr. Burkhardt on this.
23 Mr. Bartel?

24 MR. BARTEL: Well, first of all, we have
25 only one factory, so if we close it, we're out of

1 business; we're leaving the market. We have very high
2 capital costs, invested -- costs, so we have no
3 interest in leaving the market if we can maintain a
4 viable business.

5 The second part of your question: Yes,
6 there are extremely high exit costs, environmental
7 exit costs, that are triggered with the cessation of
8 operations in an industrial site, and the --

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Is that state and federal?

10 MR. BARTEL: Both state and federal, and our
11 facility is in New York State that has a very rigorous
12 state environmental enforcement agency.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Mr. Rupp?

14 MR. RUPP: I think we could include in the
15 brief what we wrote off, Olin did, when we shut the
16 Indianapolis operations down, but we took a charge --
17 I think it was a pretax charge -- in the \$30 million
18 range. We'll confirm what that was totally, but it's
19 totally along the lines of what Warren talked about of
20 shutting the facility down, dismantling parts of the
21 facility, taking care of the environmental
22 requirements. In some cases, clearly, you have to pay
23 severance, et cetera, going forth, so it's expensive
24 to shut operations down.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. Mr. Burkhardt?

1 MR. BURKHARDT: The same. It would be very
2 difficult for us, and there is a barrier as far as
3 shutting our operation down. The note that we have
4 outstanding, the fact that we have a facility in one
5 location and have quite a bit invested in that
6 location, the environmental costs, and the like; there
7 would be some real barriers there as far as shutting
8 down.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. I appreciate
10 those responses.

11 Vice Chairman Okun? I have no further
12 questions. Commissioner Hillman?

13 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Just a couple of
14 quick follow-ups. The issue that you were discussing
15 at the very first round with Commissioner Pearson on
16 your customers, your end use customers, going
17 overseas; I wasn't sure that I heard your sense of is
18 that affecting everyone equally, or are there certain
19 end use segments that are not moving offshore?

20 MR. RUPP: I think that it is probably
21 affecting everyone, maybe not as equally. I think if
22 you are more based in building products, or you're
23 more based in electrical products, you've probably
24 been affected more than others who are in automotive
25 types of products. But the end result of lowering the

1 capacity utilization in the industry ultimately
2 affects everybody because of the fact that we've said
3 that the ability to really be able to get price
4 increases in this industry is very, very difficult, as
5 we get lower capacity utilization, that becomes even
6 more difficult, so as a consequence, there is an
7 impact, I think, on the whole industry.

8 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Just so I understand
9 it, is there any difference in the fabrication price
10 that you get, whether you're fabricating a product for
11 the housewares industry versus the automotive
12 industry?

13 MR. RUPP: There is different price for
14 different applications.

15 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Do any others
16 disagree with that in terms of the end use segments?

17 Then I guess the last question I have, if
18 that's the case, if we are going to continue to see
19 this shift of all of your customers ultimately
20 overseas, what would you say your plan is to remain
21 profitable in what you're describing as a continually
22 declining market?

23 MR. RUPP: I would prefer to do that in the
24 brief.

25 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. Anyone else?

1 Okay. I appreciate that answer, and with that, I
2 think you for your answers to all of the questions
3 this morning. I appreciate it.

4 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Let me see if there are
5 any other questions from the dais. I see that there
6 aren't.

7 Mr. Deyman, does staff have questions of
8 this panel before we release them?

9 MR. DEYMAN: George Deyman, Office of
10 Investigations. I have one question and one request
11 for information.

12 On page 25 of your prehearing brief, you
13 present a table of nonsubject imports. It's public
14 information based on official statistics. You say
15 that you believe that the vast majority of these
16 imports are of 200 series brass sheet and strip. What
17 basis do you have for your statement that the vast
18 majority of the nonsubject imports are of the 200
19 series product?

20 MR. BECKINGTON: This is Jeff Beckington,
21 German. I think the best answer to that, Mr. Deyman,
22 is that throughout the entire history of these unfair
23 trade orders, I think that essentially is an
24 assumption that has been made by everyone because,
25 first of all, 200 series brass sheet and strip is the

1 predominant brass product.

2 It far outstrips leaded brass and tin brass,
3 the other two commodity areas that are covered by
4 those harmonized tariff schedule numbers, and as far
5 as anyone has ever been able to discern, including us
6 and including the Commission, for the entire life of
7 these cases, that's the best perception that anyone
8 has been able to muster at this stage of the game.

9 MR. DEYMAN: We simply wanted to establish
10 that if we use the official statistics in the staff
11 report, that they include basically the subject
12 product, the type of brass that we're studying in this
13 investigation. If you could, in your post-hearing
14 brief, and also the Respondent's in their post-hearing
15 brief, comment on the extent to which official
16 statistics do or don't include nonsubject product, it
17 would be helpful.

18 Also, one other data request. If you could,
19 in your post-hearing brief, explain exactly how
20 capacity was allocated to the subject product for each
21 of your firms, how you accounted for yield loss, and
22 basically to what extent the methodology for
23 determining capacity was consistent from firm to firm.
24 And I might add, I would like the Respondents to do
25 that for their capacity data for Brazil and Germany

1 also. We would like you to do that. Thank you. The
2 staff has no further questions.

3 MR. HARTQUIST: We'll do so.

4 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you for that, Mr.
5 Deyman. We appreciate it, and I look forward to your
6 responses.

7 Mr. Bruno and Mr. Shor, do you have any
8 questions of this panel before they are released?

9 MR. SHOR: I do not, Mr. Chairman.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Mr. Shor.
11 Mr. Bruno?

12 MR. BRUNO: No.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Mr. Bruno.

14 With that, this will conclude this morning's
15 session. I want to thank the members of this panel
16 for your answers to all of our questions. It's been
17 most helpful, and I look forward to your post-hearing
18 submissions. I'll release this panel, and we will
19 resume at one-thirty.

20 (Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the hearing in
21 the above-entitled matter was recessed, to reconvene
22 at 1:30 p.m.)

23 //

24 //

25 //

1 capacity and production is accurate and practically
2 complete.

3 Third, I will address current and
4 foreseeable market conditions and trends for subject
5 brass.

6 The data in your staff report show that
7 subject imports began to decline long before petitions
8 were filed and long before orders were entered.
9 Subject imports from all countries and subject imports
10 from Germany fell in every year from 1984 to 1987. By
11 1987, imports from Germany had declined by more than
12 half and from all subject countries by 60 percent.
13 The largest declines took place in 1985 before the
14 petitions were even filed.

15 This downward trend, moreover, has continued
16 unabated to the present date. At the same time,
17 imports from nonsubject countries like Poland and
18 India have been increasing. The explanation has
19 nothing to do with trade cases and everything to do
20 with how we add value in the industry.

21 No rolling mill in Germany or the United
22 States is dedicated exclusively to subject products.
23 Instead, we cover the entire spectrum of copper
24 alloys. Our rolled products range from pure copper to
25 different brasses, to fine Phosphor bronzes, to nickel

1 silver -- and to newly developed, high-performance
2 alloys for specialty electronic applications.

3 Of all of these alloys, subject brass is the
4 easiest to produce. It can be produced on the least-
5 sophisticated equipment, with the lowest investment in
6 technology. It is the entry-level product, but for
7 these same reasons, it is low on the value chain. It
8 has the lowest profit margins of any of the copper
9 alloys we produce.

10 The key to improving profitability in high-
11 wage countries like Germany is to move up the value
12 chain, and this is exactly what has happened over the
13 last 20 years. We have invested hundreds of millions
14 of dollars in better technology and more sophisticated
15 equipment. We have reduced capacity and production of
16 low-margin alloys like the subject product and
17 increased capacity and production of phosphor bronze
18 and high-performance alloys. The prices and the
19 profits on these products are two to 10 times higher.
20 That is why Germany capacity for C-200 series brass
21 today probably is half of what it was in the 1980s,
22 and it is why German exports to the United States have
23 declined.

24 I have read the U.S. industry brief and
25 their argument that if the orders were terminated,

1 Germany would shift production back down the value
2 chain from these higher-profit alloys back to common
3 alloy 200 series. This is nonsense, and they know
4 better.

5 The U.S. producers have also been seeking to
6 move up the value chain and would not move down. We
7 know from sources in the U.S. that Olin buys C-200
8 series brass from Poland. We know that they sent
9 company officials to India in August. It makes
10 economic sense for them to buy subject brass from low-
11 wage countries and shift to producing higher-value
12 alloys in the U.S., but don't believe we or they would
13 move backwards.

14 I will now turn to German capacity.
15 Petitioners have sought to make much of the fact that
16 there are seven producers of subject brass, but only
17 three responded to the Commission questionnaire. They
18 urge that the Commission assume that the nonresponding
19 producers have 770 million pounds of capacity. This
20 is an absurd number.

21 This case does not involve all rolled copper
22 products; it involves only one group of alloys. As
23 Petitioners acknowledge, the data are based on
24 estimates for total rolling capacity, which includes
25 both subject and nonsubject alloys. As I just

1 discussed, the Germany industry over the last 20 years
2 has been moving away from subject brass into higher-
3 value alloys to the point where subject brass occupies
4 just a small fraction of total rolling capacity.

5 We contacted all of the other German
6 producers so that we would have the basic data needed
7 for participating in this review. The data we have
8 gathered indicate that the three responding
9 producers -- Wieland, Schwermetall, and Prymetall --
10 account for roughly 90 percent of German subject brass
11 production. This is an accurate number. Let me
12 explain.

13 The four other producers, German producers,
14 are MKM, Plettenberg, Sundwiger, and Schlenk, as we
15 noted in our questionnaire response. KME and Deutsche
16 Nickel, cited by Petitioners, no longer produce
17 subject brass in Germany at all. MKM focuses on pure
18 copper strip. MKM is technically incapable of casting
19 or hot rolling brass. It only could roll cold-rolled
20 material purchases from Schwermetall. As you have
21 full data from Schwermetall, you have full capacity
22 and production data from MKM. MKM adds no additional
23 capacity or production. Moreover, its production
24 volume was small, under 6.6 million pounds in 2004 and
25 under 5.5 million pounds in 2005.

1 Plettenberg is a small, integrated producer.
2 Their plant has a total input capacity of 31 million
3 pounds, of which 6 million is devoted to welded brass
4 tube. Their remaining capacity can yield finished
5 product volume of only 20 million pounds or so, not
6 all of which would be the subject alloy.

7 Sunfegger focuses on high-performance
8 alloys. Its website does not even list brass as a
9 product anymore. Like MKM, they do not cast or hot
10 roll subject brass. They produce 4.4 million pounds
11 of subject brass annually, all of which is from re-
12 rolled materials supplied by Schwermetall.

13 Finally, Carl Schlenk is a small, niche
14 producer whose Web site indicates that they produce
15 only foils and ultra-thin strip. Again, they have no
16 casting or hot-rolling capability. They purchase all
17 of their subject brass input material from Wieland,
18 only 220,000 pounds annually.

19 In sum, the nonresponding producers and re-
20 rollers are insignificant and do not represent any
21 significant German capacity or production beyond the
22 three responding producers.

23 Finally, I will discuss current and expected
24 market conditions in Europe and in Asia.
25 Significantly, prices in Germany and in Europe for

1 subject brass are higher than in the United States.
2 We know this is an important issue, so we want to
3 provide you with the best data we could.

4 We looked first to industry publications,
5 such as CRU. While CRU does a good job of tracking
6 quantities and pricing trends, its data are not useful
7 or accurate measures of price differences between the
8 U.S. and German markets. They do not use the same
9 products in the two markets. The data do not include
10 all surcharges.

11 We compared CRU data to our own prices and
12 found the CRU numbers for Germany to be very low in
13 relation to our actual price. Because we could not
14 find any representative published pricing data, we
15 provided Wieland's own prices for Germany and the rest
16 of Europe for the specific products the Commission
17 examined.

18 The data are comprehensive and not
19 selective, and we believe they are representative,
20 given that our market share in Germany for C-200
21 series brass is roughly 50 percent. When we compare
22 our fabrication charges to those of the U.S. industry
23 available in the public staff report, we see that
24 prices in both Germany and the rest of Europe are
25 higher than in the United States. There is no price

1 incentive for us to shift sales to the United States
2 market.

3 Let me conclude by spending a minute on
4 China. German exports of brass to China are
5 insignificant. According to official export
6 statistics, 2004, German exports of subject brass to
7 China totaled a mere 1.5 million pounds. Our focus,
8 once again, is on the high-value-added, high-
9 performance alloys. Moreover, German exports of
10 subject brass to the region are concentrated in high-
11 quality, high-priced products for specialty
12 applications.

13 Our sales to China are not of commodity
14 subject brass products to producers of commodity
15 products. We sell to multinational companies with
16 their own manufacturing plants in China producing
17 sophisticated electronics and other products requiring
18 the highest-quality material.

19 New brass mills in China cannot come close
20 to our quality and will not displace our sales in the
21 foreseeable future.

22 I would like to introduce my U.S. colleague,
23 Markus Schuler, and I thank you very much for your
24 attention.

25 MR. SCHULER: Good afternoon, members of the

1 Commission. My name is Markus Schuler. I'm the
2 executive vice president of Wieland Metals, Inc., the
3 United States subsidiary of Wieland-Werke AG. Wieland
4 Metals owns and operates a copper and copper-alloy
5 rolling mill outside of Chicago. We produce subject
6 brass strip and other alloys here in the United
7 States.

8 I will address three issues that have arisen
9 in this case. First, as you know, back in the 1980s,
10 Germany was the largest exporter of subject brass to
11 the United States. Wieland accounted for the vast
12 majority of those exports. I will explain why, in
13 light of the existence of Wieland Metals and other
14 changes in the U.S. market, those exports from Germany
15 will not return.

16 Second, I will discuss quality differences
17 between certain subject brass produced in Germany and
18 that produced in the United States.

19 Third, as a domestic producer, I will
20 discuss market conditions in the United States over
21 the POR and in the foreseeable future.

22 Let me begin by explaining why significant
23 imports from Germany or any other subject country
24 would not resume if the orders were terminated. Let's
25 go back in time to the early 1980s. Wieland had no

1 manufacturing presence in the U.S. market. Our U.S.
2 customers for subject brass in Germany fell into three
3 broad categories.

4 First, we had end user customers who bought
5 large volumes of standardized products. These
6 customers could forecast their needs months in
7 advance. Our main customers in this industry were
8 lock manufacturers, companies like Schlage and Weiser.
9 We could ship these customers product by the container
10 load, and they could accommodate the three-to-four-
11 month lead times that were required to order, produce,
12 and deliver brass from Germany.

13 The second customer category comprised re-
14 rollers and service center distributors. These were
15 companies like A.J. Oster and Heyco. These companies
16 maintained inventory and could deliver small
17 quantities with short lead times to end users.

18 The third and smallest category of customers
19 we served with imports back then were end users with
20 special quality requirements. These were niche market
21 customers who had special needs exceeding standard
22 industry specification for surface finish and other
23 physical properties. We could have special production
24 runs for them using different machinery and slower
25 speeds, and we would charge them premium prices for

1 these specialty products.

2 The first category of customers which had
3 been our largest has, over the intervening years,
4 largely left the United States. These customers
5 produced low-end products which are now produced in
6 newly industrialized countries at lower cost. Our
7 former lock industry customers, for example, no longer
8 manufacture in the United States. The market for
9 high-volume products ordered by end users months in
10 advance from foreign brass producers simply does not
11 exist here anymore.

12 Wieland understood this trend, which is why
13 we invested \$30 million in the mid-1980s to construct
14 a plant in the United States. We established
15 infrastructure at the re-roller/service center level
16 of distribution, enabling us to supply end users
17 needing smaller quantities on short notice, a channel
18 of distribution we had not been able to serve from
19 Germany.

20 Some U.S. manufacturers saw the same trends
21 and reacted similarly. In 1991, Olin paid \$82 million
22 for A.J Oster, the major service center in the United
23 States, and formerly one of Wieland's largest
24 customers. Our decision to begin production
25 operations in the United States in 1987 placed us in a

1 segment of the market where we could be closer to our
2 U.S. customers and offer them much shorter lead times,
3 making it unnecessary to import from Germany to serve
4 customers here.

5 But this also meant that what had been
6 Wieland Germany's second-largest category of customers
7 in the 1980s today is unavailable, as they are
8 competitors of Wieland Metals. Moreover, the U.S.
9 industry now largely owns for itself the distributor-
10 service center channel of distribution. The only
11 category of customers remaining in the U.S. market
12 today for German producers is the third category
13 comprised of niche customers that require special
14 production runs of higher-quality brass than is
15 available in the United States. But this is a small
16 market of only a few million pounds a year,
17 encompassing small producers like GSI, who you will
18 hear from shortly.

19 In sum, large volumes of imports from
20 Germany and other countries are not likely because
21 foreign producers simply cannot meet the changed
22 market requirements. They lack of infrastructure in
23 the U.S. to reach today's end users purchasing
24 relatively small quantities at short lead times and
25 U.S. producers themselves largely control the

1 distributor channel. For confirmation, you need look
2 no further than nonsubject imports and who controls
3 and distributes those imports in the United States.

4 This makes the second issue I want to
5 discuss, quality differences between the domestic like
6 product and certain brass we can and do produce in
7 Germany -- simply put, Wieland Germany produces the
8 highest-quality subject strip in the world. To be
9 sure, most of our production is of standard-quality
10 brass meeting normal industry requirements, produced
11 in large production runs, but our standard-quality
12 products cannot be distributed in the United States
13 for the reasons I have just discussed, nor can we make
14 a profit selling it to the United States at current
15 and foreseeable future exchange rates.

16 Wieland Germany has the specialized
17 equipment and expertise to produce subject brass that
18 meets very specific customer requirements for surface
19 finish, physical tolerances, and other properties that
20 neither Wieland Metals nor any U.S. producer can meet.
21 We have invested more in technology and learned more
22 in producing subject and other products.

23 Wieland brass offers unsurpassed, deep-draw
24 characteristics due to metal uniformity, which enables
25 products and science currently not attainable in the

1 United States. We also can produce a surface finish
2 whose average roughness and deviation are less than
3 any other producer in the world. We are able to do so
4 through a combination of expertise, equipment, and
5 rolling speed. The smoother finish enables certain
6 customers to eliminate secondary operations like
7 buffing and better suits certain decorative
8 applications.

9 These higher-quality products command a
10 price premium and will certainly not undersell U.S.
11 domestic producers.

12 Finally, I wish to conclude my remarks by
13 briefly discussing trends in the performance of the
14 United States subject brass industry. Based on
15 Wieland Metals' experience in the market as the United
16 States producer, the main purchasers of subject brass
17 are customers in the automotive, ammunition,
18 electrical, and hardware industries. As these are
19 mainstays of the broader economy, demand for subject
20 brass tends to direct the overall economy.

21 During the 1999-to-2000 economic boom, we
22 experienced record production volumes and record
23 profits. Production profitability fell during the
24 2001 recession and recovered in 2003. There is no
25 correlation to trends in imports, subject or

1 nonsubject.

2 Where are we today? In the second half of
3 2005, in every single month, we had production and
4 shipment volumes surpassing any year in the past five.
5 This trend has continued in 2006 and is likely to
6 continue for the foreseeable future, not just for us
7 but for the industry as a whole. These improving
8 demand conditions result from increases in true demand
9 as well as from the end of a destocking period at the
10 end of 2004 and early 2005 brought about by
11 accelerating copper prices.

12 The rapid increase in copper, and thus
13 subject brass, prices coincided with an increase in
14 short-term lending rates that rapidly raised the cost
15 to our customers and their customers of holding
16 inventory. They reacted by curtailing purchases and
17 working through existing inventories. Now inventories
18 are depleted, and purchases are increasing.

19 Indeed, we have had trouble securing
20 adequate subject re-roll material from our U.S.
21 supplier, Olin. Beginning in October 2005, Olin
22 provided our normal allocation but refused to supply
23 our orders for additional quantities. These
24 conditions continue to the present, as Olin has turned
25 down additional orders for January and February

1 delivery.

2 While the initial shortages may have been
3 due to hurricane-related, natural gas supply problems,
4 this can no longer be the explanation. The domestic
5 industry has imposed metal price increases, new
6 surcharges, and natural gas surcharges that all have
7 been accepted by the market. Volumes and profits are
8 robust. The AD and CVD orders before the Commission
9 have outlived their usefulness and, after almost 20
10 years, should be terminated.

11 That concludes my remarks. I would like to
12 introduce Ed Pages from GSI. Thank you.

13 MR. PAGES: Good afternoon, members of the
14 Commission. My name is Armando Edward Pages, and I am
15 the president of Guarantee Specialties, Inc.
16 Guarantee's main line of business is the manufacture
17 of plumbing components for the kitchen and bath. We
18 make plumbing escutcheons, kitchen sink drains, and
19 bath waste components. Plumbing components comprise
20 80 percent of our \$12 million in annual sales.

21 I've been with Guarantee for over 30 years
22 and have been president since 1990. As president of
23 Guarantee, I am involved in all aspects of Guarantee's
24 business. This includes purchasing raw materials,
25 working on engineering issues, and setting material

1 requirements as a part of the sales quotation process.
2 Subject brass accounts for an average of 65 percent of
3 the cost of Guarantee's finished products. Before the
4 antidumping order against Germany was put in place in
5 1987, Guarantee obtained 90 percent of its brass sheet
6 and strip from Wieland-Werke AG.

7 I had first-hand knowledge of, and hands-on
8 experience with, Wieland brass through the plant
9 management, operations management, and quality control
10 functions that I held at the time. We used Wieland's
11 subject brass before 1987 because it was better than
12 all of the other available brass in a number of
13 different ways important to Guarantee.

14 First, Wieland's brass had superior cosmetic
15 qualities. Wieland's brass was better than that
16 available from domestic producers or other importers
17 in terms of surface finish, which is the quality of
18 the product that gives it its luster. Our customers
19 demand a certain level of surface finish. The
20 products we were able to manufacture using Wieland's
21 material met and exceeded that standard and required
22 less additional buffing than any other brass.

23 Not only was the appearance of Wieland's
24 brass superior when it was delivered; it remained
25 superior as it was worked into the finished product.

1 Wieland's brass was always luder-line free, meaning
2 that when we processed the brass to make the parts for
3 our escutcheons, there were no stretch lines. The
4 stretch lines, which are unacceptable in a finished
5 product, sometimes appeared when other brass was used
6 and processed.

7 Wieland's brass was also more consistently
8 defect free than other brass we have purchased then or
9 now. Defects like scratches, imperfection or pin
10 marks are unacceptable in our finished products; and,
11 therefore, they are unacceptable in the brass we
12 purchase. If we observe these defects in the raw
13 materials that we receive when we perform quality
14 control on those materials, we return the material to
15 the producer. We were forced to reject less of the
16 Wieland brass due to these types of surface defects
17 than the other brass that was purchased then or even
18 the brass that we purchase today.

19 Furthermore, Wieland's brass was softer than
20 domestic brass. We are able to produce a wider
21 variety of products with the softer material. This is
22 because softer brass can be shaped more readily into
23 different forms without the risk of cracking that you
24 have with the harder brass made by domestic companies.

25 The brass we obtained from Wieland in the

1 1980s is superior even to the brass that is available
2 today from domestic manufacturers and importers. This
3 was made clear to me recently as I examined a sample
4 of Wieland's brass from the 1980s that we still had in
5 our office. After all of these years, the sample is
6 still clearly superior in terms of its finish and the
7 softness of the material to anything I can get today
8 from a domestic producer.

9 I have that sample with me today, along with
10 a sample of brass currently available from a domestic
11 producer. As you will see, the Wieland sample from
12 the 1980s is still noticeably superior to the domestic
13 brass.

14 The loss of Wieland as a supplier hurt our
15 company. Without Wieland's brass, we had to use brass
16 of a lower quality and were no longer able to make the
17 same quality of product. Our inability to obtain
18 Wieland's brass also had a direct impact on our sales
19 and our customer relationships. Delta Faucets, a
20 customer of Guarantee's for 20 years, told us that
21 because we could no longer provide them with the same
22 quality products, products we had manufactured using
23 Wieland's brass, they would no longer purchase our
24 plumbing escutcheons. The loss of Delta's business
25 cost us between 5 and 10 percent of our total annual

1 sales.

2 If the orders were to be revoked, we would
3 seek to again purchase brass from Wieland Germany due
4 to the importance of material quality in our products.
5 We have been told by Wieland Metals U.S. that Wieland
6 Germany has made technological improvements since we
7 last were able to buy from them. We understand that
8 Wieland Germany now produces an even higher quality of
9 brass than they did in the late 1980s, brass that
10 requires no buffing.

11 Guarantee would be willing to pay a price
12 premium for Wieland's Germany, higher-quality brass
13 over the prevailing average domestic price for brass.
14 We would willingly do so because we could produce a
15 higher-quality finished product more efficiently.

16 That concludes my remarks. I would now like
17 to introduce my colleague from Brazil. Thank you.

18 MR. BAIALUNA: Good afternoon. My name is
19 Valmir Baialuna. I am sales manager for the Brazilian
20 producer of brass sheet and strip, Eluma SA. I have
21 been with Eluma in my current position for eight
22 years. Eluma supports the revocation of the orders
23 against Brazil and the other countries concerned.

24 Eluma did not participate in the last sunset
25 review conducted by this Commission. In fact, Eluma

1 has pretty much been a bystander in these cases for
2 the last 20 years. The reason is simple: Eluma's
3 imports into the United States, like all Brazilian
4 imports, were declining long before the orders were
5 issued. The import data show that in the two years
6 preceding the imposition of the orders, imports from
7 Brazil had declined very significantly, to a very
8 small percentage of U.S. demand.

9 The decision to limit our exports to the
10 United States was not directly linked to the orders
11 but to other market considerations. Starting in the
12 mid-1980s, the Brazilian market for brass increased
13 steadily and significantly. This was fueled by the
14 very significant growth in a number of Brazilian
15 industry sectors, such as automotive,
16 telecommunication equipment and construction. This
17 growth in Brazilian demand has continued until now and
18 is expected to continue in the future, as the
19 information we provided to the Commission clearly
20 shows.

21 During that period, Brazil was not the only
22 market which experienced exponential economic growth.
23 For example, Eluma and the other Brazilian producers
24 also increased their exports to Asia and later to
25 countries in Latin America. The information provided

1 by Eluma and the Brazilian industry shows that today
2 very close to 100 percent of our production if focused
3 on Brazil and Latin America.

4 In the last 15 years, we have been a primary
5 beneficiary of the globalization of the industries
6 consuming brass. Today, we supply several
7 subsidiaries of U.S. companies that purchase brass
8 from us to produce downstream products in Brazil.
9 There is little unused capacity in Brazil as a whole
10 and almost none with respect to our company.

11 The Commission has received our answer to
12 its questionnaire and also has the information that
13 was collected by SINDICEL, the Brazilian association
14 that covers brass producers. The information from
15 these two sources shows very similar trends.

16 There are currently four producers of brass
17 products in Brazil. Eluma is the largest Brazilian
18 producer. The second largest is Termoneccanica, and
19 the other two producers are very small and are
20 estimated to represent only about 5 percent of the
21 Brazilian market.

22 The information provided to the Commission
23 shows that Brazilian capacity increased over the
24 period in response to the increased Brazilian demand.
25 Using the Brazilian producers' sales to the domestic

1 market as a surrogate for Brazilian overall demand for
2 brass, those sales increased by 56 percent between
3 1999 and 2004. At the same time, Brazilian capacity
4 increased by about 50 percent. Thus, increased
5 capacity in Brazil was very much in line with the
6 increase in the Brazilian demand.

7 If you compare the capacity that existed in
8 Brazil in 1999 and the industry's sales to the
9 Brazilian market in 2004, you can see that the
10 Brazilian industry would not have been able to supply
11 the Brazilian market if its capacity had stayed at its
12 1999 level. Almost all of this capacity is dedicated
13 to the Brazilian market. Therefore, this increase was
14 necessary to meet the Brazilian demand and has not
15 resulted in excess capacity.

16 I also note that brass imports into Brazil
17 from third countries, including the United States,
18 have increased significantly during this period. For
19 example, imports of brass products into Brazil tripled
20 between 2003 and 2004. This trend indicates that the
21 growth of the Brazilian market was very significant
22 and justified the decision made by my company and
23 others to devote additional capacity to that market.

24 The U.S. industry has alleged that Eluma is
25 in the process of further increasing its capacity for

1 brass. The Commission has our capacity figures for
2 the period concerned. As I have already explained,
3 our added capacity has been focused on supplying our
4 growing domestic market and has not resulted in any
5 unused capacity. For example, Eluma's capacity
6 utilization was very close to 100 percent in 2004.

7 Under these conditions, in spite of the
8 allegations made by the U.S. industry, Eluma has no
9 significant excess capacity that would threaten the
10 U.S. industry. Even if the entire production
11 resulting from our excess capacity in 2004 was sold to
12 the U.S. market, it would represent less than 0.01
13 percent of U.S. apparent consumption. During the
14 first three quarters of 2005, this number was even
15 smaller.

16 The Brazilian industry also supplies
17 increasingly Latin American countries. This trend,
18 which started in the late 1990s, has now completely
19 overtaken our exports to Asia. As the Argentinean
20 economy slowly recovers from its slump of several
21 years ago, the data we provided to the Commission show
22 that exports to Latin America have absorbed any unused
23 capacity that was not devoted to the domestic market.
24 It is our view that this trend will continue in the
25 future.

1 Eluma would not be able to immediately shift
2 capacity to brass from other products if the orders
3 were revoked. We produce several different products
4 on the same equipment: copper, bronze, brass alloys,
5 including the C-200 series. Eluma has always produced
6 these three products and intends to continue to
7 produce them. Shifting production among these
8 products is limited by the product blend that we must
9 maintain to supply our customers in all three markets.

10 Shifting capacity to brass from copper, for
11 example, means losing sales and market share in the
12 copper market. It is possible in theory but
13 impractical in reality.

14 In fact, the information we provided to the
15 Commission shows that Eluma's capacity increased very
16 slowly and in small increments during the period. It
17 does not evidence any sudden product shifting to free
18 capacity for brass, even though the Brazilian brass
19 market was growing very quickly, as I mentioned
20 earlier.

21 In addition, diverting sales from other
22 markets to the United States would be impractical and
23 would not make much business sense. We have long-
24 established relationships with customers in these
25 other markets that would make it difficult for us to

1 divert sales from a commercial point of view.

2 Furthermore, we have little incentive to
3 give up these markets for the U.S. market. The
4 average price in these accounts is higher than the
5 average U.S. market price. With lower market prices
6 in the United States, why would we want to divert
7 sales or increase capacity to supply this market?

8 I have read and heard the arguments made by
9 the U.S. industry that it is vulnerable to our imports
10 if the orders are revoked. I am no economic expert,
11 but assuming this is true, for it to claim that it
12 still needs protection after 20 years suggests to me
13 that our imports were not the cause of its problems in
14 the first place.

15 The increase in the cost of producing brass,
16 especially copper, zinc, and energy cost, does not
17 affect the U.S. industry alone but all producers
18 around the world. In this respect, we are as
19 vulnerable as the U.S. industry to rising cost of raw
20 materials and certainly have not incentives to sell in
21 the United States if the U.S. market price will not
22 allow us to recover these costs. We currently sell in
23 other markets at prices that are higher than the
24 average U.S. market price.

25 Brazil remains a small producer of brass

1 compared to all other producing countries. Its
2 capacity to produce brass is a fraction of that of
3 Italy, France, Japan, or Germany. Unlike the other
4 countries, almost all of Brazil's capacity is devoted
5 to supplying a growing domestic market. Brazil does
6 not export significantly, nor do its exports represent
7 a significant share of its sales. For example, in
8 2004, Brazil's total exports were 2.5 million pounds,
9 or 3.3 percent of its total sales. These data clearly
10 show that the conditions of competition set Brazil
11 apart from the other countries.

12 In conclusion, I would like to share with
13 you my surprise after I read the determination made by
14 the Department of Commerce. This department
15 determined that the revocation of the countervailing
16 duty order against Brazil would likely lead to a
17 continuation of subsidies, even though it also found
18 that all known subsidy programs had been terminated in
19 Brazil. How can that be? The same question could be
20 asked of the claim made by the U.S. industry that
21 imports from Brazil would adversely affect it if the
22 orders were revoked.

23 Thank you. I will be happy to answer any
24 questions you may have.

25 MR. MALASHEVICH: Good afternoon, Mr.

1 Chairman and members of the Commission. I am Bruce
2 Malashevich, president of Economic Consulting
3 Services. I am here today on behalf of Respondents
4 participating in this second sunset review of a case
5 that was decided almost 20 years ago.

6 My comments will focus on rebuttal of
7 certain arguments in the Petitioners' prehearing brief
8 regarding performance of the domestic industry,
9 conditions of competition, and the likely effect, or,
10 rather, lack thereof, that revocation of these orders
11 against all remaining subject countries would have on
12 the domestic industry.

13 I would like to begin by turning your
14 attention to the set of public exhibits passed out to
15 you a short while ago. Exhibit 1 is a hypothetical
16 representation of subject import market share over a
17 typical period of investigation in a Title VII
18 proceeding. As you can see, the market share of
19 subject imports declined by half in this hypothetical
20 case.

21 In my some 30 years of experience before the
22 ITC, I can think of not a single antidumping or
23 countervailing duty case where the Commission voted in
24 the affirmative with subject imports having declined
25 so precipitously in relation to consumption.

1 I now turn your attention to Petitioners'
2 essential theory in this particular sunset review.
3 Please turn to Exhibit 2. It contains a quotation
4 from page 65 of their prehearing brief, and it says, I
5 quote, "that the subject imports will have a
6 significant negative effect on the domestic industry
7 in the event of revocation is most clearly indicated
8 by the data developed at the time of the original
9 investigation."

10 Clearly, Petitioners believe that the data
11 from the original POI should be the primary basis for
12 your current, forward-looking decision,
13 notwithstanding the fact that such data are now almost
14 20 years' old.

15 Okay. So let's take a look anyway. Please
16 turn to Exhibit 3. As I'm sure you now recognize, the
17 lines on Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 3, in fact, are
18 identical. The market share of the countries that
19 remain subject to this order declined by more than 50
20 percent over the course of the original POI, the exact
21 time period which Petitioners themselves believe to be
22 the most important period for your decision. It
23 strains credibility to conclude that a similar fact
24 pattern in any case before the present Commission
25 would yield anything other than a negative

1 determination.

2 If this is the best that Petitioners can do,
3 I'm tempted to just sit down and stop right now, but
4 giving them the benefit of doubt, there are other
5 aspects of Petitioners' arguments that warrant
6 critical comment this afternoon. For example,
7 Petitioners would have you believe that the financial
8 performance of the domestic industry has been poor,
9 even with the orders in place, and that revocation
10 would further injure the domestic industry.

11 A careful review of the record in this case
12 reveals that the domestic industry producing BSS, in
13 fact, is not vulnerable but, rather, quite resilient.
14 I urge the Commission to think about profitability of
15 the domestic industry in the face of what Petitioners
16 would have you believe is a perfect storm of negative
17 market developments which the domestic industry has
18 successfully overcome. Despite a general economic
19 recession during the period of review, exacerbated by
20 the impact of the 9/11 tragedy, a longer-term
21 softening of demand for various reasons, and
22 unprecedented increases in raw material and energy
23 costs, the domestic industry was able to maintain a
24 positive operating profit in every single year of the
25 period of review.

1 In 2004, the last year of the period, and
2 this is very significant in light of Petitioners'
3 theory, in the last full year of the POR, the domestic
4 industry achieved operating profits essentially equal
5 to their level in the base year of 1984 in the
6 original period of investigation.

7 As for the outlook, an article appeared in
8 the American Metal Market on December 27, 2005,
9 reporting that inventories of brass products in the
10 U.S. are expected to remain tight. You heard
11 testimony from the domestic industry this morning that
12 the outlook for 2006 is very good. I agree. We have
13 continuing growth in overall U.S. GDP at a healthy
14 level. This is important because consumers of BSS
15 products span a wide range of industries across
16 various economic sectors. They include manufacturers
17 of automobiles, ammunition, and electronics products.
18 Building and construction firms are another major end
19 user. Therefore, the performance of the domestic
20 industry producing BSS necessarily tracks the general
21 economy.

22 During the general manufacturing recession
23 experienced in the U.S. from 2001 through 2003 --
24 that's distinct from the recession in GDP, which was
25 much shorter in duration -- the BSS industry also

1 experienced declines, as expected. Nevertheless, the
2 industry remained profitable in every single year. In
3 fact, the domestic industry's financial performance
4 was even better than the Commission's traditional
5 profitability analysis reveals.

6 One condition of competition for the BSS
7 industry is that producers and re-rollers separately
8 pass through the cost of the metal to customers under
9 well-established pricing agreements. You heard an
10 excellent description about that system early in this
11 morning's testimony. More recently, U.S. producers
12 have implemented, and customers generally have
13 accepted, surcharges for fuel and energy and, in some
14 cases, natural gas.

15 It's the fabrication charge on which
16 producers earn practically all of their operating
17 revenue and profits. Thus, final net sales values
18 that are inclusive of escalating metal costs
19 necessarily inflate the true sales values of the
20 domestic industry's actual operations in relation to
21 operating or any other measure of profit. For this
22 reason, the Commission should evaluate the
23 profitability of the industry using a so-called
24 "conversion margin," which essentially excludes the
25 metal costs from the equation.

1 I confirmed with the industry's
2 representatives today in Germany and Brazil that this
3 is, in fact, how they monitor their progress in the
4 normal course of their business.

5 So I urge members of the Commission to
6 carefully study Confidential Exhibit 5 to the German
7 prehearing brief which calculates this conversion
8 margin for the domestic industry. This exhibit shows
9 that under this more appropriate measure of
10 profitability, the domestic industry achieved in
11 absolute terms much healthier levels of profit
12 throughout the entire POR than are indicated in the
13 prehearing report, and nothing I heard in this
14 morning's testimony would cause me to change my view
15 in that regard.

16 The prehearing report, I think we now
17 virtually all accept, also contains misleading data
18 with respect to the domestic industry's level of
19 capacity and, therefore, capacity utilization rates.
20 I emphasize that staff is not at all at fault here.
21 Rather, it results from an unusually wide range of
22 assumptions upon which domestic capacity was reported
23 by the individual players. Consequently, the domestic
24 industry's capacity is wildly overstated, thus
25 artificially driving down utilization rates.

1 The rates, as reported in the prehearing
2 report, also are simply unrealistic in the face of
3 reported shortages in the market during the POR and
4 the recent behavior of nonsubject imports. You heard
5 confirmation today that there were extended periods of
6 allocation, at least in 2000 and 2004, and other
7 evidence and testimony today that, to some extent,
8 they continue today.

9 I understand that at least one major
10 revision to the reported domestic capacity data has
11 just been submitted, and we'll analyze that revision
12 for the post-hearing brief.

13 We also call the Commission's attention to
14 the complete lack of harmful correlation between the
15 performance of the domestic industry and the behavior
16 of subject imports. During both the original
17 investigation and this POR, subject imports' market
18 share declined coincident with generally declining
19 levels of operating profitability for the domestic
20 industry, however you measure it. Despite Petitioners
21 claims, the two factors simply are not related in a
22 manner that would support an affirmative
23 determination.

24 Should the Commission accept Petitioners'
25 claim that the domestic industry is in a weakened

1 state, there is no causal connection between its
2 performance and the declining subject imports' share
3 of the domestic market.

4 Once again, focus your attention on a
5 particular statement in Petitioners' prehearing brief.
6 On page 3, Petitioners state, and I quote: "The
7 reasons for the domestic industry's weak condition
8 include a decline in demand for BSS over the period of
9 review with numerous downstream customers relocating
10 offshore, increasing costs of production, and
11 increasing volumes of nonsubject imports."

12 Note that there is no mention of subject
13 imports. Perhaps more important, all three of the
14 factors mentioned are completely unrelated to subject
15 imports' presence in the market.

16 I certainly do not concede that the domestic
17 industry has weakened, but I would like to comment on
18 these three factors that serve as Petitioners' theory
19 on page 3 nonetheless.

20 First, they state that the demand for brass
21 sheet and strip is declining. Although the raw data
22 indicate that apparent consumption has declined over
23 the period of review, this decline was largely
24 cyclical in nature and the result of a general
25 manufacturing recession that occurred roughly between

1 2001 and 2003. So that's three years of the POR right
2 there.

3 Since the substantial decline from 2000 and
4 2001, the demand for BSS has generally expanded.
5 Petitioners would like the Commission to focus on the
6 lean years during the recession. I urge the
7 Commission to evaluate the domestic industry over the
8 entire course of the business cycle, as it should and
9 normally does. Such an analysis will show that the
10 domestic industry is certainly not weak but, rather,
11 quite resilient.

12 The second factor mentioned by Petitioners,
13 increasing cost of production, is also wholly
14 unrelated to subject imports. The Commission should
15 note that a majority of the increases of cost of
16 production are the result of increasing raw materials
17 costs, especially copper. No one in this matter
18 disputes that increases in the cost of raw materials
19 are simply passed through in the form of higher prices
20 to the customer. Thus, they have a minimal effect on
21 the financial performance of the domestic industry.

22 Second, as we are all aware, commodities in
23 general have experienced tremendous increases in
24 prices over the last several years. However, futures
25 exchanges now suggest that moderation of this trend is

1 underway. The January 19, 2006, edition of the Wall
2 Street Journal reported that futures prices for copper
3 scheduled for March of 2007 are five cents per pound
4 lower than currently. Once again, the Commission
5 should consider the recent cost increases in the
6 context of a full business cycle and the fact that BSS
7 producers worldwide paid the same world prices for key
8 alloy elements. All parties agree on that.

9 The third major factor cited by Petitioners
10 is a reportedly significant increase in nonsubject
11 imports. Now, the testimony this morning was
12 particularly enlightening on that score, and I
13 emphasize that you pick up a confidential exhibit that
14 was just reprinted from the prehearing brief on the
15 subject of nonsubject imports. I understand that
16 that's been passed out to you all by the secretary's
17 office.

18 Now, essentially, Petitioners are arguing
19 that you should look to the behavior of nonsubject
20 imports during the POR as a forecast of what would
21 happen to subject imports in the event of revocation
22 and also as a cause of the domestic industry's
23 vulnerability. Well, they principally rely on
24 nonsubject imports from the formerly subject
25 countries: Sweden, Korea, and the Netherlands.

1 Now, think about the public testimony this
2 morning. There is no production any longer in Sweden,
3 and the imports from Korea and the Netherlands, in the
4 case of the Netherlands, were of a product that
5 couldn't be made to the appropriate quality by a
6 domestic producer, and the material from Korea was
7 bridging material that helped them start a domestic
8 production operation.

9 So owing to the circumstances testified to
10 this morning, how could the behavior of those imports
11 possibly be a forecasting tool for the future behavior
12 of entirely different subject imports from a different
13 set of countries? It's inconceivable. And, secondly,
14 how can the industry be vulnerable to an increase in
15 nonsubject imports that it mostly accounted for, and
16 that increase is explained by the special
17 circumstances testified to this morning by the
18 domestic industry itself?

19 These facts alone effectively destroy
20 Petitioners' argument regarding the significance of
21 nonsubject imports. Nevertheless, should the
22 Commission conclude that the domestic industry is in a
23 weakened state, there is nothing in the record to
24 indicate that revocation of the orders would disturb
25 the domestic market or otherwise affect the domestic

1 industry.

2 As shown in my public exhibits and
3 Respondents' briefs, subject imports in the aggregate
4 have been declining over the original investigation,
5 both absolutely and as a share of the domestic market,
6 and simply continued that trend thereafter. It's
7 doubtful the Commission would have reached an
8 affirmative determination originally against the
9 countries now subject to this order.

10 Under a revocation scenario, Petitioners
11 would have you believe that subject imports would
12 flood back into the market in significant quantities.
13 Two major obstacles prevent such a result. As shown
14 in Exhibit 3 of the Germany prehearing brief, prices
15 in the U.S. market are not above world market levels,
16 and, in fact, in many cases are below the prices that
17 could be achieved elsewhere. Thus, producers have no
18 incentive to divert shipments to the U.S. market
19 should the orders be revoked. The strong value and
20 increasing value of the euro and, more recently, the
21 strengthening of the Brazilian real, further
22 discourage diversion of shipments to the U.S. market.

23 You heard testimony from one of the Germany
24 industry witnesses that the U.S. industry now
25 generally controls distribution as well as production

1 of BSS in the United States, another barrier to
2 increasing subject imports. Brazil and Germany have
3 no significant available capacity to increase
4 production of BSS.

5 Germany had been the largest exporter to the
6 U.S. among the currently subject countries. However,
7 German capacity and production have declined
8 substantially since the original POI. Wieland, the
9 largest exporter, has established manufacturing
10 operations in the United States. The Commission
11 should also note that exports to the U.S. of Wieland's
12 nonsubject brass sheet and strip products, classified
13 otherwise in the same HTS numbers, have declined
14 steadily, both during and since the time of the
15 original investigation.

16 A simple fact is that the most promising
17 growth markets for BSS are in other parts of the
18 world, especially Asia.

19 All of these circumstances combine to make
20 it extremely unlikely that subject imports would come
21 back into the U.S. market in any meaningful
22 quantities. Should the Commission nonetheless
23 conclude that subject import market share would
24 increase upon revocation, it's very likely that such
25 increase would be at the expense of nonsubject imports

1 rather than domestic production. Although the data
2 are confidential, I urge the Commission to investigate
3 the channels of distribution for domestic shipments,
4 on the one hand, and subject and nonsubject imports on
5 the other.

6 Given the role that domestic producers
7 themselves play with respect to nonsubject imports, it
8 is much more likely that the response to any
9 hypothetically significant increase in subject imports
10 would be a commensurate decline in nonsubject imports
11 rather than domestic production. Thus, the domestic
12 industry is not somehow threatened by increasing
13 subject imports should these orders be revoked.

14 Thank you, and I would be pleased to answer
15 any questions.

16 MR. SHOR: Mr. Chairman, that concludes our
17 presentation.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you very much. I
19 appreciate your responses to our questions, and,
20 again, as we go through our questions this afternoon,
21 if you would continuously reidentify yourselves for
22 the record to assist the reporter, and we'll begin the
23 questioning with Commissioner Aranoff.

24 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
25 Chairman. Let me be the first to welcome the

1 afternoon panel, and thank you for being with us to
2 answer our questions this afternoon.

3 Let me start with a question for Mr. Traa.
4 Am I pronouncing it correctly? Thank you.

5 MR. TRAA: Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: In your brief, you
7 make the argument, and I think you also made it in
8 your testimony, that German imports would continue to
9 be quite small if the orders were removed and that the
10 only opportunity for increased imports would be to
11 some very specialized, high-quality customers in the
12 U.S.

13 I know that in your brief you analogize your
14 company's situation with the situation of the Korean
15 producer and with OAB, who are affiliated to foreign
16 producers for which the Commission revoked orders in
17 the last round of reviews in this case. Both of those
18 U.S. affiliates are integrated producers, whereas
19 Wieland's affiliate in the U.S. is a re-roller.

20 Why wouldn't there be an incentive for your
21 company to ship partially finished product to be re-
22 rolled in the U.S.?

23 MR. TRAA: For me, the main reason would be
24 that we would not put capacity into heavy-gauge
25 material and ship this to the United States at a price

1 which is not interesting for us. We would rather use
2 that capacity for producing high-quality products and
3 shipping it either in Europe or, of course, to Asia
4 into the high-performance alloys -- nickel, silver,
5 phosphor bronze -- as I've said before.

6 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: So is it your
7 contention that your capacity utilization is already
8 so high that there is just no room to add this product
9 to ship to the U.S., or is it just that even if you
10 had capacity, you wouldn't do it because this is a
11 low-end product and not worth the money?

12 MR. TRAA: I would say it's a low-end
13 product, and at this point, at this moment, with the
14 current exchange rate, it wouldn't make any sense for
15 us to ship this to the United States.

16 MR. SHOR: Just to emphasize the point about
17 the exchange rate --

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Could you move your
19 microphone closer, Mr. Shor?

20 MR. SHOR: I'm sorry. Just to emphasize
21 about the exchange rate, and perhaps Markus could also
22 comment, at current exchange rates, it is much cheaper
23 for Wieland Metals U.S. to purchase that re-roll
24 material from Olin, its current supplier, than to
25 import it from Germany. That's just a function of the

1 market.

2 MR. SCHULER: Markus Schuler. I would like
3 to add some comments here from the buying/receiving
4 end in the United States to this question.

5 While the parent company may or may not have
6 interest in supplying to the United States, I
7 certainly don't have any interest in buying from them.
8 Certainly, one of the reasons, Werner just mentioned.
9 A couple of the other reasons are very obvious and
10 were actually stated this morning by our domestic
11 producers.

12 The industry has really, really changed.
13 The long lead times that it would require certainly
14 would require us to stock far more material at our
15 warehouse in order to make sure that we're covered at
16 all times.

17 Now, with the interest rates where they are,
18 transportation costs where they are, and the metal
19 prices where they are, the financing of additional
20 volume is really not up to us. It was also stated
21 this morning that there is really not much margin left
22 in selling brass here in the United States market. I
23 agree with that. I don't have the margin to spend it
24 on capital expenditures for extended volumes of raw
25 material that I would have to do because the supply

1 chain from Germany is three to four months, and with
2 transportation costs rising and transportation more
3 and more affected and slowed for various reasons, it's
4 certainly not a feasible undertaking for us.

5 There's another couple of reasons. The
6 relationship we have with our U.S. supplier certainly
7 also enables us to buy on short notice. You also
8 heard this morning that the visibility of orders,
9 incoming orders, has been shorter than ever. Today,
10 you will see customers wanting to receive material
11 before they received order confirmations in 1984. The
12 visibility is just not there anymore. Reaction times
13 do not allow me to go, on our major product that takes
14 up the majority of our production, into inventories
15 that I just simply can't afford. The space that I
16 need to store that material -- I would just not be
17 willing to consider it for the mainstream of our
18 production.

19 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: I appreciate those
20 answers, and in response to them I would say that I
21 understand the scenario that you're describing for why
22 this wouldn't make sense. It's based on, as I
23 understand it, two assumptions which I hope that you
24 will provide some support for, either now or in your
25 brief, just to round out the argument. One, the

1 exchange rate argument, as, I think my colleague the
2 Vice Chairman was raising this morning with the
3 Petitioners, how should we address the exchange rate
4 issue when we're looking at the reasonably foreseeable
5 future to the extent that your incentives that face
6 you now with the exchange rate situation the way it is
7 might change. I don't know what kind of assumptions
8 the commission can make about exchange rates in the
9 reasonably foreseeable future. But second, obviously,
10 this situation of what the U.S. re-rollers'
11 motivations might be depends on a business model that
12 allows it to make its own decisions. I don't know
13 what the control situation is between the German
14 parent and the U.S. affiliate in terms of whose
15 profits are the major concern in how those decisions
16 are made about where the U.S. re-roller is going to
17 buy from.

18 I don't know, Mr. Shor, if there's something
19 you want to add now?

20 MR. SHOR: Yes. If I could address a couple
21 of those points real quickly? And Markus can respond
22 as well.

23 On the exchange rate, I think Markus will
24 explain that we're not talking about small changes
25 that are necessary in the exchange rate. We're not

1 talking about the Euro moving from 123 to 120 that
2 suddenly it makes it profitable. There would have to
3 be a large movement before it would be cheaper to
4 import from Germany than it is now. And that's why
5 you're seeing, again, on the non-subject brass that's
6 imported from Germany, that is also declining as well
7 for much of the same reason. It is not just the
8 subject brass.

9 MR. SCHULER: I think we have to, on the
10 exchange rate side here, look at the much longer
11 trend. If you go back to the 1980s and compare that
12 with the range we are trading today, it was the German
13 Mark back then and it's the Euro today, if you said
14 that in relation, the span of change that we see at
15 this time, the downward trend overall is perfectly
16 clear. We would need to go back to values
17 significantly away from where they are today.

18 MR. SHOR: The second part of your question
19 addressed the intercompany relationships and the
20 control issue but, as I understood Mr. Traa's
21 testimony, that was not the issue at all.

22 I think if you look at the confidential
23 information in terms of the excess capacity Wieland
24 has in particular, there isn't enough there to satisfy
25 the needs of Wieland Metals, is the first point.

1 Second, I just wanted to make sure you understand the
2 point that I understood Werner to be making.

3 Re-rolled material is much thicker material.
4 What they send to Wieland Metals and the margins on
5 re-rolled material are not as great as the margins on
6 material that they further process because they make
7 their money on processing. So it would not make sense
8 for them to shift production from a higher profit
9 product to a lower profit product on the Germany side.

10 MR. TRAA: Yes, that's correct.

11 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. Let me move
12 on, then. Thank you for those answers. A related
13 question.

14 In your brief, the argument is made that the
15 German industry has downsized and brought its capacity
16 into line with demand while the U.S. industry has not
17 done the same, but I'm not sure that that's consistent
18 with Mr. Traa's testimony this morning, so could you
19 just clarify for me, if you could, have there actually
20 been any plant closures or reductions in capacity in
21 the German industry over the period of review or has
22 the capacity been shifted to other products?

23 MR. TRAA: We shifted, actually, the
24 production to other products, so our main focus over
25 the last years is of course, besides Europe, the Asian

1 market and there are alloys, alloy groups, which are
2 considered as high performance alloys. For example,
3 one is called C194, which is also in the 100 series.
4 It's the base material for lead frames for computer
5 chips, so Intel is one of the end users of that
6 product. We consider ourselves as one of the
7 worldwide main suppliers for that product, so,
8 whatever capacity is there, we shift into this
9 production of that highly sophisticated material.

10 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much.
11 My time is up.

12 MR. SCHULER: Can I add one quick sentence?
13 The shifting also means that other downstream
14 equipment has to be installed, so shifting back would
15 mean idling that additional equipment that was set up
16 to producer the higher grade materials.

17 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much,
18 Mr. Schuler.

19 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

21 Mr. Schuler, maybe you can help me out here.
22 I just want to make sure I heard correctly. Did you
23 testify that you're currently on allocation with your
24 U.S. supplier? Did you say that?

25 MR. SCHULER: That is correct. We are on a

1 long-term agreement. As per a long-term agreement, we
2 are getting a share, the share that we have agreed
3 upon, but it has refused to give us additional
4 material.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Because this
6 morning, I thought I heard them say that any
7 allocation had ended, that there were no more
8 allocations. If you could provide the details of that
9 for purposes of the post-hearing, I would appreciate
10 it.

11 MR. SCHULER: No problem.

12 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: It's in conflict with what
13 I heard this morning.

14 MR. SCHULER: We certainly will do that.

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

16 Mr. Bruno, you argue at pages 9 and 10 of
17 your brief that if the commission does not find the no
18 discernable adverse impact standard met, we should not
19 exercise our discretion to cumulate imports of BSS
20 from Brazil with the other subject countries because
21 of conditions similar to those the commission
22 determined to exist for South Africa in the cut-to-
23 length quality steel plate investigation regarding
24 China, Russia, South Africa and Ukraine.

25 I remind you that I differed from the

1 majority in that opinion with regard to South Africa
2 and exercised my discretion to cumulate their subject
3 products with those from China, Russia and Ukraine,
4 but I won't hold that against you. I just thought I
5 would note that for the record.

6 With that in mind, I've got a couple of
7 questions to follow up with you on that.

8 First, with respect to non-subject products
9 such as copper and bronze, which were mentioned this
10 afternoon, do Brazilian producers have unused capacity
11 that could be shifted to the production of BSS?

12 We haven't asked it that way, I don't think,
13 so far.

14 MR. BRUNO: I'm going to ask the industry
15 representative to speak on behalf of Eluma. I do not
16 have this information but I certainly could get it for
17 the post-hearing brief.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Could you do that? I'd be
19 happy to hear from him, but if you could do that for
20 the post-hearing brief, I would appreciate it as well.

21 MR. BRUNO: We will certainly do it,
22 Chairman Koplan.

23 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly.

24 Go ahead, sir.

25 MR. BAIALUNA: The whole capacity of our

1 plan is split between the three product lines, brass,
2 bronze and other alloys. The capacity is all mostly
3 100 for all products.

4 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: For all of them?

5 MR. BAIALUNA: Yes.

6 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: So then you're saying that
7 with regard to your company, you could not shift
8 because you're at full capacity?

9 MR. BAIALUNA: Even if I could shift, I will
10 lose market in my other product lines. For sure I use
11 the same equipment, I could shift. Also, looking at
12 my numbers, Commissioner, you could see that my
13 capacity even if I do that will be very limited
14 because I put in my report the number that I am
15 producing of C200 alloys and all other alloys. So
16 it's possible to estimate what it would be and it will
17 be not so significant the change and we will represent
18 a marketing loss for all other products from the
19 company.

20 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. I appreciate
21 that.

22 Now, let me come back to you again, Mr.
23 Bruno. I note that a majority of domestic producers,
24 importers and purchasers rated BSS from Brazil and
25 domestic sources as always or frequently

1 interchangeably. That's the staff report in Chapter 2
2 at page 24.

3 Do you agree that subject Brazilian products
4 are at least substitutable for the domestic product?

5 MR. BRUNO: Yes, we would agree, Chairman
6 Koplan. This is a question that I discussed with
7 Eluma's representatives and I can tell you that they
8 produce and export what they call the standard type of
9 brass, so they are not into a niche market or low
10 quality or high quality, they are just standard brass.
11 So in this respect, they would compete in terms of
12 physical characteristics and end users with the U.S.
13 industry.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. I have another
15 one for you.

16 You argue at page 20 of your brief, and I'm
17 quoting, "There is attenuated competition between
18 subject imports sold to distributors on a spot basis
19 and domestic product sold to end users under long-term
20 contracts." That's a quote.

21 Don't spot sales of subject imports to
22 distributors make it easier for subject producers to
23 penetrate the U.S. market at least with regard to
24 smaller volume customers?

25 MR. BRUNO: Certain, Chairman Koplan, but

1 the point is that they would not be able to go after
2 the large end users and therefore any penetration
3 would be certainly limited. That was the purpose of
4 that point we were making.

5 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes, I understood that. I
6 just wanted to close the loop with regard to the
7 smaller ones.

8 MR. BRUNO: That's right.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Thank you for that.
10 Mr. Malashevich, at page 37 of their brief,
11 the domestics claim that, and I'm quoting, "The
12 productive capacity of the Germany industry is
13 significantly larger than at the time of the original
14 investigation" and "its ability to shift to the United
15 States is now far greater."

16 They also urge the commission to page 38 of
17 their brief to assume that the entire capacity of non-
18 responding brass producers which they assert is 770
19 million pounds, and I heard this afternoon that you're
20 not exactly stipulating to that, can be and would be
21 devoted to the subject product in the event of
22 revocation.

23 Should the commission base its analysis on
24 the entire capacity as the best information available
25 or can you provide the commission with reliable data

1 of the BSS capacity of subject non-responding Germany
2 firms and could you please include a discussion of the
3 ability to shift capacity?

4 Mr. Traa, I believe, reported current
5 production for us.

6 Mr. Malashevich?

7 MR. MALASHEVICH: Well, first of all, I
8 think it goes without saying that primary source data
9 is always preferred and I believe at least one angle
10 of your question was addressed in your testimony of
11 the Germany witnesses just a few moments ago.

12 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Yes.

13 MR. MALASHEVICH: I don't know if I could
14 add anything to their testimony at this time, but I
15 would invite them, if they feel they have material
16 that they could share with you now, invite them to
17 respond to your question completely and I will make
18 every effort I can post-hearing to work with the
19 representatives to answer your question in greater
20 depth, but I defer to them at the moment.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

22 I didn't mean to cut you off, Mr. Shor. Go
23 ahead.

24 MR. SHOR: That's fine. I know it's
25 difficult to absorb a lot of facts when they're read

1 to you, but let me clarify Mr. Traa's testimony. I
2 think it will be clear in the transcript.

3 Of the other four Germany producers, three
4 of those are not integrated producers. They do not
5 produce any raw material. They purchase all of their
6 material from either Schwermetall, a reporting
7 producer, or Wieland, a reporting producer, so you
8 have all their data because it would be double
9 counting to include their production and their
10 capacity and Wieland and Schwermetall's capacity.

11 The only other producer who has not
12 responded was Plettenberg.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Excuse me. I didn't catch
14 it.

15 MR. SHOR: It was Plettenberg. We provided
16 their capacity information and that's what we used in
17 our estimate of production. We took their total
18 available capacity and assumed that that was all
19 devoted to the subject product and used that as the
20 basis for saying that the three responding producers
21 accounted for 90 percent. So we already made the most
22 adverse assumption based on the available data to us.
23 There are no other producers of subject merchandise in
24 Germany.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

1 Did the Germany producers wish to add
2 anything to all this?

3 MR. TRAA: No, I think it's all said.

4 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: It's covered?

5 MR. TRAA: It's covered. I guess we have
6 letters from those companies showing this or telling
7 us this or confirming this information.

8 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Thank you for that.
9 I saw, Mr. Shor, you were nodding in
10 agreement with Mr. Traa.

11 MR. SHOR: We'll provide those with our
12 post-hearing brief.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: You've got to say with
14 your mic. You'll provide it with your post-hearing
15 brief, Mr. Shor?

16 MR. SHOR: We'll provide the letters with
17 our post-hearing brief.

18 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Thanks.

19 Mr. Shor, let me stay with you and your mic.
20 In a footnote in the domestic brief, it's footnote 31,
21 but the discussion is bracketed, the domestics claim
22 that re-rolled import materials could be sourced
23 outside a subject country. This was asked this
24 morning. Would such material be considered subject
25 product if re-rolled in a subject country? That was

1 asked this morning as well. And your answer is?

2 MR. SHOR: I think if it's re-rolled in
3 Germany, it counts as subject merchandise, yes.

4 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: So that's your answer?

5 MR. SHOR: Yes. But, again, Prymetall is a
6 re-roller and this relates to a question that was
7 asked before. When you're dealing with capacity and
8 production data, all three rollers and producers we
9 agree count as part of the domestic industry or count
10 as part of the foreign industry, but you have to be
11 careful so as not to double count the same capacity
12 and the same production or the same pound of material
13 twice.

14 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

15 I see my red light has just come on. I'll
16 turn to Vice Chairman Okun.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you, Mr.
18 Chairman.

19 I join my colleagues in welcoming this panel
20 here this afternoon. I appreciate your willingness to
21 participate and answer our questions and for the
22 information you've submitted.

23 Let me start with you, Mr. Baialuna, just
24 with some additional questions about future demand in
25 Brazil. In your brief and in your testimony today,

1 you had talked about home market demand and you're
2 anticipating that it's going to continue to be strong.
3 My first question would be whether you could be more
4 specific about what end uses are driving the home
5 market demand in Brazil and kind of the relative
6 strength of each.

7 MR. BAIALUNA: Well, it's almost in order,
8 as I put in my testimony, first of all, the automotive
9 industry. The automotive industry in Brazil is quite
10 strong, not only for the domestic market but due to
11 the exports of these companies. The second one is
12 telecommunications, telecommunication equipment, and
13 after that construction. There is also another one
14 that is not here that is actually the second and it's
15 the ammunition is brass strips for ammunition
16 production.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Do you have any
18 information or studies or anything external that you
19 could point to or put in the record for us to help us
20 see the statistics or the demand that you see as a
21 company, whether that's a business plan or outside
22 analysis that would support that?

23 MR. BAIALUNA: I will try.

24 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Anything that
25 you have or that you could find to help. I can look

1 at what we see in the record with regard to your home
2 market shipments now, but I just want to make sure I
3 understand the demand.

4 Yes, Mr. Bruno?

5 MR. BRUNO: Vice Chairman Okun, I just want
6 to point out, though, and I do understand that the
7 information you need is very relevant here, but that
8 the growth in the domestic demand in Brazil has been a
9 long-term trend. We're looking at basically 10 years
10 of increasing sales to that market, so this is not a
11 recent phenomenon and that's the reason why this
12 industry is projecting that it will continue to grow.
13 We're talking about structural demands in the country
14 such as construction, telecommunications and so forth.
15 So we will be happy to provide surveys and statistics
16 about those various industry sectors, but I just
17 wanted to point out that it is not a recent fluke, it
18 is really something that has been going on for many,
19 many years.

20 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I appreciate that.

21 I had asked the question this morning, I was
22 curious about it, have there been any changes in
23 regulations or laws in Brazil with respect to the auto
24 industry that are relevant to the domestic auto
25 industry in Brazil?

1 MR. BAIALUNA: I'm sorry, I do not get your
2 question.

3 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I think we were either
4 talking with staff or looking at something through the
5 newsclips. They were talking about the Brazilian auto
6 industry, there being a requirement that the cars
7 being sold in Brazil be primarily from domestic
8 production and I wasn't sure if that was a law in
9 Brazil or if it's just erroneous information. I'm
10 trying to figure out if you know that or if you could
11 find that.

12 MR. BAIALUNA: I'm sorry, I do not have the
13 information. I really don't know.

14 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay.

15 Yes, Mr. Bruno?

16 MR. BRUNO: We will inquire about this and
17 provide any information in the post-hearing brief.

18 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. That would be
19 helpful.

20 The other thing I had mentioned this
21 morning, again, from sources not yet on the record,
22 but whether CVRD has announced plans to enter the
23 copper and brass industry.

24 Is that anything you're familiar with, Mr.
25 Baialuna?

1 MR. BAIALUNA: CVRD is Company --

2 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Right.

3 MR. BAIALUNA: But it is not a company
4 linked with my group.

5 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: But is it a company --
6 are you aware of they are --

7 MR. BAIALUNA: Actually, this company is
8 exploring copper ore. They're a new reserve in Brazil
9 and they are exploring, but they are a raw material
10 producer for us. We are transformers and also they do
11 not have a refinery so they only produce the copper
12 ore, the mineral, and so other refineries would
13 produce the copper cathodes or the copper ingots that
14 would be the raw material for my company. There is
15 not the linkage --

16 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: So you're staying in
17 the raw materials.

18 MR. BAIALUNA: Yes.

19 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: The business to be in
20 right now. Yes. Okay. I appreciate that.

21 And you had responded, and Mr. Bruno,
22 perhaps for post-hearing, I just want to make sure I
23 understand the arguments with regard to whether the
24 capacity that we have on record, whether there has
25 been an expansion in capacity in the Brazilian

1 industry in 2005 in particular.

2 MR. BRUNO: I believe that the only -- if
3 you're referring to the announcements made in the
4 newspaper articles that were mentioned this morning in
5 the testimony of the U.S. industry, I would like
6 Eluma's representative to address that. I think with
7 respect to the Brazilian industry you have now the
8 data. There is one little correction that had been
9 made in the earlier version that was not made in the
10 most recent version of that data which I communicated
11 to staff yesterday. But in any case, with respect to
12 Eluma, I would prefer to have Mr. Baialuna --

13 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Please. Mr. Baialuna?

14 MR. BAIALUNA: Regarding investments in the
15 newspapers it's true, it's the investment for the
16 whole group. My group has other companies also, a
17 copper refinery, a tin producer. Eluma also has other
18 products that -- Eluma is a copper fittings producer.
19 We are leaders in Brazil for tubes and fittings for
20 plumbing. We produce brass wires, copper and brass
21 wires. So the investment is for the whole group, not
22 dedicated to specifically to the production of flat
23 products or specifically what we are talking here,
24 brass products.

25 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I appreciate

1 that. If there are any documents or information that
2 you could submit post-hearing to further clarify that,
3 I would appreciate that as well.

4 MR. BAIALUNA: We will do so.

5 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Then let me turn to a
6 question to the panel with regard to demand in China
7 and the arguments made by the domestic industry that
8 China, while it had been a growing market, is starting
9 to turn the corner and a lot of products will have to
10 find somewhere else to go. Again, one of the things
11 we had asked for this morning was whether there was
12 any more specific information that could be submitted
13 to help us better understand demand and consumption
14 trends in China.

15 Mr. Shor?

16 MR. SHOR: Let me start by just putting some
17 of the numbers in context. Petitioners had a table in
18 their brief --

19 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: If you can pull your
20 mic closer, I can't hear you very well.

21 MR. SHOR: I'm not doing well with the mic
22 today.

23 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: You've got to use it,
24 you've got to pull it closer.

25 MR. SHOR: The Petitioners had a table in

1 their brief showing the import volumes into China of
2 subject brass. They left those in short tons, but let
3 me translate into million pounds for you.

4 For Brazil, we're talking 600 pounds is the
5 total imports from Brazil. For Germany, it was 1.4
6 million pounds. These are insignificant volumes.
7 China is an insignificant market for this product for
8 the companies before you. Even if you look at all the
9 subject countries, it's something on the order of
10 14 million pounds, which is roughly under 3 percent of
11 U.S. consumption. Even if every pound of material
12 that's going to China is all subject brass, which it's
13 not, and even if it were all diverted to the United
14 States, which no one is arguing would happen, it would
15 still be insignificant. The quantities are just not
16 there.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. Well, I
18 appreciate those comments and, just again, for post-
19 hearing, to help us better understand both the
20 argument of what China is shipping into these other
21 markets and to the extent there are exports by the
22 subject producers into China, we talked a little bit
23 about what that trend line is and what it might be
24 doing in the future, but anything --

25 Mr. Traa, you look like you wanted to jump

1 in there. Please.

2 MR. TRAA: Werner Traa. I would like to add
3 to -- Mr. Bartel this morning, informed something
4 about the Chinese market and that there is some
5 capacity coming on. This is correct. I can agree to
6 that. A couple of companies in China informed the
7 world that they are going to invest into additional
8 capacity. The point for me is it's not yet -- some of
9 those investments are not yet fixed. One important
10 thing is also that I wanted to inform you that looking
11 at who is the companies that are producing right now,
12 the major share of the Chinese consumption, those are
13 Taiwanese companies. A couple of years ago, there had
14 been established three major companies. One is called
15 S & T, one is Ming Jia Li and one is First Copper,
16 which are well known in our industry. They are
17 producing at this point a major share for the Chinese
18 market and for their consumption.

19 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I appreciate
20 that. Again, anything else that we can get post-
21 hearing on the specifics would be great.

22 Mr. Traa, when you were talking about the
23 product mix that your company is producing now and you
24 had focused on the high value -- my red light is on
25 and this might take you more -- I'll come back to

1 that, Mr. Traa.

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

3 Commissioner Hillman?

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you.

5 I, too, would join my colleagues in
6 welcoming all of you this afternoon. We very much
7 appreciate your time and your testimony.

8 Maybe, Mr. Traa, if I could stay with you in
9 general to try to make sure I understand it. You
10 described a lot of your exports both to the United
11 States and to the extent that you were describing them
12 to China as niche, high end, unique products. Just so
13 I understand it, do you export any commodity type
14 brass sheet and strip to the U.S. or to any other
15 third country market?

16 MR. TRAA: Yes, we export, of course, some
17 commodity-type product into other countries. We have
18 copper strip which we export to the United States and
19 we do the same in also brass to China. As we
20 mentioned, it's 1.5 million pounds which is actually
21 brass or the material which is subject that we export
22 to China.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. Would you have
24 a sense of what portion of your total exports to the
25 U.S. market would be of this high quality niche

1 product versus what portion would be of what we would
2 describe as more of a commodity product?

3 MR. SHOR: Wieland has had no exports to the
4 U.S. for the last five years.

5 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I'm sorry. To
6 your third country markets. I'm just trying to get a
7 sense of how much of it is --

8 MR. SHOR: We'll provide that in our post-
9 hearing brief. It's confidential information.

10 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Fair enough. Fair
11 enough. I appreciate that.

12 Maybe, Mr. Pages, if I can go back to you a
13 little bit on this issue of what has been the result
14 of the changes in your source of supply. You stated
15 that you lost the business of Delta Faucet because of
16 the insufficient quality of the brass sheet and strip
17 that you were using once you no longer had access to
18 the Wieland product.

19 MR. PAGES: That's correct.

20 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. Do you know
21 who Delta switched to buying from?

22 MR. PAGES: Yes, I do.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And do you know where
24 that company sources its brass sheet and strip?

25 MR. PAGES: I believe they produce it

1 themselves.

2 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I'm not trying
3 to get into business proprietary information, but if
4 there are specifics on this that you can put on the
5 record, again, if you're in a position to tell us now
6 who did they switch to, if you would prefer to put
7 that in a post-hearing brief if it's confidential,
8 that's fine as well.

9 MR. PAGES: I know I lost the business to
10 Olin.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: To Olin? Okay. All
12 right.

13 MR. SHOR: And that's particularly
14 significant for a small producer. One thing to keep
15 in mind is some of the integrated producers here are
16 vertically integrated down into some of the finished
17 brass products, so Olin will produce plumbing fixtures
18 and things like that that compete with some of its
19 customers.

20 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. All right. I
21 appreciate that answer.

22 Coming back on the German side, given that
23 the German industry appears to have at least some
24 unused capacity, again, we can argue a lot about how
25 much of it there is, why wouldn't it make sense to use

1 some of that, to use that unused capacity to make
2 additional sales in the U.S., to spread those fixed
3 costs over a greater volume of sales?

4 MR. TRAA: I'm sorry, I was interrupted. I
5 didn't understand the end of your question. I'm sorry.

6 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: As I understand it,
7 there may be some disagreement over the size of the
8 number, but I think everybody is agreeing that there
9 is at least some unused capacity in Germany, yet the
10 argument is you're not going to ship any more to the
11 United States and I'm trying to understand why not.
12 Why not fill that unused capacity and make additional
13 sales into the U.S. market and spread your fixed costs
14 out?

15 MR. TRAA: As soon as we would fill up our
16 capacity to 100 percent, I wouldn't be able to be
17 flexible for all other customers. We do have
18 contracts with customers on a long-term delivery and
19 long-term relationship. If we fill up our capacity
20 just to the 100 percent which was discussed the whole
21 day about the question what is the real capacity of
22 each individual company, we at least at Wieland, we
23 don't fill up our capacity to 100 percent. We try to
24 keep it at 90 percent so that we are able to be
25 flexible to get in orders for the remaining 10 percent

1 on a flexible, one or two-week lead time and this we
2 couldn't do with shipping over to the United States.

3 And the other point of course is I haven't
4 heard this today also this morning, for me there is
5 always a question regarding what is the real capacity
6 in regards to the gauges. Over the last years, the
7 gauges, the thickness of the material all in the
8 industry went down. The average thickness, from my
9 understanding, with our customers at least, was
10 reduced. If you go just by quantities, by tonnage, as
11 we discussed during the whole day, this is from my
12 feeling not the right way. If you have a very, very
13 thin gauge material you cannot assume the same
14 capacity as if you have heavy gauge material which is
15 typically used, for example, for ammunition and so on.
16 If you on the other side use for electronics very thin
17 gauge, you cannot produce the same quantity. So
18 that's the other point in all those arguments and
19 discussions regarding capacities we have.

20 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And just so I
21 understand it, you're suggesting that over the last
22 five years there has been in general a move toward
23 lighter gauges, thinner material being sold, a higher
24 percentage of your sales are of a thinner gauge?

25 MR. TRAA: Yes, there is a trend. And I

1 would say this is a worldwide trend because of the
2 higher metal prices and so on, customers like to
3 reduce the gauges, the thickness of the material. If
4 I take again the electronics, we see it very, very
5 much, the miniaturization -- I hope I pronounced the
6 words correct. You see it everywhere, smaller pieces,
7 smaller parts, smaller gauges, so therefore I have
8 always a problem of really finding out what is the
9 real capacity because of this gauge situation. It
10 goes down step by step.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I appreciate
12 that.

13 Mr. Shor?

14 MR. SHOR: Commissioner Hillman, there is
15 one other point I'm going to ask Werner to address,
16 which is we heard this morning from the U.S. industry
17 that the mills basically run 24/7, that's the most
18 efficient operation. It's very different in Germany
19 and it is not necessarily the case that increasing
20 your production up to your capacity level reduces your
21 costs. There are other labor issues and other issues
22 that I'd like Mr. Traa to address.

23 MR. TRAA: Yes. Maybe for the labor issue
24 also my colleague Mr. Hanisch, who is also on the
25 board of Wieland, can help me because he is our

1 personnel director regarding labor issues. But it is
2 correct. I used to run the U.S. operation, so I was
3 the predecessor of Mr. Schuler. He is back. At that
4 time, I know in the U.S. it's very easy to have people
5 work on Saturday, Sunday, which is basically normal.
6 When I returned to Germany, of course, this was in
7 2000, we heard a lot about this timeframe when the
8 markets were booming. I came back and tried the same
9 thing in Germany and they basically told me that this
10 is, because of the German labor laws it's not
11 possible. So we run our plants there typically five
12 days a week. Sometimes Saturday morning, but that's
13 it. So a seven-day week is just not possible
14 according to German law and there the lawyer is the
15 right person to talk to.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Mr. Hanisch, did you
17 want to add anything?

18 MR. HANISCH: I'm Joerg Hanisch and I'm also
19 a member of the executive board of Wieland.
20 Concerning labor, I would maybe just describe - maybe
21 Wieland has a different strategy in employment. We
22 believe in life-long employment. That means that we
23 have to be very economical with our workforce because
24 we don't throw them out when we have less work and
25 then get them back in when we have more work. We just

1 really try to have a steady workforce and we try to do
2 it through equivalents with time accounts where we
3 give people, let's say, that they work maybe when they
4 are younger they work more. They can save something
5 on their time accounts and when they get older and
6 let's say a little bit weaker they work less, but they
7 have saved some time accounts and so forth so that we
8 really get them all through. That means that
9 certainly we do not have the flexibility like the
10 American industry maybe who could easily lay off
11 someone. We cannot do that.

12 Therefore, what Werner said, Saturday,
13 Sunday, we always would have to pay extra surcharges,
14 I don't know what you call it, for those hours.
15 Therefore, we have to try to be first very economical
16 and second, of course, have the best technology
17 available so that we make best use of our workforce.

18 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: And that is a
19 function of German law or a policy of your company?
20 In other words, do other German companies do the same?

21 MR. HANISCH: The German tariff law is that
22 we cannot lay off people easily and so forth. The
23 other, let's say, we believe in having long-term
24 relationships with our workforce. That certainly is
25 Wieland and I would say maybe part of our success,

1 that, even through hard times, we got through because
2 we have people very much devoted to the company.

3 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. I
4 appreciate that answer. Thank you very much.

5 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you.

6 Commissioner Lane?

7 COMMISSIONER LANE: Thank you.

8 Good afternoon.

9 Mr. Malashevich, I'd like to start with you.
10 You heard my question this morning of Mr. Kerwin
11 talking about pricing in other markets other than the
12 United States. Can you provide me with information
13 post-hearing as to the price comparisons of BSS in the
14 European Union and other countries, including the
15 subject countries, as compared to the prices in the
16 United States and what conclusions would you draw with
17 regard to those prices as to whether or not the
18 Respondents would come back into this market if the
19 orders were revoked?

20 MR. MALASHEVICH: Yes, Commissioner, I will
21 do that to the best of my ability.

22 COMMISSIONER LANE: Okay. Thank you.

23 Petitioners state that the basic conditions
24 of competition and terms of sales of BSS including
25 most notably the commodity nature of the product and

1 the price-based nature of competition have not changed
2 since the orders were imposed. In the Respondents'
3 briefs at pages 26 through 30, it was stated that
4 there have been no less than seven changes in the
5 conditions of competition.

6 Please explain this discrepancy, if you can,
7 and why are these changes significant.

8 MR. SHOR: I guess the reason for the
9 discrepancy is we don't agree with them. I don't know
10 how to explain it any better than that.

11 They are significant because they affect the
12 ability of a large-scale German producer, like Wieland
13 and the other German producers, to sell in the United
14 States.

15 The most significant thing I heard in the
16 testimony this morning was the testimony of Mr. Rupp
17 who said our customers have changed, they want just-
18 in-time delivery, they don't want to maintain
19 inventory, they don't want any inventory. That's a
20 very significant remark because it significantly
21 curtails the ability of a foreign producer to sell in
22 the U.S. market. Unless you have a place here to
23 maintain inventory, to store a multiplicity of
24 products that you can deliver to the customer just-in-
25 time, you can't meet the needs of that customer, so

1 that's a significant change in the condition of
2 competition that affects the ability of foreign
3 producers like Wieland, like the French producers,
4 like the Italian producers, like the Japanese
5 producers to even sell in the U.S. market.

6 The second change in the condition of
7 competition is the degree to which the U.S. industry,
8 mainly Olin, has taken over the distributor channel of
9 distribution. A.J. Oster was the largest service
10 center in the U.S. The service center has locations
11 throughout the country where they store the material,
12 they can cut it to length for you and they can meet
13 the needs of end users. Olin bought A.J. Oster, so
14 that's no longer a customer that Wieland can supply or
15 a Japanese producer or an Italian producer or a French
16 producer. It shuts out an entire channel of
17 distribution to the U.S. market because there are very
18 few independent service centers left in the country.
19 That's a significant change in the conditions of
20 competition. That's significant because it curtails
21 the ability of a foreign producer to sell in the U.S.
22 market.

23 The other change that's significant is what
24 we all heard about this morning, the customers leaving
25 the U.S. market. If you look at the customer base in

1 the United States for this material, and the
2 automotive sector is a good and significant example,
3 if you were to think of what industries in the United
4 States are most constrained by cost pressures, which
5 industries have the fewest abilities to pass along
6 price increases to their customers, it's the
7 industries that buy this material. That's why we
8 think prices in the United States are lower than in
9 Europe or elsewhere, because the customer base here is
10 squeezed by competition for their products from
11 imports. That's another significant condition of
12 competition that reduces the attractiveness of the
13 U.S. market.

14 It was Commissioner Hillman's question in
15 the morning session, why is it that if you're facing a
16 declining market with lower prices than in Europe,
17 what is that makes the U.S. such an attractive market?
18 And it was the right question to ask. It is less
19 attractive now than other markets, it's not where the
20 growth is and it's not where the high prices are.
21 That's another condition of competition we believe is
22 significant because it reduces the incentives for any
23 foreign producer to sell to the U.S. market.

24 I could go on, but I don't want to
25 filibuster all of your time.

1 COMMISSIONER LANE: Thank you. As a matter
2 of fact you can talk more if you want because that's
3 the last question I have.

4 MR. SHOR: That's a very dangerous thing to
5 say to a lawyer.

6 (Laughter).

7 COMMISSIONER LANE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I'll move right on that,
9 Mr. Shor.

10 Commissioner Pearson?

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you, Mr.
12 Chairman.

13 Let me also extend my welcome to this panel,
14 particularly those of you who have traveled quite a
15 few kilometers to get here. I appreciate the effort
16 that it takes, particularly for foreign producers to
17 participate in one of our reviews.

18 Mr. Pages, no one's asked you any questions.
19 I wouldn't want you to feel left out.

20 You indicated that you've been in the
21 business for 30 years so you must have started when
22 you were 15 and just never got away from it.

23 (Laughter).

24 MR. PAGES: I'll consider that a compliment.

25 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: It's always a

1 pleasure to have what I would consider a small or
2 medium sized business in front of us. So many of our
3 cases revolve around quite large firms and here we
4 have a case that affects someone who's in Middle
5 America I suppose would be a way to describe it.

6 Could you tell me a little more about your
7 firm? How many employees does it have, that sort of
8 thing.

9 MR. PAGES: We have two plants, one in
10 Cleveland, Ohio, and another in Pennsylvania. We're
11 about 50 employees totally.

12 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Given your
13 experience, if necessary you probably can go out on
14 the plant floor and fill in for anyone who has to go
15 home sick. I don't know whether you do do that, but
16 you really grew up with it.

17 MR. PAGES: I've done that a time or two.

18 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: I can believe it.

19 And you also, when circumstances require it,
20 would operate seven days a week? Or do you try to
21 protect people on the weekend?

22 MR. PAGES: We typically will operate a
23 normal 40 hour week. We have operated as much as
24 three shifts and Saturdays. Rarely on a Sunday.

25 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: The current demand

1 for your products doesn't quite justify those extra
2 hours.

3 MR. PAGES: No.

4 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: But you are able to
5 manage the 40 hour week currently?

6 MR. PAGES: That's correct.

7 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Do you produce mostly
8 to order or are you producing some products that go
9 into inventory on the assumption that they'll get sold
10 eventually?

11 MR. PAGES: We produce a small portion of
12 our business, we build it to inventory. It's the sink
13 strainer line that I mentioned earlier, but other than
14 that we're building to order.

15 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: How much time do you
16 have between when you might sign an order and when you
17 would be delivering it?

18 MR. PAGES: That's --

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: It wasn't intended to
20 be a trick question. But don't answer anything that
21 might be business proprietary because it's not my
22 intention to get into that. I'm just trying to
23 understand more the nature of your business.

24 MR. PAGES: Most of our customers are long
25 term and we have a long history with them so we plan

1 to build to their forecast. That means we take all
2 the lead times that we have for our raw materials and
3 manufacturing time and we're building to a just-in-
4 time combined system, so when the orders come in
5 they're ready to be shipped pretty much as they need
6 it.

7 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: And for the types of
8 brass that you're using which I understand isn't the
9 most desirable brass you can envision, but for the
10 types of brass that you are using have you had
11 difficulties obtaining it in time to meet the shipment
12 dates for your outgoing orders?

13 MR. PAGES: At times.

14 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Recently?

15 MR. PAGES: Recently, no.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: If you could obtain
17 the product that you circulated up here, the German
18 product with the desirable characteristics, would it
19 reduce your cost of producing items? For instance,
20 would it reduce your buffing costs or other costs?

21 MR. PAGES: Absolutely. It would eliminate
22 that step with that type of material. The time it
23 takes for inspecting and making sure that the
24 materials we buy now are correct would be less with
25 the Wieland material.

1 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: So you would see your
2 overall competitiveness increase somewhat then if you
3 had access to the Wieland brass?

4 MR. PAGES: I would say so.

5 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: You are part of the
6 U.S. demand base for brass sheet and strip that is
7 still here, which is very nice.

8 MR. PAGES: Still here.

9 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Can you describe your
10 competition? Does it mostly come from other U.S.
11 firms or are you competing quite directly with firms
12 based in other countries?

13 MR. PAGES: I'm actually competing with
14 companies like Olin that's here today and overseas
15 with China. The way that we're able to compete is by
16 finding ways technologically to reduce costs such as
17 eliminating steps, like the buffing operation that we
18 just spoke about. It's the only way we have any kind
19 of a chance to compete.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: And in your years in
21 the business have you seen a change in the nature of
22 competition? For instance, are you now getting more
23 competition from overseas than you might have had 10
24 or 15 years ago?

25 MR. PAGES: It's never-ending and it gets

1 increasingly difficult every day.

2 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Do you flirt
3 occasionally with the idea of putting a plant on the
4 other side of the lake from Cleveland and escaping the
5 order in that way?

6 MR. PAGES: We're a relatively small company
7 and we really don't have the means to do that
8 seriously.

9 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: So you're very
10 committed to the U.S. market and your U.S. facilities.

11 MR. PAGES: Yes.

12 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Starting an operation
13 in Nanjing just isn't --

14 MR. PAGES: It's certainly not feasible, at
15 least at this point.

16 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay.

17 I thank you very much. Anything else you'd
18 like to say for the good of the order?

19 MR. PAGES: No.

20 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay.

21 Let me speak to the Brazilian and German
22 producers then.

23 This morning I spoke with the domestic
24 industry about their hedging programs for copper and
25 zinc and for brass on the outgoing side. Do you run

1 your businesses the same way, trying to hedge the
2 costs of your inputs and also then protect the value
3 of what inventory you're holding on the brass side?

4 MR. TRAA: I'm Werner Traa speaking for
5 Wieland. I can confirm pretty much exactly, that we
6 do exactly the same as Mr. Bartel informed you this
7 morning, so we hedge on futures on the LME, our
8 customer orders. And part of our inventory, just a
9 small fraction of our inventory is always inventory
10 which is always there. We consider a fixed quantity
11 but the overlapping material we hedge on the LME --
12 zinc, copper and the other non-subject parts which are
13 nickel and so on.

14 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Mr. Baialuna?

15 MR. BAIALUNA: Regarding the Brazilian
16 industry, Eluma uses to hedge position with LME but
17 due to the high cost to make this operation from
18 Brazil there are several problems. We use hedge
19 strategies but we do it physically. We hedge
20 physically our position, buying and selling at the
21 same volumes at the same time.

22 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Are you able to do
23 that partially because there are import restrictions
24 for brass sheet and strip coming into Brazil?

25 MR. BAIALUNA: No. Not at all. The hedge

1 strategies actually they are doing to protect
2 companies like ours from between the moment of the
3 purchase of the raw material and the moment of selling
4 this raw material.

5 If you consider it, every day that you are
6 selling and buying exactly the same quantities, the
7 same LME or the same quotations, you're square. You
8 can do it using the futures market or you can do it
9 physically using the physical market for raw material.
10 We prefer to do it physically.

11 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: I see what you're
12 saying. If you're always balanced on the inbound side
13 and the outbound side --

14 MR. BAIALUNA: Exactly. So if I'm buying
15 material at a high LME, at the same moment I'm selling
16 higher. If the price goes down I will go down with my
17 prices here. So I'm square every time.

18 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you.

19 Mr. Chairman, the light is changing so I'll
20 pass.

21 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you, Commissioner.
22 Commissioner Aranoff?

23 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
24 Chairman.

25 While we're revisiting some of the pricing

1 issues that we discussed this morning I wanted to also
2 ask the German and Brazilian producers if you could
3 compare for me the way that you price your product
4 both in your home market and for any export sales to
5 the way that the domestic producers described it to us
6 this morning in terms of a metal price, the surcharges
7 that are associated with metal price, fabrication
8 cost, any surcharges for energy or transportation. Is
9 your methodology similar or is it quite different?

10 MR. TRAA: Werner Traa. For Wieland and for
11 the German and European market, it's quite similar.
12 Our system, we have of course the LME which is the
13 base for the metal price. We base all our sales on
14 that. We have the premiums as we heard this morning
15 which are typically producer premiums and then we make
16 out of them our own premiums and change it a little
17 bit. Then in addition we have some extras and
18 surcharges on the metal for melting loss we call it
19 over there in Europe.

20 So, basically the same. We also use, for
21 your information, that we put in to place what was
22 roughly 1.5 years electricity, energy surcharge, then
23 of course the fabrication price as we heard today.

24 I can also confirm that basically all except
25 the LME, is subject to negotiations with our

1 customers. That I can confirm. We do a little bit
2 different in regards to the fixation. Typically we
3 don't use metal fixation on the state of shipment
4 because we feel we want to have it fixed earlier, so
5 what we, for us we also to our customers either to fix
6 a contract, a metal contract for larger quantity for a
7 certain period of time that they can use it. We have
8 then the possibility of every other day to fix it or
9 it has to be a couple of weeks prior to shipment.
10 Then they can either base it on the actual LME or at
11 the average of demand and so on. But those are LME or
12 exchange specialties. But generally the same as we
13 heard this morning.

14 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you.

15 And just to clarify, you price the same way
16 in your home market and in the export market?

17 MR. TRAA: That's correct, yes. And maybe
18 to add one thing, sorry. Of course a lot of our
19 customers are multinational customers. They are based
20 in the United States, in Europe, and in Asia, and they
21 don't allow different metal pricing. So they allow
22 you just the same calculation you use in the United
23 States in Europe and in Asia. So that the world is
24 getting smaller and smaller as we talk.

25 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you.

1 And Mr. Baialuna?

2 MR. BAIALUNA: Actually we understand that
3 nowadays the industry is global so it's almost the
4 same. We have the metal price. We use LME in Brazil.
5 We have a premium that is all linked with the metal
6 and we have the conversion or fabrication price.
7 Sometimes for some customers or for markets we join
8 the fabrication price with the premium so it is LME
9 plus something. But the say the price is calculated
10 the same, I think it's the same around the world
11 nowadays.

12 Regarding the period for fixing the metal,
13 the moment you book the metal to make the price it's
14 also negotiable. Normally we use to fix the metal,
15 the moment of invoicing. But in some special
16 agreements we can have the average amount, the average
17 of the weight or some other period that is established
18 in the negotiations.

19 But the way the price is calculated is
20 almost the same.

21 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Have you experienced
22 energy or transportation costs that you have a special
23 premium for?

24 MR. BAIALUNA: Every cost that is involved
25 with the fabrication in our opinion is the fabrication

1 cost so we include everything in fabrication cost.

2 If I had, for example, an exercise to buy
3 the raw material for anyone, I would include in the
4 premium for the metal. So I divide everything. I do
5 not put any extra charge. I include in fabrication
6 cost.

7 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: So you don't have a
8 separate charge for it but have you in fact had the
9 same experience with rising energy and transportation
10 costs that some other producers have had in the recent
11 period?

12 MR. BAIALUNA: Well, I think that everybody
13 has increasing costs. In Brazil it was not different.
14 We also had an important energy crisis in 2001.

15 Our increases in our fabrication costs, we
16 will include in these fabrication costs covered, use
17 it to calculate the final pricing. In some special
18 agreements, for example, I can sell the material
19 exworks my plant or I can sell the material CIF, so
20 it's included, the freight and expenses for this.

21 But all costs involved with the fabrication,
22 and that means energy costs and other will be included
23 in the fabrication costs, fabrication price.

24 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you very much.

25 MR. TRAA: May I add one thing that --

1 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Certainly.

2 MR. TRAA: Because one of our customers is
3 sitting behind me, and that he is thinking that we are
4 increasing premiums. We talked a lot about published
5 premiums of the producers which are Codelco or the big
6 mines in the world, a metal premium for copper. This
7 is based, of course on a fixed monthly quantity so
8 there are no ups and downs. You have to use them 100
9 or 200 or 500 tons each individual month on the middle
10 -- let's say 15th, 16th of January, February, and on a
11 fixed shipment and you pay on delivery. So this is
12 the premium from the producers.

13 What we of course charge our customers is
14 then because we have then to finance this and
15 transportation and so on, so that's why we have there
16 different, and it's not just for any reason that we
17 mark this up. There are of course reasons that there
18 are increases from the published producer premiums.
19 Thank you.

20 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: So you're telling me
21 you don't just set an extra percentage profit margin
22 and slap it on the top. Okay. Thank you.

23 Mr. Baialuna, let me just follow up with
24 you.

25 In the industry association data that were

1 provided for us reflecting the entire Brazilian
2 industry and in the corrected information that was
3 most recently supplied to us, I don't want to get into
4 confidential information, but the number for capacity
5 utilization for the Brazilian industry as a whole in
6 the corrected data is still significantly lower than
7 the number that you're, the level you're indicating
8 for your own company.

9 My question to you, or to Mr. Bruno, is how
10 should the Commission weigh the issue of capacity
11 utilization in the Brazilian industry given that we
12 have on the one hand Mr. Baialuna saying his plant is
13 operating pretty much flat out and the other data that
14 we have from the rest of the industry?

15 MR. BRUNO: Commissioner Aranoff, with
16 respect to to 2005 I think there was a correction. If
17 you're referring to 2005, that number is wrong and has
18 been corrected and provided to the staff.

19 With respect to the other years, there is a
20 difference between Eluma's capacity utilization and
21 the information provided by the Brazilian industry,
22 but I would characterize that as relatively small.
23 We're talking about five or six percentage points if I
24 remember well.

25 I think that what is important here is that

1 if you calculate the excess capacity and the tonnage
2 basis and assume that this will be exported to the
3 United States, we're talking small numbers,
4 particularly when you assess that tonnage against the
5 U.S. apparent consumption. You're talking very very
6 small tonnage. And that's an assumption we have to
7 make, that all that would go to the United States.
8 Most of it is going to the Brazilian market as you saw
9 from the data.

10 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Okay. I take your
11 argument that ton for ton it doesn't matter, but I
12 would note that I was looking actually at the
13 corrected data.

14 My red light has come on. Thank you, Mr.
15 Chairman.

16 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Mr. Traa, Mr.
17 Schuler, Mr. Pages. German producers state at page 16
18 of the brief that, and I'm quoting, "The higher
19 quality German BSS is not fungible with the standard
20 quality brass produced by domestic American producers
21 because it is not available from any domestic producer
22 including Wieland Metals. This is confirmed by data
23 provided by U.S. purchasers. Sixteen of 27 responding
24 purchasers rated quality as the single most important
25 factor in selecting a supplier." You cite to the

1 staff report at 2-14 which is public. Then you
2 finish by stating, "No purchaser rated U.S. quality
3 superior to German quality."

4 However, nearly all responding U.S.
5 producers, importers and purchasers perceived degree
6 of interchangeability of products produced in the U.S.
7 and Germany and rated them either always or frequently
8 interchangeable. I'm referring to the staff report at
9 Table 2-7 at page 2-24. I note that with regard to
10 U.S. producers, seven out of eight said that. With
11 regard to U.S. importers, four out of four. And with
12 regard to U.S. purchasers, 10 out of 11.

13 I have two questions. First, what share of
14 the total BSS production in Germany is accounted for
15 by what you claim to be higher quality product that is
16 not available from U.S. domestic producers? That's
17 the first question. Could you respond to that?

18 I need to have you quantify this. This is a
19 follow-up to Commissioner Hillman's earlier question.
20 I'd like you to quantify for me what share of total
21 production you're talking about.

22 MR. SHOR: We'll provide that in our post-
23 hearing brief if that's okay.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: That's fine if you could
25 do that.

1 Second, does the BSS produced by Wieland
2 Metals in the United States compete with the majority
3 of product from other domestic producers here?

4 MR. SCHULER: Markus Schuler, Wieland
5 Metals. Yes, it does.

6 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: It does. Okay. Thank
7 you.

8 MR. SCHULER: We are, if I may add, just not
9 able to produce the same quality that we could supply
10 out of Europe.

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: This is for Mr. Bruno.

12 At page five of your brief you draw a
13 parallel between the current investigations and the
14 July 2000 review of pipe and tube that covered 11
15 countries including Venezuela in which the Commission
16 determined that revocation of the order in Venezuela
17 would not have an adverse impact on the domestic
18 industry because of the Venezuelan industry's low
19 production capacity and level of exports relative to
20 U.S. domestic consumption and because of an increasing
21 emphasis on shipments to the Venezuelan home markets
22 since imposition of the order.

23 I see you're nodding your head along with me
24 on that.

25 In your post-hearing brief could you compare

1 the size of the BSS industry in Brazil relative to
2 U.S. consumption of BSS. The Petitioners have
3 included information concerning the capacity of the
4 Brazilian BSS industry at pages 31 to 33 of their
5 brief, and information on capacity utilization at
6 pages 43 and 44. That information is business
7 confidential so I'd appreciate it if you could include
8 a discussion of that material in your response in the
9 post-hearing.

10 MR. BRUNO: Certainly.

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

12 MR. SHOR: Mr. Chairman, could I address
13 your question about interchangeability and fungibility
14 and quality differences?

15 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Certainly.

16 MR. SHOR: I think it's worth spending a
17 minute thinking about the way the Commission asks
18 certain questions.

19 If you ask whether a product is
20 interchangeable or fungible, first you're asking that
21 to a variety of purchasers, domestic purchasers, that
22 may never have even been exposed to the German
23 material at all, but they still answer.

24 Is a hamburger from McDonald's
25 interchangeable with one from the Capital Grille?

1 Yes. They serve the same purpose. You eat them both,
2 you eat them the same way. Is the quality the same?
3 Does that mean you'd pay the same price for them? No.

4 I view the fungibility and
5 interchangeability questions as: Can you use it for
6 the same general use? Yes. Are there still quality
7 differences that will affect the price somebody pays?
8 That's in the more specific questions on surface
9 finish, quality meets or exceeds standards.

10 So you're asking different things in those
11 different parts of the questionnaire, and just because
12 they're fungible and can be used for the same
13 application like the hamburger from McDonald's and the
14 hamburger from the Capital Grille, doesn't mean they
15 compete at the same level necessarily.

16 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: The source for that came
17 in response to Commission questionnaires. They were
18 not talking about hamburgers from McDonald's. So if
19 you can go back and take a look at the source for the
20 table and elaborate on that for me in the post-
21 hearing, that would be helpful.

22 The other thing I would say is that the
23 table that you've cited, Table 4, which deals with the
24 issue of how important is quality. I recognize that
25 quality is extremely important, but it doesn't close

1 the loop on whether there was a problem with quality.
2 That table asks what are the most important factors
3 for people who are buying. It doesn't get to the next
4 level. So Table 7 seems to approach that in my review
5 of Germany and these other countries. Table 7
6 includes much more than just Germany.

7 So if you could pick up on my question and
8 add to your answer in the post-hearing that would be
9 helpful.

10 MR. SHOR: We'll do so, Mr. Chairman.

11 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you very much.

12 Next, Mr. Baialuna and Mr. Bruno. You argue
13 at page eight of your brief, and I'm quoting, "During
14 the POR U.S. average unit prices were lower," and I
15 can that now because you lifted the bracket today,
16 "than Eluma's average unit prices in its export
17 markets."

18 Petitioners argue at page 53 of their brief
19 that "Third country markets such as China, the
20 European Union, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, have
21 import duties ranging from 3.7 to 20 percent on BSS in
22 contrast to the 1.9 percent import duty imposed by the
23 United States." And that countries such as China,
24 Korea, and the UK additionally impose a value-added
25 tax on imports of BSS.

1 Thus Petitioners argue that, "Given
2 significant third countries' value-added taxes and
3 import duty levels, subject producers would have a
4 strong incentive to return to the U.S. market with the
5 orders revoked."

6 My question is, are prices in the U.S.
7 market really lower than prices in your alternate
8 export markets, taking into account the differences in
9 duties and taxes?

10 MR. BRUNO: I will answer this question,
11 Chairman Koplan.

12 The exports of Eluma and most Brazilian
13 producers are to Latin American countries that are
14 part of international agreements such as Mercosul, and
15 they do not have to pay duties, custom duties in those
16 markets. So there is really no obstacle to them
17 selling to those markets and there is no higher
18 tariffs that they have to pay upon entering those
19 markets.

20 So if you're looking at it from the
21 incentive of selling to the United States in fact they
22 have to pay a customs duty if they come to the United
23 States while they don't pay any if they go to certain
24 of these countries where they are selling currently.

25 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you very much for

1 that.

2 With that, I don't believe I have any
3 further questions. I appreciate all of your responses
4 to my questions this afternoon and I'll turn to Vice
5 Chairman Okun.

6 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Thank you, Mr.
7 Chairman.

8 Mr. Malashevich, I did want to note, I know
9 you had raised in your testimony and in your brief the
10 argument regarding domestic industry's capacity and as
11 you are aware there was a change in that. So I think
12 I'll look at your post-hearing arguments to see, once
13 you've had a chance to look at that data, whether you
14 think your arguments still hold. So I'll just wait
15 for post-hearing on that.

16 But I did also want to go back to you on the
17 charts you were using this afternoon, the one that we
18 have sourced from Table 1, one of the public staff
19 report regarding the BSS subject import share of ADC
20 during the original POI.

21 One of the points raised by Ms. Cannon this
22 morning, and I wanted a chance to go back and look at
23 it, I think relates to this chart which is you start
24 at '84 even though for a portion of these subject
25 imports the investigation actually started in '83. I

1 think our staff report doesn't actually even have the
2 right data yet.

3 So my question is, looking at this do you
4 have a response to Ms. Cannon's argument that you're
5 really starting at the wrong point in trying to make
6 this everything for these particular subjects, going
7 down the entire period? You might better be able to
8 do that post-hearing, but I did want to hear a
9 response to that.

10 MR. MALASHEVICH: I will do it post-hearing,
11 but our entire basis for starting here was that's
12 where the pre-hearing report started and we wanted to
13 base all our data on that shall we say integrated
14 document.

15 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I don't know,
16 but my understanding is that she's correct with regard
17 to the dates being different, and therefore if for
18 purposes of post-hearing, if you agree, having gone
19 back, and I think the staff report will actually have
20 the earlier data included --

21 MR. SHOR: If I could --

22 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Just so that I
23 understand that particular argument with regard to
24 these subject imports.

25 Yes, Mr. Shor.

1 MR. SHOR: If I could just jump in on the
2 issue, and maybe there's a misperception of what our
3 point is.

4 There certainly was an increase from 1983 go
5 1984 and then from 1984 there was a steady downward
6 trend. Our point really is that before the orders
7 were entered, before the petitions were even filed,
8 imports had started a downward trend that have
9 continued. There may have been an increase in '83.
10 There may have been an increase in 1973. But there
11 was a downward trend that started before the orders
12 were entered that has continued through the present
13 day.

14 So if you look at what the trend was before
15 the orders, it was up from '83 to '84 for the two
16 years prior to the petitions being filed.

17 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I understand what
18 you're saying, but I thought one of the points that
19 Mr. Malashevich and you were making in your brief is
20 to try to say, to make this point that you can't even
21 go back to the original investigation on this because
22 it's a whole different case, and had you had that case
23 in front of you no Commission would have found it.

24 My point is, I think it's not, unless you're
25 actually looking at what we would have actually been

1 looking at, that's not a terribly persuasive argument
2 to me.

3 MR. SHOR: Maybe it was a little bit cute,
4 but we were trying to, the real point is what was
5 happening. You're not deciding the case as if you
6 were in 1987, obviously, now, so it's not really
7 relevant to your analysis. We were just trying to
8 portray the trend that started in 1984.

9 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: Okay. I understand
10 that.

11 Mr. Traa, also, if you've answered this
12 question then I'll go back to the transcript, but I
13 did want to have a chance to hear what your view of
14 the European Union market, what the trend is in the
15 future there. That's been a place where you've had a
16 fair amount of exports, and is it performing the same
17 way as the United States market in terms of demand
18 decreasing there because of movement off-shore? Or
19 were there any other trends that would be similar or
20 dissimilar to the U.S. market?

21 MR. TRAA: We have in general, of course, a
22 similar situation. We have job shops which we had the
23 explanation of this morning. Some of them are moving
24 out to China, to Asia. There is a similar situation
25 in that regard.

1 On the other side, of course, I see
2 especially in one of the key industries which is the
3 automotive industry, quite a growth, a strong growth
4 also for Europe but as well for the United States.
5 Why do I see it that way? I look at, even if you look
6 at numbers and numbers of passenger cars that are
7 produced, this is also for our industry not only the
8 only figure which is important. You also need to look
9 at the applications our product or the end product
10 goes on. If I look at the cars, BMW, Mercedes, Audi,
11 and so on, the number of applications are huge and
12 increasing year by year.

13 You have all the sensors and electrical
14 things like GPS and electronic gimmicks in those cars
15 and all those gimmicks need connectors. So in the car
16 let's say ten years ago, you have much much less
17 material from us in there, in those cars, than you
18 have today. So I see there quite a very very good
19 future and a good market trend.

20 So I can't answer it's all going to leave
21 and go out to China. I see also in Germany, in
22 Europe, still a good market and good market
23 conditions.

24 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I appreciate those
25 comments.

1 A final question for you, Mr. Traa, I
2 understand that KM Europa had purchased facilities in
3 Germany, France and Italy and manages those facilities
4 under a parent corporation.

5 I was curious. I think you had said this
6 morning that KM's German producer no longer produces
7 subject product in Germany and I wondered if you could
8 tell me what happened to its brass production, whether
9 it moved it to, if I'm correct about that did it move
10 its brass production to other European facilities?

11 MR. TRAA: Yes. According to my knowledge -
12 - sorry, I always forget. Traa is my name.

13 According to my knowledge in --

14 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: You don't forget your
15 name, you just forget to say it, right?

16 (Laughter).

17 MR. TRAA: According to my knowledge in
18 Germany or to our knowledge in Germany, they stopped
19 this. They are now in the high-performance alloys.
20 They have their own alloy groups called Stol, Stol 76
21 in France, and this goes through the press right now.
22 They are planning or there are discussions to close
23 Serifontaine which is the old metal plant. They
24 already sold their dual-gauge production, dual-gauge
25 is used for again electronics, sold that to Griset

1 which belongs to Diehl, and there are discussions
2 going around that they are going to close the
3 Serifontaine, this French place.

4 In Italy they have two places close to
5 Florence and one they closed already which has 90
6 employees. They have now finally closed a couple of
7 weeks ago and they are still producing in Campo
8 Tizzoro. This is the main production of KME in
9 Europe. There, of course they produce the subject
10 brass at this point. This is what I know.

11 VICE CHAIRMAN OKUN: I appreciate you
12 sharing that knowledge of the industry with me.

13 I think with that I don't have any further
14 questions for this panel, but I do want to thank you
15 for all your answers this afternoon and I will look
16 forward to post-hearing to read some of the additional
17 information you'll provide.

18 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

19 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

20 Commissioner Hillman?

21 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Thank you. I hope a
22 couple of follow-ups.

23 One I guess to you, Mr. Schuler. As I
24 understand some of the argument on the German side is
25 that because you have re-rolling operations in the

1 United States you would not be significantly
2 increasingly German imports in the absence of an order
3 because you have production here.

4 Just so I understand it, where does Wieland
5 Metals obtain its feed stock today?

6 MR. SCHULER: We get our re-roll from Olin.

7 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Would there be any
8 reason to get it from Germany in the absence of an
9 order?

10 MR. SCHULER: According to all of what I
11 alluded to earlier, no. For me there is no option to
12 economically import the material from Germany at this
13 point.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I appreciate
15 that.

16 Then I guess going back to you, Mr. Pages,
17 just on this issue of the whole Delta faucet
18 situation.

19 When the orders were imposed and it became
20 clear that you were not going to be directly sourcing
21 material from Germany, did you try to source the same
22 quality of brass from the U.S. industry?

23 MR. PAGES: It just wasn't available.

24 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Again, meaning they
25 couldn't supply you a quantity, they wouldn't --

1 MR. PAGES: At the time I was working with
2 Delta with that high-luster finish material and they
3 were trying to convert to a no-buff part, skipping
4 that step in the operation. Then I lost the ability
5 to import it from Germany and I was finished.

6 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Is Olin now making
7 this no-buff product for Delta?

8 MR. PAGES: I've approached them and asked
9 them to sell me a no-buff material and they said that
10 it's not available. That's the only response I got.

11 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. So it's not a
12 price issue. They're saying they're not selling it in
13 the commercial market or --

14 MR. PAGES: well, they didn't really
15 elaborate. They just said it's not available to me.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: All right. I
17 appreciate that answer.

18 Mr. Shor, Mr. Traa was just going through
19 the information that he has, as I understand it, with
20 respect to how we should think about capacity in both
21 France and Italy. I'm just curious either for you or
22 for Mr. Bruno, assuming the Commission were to
23 cumulate, do you have any sense of how we should
24 evaluate available capacity in Japan?

25 Mr. Traa, you gave Vice Chairman Okun some

1 answers with respect to your knowledge of what's going
2 on in France and Italy. The other subject country
3 here is Japan. Can you tell us anything about whether
4 there have been significant changes in capacity in
5 Japan for brass sheet material?

6 MR. TRAA: According to my knowledge, the
7 Japanese producers do almost the same as we do in
8 Germany which means they moved over the last year into
9 the more high-performance alloys. This is a worldwide
10 trend and I'm sure my colleagues here in the United
11 States can confirm this.

12 I'm not saying that the Japanese went out of
13 brass or the subject product, but I'm saying that I
14 know there is a trend in the industry, in Japan as
15 well, that they moved into other highly sophisticated
16 and higher value-added products.

17 If I take their producers, one of them is
18 Kobe, with whom Wieland has a joint venture here in
19 the United States on the tube side, and there once in
20 a while we talk also a little bit about other things.
21 I know from them that they are very very strong in the
22 electronics applications, copper, copper alloys, high
23 performance alloys. So this is one of the Mitsubishi
24 Shindo. Another one who are also very strong in the
25 electronics industry, Nikko, which is Nippon Mining.

1 They are going into those alloys. So all the high
2 sophisticated producers, of course they produce a base
3 load in their production of brass, the 200 series
4 material. But as much as possible they use their
5 capacity for the high profit margin alloys which I
6 referred to already today during my speech.

7 So what we see in the world, Japan, Europe,
8 the old producers they go into the higher value-added
9 products, and of course we have new producers. We
10 talked about Poland. We talked about India today.
11 There are output users in Bulgaria coming on board.
12 So the entry is the brass for them, no doubt. I don't
13 dispute that.

14 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: But fundamentally you
15 would not describe a change in the capacity in Japan
16 as much as a shift in what they're using that capacity
17 to produce. Still subject product, but a higher end
18 product.

19 MR. TRAA: No, no.

20 MR. SHOR: High-performance alloys. That's
21 non-subject --

22 MR. TRAA: That's non-subject.

23 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay, I wanted to
24 make sure I understood it.

25 There has been no change in the overall

1 capacity but the choice has been to use that capacity
2 to produce a product that is not the subject product.

3 MR. TRAA: That's correct.

4 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Presumably the shift
5 could come back again, but as you said there's no
6 economic reason to think that that would occur, given
7 that those are higher value products.

8 MR. TRAA: That's correct, yes.

9 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: In response to Vice
10 Chairman Okun you were speaking about what KM Europa
11 is doing. I wondered if you could talk more generally
12 about whether you know whether there's been any
13 changes in capacity in France or Italy more broadly.
14 They're not the only producer there. I'm wondering if
15 you can tell us a little bit more about both France
16 and Italy.

17 MR. TRAA: In France, to my knowledge, I
18 talked about Trefimetaux. There are other companies
19 like Gindre, CLAL, Comptoire. I don't know, CLAL,
20 which is I think in some of the papers, I saw this
21 name. To my knowledge they don't produce subject
22 alloys, the 200 series. They went into special
23 alloys, into different alloys. As I said, for my
24 feeling more in the copper side, pure copper, Phosphor
25 material, and the CLAL-alloys. Those are the copper

1 and nickel alloys which are not, those are their
2 strains. We have, I talked today,

3 In Italy, other companies, I saw in some of
4 the papers the company LMM which is a very, very small
5 re-roller, which is a customer of Schwermetall. I
6 know them because they are bankrupt, they don't
7 operate any more. To my knowledge they buy a very,
8 very small quantity from Schwermetall and just roll,
9 re-roll for one individual customer.

10 We do have in Italy other companies like
11 ILNOR. That is correct, they are producing subject
12 material but they are really local in Italy, from
13 Germany. They come into the German market. But I
14 don't see those small companies as capable of building
15 up a chain over here in the United States to get to
16 those customers.

17 My colleague Mr. Schuler described it. It's
18 for them, for the small companies, almost impossible
19 to start here a big sales organization in the United
20 States. Looking back again to KME, and we heard this
21 this morning. They say they are the world's largest
22 producer of copper and copper alloy products in our
23 industry. They still don't have any sales
24 organization, large sales organization. For example,
25 a slitting center or something like this in the United

1 States. They just don't have it.

2 So they would of course, how else you could
3 either sell in a market like the United States through
4 your own organization -- a wide organization, not just
5 one sales office. I'm talking about all over the
6 nation, offices and of course you need in order to be,
7 to provide the flexibility you need service centers
8 like we started, we have in Chicago and we use, as
9 Markus Schuler said, today's Olin organization. There
10 are plants in the past but this is not possible for a
11 company like KME to use this because there is nobody
12 there.

13 So they would have to build all this up and
14 I think this doesn't make sense for them.

15 This is my opinion.

16 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: The one other one
17 that you had not touched on was France, whether you
18 see any significant changes in capacity in France.

19 MR. TRAA: I mentioned Trefimetaux which is,
20 they belong to KME and my understanding is that they
21 closed part of Trefimetaux and there are discussions
22 that they will close this plant.

23 Over the last years we heard today Outokumpu
24 got a new owner, Nordic Capital. The same happened to
25 the company, to KME. There is a new financial

1 investor in there which the name is INTEK. So the
2 old, the former owner company which as the Orlando
3 family, they are more or less out. Today is this new
4 financial investor.

5 My understanding is that there are plans,
6 and I can't confirm this, but there are plans to close
7 or to reduce the French operations, to close this
8 Trefimetaux.

9 COMMISSIONER HILLMAN: Okay. I think that's
10 extremely helpful. Again, if there are any other
11 specific data that could be put on the record in any
12 way on this, I think it would be very helpful given
13 that we did not receive questionnaire responses to the
14 producers in Japan, France or Italy if there is
15 anything further. But I appreciate very much those
16 answers. Thank you.

17 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Commissioner Lane?
18 Commissioner Pearson?

19 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: A question for Mr.
20 Bruno and Mr. Baialuna.

21 In your brief you note that the downward
22 trend of imports from Brazil during the original
23 investigation. Can you give us any idea about the
24 pricing behavior of Brazil during that investigation?
25 In particular, did Brazilian producers under or

1 oversell the U.S. industry? And what that pattern
2 different from the other subject countries?

3 MR. BRUNO: Commissioners Pearson, I don't
4 remember this information is public or confidential in
5 the staff report. I know the answer to your question.
6 I would prefer to address it in a post-hearing brief.

7 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: That would be fine.
8 I did not see this particular information regarding
9 the original investigation in the staff report, but if
10 it's in there please point me to it.

11 MR. BRUNO: I thought it was there, but
12 that's the reason why I want to double check. I
13 thought that we were able to get this information.

14 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you.

15 Now despite the fact that it's always
16 dangerous, I'm going to try to ask a legal question
17 for Mr. Shor and Mr. Bruno.

18 The record indicates that despite the fact
19 that these orders have been in place for nearly 20
20 years, the performance of the industry has not
21 improved much since the orders were imposed.

22 As a legal matter does this create the
23 presumption that removing the orders is likely or is
24 not likely to have an adverse effect on the domestic
25 industry?

1 MR. SHOR: Mike Shor for the German
2 Respondents.

3 We address this issue in our brief. The
4 Commission in several cases has found that where the
5 condition of the domestic industry improves, there is
6 a presumption that, absent the order, things would
7 deteriorate. It follows from that that, if the
8 conditions don't improve, there should be a
9 presumption that there be no deleterious effect from
10 removal of the order.

11 MR. BRUNO: I would concur with this
12 analysis. It would seem to me that in this particular
13 case the order had no impact on the industry one way
14 or the other. It seems that if they feel vulnerable
15 it is for reasons that have nothing to do with imports
16 and therefore nothing to do with imports. The orders
17 were powerless to address those issues.

18 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Can you cite any
19 previous cases, either now or in the post-hearing, in
20 which the Commission made the determination that's
21 implied by your responses?

22 MR. BRUNO: We will try to do so, Your
23 Honor, a post-hearing brief.

24 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Okay. Then a
25 somewhat related question, in the event that the

1 Commission does not decumulate Brazil and Germany,
2 would you argue that revoking the orders would or
3 would not be likely to lead to continuation or
4 recurrence of material injury within a reasonable
5 foreseeable time. Assuming that we do not decumulate.

6 MR. SHOR: Our position is that, even with
7 cumulation, revocation of the orders would not likely
8 lead to a resumption of significant imports in the
9 foreseeable future for the reasons that Mr. Traa
10 mentioned. France, Germany, Italy. There is no
11 significant capacity there to export to the United
12 States. We addressed Germany and Brazil in our own
13 briefs.

14 MR. BRUNO: We concur.

15 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: This is probably the
16 last one I've got. In the event that we do decumulate
17 Brazil and Germany, and vote to revoke those orders,
18 what's the right thing to do with the rest of the
19 subject countries?

20 MR. BRUNO: Is this a legal question?

21 (Laughter).

22 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Look, I don't pretend
23 to understand the nuances of the law, and if we do as
24 you are suggesting and decumulate and vote in the
25 negative in respect to Brazil and Germany, we've still

1 got to do something with the others. So based on
2 everything that you've learned about this case and
3 your understanding of the law, what ought we to do
4 with those others?

5 Either now or in the post-hearing. If you
6 prefer to think on this one, that's also okay.

7 MR. SHOR: We'll think on that one and
8 address it in our post-hearing submission.

9 COMMISSIONER PEARSON: Thank you very much.
10 I appreciate all of the input this afternoon.

11 Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

12 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you. I must say
13 that we don't care is the best way to respond to that
14 question.

15 (Laughter).

16 With that, I'll turn to Vice Chairman Okun.

17 I'm sorry. I won't. I'll turn to
18 Commissioner Aranoff.

19 COMMISSIONER ARANOFF: Thank you, Mr.
20 Chairman.

21 I have two quick follow-ups that I just want
22 to ask the parties on both sides, give you a chance to
23 address in your post-hearing briefs.

24 First we've had some discussion today about
25 the percent of distribution network for brass sheet

1 and strip that's controlled by U.S. producers or their
2 affiliates.

3 If either side has something they want to
4 add to that in terms of what that percentage is and
5 what the implications of that are for the ability of
6 subject imports to reenter this market in the event of
7 revocation, that would be helpful.

8 And the second thing, we did start a
9 conversation this morning with the domestic industry
10 on some information concerning the non-subject
11 suppliers to the U.S. market, and particularly those
12 who were not subject to these orders and revoked
13 before the Netherlands and Korea which we discussed,
14 but the other non-subject suppliers who have never
15 been subject to order.

16 If there is any information that either
17 party wants to put on the record concerning the
18 quality or product range of those producers, their
19 capacity, what their markets are, or anything else
20 that would be relevant to our understanding global
21 conditions of competition, I'd just invite you to
22 please supply us with that information.

23 Thank you very much.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

25 Commissioner Hillman, did you have any

1 additional questions?

2 I believe there are no other questions from
3 the dias.

4 Mr. Deyman?

5 MR. DEYMAN: George Deyman, Office of
6 Investigations. The staff has no questions.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

8 Counsel for the domestic industry, do you
9 have any questions of this panel before they're
10 released?

11 MR. HARTQUIST: No questions. Thank you,
12 Mr. Chairman.

13 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

14 With that I'd like to thank all of you for
15 your responses to our questions and I look forward to
16 your post-hearing submission. I look forward to the
17 domestic industry's as well.

18 With that, this panel is excused and we'll
19 go to rebuttal and closing remarks. That means you
20 can step back from the table except for counsel.

21 With that, let me announce what's left in
22 the way of time.

23 Those in support of continuation have ten
24 minutes remaining from their direct presentation and
25 five minutes for closing.

1 Those in opposition have two minutes
2 remaining from their direct presentation for rebuttal
3 and five minutes for closing.

4 Mr. Hartquist, how much of that time do you
5 need to use prior to going to closing?

6 MR. HARTQUIST: I'll go directly to closing,
7 and I'll probably take about four or five minutes to
8 do that.

9 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Without objection, you may
10 proceed.

11 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 To Commissioner Pearson's question just
13 asked a few minutes ago about Brazilian prices during
14 the original investigation and whether there was
15 evidence of underselling or overselling. We have the
16 answer. It's public information. The answer is that
17 23 of 27 comparisons showed underselling by the
18 Brazilians during that period.

19 I'd just like to make a couple of general
20 remarks about comparative prices in various markets
21 around the world because there's been a lot of
22 attention as to whether prices here or elsewhere are
23 higher or lower. The general point I would make is
24 this.

25 Obviously it's impossible for all exports to

1 flow to the market that has the highest prices and
2 frequently I've seen in my experience markets having
3 the highest prices because they are protected markets
4 by way of import tariffs or other protections that
5 cause the prices to be higher in one place than
6 another. But beyond that, particularly in an industry
7 like this where there is substantial global over-
8 capacity, producers of these products are chasing
9 markets all over the world all the time. They'll sell
10 wherever they can, and in part the reason for doing
11 that is because these mills are so dependent upon
12 being able to fill the mills and keep them going when
13 they have very high fixed costs that they're trying to
14 deal with in selling their product.

15 Mr. Shor noted a few minutes ago that
16 purchasers that don't have any familiarity with the
17 German brass might rate U.S. and German products the
18 same, in commenting on the questionnaire responses
19 that you received.

20 But in fact in the responses the purchasers
21 had the ability to indicate that they had no
22 familiarity with the product and therefore couldn't
23 make a comparison, and a number of purchasers said
24 that, 12 of them did.

25 But of the purchasers who are familiar with

1 the products, 10 of 11 of them reported that the U.S.
2 and German products are interchangeable.

3 I'd like to talk for a minute about Mr.
4 Pages' testimony which frankly I found, well to be
5 kind I would say to be disingenuous.

6 He testified about Wieland's quality and he
7 testified about the Delta purchase issue, and until
8 Commissioner Hillman basically pulled out of him what
9 happened that that business he was reluctant to
10 indicate that the business had gone to Olin. That
11 Delta had found Olin's product to be of sufficient
12 quality. And as a matter of fact Delta has just
13 recently given a vendor award to Olin which is based
14 upon product quality and service.

15 So I think the responses were a little bit
16 incomplete and in fact Olin essentially is a
17 competitor of Mr. Pages' company.

18 A brief comment on German capacity and the
19 potential for export. Mr. Shor was asked about the
20 re-roller data and he commented that to include that
21 would be possible double counting. But we have to
22 bear in mind that the German re-rollers, like re-
23 rollers around the world, typically have the ability
24 to source material from various sources and often
25 import a re-roll material, and the German producers

1 have that option. So I think you have to consider re-
2 roll capacity.

3 If they were to import material from outside
4 of Germany and bring it in for re-roll and then export
5 it to the United States that would increase their
6 exports to this market.

7 Mr. Baialuna's testimony about Eluma's lack
8 of interest in the U.S. market, you know it's
9 perplexing to me. I love to see the foreign producers
10 appear before you and testify. I think that's a good
11 thing and I commend them for doing so because so
12 frequently they don't and you're left having to make
13 assumptions based upon a lack of information.

14 But if the lower prices that he testifies to
15 for brass in the United States are not attractive to
16 Eluma, why would they care if the orders remained in
17 place and why would they spend money on lawyers and
18 travel time and so forth to try to have this order
19 terminated? To me it just doesn't make sense.

20 With respect to the German material also, I
21 would note that in the original investigation the
22 issue of quality and premium price and so forth, 43 of
23 58 price comparisons showed underselling by German
24 brass at that time.

25 Now to Mr. Malashevich's graph, and I think

1 some of the problems with it --

2 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: I think you've used the
3 full five minutes.

4 MR. HARTQUIST: Then I will conclude and
5 I'll comment on Mr. Malashevich's graph in the post-
6 hearing brief.

7 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Okay. Thank you very
8 much.

9 MR. HARTQUIST: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Mr. Shor, you've got two
11 and five. Do you need time for the rebuttal or are
12 you going to go directly to closing?

13 MR. SHOR: I'll just go to closing.

14 Good evening. I'll start where Mr. Bruno
15 started this morning with the back to the future
16 analogy.

17 The domestic industry's case this morning
18 largely consisted of the argument to just assume that
19 everything would go back to the way it was in the
20 early 1980s. That's an argument that might work in
21 the first-five year review or five years after an
22 order, but it shouldn't work 20 years after an order.

23 Twenty years ago I had brown hair. Twenty
24 years ago I was thin. Things were quite different
25 then and the conditions are not the same now and

1 there's no basis to assume they should be.

2 Let's look at the factors the Commission
3 traditionally considers in these five year reviews in
4 deciding whether or not to revoke an order. It looks
5 to whether the condition of the domestic industry has
6 improved. If it finds improvement, it presumes that
7 that's a result of the order. I think we can agree
8 there's no significant improvement. Whatever effect
9 the order may have had immediately after it was
10 enacted, it's not providing much improvement to the
11 domestic industry today.

12 The Commission looks at the trends
13 immediately prior to the order, with imports
14 increasing or decreasing. There was some dispute as
15 to whether we should start in 1983 or 1984, but
16 certainly in the years prior to they order, prior to
17 the petition, the downward trend in imports had
18 already started.

19 The Commission looks to where prices are
20 higher. It's interesting in this case, you have a
21 domestic industry that's owned to a large extent by a
22 large producer based in Europe. They didn't provide
23 prices in Europe like we did to show where prices were
24 higher. They have a Korean-owned company. Why
25 weren't there prices provided by them to show that

1 Korean prices were lower?

2 The only producer that came before you and
3 provided pricing data in their home market was
4 Wieland, to show you that prices in Europe are higher
5 than in the United States. That should tell you
6 something.

7 They offered the standard product shifting
8 argument. All of the higher performance alloys which
9 are non-subject merchandise, all of the leaded brass
10 products, all of the other products that the German
11 producers have moved into, they've argued essentially
12 as I understand their brief that every pound of that
13 material would come to the United States, would be
14 shifted into lower profit, lower margin products.
15 That argument too, falls by the wayside.

16 Then we have the usual China argument. I
17 guess they can't help themselves, they're used to
18 arguing steel cases. There are no volumes of this
19 material being sold by these countries to China.
20 There is nothing to shift out of China into other
21 countries. The quantity for Brazil, I repeat, is 600
22 pounds. The quantity for Germany was 1.5 million
23 pounds. There is no potential for third country
24 product shifting into the United States.

25 The Commission also considers accessibility

1 to the channels of distribution. You heard important
2 testimony today about how the nature of the U.S.
3 market has changed. The end user customers demand
4 just-in-time delivery. The domestic industry bought
5 up the channel of distribution of the service centers.
6 How is it these large producers in other countries or
7 small producers in other countries are going to manage
8 to deliver their product to small end users in the
9 United States for just-in-time delivery?

10 Finally, I was amazed, the new argument that
11 I heard this afternoon about re-rollers. Consider the
12 speculative nature of that argument. That if the
13 orders were terminated the German re-rollers are going
14 to import material from some unnamed third country,
15 which they've never done; re-roll it in Germany; and
16 shift it to the United States. There's no basis for
17 any finding based on that. That's pure speculation.

18 In sum, we're not back in 1983 when imports
19 were increasing. It is more than 20 years later. The
20 domestic industry has had its full measure of relief
21 from these orders and it's time for the Commission to
22 terminate them.

23 Thank you very much.

24 CHAIRMAN KOPLAN: Thank you.

25 I must say I am very impressed. I just

1 counted up. We had, according to the calendar, nine
2 lawyers and three economists and we're through before
3 4:25. We'll have to bottle that.

4 I want to thank everyone who participated in
5 this investigation today. You've made a real
6 contribution to our efforts and I look forward to the
7 post-hearing submissions.

8 I also want to thank staff for their
9 contributions.

10 Post-hearing briefs, statements responsive
11 to questions and requests of the Commission and
12 corrections to the transcript must be filed by
13 February 2, 2006. Closing the record and final
14 release of data to the parties, February 23, 2006.
15 Final comments are due February 27, 2006.

16 With that, this hearing is adjourned.

17 (Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m. the hearing in the
18 above-entitled matter was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATION OF TRANSCRIPTION

TITLE: Brass Sheet and Strip from Brazil
INVESTIGATION NO.: 701-TA-269
HEARING DATE: January 24, 2006
LOCATION: Washington, D.C.
NATURE OF HEARING: Hearing

I hereby certify that the foregoing/attached transcript is a true, correct and complete record of the above-referenced proceeding(s) of the U.S. International Trade Commission.

DATE: January 24, 2006

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